ON RESUMPTION ON 26 JANUARY 1999
CHAIRPERSON: For purposes of the record today is Tuesday 26 January 1999. It is the continuation of the amnesty application of Mr Bellingan.
The Panel is constituted as previously indicated on the record and the parties are as previously indicated.
Mr Bellingan I remind you that you are still under oath. Mr du Plessis.
MICHAEL BELLINGAN: (s.u.o.)
EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: (cont)
Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman I think we stopped at paginated page 77, typed page 55. But I would like to take Mr Bellingan back to page 75, typed page 53, and the second page thereof. Can you just deal with that Mr Bellingan.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"General Gerrit Erasmus was known for his tough approach. In the Eastern Cape, while he was the commander of the Security Branch there, he had applied the 'rule by fear' concept. In other words concerning any targets of the Security Branch, including also with the assistance of the Riot Police. In Witwatersrand he was a tough and resolute leader. At one stage Captain Oosthuizen had recruited a young sergeant named Hennie Oosthuizen. He had been working at the Soweto Security Branch but had become discredited because he was not available for harde Stratcom. Hennie happened to be well-acquainted with the inner circles of the National Party at the time. In other words Adriaan Vlok, Roelf Meyer, Pik Botha, Rina Venter etc. Captain Oosthuizen was involved at the time as a National Party organiser. However, at a certain point Hennie had been too outspoken about the work outside of the Intelligence circles and this had come to Colonel Erasmus' attention. He was then Colonel Erasmus. General Erasmus said that should Hennie be a problem 'ons sal hom dood maak' - we would kill him.General Erasmus once told me that it was easy to get rid of someone should the situation merit it."
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Mr Bellingan you were present at the Khotso/Cosatu House hearing, was evidence to a similar effect about General Erasmus presented there?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman. Any operation that you are involved in regarding, not only General Erasmus but all trusted leaders in the Security Branch such as General Erasmus, but in particular here I refer to him. It was a great danger to speak about such operations because he, for example, would say, like at the Khotso House matter he said he would personally kill anyone who spoke out about that.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Can we turn to page 77 please, typed page 55, and could you perhaps deal with the first paragraph there.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"Minister Adriaan Vlok and myself had conversations on various occasions. Once at his office in Cape Town, twice at headquarters. On one occasion at headquarters he expressed the necessity for us to win the war in Natal. In other words it was quite clear he meant support Inkatha. The same day I had a discussion with General Joubert who had been complaining that we were spending too much money on these large national Stratcom projects, like the National Student Federation and that more money should come from outside sources. At the time he was in charge of sensitive investigations. When I mentioned the possibility of the use of opposition's resources he was in agreement and said it had been done extensively in the past. I also knew this because we had made use of the opposition's resources in the past".
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Mr Bellingan we can leave the next two paragraphs and then turn over to page 78, the second paragraph, could you deal with that please.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"Brigadier Willem Schoon, who at the time was Colonel de Kock's superior, told me that he could have me destroyed just like that, and he snapped his fingers. This occurred during a minor argument I had with him at Island Rock whilst we were entertaining Nedbank officials".
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Bellingan was that the normal situation that prevailed at the Security Branch in respect of the relationship between superiors and underlings?
MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman certain people you just didn't cross. General Erasmus was one and Brigadier Willem Schoon was another. There were quite a number of them.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Can you deal with the last paragraph please.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"When I discussed the possibility of receiving weapons made to order from a German gunsmith in Pretoria with General van der Merwe, he sent me to Brigadier Schoon saying it was his department. I had been in touch with this particular gunsmith and had tried out one of the firearms which was a 9mm rifle with a silencer. It worked extremely well with subsonic ammunition and I did speak to Brigadier Schoon about this contact. I don't know to what extent thereafter he made use of this".
MR DU PLESSIS: Would this have been illegal weapons?
MR BELLINGAN: They were unlawful weapons, yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. And was it easy if you were in the Security Branch at that time to obtain possession of illegal weapons?
MR BELLINGAN: Very easy Mr Chairman, including limpet mines etc, etc.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Can we turn over to the next page, page 79, typed page 57. You deal there with the operations of the Johannesburg Security Branch from 1982 to 1986. Mr Chairman it is important that we draw your attention to certain of these incidents and that is why I have to point out certain of them. Could you deal with the two paragraphs on that page please Mr Bellingan.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"This operation Omega was named as such by a Warrant Officer who worked with me, Paul Erasmus. This involved destabilisation of the left-wing via acts of destruction such as bricks through windows of houses, cars etc. Paul had named this via claiming responsibility in the newspapers on behalf of a certain right-wing group which he named Omega. The newspapers picked up on the story. The idea was to just frighten the opposition. Operations of this nature were either explicitly or tacitly condoned and were encouraged by officers such as Colonel Arthur Benoni Cronwright who was the section head at the time. Many staff members at John Vorster Square were involved. It was generally open season on the left-wingers. There were policemen, even from the uniformed branch, involved. Also private individuals as well as other officers from state departments were involved. It was on a very ad hoc basis. There was no coordination at that stage of these activities. Other activities included putting paint remover or brake fluid or thinners on to vehicles of our suspects. Motor vehicles at meetings of left-wing people would be scratched; wheel nuts would be removed; tyres slashed; equipment, for example a generator at a large meeting would be vandalised. Also trendy left-wing slogans were printed by the head office printing unit in the form of stickers and then - these were highly adhesive and difficult to remove - these would be stuck on to expensive vehicles such as Rolls Royces, Mercedes Benz etc and anywhere basically to annoy the owner and upset and rattle the left and to alienate them.
The Johannesburg Intelligence Unit, which was then known as IJ fell directly under head office, at that stage Craig Williamson, and they were also involved in similar activities."
This is not what they did all the time Mr Chairman, they were essentially an intelligence and surveillance unit, but in the evenings and on an ad hoc occasion they did participate in these so-called right-wing attacks as well.
CHAIRPERSON: Ad hoc basis.
MR BELLINGAN: Ad hoc basis Mr Chairman, it was not coordinated.
CHAIRPERSON: Basically feels like having some fun.
MR BELLINGAN: When the opportunity and/or the need arises, not for fun Mr Chairman, not at all.
CHAIRPERSON: But was it coordinated?
MR BELLINGAN: It was not coordinated.
CHAIRPERSON: So you would have a pile of stickers and if you have a free moment in the evening you would just walk down the street and stick them on to cars and things like that?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman, but I was speaking about the broader activities. All these acts of destruction as well I meant, but the stickers in particular, when they were available they usually didn't last long, we used them up pretty quickly. They were quite expensive to make, and they never printed thousands of them. We usually got bundles amounting to hundreds, so they did not last long, but they usually had a very good effect. We would also phone the newspapers on behalf of the owners of the vehicles whose names we could get from the computer and complain to the newspapers you know about these terrible left-wing organisations, just to blow the story up.
CHAIRPERSON: But I mean was there any control ...(intervention)
MR BELLINGAN: No there wasn't any control.
CHAIRPERSON: With slashing tyres and ...(intervention)
MR BELLINGAN: No Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: ...throwing paint removers onto cars and all sorts of things.
MR BELLINGAN: There was no coordination at that stage. It was on an ad hoc basis. If the opportunity arose you were expected to make use of that opportunity.
CHAIRPERSON: And were many of your colleagues involved in this sort of thing?
MR BELLINGAN: There were, at that stage there were basically two groups of about five or six each working on different sides of the passage that seemed to have a natural tendency to gravitate towards each other in a group form and do the activities.
CHAIRPERSON: Here in the Witwatersrand?
MR BELLINGAN: In the Witwatersrand area, yes. But from my investigations I also found out that there were uniformed cops also doing this type of thing. I will explain that just now Mr Chairman.
ADV BOSMAN: Can we just take the matter of the stickers for instance, did anybody authorise the printing or were they just printed by whoever who wanted to have them printed?
MR BELLINGAN: I presume there would have to be some type of discussion about that at head office and also at our unit as well. My superior would be aware that I would be requesting such stickers, or it would be Stratcom head office, the people that I liaised with there, that would take the request to the printing unit. They knew the people there. It was just on another floor. But in order to account for the expense etc, etc, I am quite certain someone would have had to put something on paper about that. All that I put on paper was the concept of what we wanted printed.
ADV BOSMAN: What I am getting at is the expenses involved in making such a nuisance of yourselves, to put it mildly, who authorised, who okayed those expenses?
MR BELLINGAN: Those would have been via the secret fund. Those expenditures had to be approved by Colonel Louis Koekemoer who would be - who would have to discuss this with the, or would have to get general approval, I presume, from one of the generals. But then on the other hand I doubt whether each and every of these things would have been taken up on an individual basis. I am quite certain the printing unit would have ordered say the plastic backing or whatever without saying we want to now print a specific sticker as a campaign against the End Conscription Campaign. Sometimes these type of claims would also be falsified. The real truth wouldn't be set out in the actual claim.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr du Plessis.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Bellingan page 80, could you perhaps just carry on until we reach a stage where I stop you.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"These type of attacks were branded by the newspapers as right-wing attacks. We encouraged this perception. There were four people involved in the investigation against these so-called right-wing attacks. There was a warrant officer from the CID at John Vorster Square; there was myself; there was a W/O Whitecross and Captain Oosthuizen who then worked at John Vorster Square. There was in fact a docket opened and kept at the CID offices but in reality the docket stayed in my office, and the CID would collect statements from people who were complaining and bring it to myself. I also asked them to find out sometimes perhaps the neighbours of these people who would be objecting to the activities of the left-wing organisations so we could go across at the same time under the guise of these investigations and recruit people to spy on the people at the same time. Suffice it to say that nothing ever came of the investigations.
Actions also included spray-painting slogans ranging from graffiti which would embarrass the left to graffiti which would enrage them. An example would be to spray a slogan calling for violence to spray the slogan in a liberal type of area thus alienating or marginalising the left-wing for which the people of the area may have had some natural pre-disposition or sympathy for the left-wingers but thereafter when there was this call for violence against the National Party or the state or whatever then it usually had the effect of marginalising these groups. An example would be to spray-paint pro-PLO and fascist slogans on Wits campus at an important time for Jewish religion. We had the perception that the majority of Jewish people were liberal. The result is that they would attack the pro-PLO people on the campus. Quite a few times we actually got them to physically attack each other. On this point IJ had once got somebody to shoot .22 bullets into the Chapel door on the campus of the Moslems Student's Association which caused reprisals again from the MSA on SAUJS, South African Union of Jewish Students etc, etc.
We also tied a dead black cat to the door of Mr Anton Harber(?), a left-wing radical journalist from the Rand Daily Mail and fired a shotgun shell into it to unnerve him. He was on the point of a nervous breakdown so we took the view that he would have less time to spend discussing and investigating the Security Branch if he had too many problems of his own. W/O Paul Erasmus at a later stage informed Anton Harber that it was I who did that."
