CHAIRPERSON: Today is Thursday, 28th January 1999. It is the continuation of the amnesty application of Mr Bellingan. The Panel and appearances are as previously indicated on the record.

Mr Bellingan, I remind you that you are still under oath.

MICHAEL BELLINGAN: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Trengove, have you got any further questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR TRENGOVE: (cont)

Mr Bellingan, did you ever use the name Scheffer in any of your undercover operations?

MR BELLINGAN: I can't recall, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: You can't recall? I'd like to turn to the so-called list of hits. I'm afraid I, despite your frequent description of it, still don't understand what it was. Can you please explain to me again.

MR BELLINGAN: That was a list which I had drawn up, Mr Chairman, which contained certain information concerning operations which involved members of, or colleagues of mine, people in the Security Branch, sensitive operations, Mr Chairman, operations which could conceivably cause people to want to co-operate, to want to join the, let's call it the traitors that were exposing operations.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, that description is so elusive as to tell me nothing. Please confine yourself to what the document contained, not what its effect might have been. So far you've told us it contained sensitive information about operations of the security police, that is to say nothing.

MR BELLINGAN: It was not only the Security Branch, Mr Chairman ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: No, no, no, please start at the beginning and tell me what it contained, not what it didn't contain.

MR BELLINGAN: It contained a list of incidents, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: So it was just a list of incidents like the list in, I think it's page 88 of your second amnesty application?

MR BELLINGAN: Something like that, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: No, no, no, juts have a look at that list. Let me find it, it doesn't seem to be - ja, the introduction is at the foot of 88 and it goes on from there through to 91. Was that what it looked like?

MR BELLINGAN: It did not look like this, Mr Chairman, it was a list of incidents. It looked similar to this, a list of incidents including certain Stratcom operations as well. It was not just killings, Mr Chairman, it was a bit broader than that. It was for example, bomb explosions etc. It was in my handwriting, it was my notes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Which incidents did it identify?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't recall all the incidents, Mr Chairman, but incidents such as these that are mentioned over here ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: No, not "such as", including don't be confusing and unspecific, please be as specific as you can.

MR BELLINGAN: At the time I compiled this list I thought long and hard about what incidents were on the list from what I could remember, Mr Chairman, so it was, I spent some time putting together this list over here. I also left out some, for example the one I mentioned the other day, the Chachacha Road incident. I don't think on this list I've mentioned things with I was involved, in other words in my application somewhere I said included in that was incidents in which I was involved as well.

So things like Cosatu House, Cry Freedom, Khotso House, was on my notes of the time but is not pages 89 to 91 over here, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, I think I understand your answer but just for the sake of the record, there's room for confusion. In your answer you referred from time to time to this list and then you pointed to the document in front of you. Those references were to the list which commences at page 89 of your second amnesty application, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: So the list in your amnesty application was your best recollection of at least some of the incidents listed in the hit-list.

MR BELLINGAN: But also somewhere in my amnesty application I explain that this included in that information that was in the envelope, was things I was involved in.

MR TRENGOVE: You don't listen to my question.

MR TRENGOVE: The list at page 89 is a list of incidents which to the best of your recollection were amongst those included in the hit-list.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: But you say the hit-list went on and mentioned other incidents as well.

MR BELLINGAN: In the documentation were other incidents as well, Mr Chairman. Aside from my listed things there were also things that Janine had mentioned.

MR TRENGOVE: I'm talking about the hit-list and then you give me answers about the documentation. Please confine yourself to the so-called hit-list. Did the hit-list contain anything other than the list of incidents which commences at page 89 of your amnesty application?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: What else did it contain?

MR BELLINGAN: It contained, as I've said, the Cry Freedom incident, it contained the Khotso House, the Cosatu House, the, a couple of bombings, Mr Chairman, some outside the country and some inside the country too.

MR TRENGOVE: Why did you not list those incidents in your amnesty application when you made your best attempt to list all the incidents which have been listed in the hit-list?

MR BELLINGAN: I've tried to explain, Mr Chairman, that I have mentioned somewhere over here in this document, that there were other incidents in which I was involved which are not mentioned over here.

MR TRENGOVE: No, but please answer the question. Why aren't they here?

MR BELLINGAN: I didn't think it was necessary, Mr Chairman, this is not an exact, I'm not trying to replicate my notes that I had in my briefcase over here.

MR TRENGOVE: Why not? Why list some but not all?

MR BELLINGAN: Well firstly, it's too long ago, Mr Chairman, I can't remember what my notes were exactly.

MR TRENGOVE: So when you made this list you'd forgotten about the other incidents, is that the explanation?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I hadn't forgotten about them, Mr Chairman. I've explained already that in here I've said that there were other incidents, but I've mentioned that in my amnesty, in the course of all the schedules I mention them, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: For what purpose did you prepare the hit-list?

MR BELLINGAN: At the time we had a problem with what they called "verraaiers" or people that became a risk, people that were keen on, or possibly going to be leaving. One of my functions was to look at the psychological state if you were, of people, of agents, or sources, handlers.

I had to be alert and aware to the risk of people that were stressed out about things. At the time with the changes in the country, there were more and more people that were joining the ANC. One of my immediate supervisors on Stratcom joined the ANC at the time, Mr Chairman. There were approaches to me even. It was a highly sensitive controversial and difficult time. So to make myself alert as to who I'm dealing with over here, am I dealing with one of these people that's been involved in these types of operations, is it his agent, is it his source that I'm dealing with, the handlers around him and the people around him. There was a thing called the Domino Principle, Mr Chairman, if one of those people topples then they all topple.

MR TRENGOVE: I still don't understand. I thought I did initially, I thought you were explaining to us that you were trying to, as it were, compile a profile of a traitor but the explanation ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: Not at, Mr Chairman, it was a list of incidents which would prompt my memory as to which people were potentially at risk in view of the knowledge that I had that people were already being recruited into the ANC's intelligence structures, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I don't understand, could you please start again and explain to me slowly.

MR BELLINGAN: Certainly, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: What you were doing and why.

MR BELLINGAN: I was making notes for myself, Mr Chairman, at the time to prompt my memory as to who, when I had dealings with various divisions, when I had dealings with various units, for example one of my planned duties was to evaluate all of the Askaris at Vlakplaas and the handlers and the people involved over there. It was a highly sensitive matter, I needed to be aware of who I was dealing with, Mr Chairman. What were the lists of sensitive matters that were involved over there, was this person in a high risk category automatically, how would that person be feeling in terms his potential exposure in terms of his need to seek insurance as it were.

People were having to, getting the feeling that they had to look after themselves. There were people like Dirk Coetzee who were forced to speak, Mr Chairman, they were forced to speak out. So there was a reaction, counter-reaction, counter-reaction on top of that again type of situation. And in order to enable me to alert myself to these things, I needed to have a list of such things to prompt my memory. For example, if I went to the Eastern Cape, I would need to know, if I saw somebody over there in Ficksburg for example, I would need to alert myself to the fact that potentially I'm dealing with someone here who is feeling very stressed out and are there any signs of it, what has he said to the agents.

I would see the agents and the handlers without, in the absence of each other, Mr Chairman, and there would be a lot of disclosures made to me by the agents concerning the handlers for example, it was a highly sensitive situation.

In fact on the one course that I was on there was a complaint because I was submitting reports to my superior about information on a unit in, I think at the time, in Soweto about someone who was a potential risk, who in fact, then the agent did go and join the ANC and I knew and via my report I submitted it, but the handler was not aware of that. So there was this kind of who should I talk to, who should I tell. It was not an easy situation, Mr Chairman. Those were my notes for myself.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, we're going to submit to the Commission that this answer of yours is simply an application of the hint to maintain a cover story, be confusing. Because frankly, you've now given the explanation four or five times and I still don't have

the faintest idea what the list was prepared for.

MR BELLINGAN: Perhaps I could say it again, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes, please do that.

MR BELLINGAN: It was a list for my use ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Just a minute, just a minute, just a minute. Was it a list of incidents?

MR BELLINGAN: It was a list of incidents, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That's all?

MR BELLINGAN: Together with it was my annotations which would refer me to people's names which refer me to possible source numbers. It would prompt my memory, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: So is it a list of incidents and those members of the, let's call them intelligence community, and their sources, informers and agents who were involved in a particular incident? So if you take your list and you take the killing of Steve Biko on page 89, then you would have all the names of the security police and whoever else who were involved in that killing?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, I wouldn't then have a date, I would just say have Biko and then I would have a couple of lines next to it for example, with some names of people. For example a colleague of mine, Deon, I would maybe have one or two annotations around it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes. So if one looks at your hit-list, one is able to see who killed Steve Biko?

MR BELLINGAN: It would require further explanation, Mr Chairman, but most certainly with a little bit of explanation one would be able to see who killed Steve Biko.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes. Now if you had the list in front of you, not somebody else, if you had the list in front of you, you would be able to see from the list, you'd take the killing of Steve Biko and you'd be able to see who was responsible for the killing?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that what this list was all about?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR TRENGOVE: So the list identified incidents of unlawful conduct of the Security Forces, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Together with the names of the members responsible for those incidents?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: No, no, you shake you heard as if you resign yourself to my proposition. Is it correct or is it not correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Well the names were not spelt out in full, Mr Chairman, it would still, I would know what I meant over there by those names but it's not everybody who could just pick up the list and say. I mean you would have to know about Biko for example, to know there was no full elaborate history associated with it, it's just as I've explained, Biko, some names. For example, the example I gave as Deon, then you would have to know that that refers to Gideon Nieuwoudt.

CHAIRPERSON: So if Janine looked at the list she would see a number of incidents, the killing of Steve Biko with some annotations which she wouldn't necessarily be able to decipher, to understand?