MR DU PLESSIS: Right, Mr Bellingan on page 81 you deal with head office and the Johannesburg Stratcom operations. Could you deal with that please.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"Officers at head office were aware of the intimidation of the left and from time to time Lieutenant Basie Bouwer and Jaap van Jaarsveldt would come through to Johannesburg and get involved with us. Another popular activity was shooting ball bearings and the tips, the projectiles of bullets at cars' windows or people. It had the effect - people would find these projectiles and believe they were being shot, for example, very unnerving. It also happened, for example, that Basie, who was head of Stratcom Pretoria at the time, would pick up the phone and say to me that something had to be done about, for example the End Conscription Campaign. One particular occasion in fact, on a Friday afternoon he phoned me and said Magnus Malan wanted something done about the End Conscription Campaign Festival at Wits. So we wouldn't have done it otherwise but in order to keep everybody satisfied at head office we went through into the usual tyre slashing, paint thinners on cars etc, just to get media coverage for them to see something was done. If we designed concept pamphlets head office would print them for us. To a large extent this was disinformation for Wits campus. Sometimes they made boxes full of pamphlets for us to distribute. One such occasion was a series of three fake UDF pamphlets. I hired casual labour outside the Bantu Affairs office in Albert Street, gave them UDF T-shirts an gave them R5,00 and promised them more money after the job and they were asked to then walk through town and distribute these fake UDF pamphlets. This was now a series of pamphlets, the first two days had gone well. On the third day the media, in particular the Rand Daily Mail had covered this distribution with photographs of the pamphlets so we were getting wide coverage, but on the third day we were photographed, I think paying one of the fellows who had been distributing pamphlets, but luckily the night news editor worked for me so the newspaper only printed a ruined photograph. You could not see us clearly in the picture and he gave me the good photos that evening. When I phoned him he immediately said, Michael, Michael what have you been up to. He already knew about it. He had already done the necessary.
I also occasionally attended the local Stratcom inter-departmental subcommittee meeting which was usually at the Witwatersrand Military Command, Joubert Park. At that meeting the most active person with any great expertise was a member of SABC radio, but that was all largely soft Stratcom propaganda actions.
When the military government of PW Botha was at its prime Adriaan Vlok as Minister of SAP, the Security Branch head office sent a message through to us requesting names of targets. I understood that the government had reached saturation point with the opposition in late 1985. On instruction we did reconnaissance work for the destruction of certain organisations. The plan was either to blow up with explosives, to burn down, to burglarise and vandalise or to maintain this information until further notice. We photographed places, checked out what locks they had. Drew sketches, checked out the security. A warrant officer on my staff, Nanie Beyers and myself got the plans of these buildings from the Johannesburg City Council. Organisations included the South African Council of Churches, Cosatu, Work in Progress, National Association of Democratic Lawyers, and also the Legal Resources Centre. Those involved at the time or those who had knowledge and/or were involved were Brigadier Erasmus, Captain Oosthuizen, myself, W/O Whitecross, W/O Beyers, W/O Joubert and other members with explosives knowledge like Captain Charles Zeelie.
A notable example of the end result of such joint planning with head office and with the government for that matter was the bombing of Khotso House.
Obviously the Johannesburg Surveillance Unit, IJ, was also tasked for surveillance as well. At that point the IJ's intelligence function had been transferred to us. They only had a surveillance at that point. The head at the time was Captain Len Nel. Len was later transferred to work with me at Stratcom in Pretoria under Brigadier MacIntyre. Basie Bouwer got me involved with the State Security Council. Via him and another officer, Derek Bruyn from headquarters, I was occasionally invited to meetings at Byron Place whilst I was still at Johannesburg."
ADV GCABASHE: To meetings of what, the State Security Council? What meetings were taking place?
MR BELLINGAN: Subcommittee meetings on End Conscription Campaign and student activities etc, etc. Educational, matters of that nature.
MR DU PLESSIS: These were not, obviously not Security Council meetings themselves, but we've heard evidence of the subcommittees, the GBS and all these other committees.
MR BELLINGAN: Subcommittee meetings Mr Chairman. Some Brigadiers from the Army and so on and so forth.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Bellingan you deal further on, on page 83 you deal with the Million Signature Campaign. You don't have to read that. Can you just very shortly explain to the Committee what that was about.
MR BELLINGAN: There was a campaign to collect signatures coordinated by a number of organisations and prominently the Release Mandela Campaign, the idea was to gather signatures and our objective was to discourage the public from signing this, signing these petitions. So there were various things, for example placing of uniform police to discourage the public and give it this idea of linking it with criminality. And we also stole the clipboards once, towards the end of the day once people had gathered a lot of signatures.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And then on page 84, typed page 62, paragraph 2, can you just read from there.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"In late '84, I think it was during 1984, Captain Oosthuizen, W/O Whitecross, Sgt Engelbrecht and myself burned down the Wits SRC building. It was a well-planned operation. The idea was...."
MR DU PLESSIS: You don't have to go into the detail of that operation. Can you perhaps then just read the last paragraph and the first paragraph of the next page.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"The case of arson was investigated by a warrant officer at Hillbrow Detective Branch and I stayed in touch with the investigation and obviously nothing came of it. We were later invited to a braai at Captain Oosthuizen's house. Brigadier Erasmus was there too. Nothing was said about the operation but it was quite clear it was to celebrate an operation".
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And then paragraph 3 on page 85.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"At one stage I overheard planning for the murder of one of the Watson brothers. He was on his way to Gaberone for one or other reason. He had contact with the ANC and one of our agents, by the name of Steve, code name Steve, was tasked to kill this particular activist. As it turns out he tried to interrogate him first before shooting him and Watson got the better of him. Steve ended up in jail in Gaberone and via intervention from Pik Botha he was later released and obviously we looked after him after that".
MR TRENGOVE: Mr Commissioner I wonder if I could appeal to you and perhaps to my learned friend. Evidence is being repeatedly given in the vaguest possible terms. Now theoretically we can of course re-run all of the evidence to get the specifics, but it clearly would prolong these proceedings unduly. If I may use this last paragraph as an example. The witness says something quite far-reaching. He said he heard how the police conspired to kill a Mr Watson, but he doesn't say where it happened, when it happened, who conspired and who gave the order. We can't meaningfully cross-examine without those particulars, and I would urge you to request my learned friend, when he leads evidence of this kind, to tell us where, when and by whom those things were done to make it meaningful to us so that we could approach those people and ask them whether it is true to enable us to cross-examine.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Trengove. Mr du Plessis you have heard what Mr Trengove is saying. Of course it is your witness, it's your case.
MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman I will gladly oblige. I have been trying to go faster and I have skipped certain paragraphs because I do not think it is necessary to belabour the committee with incidents such as this in detail. The reason why I am presenting the background evidence, just to give you an indication, in my view, and that would be my submissions as well eventually in argument, it is important for the Committee to have an exact idea of what Mr Bellingan was involved in. None of us were part of the Security Police. We have all heard lots of evidence about it and we have a general background, but I don't think a lot of evidence has been presented about Stratcom operations and people involved in that section of the Security Police. In my submission it is important to paint the picture for the Committee of the frame of mind of Mr Bellingan and for that reason it is important to sketch a lot of background information to you of operations that he was involved in, things that were sent to him, the whole aura under which he operated and the things he was involved in.
And then further specifically the knowledge that he had of Security Branch operations in general. Because at the end of the day it relates exactly, specifically to the political motive of the killing of his wife. And it is important to relay to you exactly what sensitive information he had in his possession.
Now Mr Chairman I can go into much more detail in respect of this and if you give me an indication that I should I will do so. The only result of that Mr Chairman is that the leading of the evidence is going to take four days or longer. That is the effect of that. We have already tried in the background evidence you can see that we have dealt with certain issues very shortly just to give you an idea of the type of information that he came to hear about. Now I would venture to say that that would be enough for purposes of what I want to place before you. But if I am going to be criticised or if I am going to be faced with an argument, it seems, that my client is not making full disclosure because he does not give details of this, then I will have to go into the details. Mr Chairman that is going to take us four or five days.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no, no ...(intervention)
MR TRENGOVE: Mr Commissioner let me make it quite clear. I am not asking for more evidence, we would appreciate less. But when evidence is given we complain about the terms in which it is given. It would not take any longer to say on that date, at that place X or Y to kill one of the Watson brothers and he should preferably also be identified. I am not suggesting any more evidence. What I am suggesting is that evidence isn't as vague as this absolute meaningless statement in paragraph 3.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes well Mr du Plessis you have prepared your case along whatever lines you were instructed to do. I can't order you from here to - in fact I would be reluctant to get you to burden the Panel with a lot of detail which is not really going to assist us in the two central enquiries around the incidents that we are, or three, that we are faced with here. But you know you must present your case as you feel serves the best interest of your client and we must try and accommodate the difficulties of Mr Trengove and the other legal representatives as best as we can.
MR DU PLESSIS: I don't have a problem with that Mr Chairman and if that is the case my client's life really depends on this application then I will have to deal with the incidents in more detail and then I will be forced to do that Mr Chairman. That is the most conservative approach that I can take with respective - if I take my client's interests into account and I am not going to allow my client to be faced with questions of why didn't he say this and why didn't he say that in evidence-in-chief. Then I will have to go back to certain paragraphs which I scanned over and we will have to go through that in detail Mr Chairman, then I will have to do that.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no, no, I think you must proceed with your case. You have heard Mr Trengove's clients seem to have raised as a specific example this incident around the Watson brothers, it might be relevant, we are not sure. In this hearing you've heard the sort of issues that he had raised, the particulars around that you know and it is up to you if you want to lead your client on that it's entirely up to you. I am not going to impose on your case at this stage, definitely not.
MR DU PLESSIS: As it pleases you Mr Chairman. Perhaps a solution in this, and this is a Commission, so I suppose this could - it could be dealt with in this way, is for Mr Trengove to give me an exact idea in respect of the evidence that was already given to you and the evidence that I am going to present exactly in respect of which aspects he wants more information, and then we will gladly provide him that information that will curtail going into each and every paragraph in detail.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no, no, I think carry on with your case. You are both experienced practitioners. I am quite sure you can resolve whatever difficulties there might be, but do carry on.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Right Mr Bellingan, on page 85 paragraph 3, can you remember anything more about what you have stated there?