MR BELLINGAN: Well the problem, Mr Chairman, is that Janine knew very well about those incidents because I had given her some elaborate explanations already about covert operations.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you explained to her how the hit-list works?

MR BELLINGAN: No, not the hit-list, Mr Chairman, not at all, but ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But how was she going to know, look if you had written Deon there?

MR BELLINGAN: Well she would know who Deon was.

CHAIRPERSON: And your other annotations, would she have been able to understand them?

MR BELLINGAN: I suppose most of them, Mr Chairman, or many of them.

CHAIRPERSON: And somebody outside?

MR BELLINGAN: Not necessarily, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And a security policeman?

MR BELLINGAN: Oh yes, a security policemen would, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR TRENGOVE: So what the hit-list would tell the informed reader is who the people were that were responsible for these incidents?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Anything else?

MR BELLINGAN: No.

MR TRENGOVE: Ja, we now know what the list, what the content of the list was. Could you just explain to me again, having compiled the list of incidents together with the names of the people responsible for those incidents, why did you do it, what was its purpose?

MR BELLINGAN: Once again, Mr Chairman, it was for my use in order to alert me to potential problem staff, potential problem agents, problem areas, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Oh, you mean these are security policemen with a serious crime on their conscience?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And why was it necessary for you to list all the security policemen with serious crimes on their conscience?

MR BELLINGAN: As I've explained, Mr Chairman, because they were huge problem areas in the context of our work at the time, in the context of the changes.

MR TRENGOVE: You mean because they were potential candidates for defection?

MR BELLINGAN: Not just that, Mr Chairman, but also people who would be potentially in need of psychological assistance. And our problem was, if I may just elaborate, that it was not a situation where they could just of their own accord go and see somebody about their problems they may be experiencing because that would put them into a huge risk category. How would they possible indulge in therapy concerning this problem, when they may not speak about it, Mr Chairman. So, for example, I had the problem with the chap who was involved in the, the one Watson brother in Gaberone, he was starting to crack up.

There was an investigation where he was also suspected and what do we do with the fellow, what, who do we refer him to. It would be far better if we could refer him to people who worked for me, psychologists that I trusted, experience people that could take care of those problems.

MR TRENGOVE: Was it just as a social service to these policemen or was the real purpose to protect against the risk that they might defect?

MR BELLINGAN: It was from the point - it was not, my perspective was not just a purely helping one for these people, but obviously that played a small part in it. It was more like the element of defection that was a concern to me, it was more like the risk that they pose that was a concern to me.

MR TRENGOVE: I see.

MR BELLINGAN: But obviously the human element was not lost on me.

MR TRENGOVE: So the whole purpose was, the whole purpose of the exercise was to minimise the risk of defection?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Who instructed you to undertake this project?

MR BELLINGAN: Nobody instructed me to draw up this list, Mr Chairman, the broader project ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: No, let me make it quite clear, who instructed you to undertake the task of identifying people who are at risk of defection because of the crimes on their conscience?

MR BELLINGAN: It was part of my duties, Mr Chairman, I was not called in one day and said specifically my ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: So the answer is nobody instructed you?

MR BELLINGAN: In the same way that nobody instructed me to kill Janine, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, you don't have to justify the answer yet, just answer the question. The answer is nobody instructed you?

MR BELLINGAN: I can't think of anyone who specifically set in motion, called me in one day and set something in motion in terms of an instruction, an order. I can't think of anyone like that. It may even have happened. I can't recall now what prompted this series of events.

MR TRENGOVE: Which of your superiors were aware of the fact that you were undertaking this important task?

MR BELLINGAN: I think it would have been at the time Colonel Oosthuizen, possibly Colonel Nel, possibly higher ranks as well, Mr Chairman. We had to make presentations from time to time and I provided statistics.

MR TRENGOVE: What did you do to identify all the responsible policemen who were responsible for these incidents?

MR BELLINGAN: Sorry, Mr Chairman, what did I do?

MR TRENGOVE: What did you do to find out which members had been responsible for these incidents?

MR BELLINGAN: I was just observant over all the years, Mr Chairman, I listened to loose talk and I just basically opened my eyes and ears.

MR TRENGOVE: So you mean you just sat down and wrote it out from your own knowledge?

MR BELLINGAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Picked up through passage talk over the years?

MR BELLINGAN: Not just passage talk but in specific consultations with people, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Now to whom did you report on the outcome of this project?

MR BELLINGAN: I would have discussions with my immediate supervisor, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I don't want to know what would have happened, do you remember to whom you reported?

MR BELLINGAN: There was no specific outcome, Mr Chairman, it was a process. So it was an ongoing thing, something arose, we would speak about it. For example I was going through my notes, there was a note that I'd sent I think to Colonel Taylor, concerning an agent in the ANC structures in the Mossel Bay area and we had sent down someone to see him, it was a potential agent, we had declined to appoint the person for certain reason, and they'd gone ahead an appointed him and at a later stage he became a problem.

MR TRENGOVE: No, no, no, Mr Bellingan, I understood your whole explanation to be that this was to be the beginning of a co-ordinated effort to minimise the risk of leaks, by providing assistance to people under stress.

MR BELLINGAN: It was also an ongoing thing, Mr Chairman. So in that particular instance I reported to Colonel Taylor because the query had come from him concerning this particular person.

MR TRENGOVE: No but that's an ad-hoc and incidental query.

MR BELLINGAN: Exactly.

MR TRENGOVE: What happened to the plan to provide coherent and co-ordinated assistance to people under stress to avoid their defection?

MR BELLINGAN: No, there was no such project, Mr Chairman, it is as the advocate says, it was an ad-hoc thing.

MR TRENGOVE: So you prepared the list just in case you got a query from somebody about, from some superior about some other member, to know that that member had been involved in some serious crime?

MR BELLINGAN: I saw it as my responsibility to be proactive, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Just answer the questions, don't try and justify. Are you saying that you prepared the list just to be prepared in case you got a query of that kind?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it is as I explained, Mr Chairman, it was to alert me on an ongoing way so that I would be aware of exactly who I was dealing with if there was a potential problem area.

MR TRENGOVE: But you were aware, you've just told us that this list was simply writing down what was already in your head.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, but if I had to be asked to close my eyes now and replicate what I've already written over here, which took me some time to put together and then with amendments and amendments and amendments, I wouldn't get it right the first time, I would forget things. I'm much better off if I sit down and prepare my own notes working on my own.

MR TRENGOVE: Just to remind yourself who the members were who had been involved in these serious crimes?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Did you carry the list with you so as to use it for that purpose?

MR BELLINGAN: I'd only just started to prepare this matter, Mr Chairman, it was an idea that I had, it wasn't something that I was going to prepare a wall chart of or something like that, it was a very sensitive and confidential thing for my use. I used to utilise my office as a home, as my home as an office, Mr Chairman, so I often took things home and yes, I did take it home, I did carry it with me.

MR TRENGOVE: So - but it's purpose was simply to remind yourself when you dealt with any of these members, that they were members under stress and therefore in risk of defection?

MR BELLINGAN: Potentially, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Potentially what?

MR BELLINGAN: Potentially, as the advocate says, potentially under stress. Various people have different ways of reacting to the stress, some of them were cracking up. I know for a fact Colonel Taylor in Natal was busy cracking up.

MR TRENGOVE: But I'm not sure whether you confirmed the first part of my question, so is my understanding now correct that the list was merely intended as a reminder to yourself in case you had to deal with these people to remind you that they were potentially under stress?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, at that stage it was purely for my own purposes. At a later stage ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: And for that purpose alone?

MR BELLINGAN: To prompt my memory, yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes. What about this business that you told us about psychological assistance and trusted psychologists and assistance to these people to help them to avoid the risk of defection? I thought that was the purpose of it all. Now you tell us it was something quite different, it was just to remind yourself in case you had to deal with these people.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, even the person I referred to in the Gaberone incident, I never got him to a psychologist, it just never happened but I did try.

MR TRENGOVE: Don't confuse, just answer the question. I thought from your earlier description that at least part of the purpose of this list was to identify people to whom psychological assistance would be rendered.

MR BELLINGAN: That's ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Mr Chairman, he testified possibly - to whom assistance possibly may be rendered in future in a specific situation, not to whom it will be rendered. And Mr Chairman, with respect, I don't want to object every time to my learned friend's method of cross-examination so I'm just going to place this on record. And that is that my learned friend keeps on saying to the witness he doesn't answer the questions when he answers the question. Now I will that for argument but I just want to place that on record, that on various occasions and with various questions yesterday and today, my learned friend has done so after the witness has answered the question. And I'm not going to object every time, I'm drawing your attention to that and I will direct specific argument in that regard to you at the relevant stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and you could re-examine as well. I don't think there's any misunderstanding about the partial purpose, if I might put it that way, of this hit-list for psychological assistance. Mr Trengove?

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, you and I have been discussing the purpose for which you prepared this document. You initially told us that its purpose or at least one of its purposes was to provide psychological assistance to people under stress to minimise the risk of defection. In your later answer, your most recent answer you said, no, no, no, it's only purpose was to remind yourself when you deal with people, that they might be people under stress. How do you reconcile those two answers?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, quite simply because the alerting of myself would have referred not just to the defectors but also to people who might be in need of such a thing, if I could facilitate it, if I could get it right, instead of them just cracking up or doing something irrational. If I could get it right then I would. I had discussions like that with some of my, one of my superiors and in the end it never really materialised but when I say alert myself, I mean to mean to all the potential dangers including the fact that something could be done which was psychological assistance.

MR TRENGOVE: Is my understanding correct that you were not instructed to prepare the list and also did not report to any of your superiors on the list?

MR BELLINGAN: No, that understanding is not completely correct, Mr Chairman, it's partially correct. In specific incidents on an ad-hoc basis I did report to my superiors but I did not take a list with to them, Mr Chairman, it would have been a very foolish thing to do, for me to be seen with such a list. I didn't take it to them and say we've got a problem over here, amongst the list of incidents in which we have been involved there is potentially a problem area over here. I didn't do that, but on certain occasions like for example, the one I mentioned with Colonel Taylor concerning the person in George. I can remember preparing something over there ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: You didn't tell any of your superiors that you had such a list?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, I didn't.

MR TRENGOVE: Then when - you say you recovered this list on the night of the murder, under Janine's car seat.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And destroyed it.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Why destroy it?

MR BELLINGAN: I destroyed all the documents that were in the envelope, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I know that's what you say, I'm asking you why you destroyed this list.

MR BELLINGAN: Because I realised the effect that this could have, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: But you realised that all along. This was meant to be a useful source of information, why destroy it?

MR BELLINGAN: It was not only that that was in there, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I'm talking about this document. Why did you destroy it?

MR BELLINGAN: It was a highly sensitive document, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: It had always been.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR TRENGOVE: And you had very many highly sensitive documents if you're to be believed, why destroy this one?

MR BELLINGAN: There was no better time than then to get rid of as much stuff as I could, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: No, but it was meant to serve a purpose, why destroy it?

MR BELLINGAN: The purpose of the document had changed very drastically from what I had intended it to what it was going to be used for, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Your purpose for the document was still the same, to be available as an ongoing reminder of people under stress, why destroy it?

MR BELLINGAN: Because I felt that the need to destroy it was very urgent, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Why? Take it back to the office, put it where it belongs and have the benefit of its use.

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, it would have provided a motive for the murder.

MR TRENGOVE: Why?

MR BELLINGAN: Because I knew that I would be a prime suspect, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: No, no, no, a document in your file in the office doesn't provide a motive for a murder.

MR BELLINGAN: I was told that my office would be looked through as well, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And they would ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: And I had an opportunity to clear out stuff there too.

MR TRENGOVE: And they would find a document which would be the kind of document that one would expect to find in a security policeman's file.

MR BELLINGAN: Certainly not with notes from Janine on it, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Oh, I see, are you saying that she annotated things on it?

MR BELLINGAN: No, she didn't annotate things on it but there was a note from Janine amongst the stuff as well.

MR TRENGOVE: Ja, well don't confuse the issue, we're talking about the hit-list. Why not just take it back to your office and use it for the purpose for which it was prepared?

MR BELLINGAN: It needed to be destroyed, Mr Chairman, I couldn't carry it around with me, it would have been reckless.

MR TRENGOVE: No, but please answer the question ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: ... all the way back to Durban ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: Please answer the question. Simply to say it needed to be destroyed tells me nothing, I'm asking you why you destroyed it.

MR BELLINGAN: So that it could not be used in any way to become an embarrassment, Mr Chairman, for the Security Branch and for the government.

MR TRENGOVE: It was no greater an embarrassment than the day you prepared it, why destroy it?

MR BELLINGAN: It was under my control when I prepared it, Mr Chairman. At that time it was out of my control and the fact that there would be fingers pointing at me, it would have been very silly for me to carry such stuff around with me.

MR TRENGOVE: Why?

MR BELLINGAN: It would have been equally silly for me to put it under my car seat for example ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: No, I'm not making any such ridiculous suggestion, why not take it back to the office and use it for the purpose for which it was prepared?

MR BELLINGAN: It was better to destroy it, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Is that your best answer?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: You say if it were found in your possession it would have been incriminating, pointing, identifying you as a murder suspect, who on earth could that have happened? If this document had been found in your file in the office, how would it in any way have suggested that you were the murderer of your wife?

MR BELLINGAN: Not just that, Mr Chairman, ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: No, but confine your answer to that. I want to know what you meant when you said that it would have incriminated you.

MR BELLINGAN: It would have provided a motive, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: How does a list in your office provide a motive to murder your wife?

MR BELLINGAN: Because it would then that I was deeply involved in these matters, it would mean that I was alerted to these problems.

MR TRENGOVE: To what problems?

MR BELLINGAN: To the unlawful activities, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And why would that prompt you to - why would that constitute a motive to murder your wife?

MR BELLINGAN: Because I was very well aware of the fact that Janine was speaking out. I wasn't sure exactly to whom all she had spoken and I knew she was speaking to attorneys, I knew she was speaking to ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: About what?

MR BELLINGAN: ... family.

MR TRENGOVE: About what?

MR BELLINGAN: Well I wasn't exactly sure all about what but at the time that I first, my attention was first drawn to that concerned the Numsa matter, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, your answer simply doesn't mean anything to me. How would the list in your possession have incriminated you in relation to the murder of your wife?

MR BELLINGAN: People knew that Janine had a lot of knowledge, Mr Chairman. Had I had such a list, had Janine had access to it, it would have been an indication that it was necessary to eliminate Janine for the knowledge that she had and already there were indications that I had a problem with Janine ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: Well only if it were shown that she had had the list might it have been a problem but that would have been a problem anyway, whether you destroyed the list or not, isn't that so?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, but it's not the way I perceived it.

MR TRENGOVE: When did the list go missing?

MR BELLINGAN: It was - I'm not sure when exactly it went missing, when Janine took it exactly but ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: When did you miss it for the first time?

MR BELLINGAN: After I heard her telephone conversation, Mr Chairman, I went to look for it and I noticed it was gone.

CHAIRPERSON: Which conversation was it?

MR BELLINGAN: On the tape recording, Mr Chairman, with the person that she was speaking with.

CHAIRPERSON: Where she promised ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: And she'd mentioned the list of hits and then I ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ... to mail the list?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct, Mr Chairman. I wanted to go through my stuff and see what exactly is she talking about and is it potentially that document that I had.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

ADV GCABASHE: Had you indicated that that was September? Is my recollection correct?

MR BELLINGAN: That was in September, Mr Chairman.

ADV GCABASHE: September of '91.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR TRENGOVE: And then when you realised that the list was missing and she had it in her possession, did you say to her, do you have my list, can I have it back?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Why not?

MR BELLINGAN: To antagonise Janine or to put her in a position where she felt threatened was a mistake. She already had asked me a couple of times whether she was under any type of threat, she'd asked me a couple of times and each time I had to reassure her no, there was no such thing.

MR TRENGOVE: I know that she was going around telling people that she was afraid you were going to kill her, why should she be afraid that you might kill her?

MR BELLINGAN: Janine had a mind of her own, Mr Chairman. When she made up her mind about something there was no stopping her.

MR TRENGOVE: Well she turned out to have been right.

MR BELLINGAN: She turned out to have been right, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Why didn't you report to your superiors that this list had gone missing?

MR BELLINGAN: It was not possible to do that, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Why was it not possible?

MR BELLINGAN: Because there would have been absolutely no point. The only purpose that could have achieve would be to alert them to the problem of Janine, to alert them to the fact that I had such a list in the first place.

MR TRENGOVE: Well forget Janine's participation in the loss of the list. Why not report to your superiors that such a list has gone missing and its exposure may embarrass the security police, the Nationalist Party, the government and the peaceful transition to democracy as you say?

MR BELLINGAN: For the same reason, Mr Chairman, that I didn't explain that Janine despite her agreement with me after we reconciled, had continued to take other documentation for the same reason, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: No, I don't understand that, why not simply say to them listen I have such a list and I'm afraid I've lost it, it's potentially highly embarrassing, what do you suggest we do to contain the risk of embarrassment?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I still felt that I had a very important role to play in this country. I could not just allow my career to be ended like that.

MR TRENGOVE: So you sacrificed your country's future for the sake of your career?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I see my career in the police being linked to the country's future.

MR TRENGOVE: No, no, no, you jeopardised the country's future by not reporting the leak for the sake of your career, is that what you're saying?

MR BELLINGAN: No, on the contrary, Mr Chairman, I had already thought then that I may have to eliminate Janine. The thought had already crossed my mind that this operation with regard to reconciliation, with regard to keeping Janine happy had taken on a different dimension, Mr Chairman. It was progressing, it was developing further and there was something that needed to be done.

MR TRENGOVE: But the problem would not be solved, as we pointed out yesterday, if she'd already spilt the beans or if the list was in safekeeping with someone else.

MR BELLINGAN: Janine was going to spill the beans, and that also is a process, Mr Chairman. Let's take the list for example, just giving it would have been one step, people would have got information from it. It's not just that it's a list coming from the Legal Resources Centre, this was a list coming from a Security Branch policeman, Mr Chairman, it has a different meaning. And then there are the explanations that Janine could give on the list, information that she had from me. It's not just a list.

MR TRENGOVE: Ja, and she may well have done so.

MR BELLINGAN: I'm pretty certain she was going to do so, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: She might already have done so.

MR BELLINGAN: No, I didn't get that impression, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: She might already have done so. You had no reason to be sure that she hadn't.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, but then she still would have been available as a witness if that were the case. Whether she had done so or not and who she had done so or not, she still would have been available to testify before commissions, to give elaborations, to give explanations, Mr Chairman. It wasn't just a simple matter of; I've the list back now, that's fine. It wasn't like that at all, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: So that murdering her would not solve the problem.

MR BELLINGAN: No, quite the opposite, Mr Chairman. I didn't see anything else to do about the problem. If it was anyone else in the Security establishment they would have been eliminated a long time before that.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, murdering your wife would not have solved the problem, the country's future would still be at risk.