MR BELLINGAN: I think the main reason why I mentioned this in the amnesty application Mr Chairman is because at a later stage, in 1991, I did an investigation at IJ where information had been leaked. So it will become apparent later the importance of this and then Steve was one of the people there and of course he had taken a lot of psychological strain in prison in Gaberone and he was a person that we looked at as a potential suspect for leaking information to the African National Congress. From my prison cell, Mr Chairman, with the greatest of respect, there is noways I can be expected to remember dates of incidents like this or even exact names. That would just be ludicrous for me to be expected to remember all of that. But the incident took place in Gaberone, in the hotel room where Mr Watson was staying. It will be very easy for anybody over here to check the details up and really that was the purpose of my talking to the investigative unit of the TRC, is for them to be given an opportunity to check these details up and to come back to me with details, to provide me with dates. I can't even remember what year we burnt down the SRC building. It was '84 or '85 perhaps '83, let alone remember an exact date. So failing the investigative unit of the TRC coming back to me with that type of information how would I be expected to do it from my prison cell.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Bellingan do I understand you correctly are you saying that you never got any feedback back from the investigating unit?
MR BELLINGAN: No, no dates, no times, nothing like that.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Bellingan while we are on the subject of what you overheard here, can we just stop here for a moment and sketch to the Committee the situation pertaining to information in the Security Branch. And let me clarify the question by asking you by way of example. This type of operation would not have been an operation that you or the unit that you were involved in would have been involved in, but you heard something about it.
Were there other instances where you would have heard of operations before the operation or after the operation, maybe drinking at a bar and people would talk about it amongst the Security Branch policemen about certain operations, can you elaborate a little bit on that.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman there was the danger that with this competitive element amongst the operators in the Security Branch, which was more like the elite core, there would be the occasions during a braai when operations would be discussed; there would be a cross-pollination of ideas; of potential future operations. And then also of course it was usually by default, usually operations that went wrong that we came to hear about first. But in my opinion there was far too much loose talk about these type of operations; far too much bragging; far too much one-upmanship as it were.
MR DU PLESSIS: And did it come about that you obtained in such a way information of sensitive operations that your unit was not specifically involved in?
MR BELLINGAN: That is true Mr Chairman. And of course at a later stage I specifically looked at counter-espionage as one of my functions. So I would have had to pay close attention to this kind of talk at a later stage in my career in 1991, '92, '93.
MR DU PLESSIS: And Mr Bellingan if we can just deal with the Stratcom side of your work, were you ever involved in actions after a specific operation to deal with that operation?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman quite regularly, in particular at head office when I was at Stratcom, we would seek to blame somebody in the opposition. And example would be the Shirley Gunn incident just after Khotso House. Another example would be Cosatu House. We tried to blame splinter groups within the Union movement. There was also of course tasking of very many Stratcom agents and of our projects to help to cover up these things and to blame other people to create a climate in which it really was expected that if the public did suspect that it was us that they would accept it as a necessary and important part of the struggle against the revolution.
ADV GCABASHE: But with all these what I might call "mopping-up operations" would you be instructed to mislead the public as in the Shirley Gunn incident, or would you be doing this of your own initiative? How exactly did this work?
MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman there was never an instruction to mislead the public. We just took it as implied that that was what we needed to do. In some instances, specifically it was requested of us what, for example, what could be done for example Brigadier Joubert asked me in particular about the Khotso House thing as to what could be done. We never sold the Cosatu House cover-up to the public. Everybody still thought it was us anyway that blew up Cosatu House. So there was a specific request as to what should be done about that. And then of course the media via the media relations officer, the police, he was involved there. Our projects were involved in helping to cover that up as well so - that was more of a specific.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Bellingan I think to make the question a little bit clearer, if a Stratcom operation had to be carried out would you have been told to publish this story or that story, or was it your function to take your own initiative to decide how the Stratcom story should look like, how it should sound like, how it should be published? Did you use your own initiative or did you get an instruction from above on how it should be done?
MR BELLINGAN: No they relied upon our expertise for that Mr Chairman. That was the purpose of my work. It would happen, for example - one evening to give you an example, General van der Merwe phoned me at home and said he was very disturbed someone had, some senior member in the government had contacted him and was complaining about a document put out by one of the Church groups, I think it may have been the Kairos document or something like that, he said we must do something about it to counter it. So do something about it and we did basically. We made sure that there was something done about that. I didn't have to get back to him. He didn't have to say anymore and in case he wouldn't have bearing in mind the mode of communication.
MR DU PLESSIS: And in respect of such actions were there ever any comebacks, did anybody come back and say you didn't do this operation right or you shouldn't have done this, or you shouldn't have done that in respect of a Stratcom operation?
MR BELLINGAN: No there were never any complaints about that, quite the contrary.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Mr Bellingan then on page 85 you deal with the period 1986 to 1993 and you say that about the middle of 1986 you were transferred to headquarters. You were second in charge of Stratcom national. Who was your superior then?
MR BELLINGAN: It was at the time Captain Louis van Niekerk.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Can you deal with your operations during that time please.
MR BELLINGAN: These were the broad national projects that I mentioned previously. The three projects which we had in fact taken over from Military Intelligence were Uwusa, which was the Inkatha trade union; the NSF, which was code-named at that stage "Babushka", and VAT, Victims Against Terrorism, which was code-named "Polemos"(?). The first thing I did was to get permission to start a Stratcom personnel project. In other words to employ RS agents on a fulltime basis.
ADV GCABASHE: Sorry Mr Bellingan you see something like this it's very easy for you to say get permission from X, that just helps us understand who was instructing and who would then be following the orders. You know this is a good example of what Mr Trengove was pointing out earlier.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
ADV GCABASHE: Quick, easy, can you do that one?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes I understand.
ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.
MR BELLINGAN: Projects such as this any change in them, any expenditures etc had to be motivated to the head of the Security Branch. So at the time it was, if I am not mistaken, it was General van der Merwe was head of the Security Branch at the time. So we would have written the memorandum to him. It would have been given to our group commander which was Brigadier Stadler. He would have recommended it, gotten General van der Merwe's approval and the memorandum would have been sent back to myself. If it was an expenditure of more than R100 000 a ministerial memorandum would have had to have been prepared, a so-called "blou-brief". And then the signature of Adriaan Vlok would have had to have been obtained. After the Commissioner would have had to sign as well.
So in this particular memorandum that I am talking about it was really a policy matter so, and I can recall going and discussing the matter with senior people and the memorandum was approved by General van der Merwe.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Mr Bellingan can you go further where the sentence starts with "Brigadier Louw Malan".
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"Brigadier Louw Malan was one of the senior brigadiers at the Security Branch at the time working just under General van der Merwe and he had told us, us being myself and Louis van Niekerk, prior to him leaving, he left and then it was myself after that. He had told us to get suggestions from the regions via a national Stratcom conference for the Security Branch. In other words to get the opinion, to get the regions to buy into this, into these projects, into this idea of Stratcom being coordinated on a national basis. So I then arranged the very first Stratcom conference that the Security Branch held, national Stratcom conference. That was, if I am not mistaken, in 1986, at Port Alfred. We invited people with knowledge of or involved in Stratcom to attend. The idea, as I say, was to get them to feel empowered and then also to buy into this concept of getting RS agents and getting fulltime staff involved with Stratcom at all of the regions. Previously the projects had been centralised. The regions wanted to run their respective operations themselves."
MR DU PLESSIS: Can we just stop there. You say the project had been centralised, what do you mean by that?
MR BELLINGAN: We had run everything and prior to myself being transferred to head office everything had been run at head office, by head office, and the regions of course came to hear about these things and did not like head office by means of a project operating in their region. The regions felt that they had the expertise on the ground level and that their expertise should have been utilised. They were also - in terms of management it was also more practical to do it that way, and in terms of credibility for the projects. And I agreed with that. So when I was transferred to head office I made the point of seeing that we decentralised these projects.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right please go ahead.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"There were a couple of us involved at the time. Jan Weyers ran Polemos. I accepted Babushka. We renamed the projects - I named mine Jackal; Jan named his Romulus and the trade union project was named Omega. We then divided these further into operations. In other words we had a big budget, we had a project approved, ministerially approved, we then had, in order to better utilise the finances and the resources available we divided it up into operations because once, in terms of the regulations, once money has been approved for a project you can't utilise it for anything else except that project. So to use it most efficiently we divided it up into operations. Then under the operations we had actions in turn. So this also was in line with the suggestions that came out at the Stratcom conference, to be more responsive, to be more flexible, this is what we had in mind, and also to accommodate the regions. Many of them had their own ideas and wanted to run their own operations. So in this way we broadened the scope so that we could better utilise the resources and make the effort more flexible and responsive".
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Mr Bellingan then you say in the next paragraph, "Janine", your wife, "assisted over that period with the following....". Now before we deal with that can we just go back. Can you just explain very shortly to the Committee how did you meet her and when did you meet her, Janine?
MR BELLINGAN: I met Janine during the eighties. I had in fact been introduced to Janine with a view to recruitment and those were my first discussions with Janine were in terms of recruitment. She had a particular expertise, very highly knowledgeable and educated with chemical matters. She was an analytical chemist and there was a group at the time called Technology Advice Group. It was an advice group - it was a non-government organisation providing advice to, amongst others, trade unions etc, and this is the sort of route that we generally had in mind.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now when did you meet Janine, can you remember?
MR BELLINGAN: It was in the early to middle eighties. We got married in 1986.
MR DU PLESSIS: And you testified that you recruited her?
MR BELLINGAN: That is correct, yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: Did she thereafter work for the Security Branch?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes she did.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And in this paragraph on page 86 you deal with what she assisted you with, or the Security Branch with over the period, which period are you referring to now Mr Bellingan before we go to the details of what she assisted with? Over which period did she assist the Security Branch?
MR BELLINGAN: She assisted the Security Branch on and off right up until approximately towards the end of 1990. So that would be from roughly '85 to 1990.
CHAIRPERSON: On what basis was she assisting? What was she - was she an agent, was she an employee, what was the relationship between herself formally and the Security Branch?
MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman she never was an agent, which is fulltime employment. She worked on the basis of a source which would be motivations that we had to submit either for work performed or every six months, or at a later stage every year for example we motivated for remuneration for sources. Janine worked on that basis.
MR DU PLESSIS: What exactly did she do Mr Bellingan?
ADV GCABASHE: Just if you don't mind Mr du Plessis, just clarify that even further. She knew that the work she was doing with you was for the Security Branch, for Stratcom, not for you the person she had a relationship with? Just did she know clearly that she was working for the state?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes, no very clearly. When she was introduced to me she was introduced to me as an officer in the South African Police in the Security Branch and there was never any secret about that. It was a very open approach.
The type of work - what transpired Mr Chairman is that because a relationship developed between Janine and myself I had in fact pointed out to her that if we were to go ahead with this fulltime work as an agent she would have to be handled by somebody else because it would be wrong for me to go through the motions of employing an agent, it was quite a process at that time, if she was closely involved with me. There was already rumours of this type of thing in other regions and I didn't want to do it. Alternatively she could work then on this lesser basis, call it part-time and I could still continue to handle her as such, and then that is the option that Janine opted for.
So what she ended up doing is typing, assisting me with drawing up pamphlets, typing them, as well as dropping them at places like Wits University; typing of ...(intervention)
MR DU PLESSIS: Can we just stop there Mr Bellingan. Can you give us specific examples?
MR BELLINGAN: A wide range of - for example a false Nusas pamphlet, we would draw up a false Nusas pamphlet and drop it as if, or purporting to come from Nusas.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. The second paragraph.
MR BELLINGAN: Typing of sensitive memoranda including for Stratcom projects; typing of memoranda, covert information, other sensitive counter-revolutionary documents.
MR DU PLESSIS: Now Mr Bellingan let's just stop there. How did you deal with her or explain to her the sensitivity of the information in these documents? Did she understand the sensitivity? Can you just elaborate a little bit.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman. All of the sources and agents that we dealt with were fully aware of the Protection of Information Act. In fact there was a form which we had which they were required to sign stipulating the details of the Protection of Information Act. It was loosely referred to as the Official Secrets Act.
ADV GCABASHE: Yes, but the question really is Janine, in particular, did she sign this? I am not really too interested in the rest of the agents, Janine in particular. What is your answer to that?
MR BELLINGAN: No she didn't sign it but it was applicable to her. That was a point of contention later on in my marriage.
MR DU PLESSIS: Now Mr Bellingan did you ever discuss with her the sensitivity of the information? Did you ever speak to her about it? Did you ever warn her about the sensitivity of the information?
MR BELLINGAN: At a later stage after I realised that some documentation was going missing I made a point of talking to her about that. And then again after I had been confronted by an attorney, Mr Charles Mendelow, the first thing I did was to discuss in great detail the matter with Janine, the sensitivity of the information and the aspect of her playing with fire. But in the early stages of my marriage Mr Chairman, it was not a great point, it was just accepted as fairly obvious.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright Mr Bellingan can you deal with paragraph 3 please.
MR BELLINGAN: She assisted with the administration of projects. In particular she assisted us with trade union staff and at one stage she was approached to again work on a fulltime basis by a colleague of mine who was involved with the project called Omega. She accepted to work as a source with him, but she at a later stage refused to sign any contract or any other documentation relating to the work. I got the impression she did not want to be bound, she didn't want to sign anything.
ADV GCABASHE: At a later stage, how later? You got married in 1986.
MR BELLINGAN: This was during my work at head office Mr Chairman, which the project Omega, this would have been around 1988 I think.
CHAIRPERSON: So this work that you are referring to that she was involved in, was that during your marriage?
MR BELLINGAN: During my marriage yes, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Did she do any work for the Security Branch prior to the marriage?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman, that was in particular the pamphleteering and that type of thing at Wits University. That was while I was in Johannesburg. I was transferred to head office around the middle of 1986, so all of this would have been '85, which would have been prior to my marriage.
CHAIRPERSON: So was it since about 1985 that she started performing these tasks and so on?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: And was she then your girlfriend?
MR BELLINGAN: She was my girlfriend Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Now was this the general nature of the kind of work that she was doing, typing, assisting with the administration of projects, as you have put it, dropping off pamphlets and so on, was that the sort of general nature of what she was doing?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman. Also there's the media projects, two of the media projects in Johannesburg she was assisting me with those over there as well. I couldn't type and we needed to sometimes type these things very quickly and the cover that I was using with the false - the people working for us on a false-flag basis I was supposed to be a journalist of some note in Europe somewhere and I couldn't even type, so I relied upon Janine for that. And some of them even met her. She maintained the cover of myself, being working under cover for papers, lecturing papers overseas etc. She assisted me sometimes with meetings. For example I mentioned this Mr Rohan(?), Rafiek Rohan earlier from Irna(?) paper. At one stage it was necessary to persuade him of my credibility and I had a dinner meeting with him with Janine present as - she posed as my wife but to give me credibility to back up what I was saying about this particular media agency, which was called Alternate Media Services.
CHAIRPERSON: This was sort of, if I may put it that way, duties of a, tasks of a fairly general nature, but for what purpose were you going to recruit her in the first place when you approached her in the eighties?
MR BELLINGAN: That was as a penetration source Mr Chairman with Technology Advice Group which would be in line with her expertise, qualifications, and that would have been a fulltime penetration source.
CHAIRPERSON: Was that supposed to have been linked to her knowledge of chemistry?
MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Now what came of that?
MR BELLINGAN: No we opted against that because of the relationship that developed between us. It would have looked bad for that to happen. Janine appeared to be - let me put it this was Mr Chairman, I did not want to, also from my side, involve her in something of that nature so I was holding back, and in the end she was happy to just work on a part-time basis and not to go for this penetration source.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. So that would have been a more full-blooded sort of relationship as an agent of the Security Branch?
MR BELLINGAN: It would have been full-blooded agent. She would have had to adopt the mannerisms of the left; she would have had to change in certain respects.
CHAIRPERSON: And then she became your girlfriend and now she is helping you to drop off pamphlets and she types and so on.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Who was doing the typing before this?
MR BELLINGAN: Between the administrative people at the office who were over-burdened and Afrikaans speaking. You can't type a Nusas pamphlet with the odd Afrikaans word and grammar which is quite obviously done by an Afrikaans person, mistakes of that nature. Plus we couldn't get it done quickly. These people were over-burdened with work. If we needed to respond to some issue when an opportunity arose we needed to do it quickly and really the administration was a huge problem.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes but I mean how did this develop because I mean this is removed from the expertise that she apparently had and which the police were interested in? Was it more of a girlfriend helping out the boyfriend? I mean you know you've got a couple of hundred of pamphlets that you must go and drop somewhere and she helps you.
MR BELLINGAN: You see Mr Chairman I also had to make sure that Janine was fairly productively employed because she was unemployed at the time but she wanted to and I did encourage her also then to get work. So she got work at a company in Randburg using her expertise fulltime, a fulltime job using her expertise with analytical chemistry and then working part-time for us. She had a flat, she had expenses. The company went bankrupt and then again she had to work fulltime for us for a period and then I would have to motivate that work at the office. So I also looked for work for her and there was plenty of work. We needed all the help we could get. At the same time I was her boyfriend Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes because I mean she, if I understand the position correctly, she didn't have any special skills as a typist or a particular skill of a person who can drop off pamphlets, that's just general stuff, anybody can do that.
MR BELLINGAN: That's true Mr Chairman ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: So she's an extra pair of hands. She was actually an extra pair of hands for you in your job.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes but amongst myself and my colleagues typing was not something that we could do so it was a little bit more than an extra pair of hands.
CHAIRPERSON: And she was unemployed.
MR BELLINGAN: And she was brilliant, she was very intelligent as well.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes but I mean that wasn't really an issue insofar as the typing and that sort of stuff was concerned.
MR BELLINGAN: And she was unemployed Mr Chairman, that's true. It was an opportunity which we made use of and which I admit was convenient too in a way.
CHAIRPERSON: Because I mean it wouldn't be correct to refer to her as somebody who is of a real - a person who is really involved with the Security Police either as an employee or on some other sort of basis, as a source you say, but I mean even that, as a source, I have difficulty to understand that. I mean it looks to me as if she was basically helping out.
MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman as far as the media operations were concerned there I would regard her as a source because she was an integral part of the operations. It was more than just an extra pair of hands there. There she had to use a bit of initiative. There was a bit of input required from her. Some ideas of hers etc etc. Even with the pamphlets, it was a bit more than just typists kind of thing. But she was no - she was not fanatically, ideologically committed, but she did see the need for the work and she did make herself available for that. But she had no particular political expertise which we could have immediately drawn upon other than her studies where she had observed the little bit of politics. But she even during her studies she never was involved as a student activist or anything like that.
CHAIRPERSON: And was she paid regularly by the Security Branch?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Sort of a monthly basis?
MR BELLINGAN: Monthly basis.
CHAIRPERSON: And how did it work? Did you have to submit claims for payment?
MR BELLINGAN: I would have to submit the claims.
CHAIRPERSON: To say what she had been doing?
MR BELLINGAN: Well we used to elaborate sometimes and add a little bit, the motivations.
CHAIRPERSON: But how do you get the money?
MR BELLINGAN: The Security Branch would then, at the end of the month you would receive an envelope, various envelopes, each one with your sources' money in it and there would be a receipt attached and you would give the person the money, cash, and they would sign and you would return the receipt. That's how the payments were made.
CHAIRPERSON: Were these varying amounts or was it a fixed fee for a source?
MR BELLINGAN: Varying amounts Mr Chairman, anything from R50,00 to R5 000. Not that Janine was ever paid R5 000, but those are the sort of amounts for sources that I observed during my period.
CHAIRPERSON: And now who determines the amount?
MR BELLINGAN: Well it's determined in combination of the handler who motivates for a specific amount.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that you now?
MR BELLINGAN: That would be myself.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR BELLINGAN: And the - it would have to be recommended and I think on an ad hoc basis the commander could approve, but as a source for any long term, six months or a year type of contract if you like, that would have to go to Louis Koekemoer's unit in Pretoria and they would then give permission for that. And then that would be a standing motivation for the local standing advance to pay out money and then for them to fill up that standing advance.
CHAIRPERSON: So they were really paying out on what you had submitted to them, the Police.
MR BELLINGAN: That's correct Mr Chairman. There was a local standing advance and then there was the secret fund at head office as well. Each region had its own standing advance.
CHAIRPERSON: And this was all in cash?
MR BELLINGAN: All in cash Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
ADV BOSMAN: Can you just clarify this for me please Mr Bellingan. You said that Janine was not politically or ideologically committed, how did it come about that she was identified as a possible agent or source?
MR BELLINGAN: I think I perhaps expressed myself incorrectly there Mr Chairman if that was what was understood. She was committed to our struggles. She had no particular political expertise or - but she was most definitely committed, I mean I would never have recruited her if that was not the case. She was committed to the National Party's ideas; she was committed, at that time, to the objectives, as I portrayed them of the Security Branch to her; she saw the need for intelligence work; she saw the need for our Stratcom that we were involved with. The things that came to her attention we used to talk about and sometimes she used to laugh about the reaction of the people in the press etc, etc.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Bellingan if I can just interrupt there. I understood you to say that you were introduced to her because she was or she had been identified as a possible agent. So before you got to know her why was she identified as a possible agent or source? Can you assist us there?