MR BELLINGAN: No, I think I've explained, Mr Chairman, that by eliminating Janine it solved the problem.

MR TRENGOVE: It wouldn't have solved the problem if she had already spilt the beans.

MR BELLINGAN: The problem would have been slightly worse than what it was years before, Mr Chairman, but then in years to come the problem would have been a great deal worse if Janine was around to explain, to testify, to give assistance, to the intelligence of the opposition.

MR TRENGOVE: So what you're saying is that murdering her might have helped but it would not have solved the problem?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it did help and it stopped Janine from speaking out.

MR TRENGOVE: Please address the question. I'm not asking you what happened in the result, I'm asking you what would have happened if she had already spilt the beans? Murdering her would not have avoided the risk to the country.

MR BELLINGAN: I didn't see it that way, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Please go to the list at page 89 of your application. By the way when did you prepare this list?

MR BELLINGAN: On 89, Mr Chairman?

MR TRENGOVE: No, the original list, the hit-list that Janine took.

MR BELLINGAN: It was - the original list was - I didn't sit down and do it in one sitting, Mr Chairman, it was done by me over a period of time.

MR TRENGOVE: But in ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: In 1991.

MS GCABASHE: Can I ask, when did you make the last entry if you can't remember when you made the first entry? Give us an indication.

MR BELLINGAN: I don't recall. No, I don't recall, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Take the first item on the list at page 89, the killing of Steve Biko, what did your list, whom did your list identify as a culprit who was not known publicly to have been responsible for the killing of Mr Biko?

MR BELLINGAN: Deon Nieuwoudt, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: What was his role in Mr Biko's murder?

MR BELLINGAN: He was involved, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I know that's what you say, what was his role?

MR BELLINGAN: I understood, Mr Chairman, that with the killing of Biko, Deon Nieuwoudt had been an integral part. I also understood further that - and also my notes would have had another name and that is, he was a Colonel or a Brigadier Goosen who had been involved in a coverup, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: For the third time what was Deon Nieuwoudt's name, role in the murder of Mr Biko?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't know exactly what he did but he was involved, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I thought you said that he had participated in the murder of Mr Biko.

MR BELLINGAN: That is what I understood, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: But you didn't know what role he played at all? Just a piece of gossip that he was in some way involved?

MR BELLINGAN: This is far more that gossip, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: From whom did it come?

MR BELLINGAN: From people in the Security Branch close to myself, close to him, possibly including him. I can't recall now.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, you're being evasive, from whom did the information come?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, if he testifies that he can't recall ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: He didn't testify that.

MR DU PLESSIS: He did testify that now, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: He did not do so, he simply said from people involved.

CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen!

MR TRENGOVE: He didn't say that he didn't remember their names.

CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, please, please. Mr du Plessis, leave him, let him answer the question please.

MR DU PLESSIS: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: From whom did you get the information about Nieuwoudt, Nieuwoudt's role in the murder of Biko?

MR BELLINGAN: Perhaps I said it too softly just now, Mr Chairman, but I don't recall.

MR TRENGOVE: I see. You're not just picking up - I'll leave it at that. You don't recall from whom you got that information.

MS GCABASHE: Can I ask, you only joined the SAP in 1979.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MS GCABASHE: When did you get this information? You only joined the Security Branch in '81 and you got this information at some stage, when?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, it was not current information, I didn't get the information each time as these incidents happened. If I remember correctly, the incidents I mention here are incidents specifically that I was not involved in.

MS GCABASHE: Yes, but just help us understand when you might have received this information and where you can, the source.

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot recall, sorry, Mr Chairman.

MS GCABASHE: And when might you have discussed these particular incidents with Janine, in 1991?

MR BELLINGAN: Once again, Mr Chairman, it was not one session, it was a period of time with question and answers with Janine starting with the trip to Umgazi.

MS GCABASHE: In 1991?

MR BELLINGAN: I think that was before that, Mr Chairman.

MS GCABASHE: That's the reconciliation trip, isn't it?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, that was before the birth of my son. That would have been early 1990, if I recall.

MS GCABASHE: And you think you might have recalled all the detail you can't recall today then?

MR BELLINGAN: Inasfar as those incidents had occurred already, but certainly thereafter Janine had asked me a lot of questions and I had provided her with a lot of information. There was no ways at that stage that I was in a position to just suddenly stop and say no, I now no longer trust you because that would have been the end of the matter. Janine would have gone ahead and - I understood then that she was very vengeful towards the Security Branch.

MS GCABASHE: Thank you.

ADV BOSMAN: May I just ask you this question, Mr Bellingan? You were expert at providing disinformation, why did you not provide Janine with disinformation if you wanted it to seem as though you were still trusting her?

MR BELLINGAN: It's far too complicated, Mr Chairman, and Janine was far too sharp. She was in many respects sharper than myself. I just - perhaps lie on the telephone to Janine but there's no ways that I could lie face to face to Janine. I tried it and it had not worked, Mr Chairman.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, to come back to Mr Nieuwoudt's role in the murder of Mr Biko. We now have it you don't recall the source of your information?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I'm still not clear what information you had about his role in the murder of Mr Biko.

MR BELLINGAN: That he was intimately involved, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Fullstop. Is that all?

MR BELLINGAN: That's all, Mr Chairman, that I can recall now.

MR TRENGOVE: In some undefined way?

MR BELLINGAN: At this point in time that's all I can recall, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: So your list would simply have identified, said Biko and it would have said Deon, which to the informed reader would have meant Nieuwoudt but would have told the reader nothing more about his responsibility for participation in the murder of Mr Biko?

MR BELLINGAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Take another incident, the one dated 1982, the murder of Mr Griffiths Mxenge. What information did you have about the culprits responsible for his murder, that was not yet public knowledge in 1991?

MR BELLINGAN: That the - for example, that the Security Branch in Natal were aware of it and played a role.

MR TRENGOVE: No, no, who in Natal had been aware of it and played a role?

MR BELLINGAN: Brigadier van der Hooven and Colonel Andy Taylor.

MR TRENGOVE: But was that no public knowledge in 1991?

MR BELLINGAN: I think that's still not public knowledge, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, 1991 was after the Harms Commission and after Dirk Coetzee and Almond Nofomela had spilt the beans on the Mxenge murder.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, but they were thoroughly discredited. Had I come along and said that or Janine, it would have been an additional problem.

MR TRENGOVE: What was the source of your information about their involvement in the murder?

MR BELLINGAN: People at the Security Branch in ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: Who?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't recall exactly. They also told me of certain other concerns that they had, for example the fact that the vehicle used had been driven into Louis le Grange Plein afterwards and some blood had been washed off right there and basically in front of everybody.

MR TRENGOVE: That's the Coetzee/Nofomela story. But answer my question, who told you about the involvement of van der Hooven in the Mxenge murder?

MR BELLINGAN: It was not Coetzee or Nofomela. I don't know what their version, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Answer the question! For the third time, Mr Bellingan, who told you?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't recall, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: The second-last incident on page 89 which you say:

Who was the MK operative who was the victim of that murder?

MR BELLINGAN: Actually it was the brother of an MK operative, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: What was his name? Maponya, Japie Maponya?

MR BELLINGAN: Japie Maponya.

MR TRENGOVE: And who at the Krugersdorp Security Branch arranged for Eugene de Kock to kill him?

MR BELLINGAN: It was one of my later superiors, Colonel le Roux and - yes.

MR TRENGOVE: That murder has been the recent subject of an amnesty application, isn't it? - received wide publicity. And so did it in the trial of Colonel de Kock.

MR BELLINGAN: I expect so, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Over the page, page 90, the item in the middle of the page relates to the murder of Stanza Bopape who had been killed by the Johannesburg Security Branch. It was at all times known who had been present when he was either killed or went missing, isn't that so?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't think so, Mr Chairman, I thought it was a highly sensitive matter which wasn't known.

MR TRENGOVE: No, the police had an explanation, they said certain security policemen had taken him out for investigation and he escaped.

MR BELLINGAN: At van Niekerk etc., etc.

MR TRENGOVE: But the identity of the security policemen present at the time was never a secret, it was always public knowledge, it was part of the police explanation.

MR BELLINGAN: Not the fact that there was a huge coverup, Mr Chairman. There was a huge coverup around the whole thing.

MR TRENGOVE: Ja, but we're talking about the murder. Do you know of anybody involved in the murder whose identity as a policeman on the scene was not known?

MR BELLINGAN: The man died from some type of problem during interrogation, during shocks or something as I understood it. They didn't strangle him or hit him on the head with a spanner or anything, Mr Chairman, but there was a huge coverup surrounding that as I understand it.

MR TRENGOVE: Who told you about the true facts of the murder?

MR BELLINGAN: It would have been people from the Johannesburg Security Branch with whom I was friendly, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Who? Name them.

MR BELLINGAN: I don't recall exactly, it may have been ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: No, I don't want you to speculate.

MR BELLINGAN: You see I was on an interrogation course with some of those people. It was ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: Name them.

MR BELLINGAN: It was Major van Niekerk who at the time I think who was a Captain who presented the interrogation course to me when I, shortly after arriving at John Vorster Square. I think it - I was friendly with Charles Zeelie. It may have been him, I cannot recall, Mr Chairman. It may have been other people too. ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: ...(indistinct) probably anybody, Mr Bellingan.

MR BELLINGAN: Probably a series of conversations, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: No, I'm asking you whether you can recall a single name of the people who told you of the true facts around the murder of Stanza Bopape.

MR BELLINGAN: I don't recall, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: The two, three incidents down, the murder of Anton Lubowksi. Who murdered him?