MR BELLINGAN: No I don't know why. But with intelligence work Mr Chairman there was what we call "spotters", people that would identify potential agents. These were a wide range of people and we would then check the people out. We would then do a background check, we would then see is there some need, some specific area that we could in fact utilise the person in, bearing in mind their particular field of expertise; their qualifications; their circumstances; and then we would develop a person as it were, the targeted person, and then the approach would be made. Of course this was a little bit short-circuited in this case. I remember someone approaching me, I remember talking to Janine. I remember being satisfied. We didn't always work according to the book Mr Chairman.
ADV BOSMAN: May I just put it in a different way. I am not so much concerned with what you got to learn about her subsequently. I am concerned about her identification prior to you having hand any knowledge of what type of person she was. And I am quoting what you said, you said she was not fanatically ideologically committed. What I would like to clarify is this, would the Security community not have looked at people who were fanatically and politically and ideologically committed in their identification of possible, of potential agents or sources? This is where I have difficulty in understanding.
MR BELLINGAN: I understand you. I did not want to create the impression that Janine was some type of right-wing activist. That was not the case, but certainly in terms of the best type of agent is one whose motivation is based on political ideological factors. That is your best type of agent. And Janine had the necessary ideological approach. She was committed enough to fit into that category, but at the same time she was no fanatic. Sometimes, I don't know if I am answering the question now, but sometimes there was a problem with people that offered their services but they were fanatics. They were already known in the community as fanatically opposed to left-wing politics, or to the African National Congress or to anything liberal for that matter, and then how would you possibly take such a person and then use them as a penetration source. So there was no connotation like that attached to Janine. She was not regarded by anyone as being involved in some conservative group and then suddenly the next day she's involved with a radical trade union outfit.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you Mr Bellingan. I don't think we need to take that further. My question was simply what, what caused her to be identified as a good potential agent or source.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR BELLINGAN: I suppose that some potential agents are also motivated by financial considerations, by money. They don't do it for ideological reasons, they'll do it for anybody provided the price is right.
MR BELLINGAN: Most definitely Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Can we rule out that category insofar as Janine was concerned because she was employed, I believe, when you met her not so?
MR BELLINGAN: No she was unemployed Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: When you met her?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: In the eighties?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes. In fact if I am not mistaken she had had a dispute with the organisation for which she was working and she had returned back to Johannesburg from Cape Town and, yes, that is correct. She was in fact unemployed at that time.
CHAIRPERSON: But this element of financial consideration can we rule that out insofar as the possible basis for having identified her as a potential agent initially is concerned?
MR BELLINGAN: I think everybody needed money to live. Janine needed the job Mr Chairman, but I don't think Janine was actuated purely by financial considerations. I don't think so. It's not something I considered in any great detail then. She was available, she needed the job, we needed somebody, she was English-speaking, she had no connections with any right-wing groupings etc, etc, so she had the necessary motivation to do the work, but I never gained the impression then that she was motivated purely by financial need.
CHAIRPERSON: She was also not a person who was compromised?
MR BELLINGAN: She was not at all compromised.
CHAIRPERSON: That you could blackmail into becoming an agent.
MR BELLINGAN: No, not at all, but we did use blackmail Mr Chairman, there were various techniques.
CHAIRPERSON: No but I am not, I am just talking about her because I am trying to ...(intervention)
MR BELLINGAN: No, there was no such thing at all Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: ...to look at the point that my colleague has made.
MR BELLINGAN: It was a very straightforward recruitment.
CHAIRPERSON: Alright. Thank you. Mr du Plessis.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman I don't want to testify but I can tell you that from my experience in the South African Defence Force to get any typist to type anything is one heck of a job.
Mr Bellingan page 87, paragraph 4. Now the statement you make there is a very wide statement. Could you perhaps deal with it and then deal with the knowledge that she would have had or would have obtained in respect of the Security Branch operations. And I want to draw your attention to the fact that you say SAP Security Branch which is very wide. Could you perhaps just clarify that.
MR BELLINGAN: This is in respect, in particular, of the Stratcom operations which I spoke about. In other words the trade union operations, the projects that is, Omega, Jackal and Romulus. The agents, the handlers would meet at my house regularly. Janine knew about these things. She typed memoranda. So I am referring here to my work in Pretoria.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Bellingan you refer to the fact that she had knowledge of covert operations, can you elaborate a little bit on that?
MR BELLINGAN: Janine was a very curious person by nature and she knew about certain covert activity of the Security Branch from things I had been involved in, from projects, general methods of operation, and at a later stage I noticed that Janine was going through my things and that at a later stage I realised that she had knowledge of operations, for example the Numsa matter.
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, we don't have to get into that Mr Bellingan. We are just dealing with the knowledge she obtained by working for the Security Branch.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: Did she obtain knowledge of sensitive operations?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: And did she obtain knowledge of covert operations?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes she did Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Now Mr Bellingan then you say "We were also involved with ad hoc operations", did these operations include Janine or does that refer again to your normal operations that you were involved in?
MR BELLINGAN: No these ad hoc operations at Stratcom did not include Janine. She did know about, for example the Cosatu House/Khotso House, the Cry Freedom incident; she knew about the - a further burning of the Nusas office at Wits which had been done by people on the staff at Pretoria, that type of thing she came to know about.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right Mr Bellingan. And during your relationship before you got married and after you got married with reference to your work and the knowledge that she had did you trust her?
MR BELLINGAN: Absolutely Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: And did you discuss certain operations of the Security Branch, and especially the operations that you knew of or were involved in with her from time-to-time?
MR BELLINGAN: A little in the beginning, just enough to what I consider to be sufficient information to satisfy her curiosity but at the same time not enough to compromise operations which she was not involved in.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right we'll get back to that, to the point, the question I am going to ask you later on in the evidence again. Can we just deal with that now very generally. Later on did that change, did you speak to her more in detail?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman, in particular after the visit to the attorney who had phoned me and invited me to come to his office, Attorney Mendelow, who had confronted me with the fact that Janine had a lot of knowledge of the Security Branch, of operations. He mentioned also the defrauding or irregular transactions, let me put it that way. And then after I had spoken to General Erasmus at his house he had informed me that - I had said to him look if this is the case I don't mind getting a divorce. That's the way I felt about it. He said to me that that would be a mistake because there were too many leaks already, there was too much pressure on the Security Branch and that that would in no way ensure that Janine did not speak or disclose her knowledge in any case. He advised me to keep Janine happy. So obviously to do that I would have to then to explain the work in a lot greater detail if I saw that there was a possibility that on a personal level we could reconcile, that is Janine and myself.
MR DU PLESSIS: And did you do that Mr Bellingan?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes we reconciled.
MR DU PLESSIS: No, did you discuss it more in detail?
MR BELLINGAN: After reconciling with her I discussed my work in detail with her. I answered her questions, I talked about the work, I explained it to her.
CHAIRPERSON: Why did the Attorney Mendelow raise this question of Janine's knowledge?
MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman ...(intervention)
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman may I perhaps come in here. I am going to go through that in chronological detail.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: And I just wanted to deal with this to conclude the - in general her knowledge, but I will come back to it.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: In chronological order.
CHAIRPERSON: I will be patient.
ADV GCABASHE: Just a bit of clarity on a point you mentioned a minute ago. General Erasmus asked you to keep her happy. Your decision was to tell her a little more about your work, a lot more about your work in fact, but that was your decision, that was not an instruction from Erasmus to bring her further into the Security establishment by divulging certain things to her. Just clarify that for me. Your decision or an instruction from Erasmus, which one was it?
MR BELLINGAN: It was my own way of handling the situation Mr Chairman. And that was only after I was satisfied that we were reconciled. It would have been extremely reckless to do it before I was satisfied with that.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Mr Bellingan could we then deal with the next paragraph on page 87 - "Perceptions of illegal acts perpetrated", could you deal with those two paragraphs and the rest on page 88 please.
MR BELLINGAN: "Operatives had a strong belief in the justness of their actions". When I speak about operatives here I don't mean each and every person involved in the Security Branch. There were those that basically thought that they had office jobs but there were others that were committed and were involved in covert activity and that is what I mean over here.
"I believed in and had a strong sense of a just cause. The enemy posed a threat and was evil. The sum of action and counter-action amounted to a civil war within the context of an ideological struggle. However, the government could not admit that there was a civil war due to political expediency. The security forces were fanatically loyal to the government. Avoidance of embarrassment to the government was believed to be vital. Actions for which I and my colleagues apply for amnesty cannot be ascribed to systematic aberration by the security forces. They took place in the context of government policy. By this I mean a general plan of action, not each and every specific order. We all knew that the acts were unlawful, many of the acts that is. Not all covert work was unlawful but we all knew, when it was we knew, however, none of us considered these acts to be blameworthy. On the contrary during the heyday of counter-revolutionary activity these actions were highly commended. With the transition these acts were no longer commendable and blameless".
I mean here the political transition, the unbanning, the negotiation era.
"Suddenly the hunters became the hunted. The National Party's ruthless approach in and the run up to the negotiations left us feeling betrayed and vulnerable. Stress and paranoia became common".
By the ruthless approach I mean there was no guarantee of indemnity, there was no proper prior consultation.
"This was no time for anyone to betray one in this work, especially someone in a position to do great harm by virtue of having much information. Being so close to the Security Branch and being on a mission there is no clever strategy that can be implemented to avert such a dangerous situation".
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright Mr Bellingan. And then the next paragraph you list the list of matters which you say Janine was aware of, incidents where you were not directly involved in but you say that she was aware of. We are going to get back to that evidence when we deal with the application of the murder of Janine. From page 89 to 91 you list a whole list of incidents which have, most of them I think have served before the Truth Commission in one way or another, do you confirm that Janine had knowledge in one way or another or in some way of these incidents?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman and more.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And can you just very shortly explain to the Committee in what way would she have obtained information of these incidents?
MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman I made up a list of potential problem people, potential problem areas during the course of my work in the early nineties. There were leaks, there were people - I visited the regions on a national basis, there were dissatisfied people. There were people that were threatening. There were agents that were going across to the ANC. There were policemen that were doing that. There were those that felt threatened because of the actions that they had been involved in. There were policemen whose telephones we were tapping. There were scandals taking place, Inkathagate etc, etc. I was involved in these investigations. I was involved when things had come to a head and there was a leak. I would be involved in - I introduced the polygraph test for example, to the police. I would be involved in them assessing, analysing, together with other experts that we hired, to try and see after a leak who had done it, and then in some cases to see what we could do to prevent this type of thing from happening. And as such I had prepared a list of potential problem areas, and it is a list quite similar to a list of these matters, and which Janine at a later stage referred to as a list of hits. She got it from me Mr Chairman, aside from some of the things that Janine knew about that some of my colleagues had done. For example the bomb blast in Lusaka; burning the ANC offices. These were discussed amongst my very close colleagues including in Janine's presence. So those things she knew about directly from the source and in other instances it was from my own notes which were in a locked briefcase.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Bellingan did you give that list that you have testified about to her willingly or how did it happen that it got into her hands?
MR BELLINGAN: Not at all Mr Chairman, I most definitely did not give it willingly, this particular list. But Janine had been going through my briefcase apparently and she must have taken it from my briefcase.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, we'll get back to that Mr Bellingan. Page 91, after that list of incidents, it starts with "Throughout my time....", can you just carry on there.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes.
"Throughout my time at Security Headquarters there was active assistance to the Inkatha Freedom Party. The idea was to facilitate the causes of the IFP politically as well as militarily. Attacks on the UDF and ANC targets were regularly carried out by sympathisers. We at Stratcom labelled this 'black-on-black' violence.
Whilst we were still at Maritime House a Major Chris Kendal gave some guns IFP informers. The guns came from the stores at Police head office".
It is really in that context that I mention this, the fact that it was so easy to get the firearms. Chris Kendal just picked the telephone up and he asked someone at the stores, presumably a uniformed person, that we need some firearms for our people in Natal. They are under attack, they are under threat and the next day there were firearms in the office. In fact I even got one for myself.
"The Pietermaritzburg Security Branch was active in the Natal war. Certain of the Indunas were actively encouraged to overcome the UDF in the area. From about 1990 Vlakplaas got involved via supplying arms and ammunition. Some of our agents also resigned and joined the IFP fulltime in one or other capacity".
There I mention someone's name who I had recruited and who worked with me and who visited my house regularly.
"There were also in this time many campaigns to discredit people such as Winnie Mandela and Alan Boesak. For example Boesak's affair, Alan Boesak's affair was made public via what I believed to be concocted tape recordings and fake investigation diaries. Hasie Bouwer and Lieutenant van Wyngaardt at John Vorster Square were involved in that".
ADV GCABASHE: Just explain that to me, "concocted tape recordings and fake investigation diaries", just in simpler English.
MR BELLINGAN: Well although the hotel room was bugged where Reverend Alan Boesak was to meet the lady that later became his wife, the tape recording was apparently not very clear especially the lady's voice, so somebody was got to elaborate the breathing and these type of sounds that one would expect to come from the room. So Stratcom elaborated that tape and then leaked it. Investigation diaries were made and leaked to the press as if a private investigator had been following these people around for kind of a marital type of problem, had been hired for this type of thing. That was done by the Security Branch.
ADV GCABASHE: Were you involved in this, your division?
MR BELLINGAN: No not directly, I was still at Witwatersrand then. This was just prior to me being transferred to the Church desk. I was still on the student desk. But I was fully aware of the entire matter. I was a bit critical of it because for example the hotel door had not been locked so it would have been possible to do it in a much more sensational and better manner, but this is how it happened.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. On that note we will adjourn for 15 minutes.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
MICHAEL BELLINGAN: (s.u.o.)
EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: (cont)
Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Bellingan on page 92 the second incident which you wanted to refer to relates to Mrs Winnie Mandela and the Stompie Sepei incident, can you just deal with that.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman.
"During the investigation by the Soweto Security Branch into this incident I was sent to Soweto, to Protea by Colonel MacIntyre, to go and assist Brigadier "Ig" Coetzee and the team to see what kind of mileage Stratcom could get out of this in terms of discrediting the Mandelas. At the time the investigating officer told me that there was in fact no evidence against her but that - I mean that did not deter us from looking at the situation to see how we could possibly exploit it anyway. It most likely was at an early stage of the investigation Mr Chairman. We had long discussions about it. A W/O Dave Walkley from Stratcom also went with me to Soweto at that stage".
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Can we turn to page 93, typed page 71 please. You deal there with the consolidated approach towards Stratcom. Can you just deal with that please.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman.
"Actually it was after I became an officer and after I had been, in particular after I had been on the Stratcom course that I managed to consolidate Stratcom at Witwatersrand so that there would not be so much ad hoc Stratcom that in fact it would be coordinated by myself. After my transfer to head office in the Stratcom unit, in 1986, I was the architect of the new consolidated approach which was to consolidate via permission from the General to appoint fulltime personnel for Stratcom and to give the operations credibility and to see that they were a little bit more efficiently and effectively run, but then at the same time to decentralise this approach to the regions.
From the nineties it became apparent that the African National Congress had started recruiting civil servants on a large scale. Members of the security forces were also becoming very disillusioned with the National Party. A large-scale but very secret cover-up of past activities was under way. At the same time it was evident that scapegoats could be sacrificed.
With the era of negotiation politics well entrenched there was of course no turning back. The international policy of sanctions and disinvestment, combined with the internal struggle policies, in other words ungovernability, attacks on military targets etc, had been extremely effective in bringing the National Party to its knees. When you have the carpet pulled from a strong authoritarian government chaos is bound to follow.
With financial bankruptcy and heightened demotions of different groupings in the country chaos would have meant the slaughter of thousands of people on a massive scale. This would have included the hated Security Branch. It was therefore imperative that the government be allowed to continue with negotiations without critical scandals in the media, sensational scandals. Had Janine made the disclosures she threatened to it would have created a massive media scandal and the government would not have pulled off the peaceful transition to democracy.
As it was the various scandals and actions of the South African Police were creating serious hurdles. There is no way the country could have afforded an unguided missile with a hostile mission, whether that be directly to the government or to the government via an agent of the government destroying the negotiations".
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Mr Bellingan just to put that in perspective. In 1991 President de Klerk had already given his famous speech and Codesa was underway, is that correct?
MR BELLINGAN: In 1991?
MR DU PLESSIS: Ja.
MR BELLINGAN: At the end of 1991 Codesa got under way but President de Klerk gave his speech in 1990.
MR DU PLESSIS: And the Harms Commission had already taken place.
MR BELLINGAN: That is correct. That was a problem.
MR DU PLESSIS: And it is common knowledge today, Mr Bellingan, that there was a massive cover-up and lying at the Harms Commission, is that right?
MR BELLINGAN: There was a huge cover-up Mr Chairman. MR DU PLESSIS: We've heard evidence before Committees of this Commission over and over again about that. Did you know about that cover-up and the lying?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes it was a coordinated cover-up, well coordinated cover-up.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right.
ADV GCABASHE: Do you know exactly who coordinated it?
MR BELLINGAN: I know that from the perspective of members of the Security Branch there were senior officers involved in ensuring that secrets of the Security Branch were not willy-nilly exposed. Officers that were called to testify had spoken to me about it. Nobody approached me because I was not involved in the Harms Commission. I was not called to testify about anything at all.
MR DU PLESSIS: Do you know of anybody specifically?
MR BELLINGAN: One person, Captain Smit, was a good friend of mine and he had spoken to me at great length about that. There were others too.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Mr Bellingan and you say on page 94 "had Janine made the disclosure she threatened to, it would have created a massive media scandal". Can you recall at that time the attitude of the media and specifically the left-wing media towards the security forces? Can you elaborate a little bit on that?
MR BELLINGAN: They were extremely hostile to anything connected with the Security Branch. Very untrusting and very obsessed I would say with anything to do with the Security Branch and the slightest of rumours would be elaborated on for a number of days in the press. Whenever they picked up on a story they also would not let-up on a story. They would investigate. They would see if they could get to the bottom of it.
MR DU PLESSIS: And Mr Bellingan this view which you testified about here on page 94, was that your subjective view in 1991?
MR BELLINGAN: It was Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Now we deal on page 94 further with the general background of operations of the Security Branch. We don't have to go into detail in respect of that. Can we turn to page 95, paragraph 6. Could you deal with that paragraph please.
MR BELLINGAN: Paragraph 5?
MR DU PLESSIS: Paragraph 6 please. Well let's deal with 5, sorry deal with 5 and then 6 please.
MR BELLINGAN: 5.
"The first time I went to Vlakplaas was while I was still based at Witwatersrand and that was to meet Roelf Venter, who was then a lieutenant and Captain Naude. My objective at that time was to interrogate a captured new Askari. I remember the man was cooperative. Then the last time I was at Vlakplaas was some months before Janine's death.
General Johan Coetzee was instrumental in starting the RS programme. That is "Republiek Spieonasie", that is the programme of fulltime agents working in a covert capacity. It was then referred to as "Operation Crocus". Colonel Oosthuizen and Major Derek Botha later in the early nineties changed the name to "Detegere".
It kept the same reference number, if I - from memory I think it was 28/2/1/27 for what that's worth. The African National Congress' reference number, if my memory serves me correctly was S, meaning Security Head Office, 9/126.
General Coetzee was Craig Williamson's handler when, as I understood it, together with National Intelligence Operation Daisy was launched, which was the stealing of funds from the International University Exchange Fund for, amongst other reasons, to buy a farm near Pelindaba, about 15 kilometres from Vlakplaas. The farm was referred to as Daisy Farm. It was used for training of sources and agents. It was in fact where I attended my intelligence training course.
General Coetzee was especially fond of the army and encouraged contact with the Department of Military Intelligence. He was also friendly with Minister le Grange. General Johan Coetzee had a close relationship with Captain Louis van Niekerk, who was the one who drew me across to head office.
General Coetzee was also very friendly with very senior operators like Jacques Buchner who also attended many functions at Daisy. Brigadier Buchner later became Commissioner of KwaZulu Police. Prior to this he was the head of Pietermaritzburg Security Branch and he was always an honoured guest of Minister Buthelezi. Jacques Buchner and Colonel Louis Botha from Durban got along very well with Minister Buthelezi.
Colonel Andre Beukes..."
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright let's stop there Mr Bellingan. Do you confirm the correctness of the rest until the end of page 97?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes I do Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Page 98 until page 100 it deals with your knowledge of events, propaganda and your view on propaganda. And then you state in the last paragraph on page 100 that you will elaborate in respect of certain facts when you give evidence before this Commission, which you have been doing up to now, do you confirm the correctness of what is stated from page 98 to page 100?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes I do.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Can I refer you then to Bundle 3.1, page 92. Mr Bellingan these are, from page 92 up to page, approximately page 240, contain certain documents which I just shortly want to deal with, we don't have to elaborate a lot. These documents Mr Chairman just give a broad background view of some of the information available to Mr Bellingan, some of the courses he attended, some of the seminars, and various other lectures he attended or was involved in. I am just going to deal with that very shortly.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, is it up to page 240 or 239?
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman mine is not numbered properly right at the end. 239, to page 239.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Bellingan the first document I want to deal with starts on page 92, can you just very shortly explain this document. We will get back to this document later in the evidence.
MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman this document was extracted from a computer during the Vula investigation and it contains details of the approach of the secret operatives involved in that operation.
MR DU PLESSIS: Now Mr Bellingan can you just very shortly, very shortly give the Committee a background to Operation Vula, what it was about and when did this document come into your possession.
MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman after the unbanning of the ANC MK continued their preparations for war by way of Operation Vula. They continued infiltrating trained personnel and weapons. They spied on us. They built their underground intelligence structure. They expanded their intelligence capabilities. All of this despite signing the Pretoria Minute.
The Vula investigation took place and certain information came into our possession, amongst other things this document which I attach over here from page 92, and which I refer to in terms of my - included in my political motivation.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Bellingan we will get back to your document, I just want you to establish the status of the document.
Alright then. Page 157, that is a document by Mr Wim Booyse, I think he later became Professor, which sets out the role of the ANC in "aarbeids onrus" and it was a seminar in March 1987. Does that, Mr Bellingan, does that reflect the view of the security forces, the trade unions and what they were involved in at that time?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes it does Mr Chairman. Allow me to just say that I never actually attended this seminar but Wim Booyse gave this to me.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Then page 177 is a document of a "hanteerder's konferensie" which you attended 19 - 22 February 1990.
MR BELLINGAN: Correct Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Are there any issues or aspects that you would want to direct the Commission to?
MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman I see I have written quite a few notes over here on this document. Certain issues were raised, personnel issues which I had to attend to then including the problem of what somebody raised as, in paragraph G, as ...(intervention)
MR DU PLESSIS: That is on page 178.
MR BELLINGAN: Page 178. They refer to the "recent spate of traitors or defectors etc etc etc". And these are the type of issues that I was called upon to, amongst others, to deal with.
MR DU PLESSIS: Was that the situation at that time in 1990 Mr Bellingan, according to your own ...(intervention)
MR BELLINGAN: Absolutely Mr Chairman, it was a huge problem for the Security Branch, for the agents and then also personnel, especially personnel who felt threatened.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And then page 182 is also a document pertaining to a course on Strategic Communication. Is there anything that you would want to draw the Committee's attention to?
MR BELLINGAN: On page 184 by way of substantiation in my amnesty application I refer to Major Derek Botha having been in charge of Project Omega and there it is clearly set out that he talked about that at this particular conference.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And you are mentioned on page 185, you were responsible for testing and evaluation of RS agents and sources.
MR BELLINGAN: And sources.
MR DU PLESSIS: Is that correct?
MR BELLINGAN: That is correct. I can also point out Mr Chairman that during, I think it was during this course over here, Captain Johan Putter had spoken on covert Stratcom, somebody had in fact tape-recorded his talk and exposed it to the media. It was in one of the major newspapers where he had spoken about approval by Minister Vlok for elimination of people as an accepted Stratcom method etc, etc. It was reported in the media I's sure we could make a copy available if necessary.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right Mr Bellingan. Then page 198 is another document, and agenda of a seminar. Is there anything you want to point the Committee's attention to? Did you attend this seminar?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes I did Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: You gave a lecture as it appears on page 191.
MR BELLINGAN: Correct Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Is there anything else you want to point out?
MR BELLINGAN: I don't think so Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright.
MR BELLINGAN: Perhaps at the top I've just made a note, a lot of the people pronounced "Detegere" wrong, "Deta Gear" they used to call it. It's nothing serious.
MR DU PLESSIS: Page 195 there's another - there's a Stratcom course 1989, the programme of the course, do you want to point anything out there?
MR BELLINGAN: Again Mr Chairman on page 197 Major Derek Botha and Project Omega. Project Jackal had, at this stage, been taken over by Captain Putter from me. He took over my desk when I moved - when I started the national personnel desk, evaluation of agents etc, etc. Captain Johan Putter took over.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright Mr Bellingan. And then page 202 ...(intervention)
MR BELLINGAN: Sorry Mr Chairman also on page 197 the person who later joined Inkatha, Mr Philip Powell, is mentioned as well and one can see that he talked also on running election campaigns on campuses, because when I recruited him he had in fact been - I had intended him to become the chairman of the National Students Federation, so he was an expert in those matters and there one can see his expertise reflected.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right Mr Bellingan the document on page 202 and also the next document from page 205 to 206 and the next one from 206 to 208, can you just very shortly explain what they are? What do they portray?
MR BELLINGAN: These are some of the goals that I set in 1991 for people in my unit Mr Chairman, pertaining to testing and also I think, ja recruitment, point number 5, "Management of a cover agency". I also ran a recruitment office which was situated at Midrand.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright Mr Bellingan and then page 209, "training seminar, covert information training programme", 2 May 1991 and the next document refers to certain statistics, page 211 I think up until page 218, can you just deal with that please.
MR BELLINGAN: Which page...
MR DU PLESSIS: Page 209, did you attend this course? Did you attend this seminar?
MR BELLINGAN: I think so Mr Chairman. I am just looking if my name appears anywhere.
MR DU PLESSIS: It doesn't.
MR BELLINGAN: It doesn't.
MR DU PLESSIS: Ag sorry it does, on page 210, the fourth last one it refers to personnel development.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes, personnel development is what I spoke on for an hour over there.
MR DU PLESSIS: Is there anything you want to point out to the Committee? Nothing?
MR BELLINGAN: Nothing in particular Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right, then page 211 to 218, the statistics on page 211 what do they relate to?
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman from around April 1989 until 31st December 1991 this reflects the extent of the work that my unit did in terms of the number of people evaluated by the unit via psychometric testing, in-depth interviews etc. I can just draw the Committee's attention to the fact that this is a huge amount of candidates that was in fact assessed. I point it out simply for the fact that we were extremely busy.
MR DU PLESSIS: Was this done apart from all your other actions and work that you had to do?
MR BELLINGAN: This was apart from other covert activities. For example the recruitment - I think that these statistics included the polygraph assessments, in fact they did. If we would hook someone up on the polygraph and give them a series of tests and interviews it would be registered in these statistics as well.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. And then page 219 the document it states some of the characteristics sought according to the task specifications, do you want to point out anything in this document?
MR BELLINGAN: Perhaps Mr Chairman on page 221 "Motivation and Commitment", paragraph 7,
"Strong motivation for the specific task is needed. It is important that there is absolute commitment to the task as well as to the organisation".
MR DU PLESSIS: Now Mr Bellingan these documents that we have dealt with up to now were they ...(intervention)
MR BELLINGAN: Sorry, just give me one more chance. In terms of "Adaptability and flexibility" on page 222, paragraph 10 of the document, just let me read the whole thing -
"They should ideally have a broad, unbiased, even progressive vision of the world. This vision should include setting goals for the future, cautiously calculating risks to reach them, making the necessary decision towards action in this regard (independent within parameters); must have initiative, creativity for new ideas and the freedom to act - in other words a self-starter. Should not be content to follow an established work pattern to perfection. In other words not being static or working in a rhythmical, steady, repetitive manner. Should be a need to progress and grow. Various interruptions and changes to the main function or routine are frequent and call for a quick response".
I see one of the agents that I referred this to said "often reflex response" over there. Because I obviously circulated this document for people's comments at the time.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Bellingan was this applicable to agents which were to be recruited?
MR BELLINGAN: This was criteria I wanted people to look at in terms of penetration sources and agents.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. The document on page 224 to 226 sets out the goals for 1990, the psychometric component. And then on page 225 you relate the goals of 1990. Did you draw this document, were you the author of this?
MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman it would have been done under my instruction by someone on my staff, with my input.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Is there anything you want to draw the Committee's attention to?
MR BELLINGAN: Perhaps paragraph 11 and paragraph 10, just the fact that we conducted follow-up visits in order to keep up-to-date with the progress of agents. Not specifically their operational productivity but more especially their emotional development and whether they were coping; whether they were under too much stress; whether there were any problems with respect to leaks etc, etc.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right Mr Bellingan, and then could you turn to page 232 please. This is a document referring to an officer's course. Is there anything in respect of this document until page 235 which you want to draw the Committee's attention to?
MR BELLINGAN: I see this was a lecture at Potchefstroom Mr Chairman and my specific - the tasks that we lectured on is mentioned on page 235. The topics dealt with establishing and building an effective information system, psychometric testing, psychological perspectives, building on the RS programme; counter-espionage and security. That was what Unit D was required to lecture upon.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright Mr Bellingan. Can we then turn to the first incident you apply for amnesty for, that is in Schedule 8 of Bundle 1, the application pertaining to the Numsa funds which you find on page 389 of Bundle 1.
Now Mr Bellingan I want to deal with one or two issues before we get to the details of this specific incident and the incident pertaining to your wife.
After your wife's murder there was an inquest, is that correct?
MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: And you testified at that inquest, is that correct?
MR BELLINGAN: I did Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: And what is your view, what do you want to tell the Committee about the evidence that you had given at the inquest pertaining to the truth thereof?
MR BELLINGAN: Largely Mr Chairman my evidence there would be substantiation of my application for perjury at a later stage. There was very little truth, very little direct answers, a lot of vague answers, a lot of answers which I attempted not to allow people questioning me to dead-end, and at the same time trying to provide some type of answer so as not to look too much like I am unwilling to testify about it.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And what was your attitude especially pertaining to evidence of your involvement with the Security Police, the Security Branch, what was your attitude towards evidence of that nature?
MR BELLINGAN: My attitude was very simple Mr Chairman. I was not prepared to make disclosures, I was in fact told not to, but I wouldn't have in any case.
MR DU PLESSIS: Was that the inquest and the trial for that matter held before any real revelations before the Truth Commission was made?
MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: And what was the general attitude of the security forces at the time of the inquest and the trial pertaining to disclosure of actions of the security forces?
MR BELLINGAN: The attitude was that the covert activities had to be covered up. Other than those that were, for example, already elaborated on to a greater or lesser extent before commissions such as the Kahn Commission, and even then it would have been completely inappropriate to comment upon it for fear that one said something that was not told to the Kahn Commission.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And Mr Bellingan did the same attitude prevail at the trial?
MR BELLINGAN: The same attitude did prevail at the trial Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Were the circumstances the same?
MR BELLINGAN: The circumstances were the same.
MR DU PLESSIS: I mean the same in relation to disclosure of actions of the Security Branch, let me just make the question.
MR BELLINGAN: That is correct. As far as I was concerned the Protection of Information Act in any case still applied to me. Nobody had given me any written permission, no one had given me any indemnity so that I could speak openly about these things.
MR DU PLESSIS: And Mr Bellingan have you ever testified the truth before any court or commission or inquest or anywhere else about the actions pertaining to specifically your wife as well as the Numsa incident?
MR BELLINGAN: No I have not Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: And what is your intention and your view at this hearing and at these proceedings pertaining to that and pertaining to the truth?
MR BELLINGAN: My intention is to tell the truth to this Commission.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Bellingan can we start then on page 389. You apply for amnesty of the acts set out on page 389, would be either fraud or theft. And then on page 390 you start with the nature and particulars of the operation.