MR BELLINGAN: I'm not sure exactly who murdered him, Mr Chairman, but it is clear that there was a coverup surrounding it because as I say there, I had been tasked when I was at Johannesburg to do certain Stratcoms around him and there's no ways that I would have been tasked to do that had he been an agent of the State.

MR TRENGOVE: The purpose of your list was to identify the people responsible for the crimes you listed. This crime was the murder of Anton Lubowksi, who murdered him?

MR BELLINGAN: I'm not sure who murdered him, Mr Chairman, but people were friendly with Gene de Kock who knew, who had information as to who murdered this ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: Ja, but what did your list say, who were the culprits responsible for that crime?

MR BELLINGAN: On my list I would have been alerted to the name Gene de Kock.

MR TRENGOVE: How do you mean "alerted to the name Gene de Kock"?

MR BELLINGAN: Or I would have, I would have made a note there for myself.

MR TRENGOVE: What note?

MR BELLINGAN: Maybe just the name: "de Kock" or maybe just ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: No, no, no, in what - we're dealing with one item, the murder of Anton Lubowksi. Your list you said listed the names of the culprits, which culprits would you have listed in relation to the crime of murder of Anton Lubowksi?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't know the individual people. I do know that it was the CCB, Mr Chairman, and I know that the people from the CCB were friendly with de Kock and that he had more knowledge of it. I'd heard from someone at Vlakplaas about something that he had said.

MR TRENGOVE: Ja. Your list you said named culprits, are you telling us that in relation to Lubowksi no culprits were named?

MR BELLINGAN: Someone may have got the impression from my list that Vlakplaas was involved and that would have been the wrong impression, Mr Chairman. It was not Vlakplaas that was involved but Vlakplaas or de Kock who had knowledge of who was involved ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: Just answer the question.

MR BELLINGAN: As well for that matter other people ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: Just answer the question.

MR BELLINGAN: ... friendly with Joe Verster etc., etc.

MR DU PLESSIS: But Mr Chairman, he already said that de Kock's name was mentioned on the list, so he has answered the question.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, no, it's more pointed, the question is directed at the perpetrators, does the list disclose the perpetrators of the murder of Anton Lubowksi? That's the question, Mr Bellingan. Will you respond to that?

MR BELLINGAN: Most likely it would have had CCB as well mentioned there, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: CCB?

MR BELLINGAN: Mm.

MR TRENGOVE: But CCB is not a person vulnerable to psychological stress who might defect. And that was the purpose of your list, to identify people and not organisations.

MR BELLINGAN: It was the knowledge then that, of the connection with Vlakplaas, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, I don't understand your answer. Were any culprits identified in the list?

MR BELLINGAN: Not names, Mr Chairman.

MS GCABASHE: Just repeat that, not names of culprits on the list?

MR BELLINGAN: There were no names of culprits.

MS GCABASHE: On the list?

MR BELLINGAN: Next to my annotation over there, because ...(intervention)

MS GCABASHE: No, the question was: on the list? This is why I ask.

MR BELLINGAN: On the list was the name - if I'm not mistaken de Kock's name was mentioned.

MR TRENGOVE: As one of those responsible for the murder of Lubowksi?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: But that's the question.

MR BELLINGAN: So in terms of the person responsible I could not possibly have mentioned that on the list because I don't know even as I sit here today, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes. So why was Lubowksi on the list at all?

MR BELLINGAN: Simply of the connection with Vlakplaas.

MR TRENGOVE: Why?

MR BELLINGAN: Because it was a concern, for the same reasons that I've mentioned.

MR TRENGOVE: No, I don't understand your answer.

MR BELLINGAN: Vlakplaas - the operators at Vlakplaas, Mr Chairman, were particularly vulnerable to these things because they had been called upon to act in terms of elimination of people, in terms of most of these things. And they had a wide knowledge of all operations all around the country.

MR TRENGOVE: Ja, they were professional assassins. If you were worried about the assassins, you had good reason to be worried about them. I'm not asking you why you were worried about the Vlakplaas people, I'm asking you why Lubowksi's name was on the list.

MR BELLINGAN: Simply for that reason, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: For what reason?

MR BELLINGAN: For the fact that I'd heard from people at Vlakplaas that the assassination was done by the State, CCB.

MR TRENGOVE: By the CCB?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR TRENGOVE: Your answer doesn't make sense, Mr Bellingan. You say you mentioned Lubowksi's name because people at Vlakplaas told you that people at CCB had been responsible for his murder, why is his name on the list?

MR BELLINGAN: It's a State operation, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: It may be a State operation. Your list -the purpose of your list is to identify security policemen potentially under stress and therefore at risk of defection. Why does Lubowksi's name feature at all?

MR BELLINGAN: For the reason that I've explained.

MR TRENGOVE: I see.

MR BELLINGAN: I don't mind explaining it again, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes. The documents that Janine had and that were subsequently recovered by the police - that Janine had at the time of her death and that were subsequently recovered in her locker at work, were all Numsa theft documents, correct? Your nod doesn't record, Mr Bellingan.

MR BELLINGAN: My?

MR TRENGOVE: Could you just give an audible reply, your nod doesn't go onto the machine.

MR BELLINGAN: I presume so, Mr Chairman, I don't know.

MR TRENGOVE: You also know that she'd had those documents for some years.

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: She'd already had them - she already discovered and removed documents about the Numsa thefts in 1989.

MR BELLINGAN: Janine had given me back documentation, Mr Chairman. For example the passport ...

MR TRENGOVE: Ja, so you knew that she had for a long time had documents or had already long ago had documents about the Numsa thefts, it wasn't a new discovery for her, correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And you discovered you say, in August 1991, that she had left these documents with Lorna Smith in safekeeping and that Lorna Smith had now returned them.

MR BELLINGAN: All I discovered was that Lorna Smith was returning documentation to Janine. That's all that I heard on the tape, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Which Janine had given to Lorna Smith in safekeeping?

MR BELLINGAN: Well I didn't discover that.

MR TRENGOVE: Didn't you know that?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Could you remind me of what you said in that regard in your amnesty application? You deal with it in Schedule 20, at the foot of page 427, Mr Bellingan.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I made the presumption, I didn't know that she the documents in safekeeping but it stands to reason that she would have. But to ask me did I know that she had them in safekeeping, it's a presumption.

MR TRENGOVE: Well let's read what you've said in your application under oath. Would you read that ...

MR BELLINGAN: Certainly, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: ... that first sentence of the last paragraph?

MR BELLINGAN:

MR TRENGOVE: Now that's the statement you made under oath?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, but I can elaborate now which I've done ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: Then why did you ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: ...(indistinct) tape recording presumably had it in safekeeping for her.

MR TRENGOVE: Why did you tell us a minute ago that you didn't know that Lorna Smith had held these documents in safekeeping for Janine?

MR BELLINGAN: I didn't know, I presumed it. I think it's a fair presumption, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: But you state it as a fact in your amnesty application, correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And you confirmed that fact under cross-examination yesterday.

MR BELLINGAN: I don't recall, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And yet today you say you didn't know why Lorna Smith had had the documents?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I presumed.

MR TRENGOVE: In fact Lorna Smith returned the documents because you had terminated her 10 year of the cottage on your premises, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Actually Lorna Smith had terminated it, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: So when she moved she brought back the documents, gave them back to Janine. Do you know that?

MR BELLINGAN: I think that's how it was, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Do you know where Janine asked her to take the documents?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: She asked her to take the documents to her work, to Janine's work. Did you not know that?

MR BELLINGAN: I subsequently found out, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Where Janine locked them away in her locker. Do you know that today?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And she told Jonelle Donders, a friend of hers, that if anything should happen to her she should tell the right people about the documents in the locker, do you know that?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I don't know that, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And it was in fact Jonelle Donders who told the investigating officer that the documents were in the locker, which led to Captain Steyn's discovery of those documents. Do you know that?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I didn't know that, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: What does - in fact and Jonelle Donders I must tell you, was not the only person to whom she told of the documents, whom she told of the documents, she told a lot of people about them. Do you know that? You mentioned Mr Bastiaans yesterday, he was another one who was told of these documents.

MR BELLINGAN: Documents, Mr Chairman, I don't know if it's specifically those documents.

MR TRENGOVE: And she told these people that these documents disclosed the Numsa fraud.

MR BELLINGAN: It doesn't surprise me, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: You see, what she believed these documents revealed is firstly that you stole the money from Numsa, put some of it into a police account and took some of it for your own benefit. Do you know that that was her belief?

MR BELLINGAN: Janine had the impression that we should be utilising that money, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: No, it wasn't merely a suggestion, she believed that you were milking the Numsa money for your personal benefit.

MR BELLINGAN: I told Janine better, I explained it to her, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I'm simply telling you that that was what she believed was happening, correct?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And she repeatedly accused you of it.

MR BELLINGAN: At one stage Janine did accuse me by saying that: with all this money lying around, why don't we utilise some of it for our things around the house. She said that repeatedly, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Her belief was that there was far more money being spent on your household and lifestyle than could be explained by your salary.

MR BELLINGAN: Quite the opposite, Mr Chairman, Janine used to complain about the lack of money.

MR TRENGOVE: You lived in a lavish house, luxurious house, correct?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, that's not correct.

MR TRENGOVE: You made extensive extensions and renovations to the house, improvements to the house?

MR BELLINGAN: I was very proud of what I was doing, Mr Chairman, and it was an excellent investment. And it is correct, I did it.

MR TRENGOVE: And you lived at - you lived a luxurious lifestyle?

MR BELLINGAN: Not at all, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: You wore fancy clothes, shoes we know that cost R400,00 a pair.

MR BELLINGAN: I doubt whether those shoes cost R400,00 a pair when I bought them, Mr Chairman. In fact at the one forum, I think it was the trial, the original slip was produced for the shoes. I think they were closer to R200,00.

MR TRENGOVE: But when she threatened divorce you told her she'd get nothing because you'd plead poverty.

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, I was quite willing to divorce Janine at one stage. I was quite happy to do it.

MR TRENGOVE: Janine also said that the documents revealed that you had planned to transfer money to Judy, your sister, Judy White.

MR BELLINGAN: Janine was under that impression, yes.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes, and she told people so.

MR BELLINGAN: I'm not surprised.

MR TRENGOVE: So you see, the documents she had she believed proved not that the police were stealing Numsa money, but that Mike Bellingan was stealing that money for his personal benefit.

MR BELLINGAN: At one stage there had been an attempt to blackmail me, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: By making that accusation?

MR BELLINGAN: By making that accusation via Mr Charles Mendelow.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes, that was her belief. And when she threatened you with exposure the threat was not to make the security police operation public, the threat was to report you to the security police superiors for your theft from the security police.

MR BELLINGAN: Not at all, Mr Chairman, that threat to me was absolutely misguided by Janine, and I explained it to her. And it was evident after my discussion with General Erasmus that it was completely ludicrous. In fact he even said to me that: "Let her do what she wants. If she wants to report it, let her report it, nothing will come of the investigation once it has been reported - if it's reported to the police that is." But in terms of my perception of the threat to myself, that I was somehow personally at risk, that is absolutely ludicrous. I never would go to General Erasmus and just discuss these things openly with him unless it was evident that he was someone to be trusted and somebody who was involved in this thing. But Janine knew that, I told that to her afterwards.

MR TRENGOVE: The threat that she made was a threat of reporting your crime to your superiors, that was her threat.

MR BELLINGAN: General Erasmus also didn't see it like that.

MR TRENGOVE: No, no, no, just confirm that that was her threat, correct?

MR BELLINGAN: That was the initial threat, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And that was what she believed the documents revealed, correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct. On the face of it, Mr Chairman, that was the correct assumption that she made on the face of the documents.

MR TRENGOVE: You know that she always knew that you bugged her telephone, or the home telephone?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, she found out, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: She found out very early, a day or two after you installed the bug.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I'm not exactly sure when she found out but she did find out, yes. She complained to me about it.

MR TRENGOVE: And over the years she's always said to warn people to be discreet on the phone because it was bugged, you were taping her conversations.

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, we resolved that matter and I took the tape recorder out of the ceiling. Then when we moved in to the - we moved from the side that Lorna Smith was going to rent into the other side because Janine was pregnant and there were steps in the other side and it was more convenient for her not to use the steps, to just have a flat passage. So we moved in then and then I had the opportunity to reinstall the bug without Janine knowing. So she was in fact under the impression that there was no bug on the telephone.

MR TRENGOVE: No, she at all times warned her friends to be careful because you taped her conversations.

MR BELLINGAN: She may have said that.

MR TRENGOVE: You see, Sir, I have difficulty with your evidence about the hit-list for this reason, whereas she took great care to hide the Numsa documents off the premises, you say that she sat with this hit-list bombshell but kept it under her car seat.

MR BELLINGAN: I'm not sure if I should, if I'm required to speculate here or ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: Well I'm suggesting to you it doesn't make sense at all. Can you suggest any sense in her doing so?

MR BELLINGAN: Janine may have had a motive, Mr Chairman, she may somehow have felt that she could utilise one of the things for leverage, other of the stuff was too sensitive. Most likely there was more stuff amongst that documentation which was removed by my colleagues or by somebody, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: But could you ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: ... of the documentation, because Janine knew very well who exactly was involved in this thing. When I went through the evidence and that, it was quite clear to me, in the inquest and so on, that the investigating officer had been led up the garden path.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: That it couldn't have been from Janine's documents because she knew very well who was involved because I told her after we reconciled, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, just answer the question. On the one hand we know that she took great care to hide away the Numsa documents off the premises, on the other hand you would have it that she sits with this hit-list bombshell but doesn't exercise the same care and simply quite carelessly leaves it under her car seat. Can you explain the anomaly?

MR BELLINGAN: It was not carelessly left under the car seat, Mr Chairman, it was in fact tied under the seat so that it was not lying around under the car seat, firstly, and secondly, the correct version of the Numsa matter was in fact in that envelope.

MR TRENGOVE: What correct version of the Numsa matter?

MR BELLINGAN: The correct version that this was an operation, a WH10 operation.

MR TRENGOVE: Was in the envelope?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: But can you explain why she takes so much care to preserve the relatively trivial documents on the one hand compared to the hit-list bombshell, but carries around the bombshell under her car seat at the risk of your finding it there?

MR BELLINGAN: Well Mr Chairman, I understood that documentation would be at the premises. Janine didn't have the habit of going to her office during the weekends, so I understood that the documentation would be there. She may have wanted to hand it over to somebody presumably that's from the tape, that's what I understood.

MR TRENGOVE: She would mail it, not take it home, mail it.

MR BELLINGAN: Any other documentation which there may be I could count upon the police to take of, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Why do think did she hide these documents away from home?

MR BELLINGAN: In her locker?

MR TRENGOVE: Ja.

MR BELLINGAN: Janine must have had a reason why she wanted to do that.

MR TRENGOVE: To protect them against whom?

MR BELLINGAN: She may just have forgotten them there, Mr Chairman, she may - I'm not sure what ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: No, no, no, don't speculate, I'm telling you as a fact that she hid them away and took great care to hide them away off the premises. Now I'm asking you, assuming that to have been the case, against whom was she protecting them?

MR DU PLESSIS: But Mr Chairman, my learned friend in one sentence says the witness must not speculate and then he asks a question of which the answer is clearly going to be pure speculation.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes, I'm inviting him to speculate. I'm inviting him to give a sensible reason, sensible explanation ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: But then he mustn't tell the witness not to speculate, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I didn't tell him ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well just - it's not really a point that you should be fighting over. Can you respond, Mr Bellingan please?

MR BELLINGAN: I suppose Janine thought that she could have some type of leverage with that, Mr Chairman, in terms then of should she ever want to proceed with this on/off divorce type of situation, that she could have some leverage to suggest that I was involved with something concerning funds, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: The question ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: And that I might somehow give in to some type of settlement, as Mr Mendelow put it then.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, you're not answering the question, the question is against whom was she protecting the documents that she hid away in the office?

MR BELLINGAN: It must obviously also have been against me, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes, exactly, but if she left them under her car seat they were very vulnerable to your discovery and removal of those documents.

MR BELLINGAN: If she left them under the car seat?

MR TRENGOVE: Ja.

MR BELLINGAN: It was extremely difficult for me, Mr Chairman, to search around anything to do with Janine, she was watching me like a hawk. There was no ways I could go and search through Janine's car.

MR TRENGOVE: She told everybody, or not everybody, she told lots of people about the Numsa documents, never told anybody about the hit-list. Are you in a position to explain why that might be so?

MR BELLINGAN: I had in no uncertain terms explained the Official Secrets Act and the playing with fire aspect to Janine. We had had many conversations about it, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: No, I'm talking about her confidants, the people she trusted enough to tell them that she had these documents which disclosed your crimes. She never mentioned a word to anybody about the so-called hit-list.

MR BELLINGAN: Well that's not accurate, Mr Chairman, I heard her mentioning the so-called hit-list.

MR TRENGOVE: To whom, on the telephone?

MR BELLINGAN: Ja.

MR TRENGOVE: To whom?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't know to whom it was. I presume it was ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: The only people today ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: ... a member of the ANC.

MR TRENGOVE: The only people today who say that she spoke of a hit-list are you and Judy, nobody else knows about it, correct? Correct, Mr Bellingan?

MR BELLINGAN: I've made these disclosures now, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I know you have. You don't know of anybody who knew that Janine had the hit-list before her death?

MR BELLINGAN: I never disclosed it to anybody then, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: So the only witnesses to that fact are you and your sister?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, had somebody to whom she was speaking known who Janine was, that would have been a different matter.

MR TRENGOVE: And what's more you say that she - as far as we know she didn't mention this hit-list to anybody, except that she spoke about it on the phone which she knew to be tapped.

MR BELLINGAN: No she thought it wasn't tapped at that stage, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I'm telling that she knew that it was.

MR BELLINGAN: That's not correct, Mr Chairman, I know that she knew it wasn't tapped.

MR TRENGOVE: I want to suggest to you that this story of the hit-list is a piece of fabrication, it's an attempt to give a political colour to the murder of your wife.

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, it's no fabrication whatsoever.

MR TRENGOVE: You emphasised yesterday that if you hadn't killed your wife her imminent disclosure posed a risk of national proportions, do you remember that?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: You even said that the peaceful transition to democracy was at risk. Could you please refer in this regard to your document, Exhibit C to see how emphatic you are in that regard. Page 6, paragraph 4 ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: Excuse me a second, please. Sorry, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Could you refer to page 6, paragraph 4 and just read that paragraph into the record.

MR BELLINGAN:

were more than, yes:

MR TRENGOVE:

You don't think that's a trifle overstated?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE:

you say.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: You don't think that's an overstatement?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: This list of incidents of police atrocities you say would have not only prevented the political settlement but would have led to mass insurrection, how?

MR BELLINGAN: Not just the list, Mr Chairman, sensitive matters such as the Numsa things, such as operations we were involved in, such as that list. Anything that was embarrassing to the National Party then could have ended the negotiations completely, Mr Chairman. There would have been no trust between the National Party and Mr Nelson Mandela. The slightest thing at the time was sparking off problems between the two.