Now let's just get back to the date, this happened during 1988 to 1989, is that correct?
MR BELLINGAN: In fact Mr Chairman I think this matter pertaining to Numsa was only during 1989.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright Mr Bellingan, and you have already testified in your general background evidence to the background of this kind of operation or this operation itself as reflected in the affidavit of Major van der Merwe in Bundle 4, is that correct? The WH10, is that correct?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes that is correct Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now can you start with the first paragraph on page 390 please.
MR BELLINGAN: I say here Mr Chairman:
"Theft of money intended for the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa - the acronym being Numsa. Cheques destined for leftist organisations were regularly obtained by mail interception. To my knowledge most of the regions were involved with this practice".
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. The next paragraph you start at the beginning of the operation, how you became involved in that, can you please deal with that.
MR BELLINGAN: Early in 1989 I was approached by Brigadier Erasmus ...(intervention)
MR DU PLESSIS: Is that a mistake the '88?
MR BELLINGAN: That's a mistake Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right.
MR BELLINGAN: And the reason I know that is because I have recently, yesterday in fact, had an opportunity to look at the date that I opened the account and that is, I think, the 1st of March 1989, and a couple of days prior to that General Erasmus had approached me. So when I say 1988 I was just a bit confused as to the exact date. At the end of 1988 in fact I was transferred from Maritime House to Unit D when I then worked again under Brigadier Erasmus. And then shortly after that, in this particular incident, it must have been a couple of months, he approached me on this matter. So it is a mistake. It should read 1989. That will be obviously the end of - I think it's either the 1st of April or the 1st of March that I opened that account. I can't remember now, it is here in these things somewhere.
Anyway I was approached by Brigadier Erasmus who was then head of the Intelligence and Stratcom Section which is D, Group D to see if my contacts in the banking world could help us do something with these cheques. I then approached an ex-colleague of mine, Basie Bouwer who then worked at Nedbank.
MR DU PLESSIS: Can I just stop you there Mr Bellingan. At that stage you were not - were you involved in the interception of cheques, the banking of the cheques, did you know about it? What was your knowledge or involvement?
MR BELLINGAN: I knew about it obviously Mr Chairman but I wasn't involved. In fact what had happened is, as I had explained earlier, I had now started this personnel component involving psychometric testing etc on a national basis for agents and sources for Intelligence and Stratcom. Captain Johan Putter had taken over from me and General Erasmus in fact said to me that they had been unable to come right at - through Captain Johan Putter's contacts at Volkskas and there was some problem over there and couldn't I maybe see if I could do something. So then I approached - I did a few things, one of them was approaching Basie who I knew very well and who was then a chief investigator at Nedbank for things like fraud etc, etc for certain of the regions ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: What did Brigadier Erasmus want to do? What was his intention?
MR BELLINGAN: Well Mr Chairman he said that these cheques were just lying around going stale, nothing, not enough was being done with the ones that were being sent across to Stratcom.
CHAIRPERSON: Did he want to lay his hands on the money?
MR BELLINGAN: He wanted to make sure that the opposition didn't lay their hands on the money Mr Chairman. That was primarily what I understood.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry what did you say?
MR BELLINGAN: Primarily not to allow Numsa to get their hands on the money, primarily, and then secondly I understood that we would be using that money for operational purposes.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but they were going stale, so Numsa would in any event not have been able to do anything. So he approached you, as you say, to see whether you could do something with these cheques, what was it that he wanted to do with the cheques?
MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman these cheques were not sent to Stratcom for purposes of information. They were sent to Stratcom for purposes of cashing them. Now had they gone stale as they were the drawer would simply be called upon to make out another cheque and payment would have taken place. Had we cashed them then that wouldn't have occurred. The drawer wouldn't have had the opportunity he would have considered the matter as being finalised.
CHAIRPERSON: So Erasmus wanted to steal the money?
MR BELLINGAN: It was more like fraud Mr Chairman. There was no intention for an appropriation for personal use. It was a misrepresentation which would prejudice Numsa. So the appropriation was not for personal use, it was for operational purposes. So theft is a strong term to use. I would be more comfortable with fraud.
CHAIRPERSON: It might have been fraud as well. It's not really important. But primarily he wanted the money.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes, no we had to cash the cheques Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: That's why you went to all the lengths that you did apparently on the papers here.
MR BELLINGAN: No that's very clear in my mind that we had to cash the cheques.
CHAIRPERSON: No, no but you were not entitled to the money.
MR BELLINGAN: No we were not supposed to use this - it was not for personal use Mr Chairman, not at all.
CHAIRPERSON: Apart from that, let's leave the use for the moment, just taking the money, it was not meant for you, the Police ...(intervention)
MR BELLINGAN: It was unlawful Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes so I mean, so Erasmus, whether it's a strong term or not Erasmus wanted to steal the money, he wanted you to help him to steal the money.
MR BELLINGAN: Well it was very clear to me what I should be doing and that was to cash the cheques Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman.
Before we go on Mr Bellingan let us just stop with the instruction of Brigadier Erasmus. Did he say to you that the intention was that the money should be used for private use or did he say anything about the intention or the use of the money when he instructed you to open the account? Did he say anything about how the money was to be used?
MR BELLINGAN: There was no discussion as to the use of the funds, but bearing in mind what Brigadier Joubert had said to me previously about utilising the opposition's resources bearing in mind that that is something I told people on Stratcom lectures that we must utilise the resources of the opposition bearing in mind that we did it regularly. We took the opposition's money and we would use it to discredit people, for example paying it into people's bank accounts and at a later stage recruiting them, giving them the option, tell them that there is a rumour that they have been stealing funds from the organisation and of course none of them ever went to the bank to query where the money came from, and then saying to them we could protect or we could tell their colleagues they stole the money. And if they didn't work for us they were blown from the struggle as it were. If they did work for us that was just as well. So it was using their money for devious purposes like that.
Plus we also took resources, we took computers, we took typewriters, photostat machines from places, ANC offices, non-Government organisations. It was not something unusual Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Bellingan just to add to that, do you have knowledge of, for instance weapons, caches of weapons which were unearthed by the security forces and which were later used by the security forces, do you have any knowledge of that?
MR BELLINGAN: Yes Mr Chairman there were incidents like that. There were arms caches that were utilised against the opposition, for example handgrenades with their detonation time was set to zero and people were left to blow themselves up etc, etc, or people were set up.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Bellingan you yourself, when you received the instruction to open an account or assist with opening an account knowing that the cheques would be banked in that account, what was your perception of the reason therefor, and what was your perception about what the money was to used for?
I think you have answered it, just give the answer very shortly again.
MR BELLINGAN: Anything Mr Chairman that could further the objectives of our unit or the Security Branch at large, anything would have been acceptable. It would have been what we would have termed a bona fide use of that.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Then could you carry on. You say you approached an ex-colleague of yours, Basie Bouwer, could you carry on from there please.
MR BELLINGAN: Yes. This to me was a safe option because Basie was an old Stratcom operator. I could be very straightforward with him. Brigadier Erasmus and Basie were on familiar terms and Nedbank was, at the time, very helpful to the Security Branch. Captain Jerry Raven gave me a passport to use with the correct stamps etc. I, of course, gave him a photograph to put on. I opened an account at Nedbank at the Main Branch in Pretoria.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, can we just stop there. Would Captain Jerry Raven have known about the purpose of the passport to open the account, would he have known about that?
MR BELLINGAN: Most likely he would have known Mr Chairman. I don't know how much he knew. The name on it, I can't remember, it must have been Nicholas Umsa, it may not have been immediately apparent but if it was Mr N Umsa Jerry would have just laughed. He would have known immediately what it was about. He may or may not have known.
MR DU PLESSIS: Did you tell him about it?
MR BELLINGAN: I can't recall Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now could you carry on. You say "I opened an account at Nedbank, Pretoria".
MR BELLINGAN: That's correct. That account was in the name of Nicholas Umsa. Basie went shortly thereafter and removed the photocopies of the passport etc from the file and then this account was used to deposit the Numsa cheques. It was opened in the name Nicholas Umsa, in other words N Umsa.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right, let us just stop there. Who was responsible for depositing the cheques?
MR BELLINGAN: Well anybody could really do it Mr Chairman once I had shown them how. Anybody could do it. As it was I took that responsibility upon myself, but at other times other people also deposited cheques into the account. It was very easy. One just put them in envelopes and put them in the autobank.
MR DU PLESSIS: Where did the cheques come from?
MR BELLINGAN: From Colonel Vic MacPherson's office. They were always sent to him from the library, from Colonel Horak's section, and then either Derek Botha or W/O Dave Walkley would give me the cheques. On one occasion I collected them directly from Colonel Vic MacPherson.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Mr Bellingan then you say, the last sentence over to the next page, you say other accounts were opened to facilitate the transfer and withdrawal of funds?
MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: Do you know of any other such similar accounts such as the Nicholas Umsa account?
MR BELLINGAN: Firstly just regarding this particular incident let me just say that I was then not at Stratcom, I was simply helping Stratcom to show them how to do this in a very easy, effective manner. So one of the people that was at Stratcom, a W/O Walkley, he had gotten hold of some ID books. We arranged to get his photograph nicely and neatly stamped in these ID books. One of the names in the ID documents he had was a Philip Geldenhuys. So in conjunction with Basie Bouwer we went to Nedbank at Sandton, which was also one of the banks that was covered by Basie's jurisdiction as it were and an account was opened there in the name of Philip Geldenhuys. So primarily so that money could be transferred from the Nicholas Umsa account because I was not prepared to go into the bank all the time and draw money. It was one block, two blocks away from our office and with the autobank cards one can only draw, at that stage I think R300 a day. So it was a very inefficient way of perpetrating this fraud just via the autobank cards. So we needed what could be termed, I suppose, laundry accounts and then W/O Walkley then opened the first of these accounts.
MR DU PLESSIS: Did he open the Geldenhuys account?
MR BELLINGAN: He opened the Geldenhuys account Mr Chairman.
MR DU PLESSIS: And in the documents provided to us by the Commission there are also documents of a certain Namedi Umsa, do you know anything about that?
MR BELLINGAN: Again that was Stratcom. I understand it was one of the Askaris who had opened that account.
MR DU PLESSIS: Were you involved at all with that account?
MR BELLINGAN: No I was not involved in that.
MR DU PLESSIS: Which account were you personally involved with?
MR BELLINGAN: I was personally involved with the Nicholas Umsa account Mr Chairman. After I closed the Nicholas Umsa account they went and opened the Namedi Umsa account because the channel for cheques, the primary source to funnel them into the banking system was now lost to them because I closed the Nicholas Umsa account so they then needed a similar thing so they tried the Namedi Umsa thing after that