MR TRENGOVE: No, we're talking about ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: In fact at a later stage Codesa 1 fell apart completely I think, because of relatively, by comparison, relatively minor things.

MR TRENGOVE: Don't speak in general terms, we're talking about the risk of Janine exposing your hit-list. Are you suggesting that could have been used to stir up mass insurrection?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: It's absurd, Mr Bellingan, explain how.

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, these matters were being exploited at the time by political opportunists, including the media. They would take the slightest matter like that and it would not be laid to rest until such time as there was a thorough assassination politically of the National Party and the Security Branch.

MR TRENGOVE: Everybody knew that the security police had been involved in a variety of atrocities.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, ...

MR TRENGOVE: How could the news of it have caused mass insurrection?

MR BELLINGAN: The liberal community always suspected, the South African white population knew it, they were comfortable with it. People wanted to expose it. Credible people standing up and giving information about is was another matter altogether, those people usually didn't live very long, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Have a look at page 8, paragraph 7. You just need to read - well, perhaps read the whole of paragraph 7. Sorry, just the part at the foot of page 8. Could you read it into the record please.

MR BELLINGAN: ...(indistinct).

MR TRENGOVE: Ja, at the foot of page 8, paragraph 7.

MR BELLINGAN:

MR TRENGOVE: Is that not an overstatement?

MR BELLINGAN: I didn't think so then, Mr Chairman, and I don't think so now.

MR TRENGOVE: Next page, the second paragraph on that page.

MR BELLINGAN:

...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: Sorry, the second paragraph on that page.

MR BELLINGAN:

MR TRENGOVE: Is that not an overstatement?

MR BELLINGAN: It's an overstatement, Mr Chairman. In some respects a slight overstatement.

MR TRENGOVE: In what respect is it a slight overstatement?

MR BELLINGAN: Well perhaps I should have said "most likely would not have occurred". I say emphatically here "would not have occurred". And then perhaps these things would have occurred at a later stage, Mr Chairman, but what I mean is the need to accelerate these things, the need to get on with transition, Mr Chairman, it had to be done as quickly as possible. And with problems, with the unguided exposure of information it is a problem. Via a process like the TRC, Mr Chairman, it's a completely different matter, it's a controlled release of information, that's different. But to have it just exploded on the public at that time before these things could be taking place, would have prevented these things. They may have occurred sooner or later but that's not the point, Mr Chairman. The level of tension in the country, the level of mistrust between people, the level of political violence was very high at the time.

MR TRENGOVE: Now I understand you to have said that this represented not only your perception today but the view you held at the time of the murder, that these calamitous consequences would follow if you did not murder Janine.

MR BELLINGAN: What I said, Mr Chairman, is that when I drew this document up most of it represented my perception at the time of the murder and some of it represented my perception concerning that at the time I drew the document up. I said it very clearly yesterday.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, the paragraph you've just read out, did they or did they not reflect your perception at the time of the murder?

MR BELLINGAN: Those types of things that needed to be done, at the time of the murder I wouldn't have been able to give you this list because how would I possibly know President de Klerk was going to get the Nobel Prize?

MR TRENGOVE: Yes. But the magnitude of the calamity that would follow upon the disclosure was clear to you at the time?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And yet you did not report the risk to anybody?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: You did not discuss your plan to murder Janine to avoid the risk with anybody?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Not your commanding officer, correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Not the head of the Security Branch?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Not the Commissioner of Police?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct.

MR TRENGOVE: And not the President?

MR BELLINGAN: Correct.

MR TRENGOVE: Because you didn't trust them?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, not because I didn't trust them, because I didn't want to burden anybody else with that firstly, secondly because of the need for secrecy surrounding such a matter. The fact that there was far too much talk and far too much mistrust at the time and far too many leaks, intentional and unintentional, and the fact that the opportunity at the time did not really present itself for the kind of discussions that Mr Trengove is talking about, Advocate Trengove is talking about.

So in terms of the element of mistrust, it's in the back of my mind, Mr Chairman, that there can be consequences and most probably there will be, but that forms part of the background to the three things that I've mentioned now as well.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, you say firstly you didn't want to burden those people with this problem. This problem placed the whole country and its future at risk, why did you not want the Commissioner of Police to be burdened with that problem?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, it's not that problem, they were burdened with that problem already in the natural course of their, of the times.

MR TRENGOVE: No, here was a risk of ...(intervention)

MR BELLINGAN: I'm talking about the burdening with the decision to take a human life.

MR TRENGOVE: Here was a risk to the country of which they were blissfully ignorant, why did you not tell them about it?

MR BELLINGAN: They were aware of those problems in general.

MR TRENGOVE: They were not aware of this imminent risk, why did you not tell them?

MR BELLINGAN: They may even have been aware, Mr Chairman, via ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: As far as you knew they were not aware of this imminent risk. You say you didn't tell them and one of the reasons is you didn't want to burden them with it, didn't want to trouble them with something like this. The future of the country is at stake if you are to be believed, why not tell the Commissioner of Police?

MR BELLINGAN: For the reasons I've given before, Mr Chairman. If I need to repeat them I will repeat them.

MR TRENGOVE: The second reason you raised was the need for confidentiality, there were too many leaks going around. You didn't think you could trust a Commissioner of Police to keep confidential matters secret?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, not everybody in the police could be trusted at that stage ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: No, I'm talking about the Commissioner of Police.

MR BELLINGAN: Commissioner of Police?

MR TRENGOVE: Yes.

MR BELLINGAN: He also had to think about himself, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: So you didn't trust him to keep things secret?

MR BELLINGAN: It didn't occur to me to go and talk to the Commissioner of Police at that point in time. In the context of what I have said already.

MR TRENGOVE: General Erasmus you also didn't trust him to keep things secret, the father figure.

MR BELLINGAN: It is General Erasmus who told me to keep things secret.

MR TRENGOVE: Answer the question, why didn't you trust him to keep things secret?

MR BELLINGAN: And secondly, Mr Chairman, it is not I who used the word "father figure". I wish the advocate wouldn't put words in my mouth.

MR TRENGOVE: Just answer the question, Mr Bellingan.

MR BELLINGAN: What was the question?

MR TRENGOVE: Why didn't you trust him to keep things secret?

MR BELLINGAN: General Erasmus had a huge burden of problems as it was already, Mr Chairman. To a certain extent he was aware of the problem with Janine, to a certain extent. He expected me to take care of that problem, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: You know you explained to us yesterday or the day before, that is one wanted to have stickers printed you needed authority to do so, do you remember that?

MR BELLINGAN: For the expenditure, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes. Could you however go off and assassinate without authority?

MR BELLINGAN: I didn't do it without authority, Mr Chairman, I did it without a direct order.

MR TRENGOVE: You needed specific authority to print stickers, don't you?

MR BELLINGAN: For the expenditure relating to the printing of the stickers, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes. Did you think that you could go off and commit a murder without any specific authority to do so?

MR BELLINGAN: I didn't think so, I know, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: So you knew that you went off to commit this murder without authority?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I knew that I went off with authority.

MR TRENGOVE: No, you knew that you needed specific authority which you did not have.

MR BELLINGAN: I did have it, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Specific authority to murder your wife?

MR BELLINGAN: No, not to murder my wife.

MR TRENGOVE: You did not have specific authority to murder your wife.

MR BELLINGAN: I did not have a specific order to murder my wife.

MR TRENGOVE: I'm talking about order or authority. Permission or order to murder your wife you didn't have, correct?

MR BELLINGAN: A specific order to go and murder my wife I did not have, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes, in fact nobody else in the police were even aware that you were going to do so, correct?

MR BELLINGAN: At that point in time they were not aware, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: And I don't know what rules the police had about assassinations, but wasn't it necessary to seek specific approval before one was committed?

MR BELLINGAN: In the nature of these things, Mr Chairman, that is exactly the kind of thing that you don't put on paper.

MR TRENGOVE: I'm not talking about paper, I'm talking about authority.

MR BELLINGAN: There was authority for these political killings, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: No, specific authority. Mr Bellingan, I'll come back later to your suggestion that there was this vague general mandate to go around assassinating people, but I'm talking about specific authority to kill a specific person. What were the rules of the Security Branch, was specific authority required for an assassination or not?

MR BELLINGAN: There was specific authority, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: No, that's not my question.

MR BELLINGAN: Things I've quoted over here ...(indistinct) specific authority.

MR TRENGOVE: No, that's not my question. I'm asking you about the rules, what rules governed assassinations? Was specific authority necessary for assassination or not?

MR BELLINGAN: This was a war, Mr Chairman, there were no rules.

MR TRENGOVE: I see. So you could - provided you were a member of the security police, you had an open-ended authority to assassinate people at your discretion.

MR BELLINGAN: My discretion, Mr Chairman, was not some frivolous thing like it's been made out to be.

MR TRENGOVE: Just answer the question. Are you saying that every member of the security police had an open mandate to assassinate people in his discretion?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't think every member of the security police saw it that way, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I'm asking you what the mandate of the security police was as you understood it.

MR BELLINGAN: We were the political police. Amongst other things we did do assassinations, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: That's not an answer to my question. What was the mandate of the security police, was it to go around assassinating people entirely within their discretion, without seeking approval or authority from anybody?

MR BELLINGAN: It's not the way things happened, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: I'm not asking you whether it happened that way or not, I'm asking you about your understanding of what you were mandated to do.

MR BELLINGAN: My understanding, Mr Chairman, was that if it was necessary then it had to be done. It happened in the past. I understood exactly what my position was, I understood exactly what the position of my colleagues was, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Mr Bellingan, ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may he be afforded the opportunity to finalise his answer because with respect, my learned friend keeps on interjecting while the witness is trying to say something more and then further questions follow. Could he perhaps be allowed to answer the question fully?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do you want to add anything that, your answer?

MR BELLINGAN: Thank you, Mr Chairman. It is not just - I mean my perspective was not just simply a question of an order from a commander in the Security Branch, we used the methods of the enemy. I quoted the authority in my amnesty application too, which coloured my perspective of how I would take such a decision, Mr Chairman, from the KGB, from the African National Congress, from the African National Congress after peace agreements were signed. It is not some isolated event, Mr Chairman, such a decision, it is something that must be seen and I ask the Commission to see it in the context of the time.

MR TRENGOVE: I'm not asking you for the moment to justify your answer, I'm simply asking you to answer the question and that is how you understood your mandate, not your justification for it. Did you understand your mandate to be to assassinate people in your discretion without discussing it with anybody else in the security police?

MR BELLINGAN: I understood, Mr Chairman, that if the opportunity arose, if there was a need for it then I would and I was committed, Mr Chairman, to act accordingly.

MR TRENGOVE: So your answer to the question is yes?

MR BELLINGAN: ...(indistinct due to interjections)

MR TRENGOVE: ...(indistinct due to interjections)

MR DU PLESSIS: With respect, Mr Chairman, and I don't want to interject too often but with respect, the answer is not just a simple yes or no. He has explained the answer and my learned friend is trying to push him into an admission of yes to his question, where the answer is not as simple as that. The answer is simply not just yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Trengove is obviously trying to get the witness to elaborate. You can respond to the question, is the answer yes or no?

MR BELLINGAN: In the context of what I've said, if somehow it will help Mr Trengove, then let me say yes.

MR TRENGOVE: No, no, no, I want you to give answers which are true and not answers which are given in sympathy for my plight. I understand your evidence to be, but I don't want there to be any misunderstanding about it, that you were entitled under the mandate as you understood it, to decide for yourself without discussion with anybody whether it was necessary to assassinate someone and then to execute that assassination. Am I correct in my understanding?

MR BELLINGAN: The advocate is correct in that I perceived my mandate to be like that, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: You were not in the department of assassinations, it was not part of your unit's business, correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, these things were carried out on a nationwide basis. The fact that they happened to have been done in a more concentrated basis at Vlakplaas doesn't mean that the sole burden was just, lay just with Vlakplaas.

MR TRENGOVE: You were a personnel officer with a desk job.

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, that is not so.

MR TRENGOVE: Were you not a personnel officer at the time?

MR BELLINGAN: I never had an administrative job, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Were you not a personnel officer at the time?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I was a personnel - I was an officer in charge of the Personnel Development Unit, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Yes. And the unlawful activities for which you're seeking amnesty in this application were activities committed in a different capacity when you were stationed in Johannesburg, correct? - except for the murder of course. But all of the other activities related to an earlier time when you were stationed in Johannesburg.

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman, that isn't correct.

MR TRENGOVE: What unlawful activities did you commit in your '91 capacity for which you're now seeking amnesty?

MR BELLINGAN: In 1991?

MR TRENGOVE: At any time while acting in the capacity as head of the Personnel Development Unit.

MR BELLINGAN: The Unit, Mr Chairman, was Personnel, Intelligence and Stratcom, on a nationwide basis. To isolate it from the activities that were occurring around the country then cannot be done because I had knowledge of them. I've applied for amnesty for being an accessory.

MR TRENGOVE: Oh, you mean in the sense that you might in that capacity have incurred responsibility for other people's crimes?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Ja, the crimes you committed yourself for which you're seeking amnesty are crimes of thuggery committed in the '80's, correct?

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: What's wrong with my description of those crimes?

MR BELLINGAN: Well this was not some random thuggery as Mr Trengove puts it.

MR TRENGOVE: No, I'm not suggesting random thuggery, I'm just suggesting that compared to murder, those were petty matters, hanging cats outside people's doors, smashing car windows, throwing bricks at people. Granted one arson, but compared to assassination that was petty thuggery.

MR BELLINGAN: I think that the advocate has a completely wrong perception, Mr Chairman, there were other matters too. For example the compilation of lists, the surveillance done regarding bomb explosions, Khotso House, Cosatu House ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: No, you might have done a little bit of field work for the people responsible for the serious crimes, but that was the extent of your participation.

MR BELLINGAN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Field work and thuggery.

MR BELLINGAN: These types of investigations I was doing most likely led to people being killed.

MR TRENGOVE: That may be.

MR BELLINGAN: If I may take an example, take Webster for example, when I ran the Church Desk he was one of my suspects. At one stage I was asks to provide names of people. I don't recall now, I have given his name to somebody then, Mr Chairman. It's been bothering me, I don't know what role I played in the ultimate decision to kill the man. I don't know, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Are you claiming that you might have been responsible for his murder?

MR BELLINGAN: I may have been indirectly responsible for it. There was a lot of this kind of work that we were doing on an ongoing basis, Mr Chairman. There were people, for example Brian Ncqulunga who was a problem, he became a nervous wreck ...(intervention)

MR TRENGOVE: Your ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me, Mr Trengove, I intend to take a short adjournment at this stage.

MR TRENGOVE: As it pleases you.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn for 15 minutes.

MR DU PLESSIS: ...(start of tape) and that's obviously the only discussion I had with him, a concern he has about the fact that cross-examination will not finish tomorrow, that the matter is going to be postponed. He specifically mentioned to me certain problems he has with that. I have explained to him the position and the normal procedural situation and I have told him that I do not intend to place certain things on record or to deal with certain things.

He has asked me if you could afford him the opportunity to raise the problems that he has with you and I have said if he feels against my advice, that he wants to raise these issues, then he should ask you if he could do that, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, are those related to the question of cross-examination not being finished?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright. Yes, well perhaps it's a bit early but I had hoped that that was not going to be the case, but I suppose let's proceed and then let's see how far we get with the question of cross-examination. And if you have problems tomorrow, then I'll give you an opportunity to put it on record and we'll see what we can do.

MR DU PLESSIS ADDRESSES COMMITTEE: Mr Chairman, perhaps I can just raise the point or make the point that he has made to me, and I want to say firstly that there is no reflection on Mr Wagener at all when I say this, and that is why I was reluctant to say it any event. Is that my client informs me that he does not trust Mr Wagener's clients at all and he feels that if there is an opportunity of a month or weeks to go through the record, to study the record and to be able then to deal with his evidence in the light of the history of this matter, that he will be severely prejudiced.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well I hear what you are saying. You know ideally of course we would have preferred to get this application done in one sitting and as a Committee we often try to do that but we understand that we must be realistic. There are other considerations to be taken into account, the fact that there are many people who are involved and who are affected by the process and some of these consequences of course are inevitable. You know it just flows from the nature of the process. I don't want to get into that discussion at this stage. If your client has anything in particular that he wanted to put on record, I think let's do that at the end of the day, tomorrow when we have to deal with the future conduct of the matter. But I think for the moment let's see how far we get with the cross-examination.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, may I come in here. I'm not exactly sure what is meant by the remark that my clients are not trusted and I'm not exactly sure what to make of this, maybe if I can get an indication. What am I to do now? I can merely convey this to my clients and say to them they are not to be trusted.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Mr Chairman, I wanted to elucidate on that, we wanted to make it clear and that is why I didn't want to place this on record myself. My personal view is not the view that was expressed now. I was given instructions by my client that that is the way he feels. I want to make it clear that it is not my personal view. I do not insinuate that Mr Wagener will be involved in anything untoward. I know most of Mr Wagener's clients and this is definitely not my personal view. These were my instructions from my client and that is his view. And that is as far as it goes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Wagener, I understand your being perplexed at this stage. It seems to be a personal view that the applicant holds. I don't know what else could be done about that but as I've said I don't want us to debate this thing at this stage. I'm not quite sure where it will take us to. It might be that there is something relevant for our purposes in this but certainly not at this stage. I would like to see how far we can get with the cross-examination. That is my immediate concern.

I must just indicate that at this stage I don't believe that there is anything that has happened at the proceedings here that prejudices the applicant in any way, certainly not insofar as Mr Wagener and the way in which he has been conducting the matter on behalf of his clients is concerned. In fact he has by the nature of things and in view of the fact that he's representing interested parties, he hasn't been playing up to now a very active role in the proceedings. He might very well do it eventually but certainly there is no basis for any action on the part of the Panel I might say, at this stage.

So I'm simply going to leave the matter at that, Mr Wagener, there's not much that we can do at this stage about it, and see if we can't get on with the proceedings. That's the bigger concern I think in the circumstances.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just mention that I agree with you pertaining to your perceptions of Mr Wagener.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis. Mr Bellingan, I must remind you that you are still under oath.

MICHAEL BELLINGAN: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Trengove?

MR BELLINGAN ADDRESSES COMMITTEE: Mr Chairman, perhaps if I could just be given one or two words on the matter as well. As I haven't really had a chance to properly canvass with my advocate because of the problem that I may not speak with him. At no stage did I ever insinuate that I had a problem with Mr Wagener. That is not the case at all. But I have very good

grounds which may be outside the ambit of information that comes to your attention, Mr Chairman, for what I'm suggesting. It's a procedural issue which I have been raising or trying to raise from this morning and it's been bothering me the whole time, even before the start of this hearing. It still bothers me tremendously and that is all. It's a procedural issue as to getting the cross-examination finished in one sitting.

It's a concern based on a long history of facts to my knowledge and not within the knowledge of this Committee, Mr Chairman. So in no way have I suggested that there is anything untoward about Mr Wagener's handling of this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well we've noted all of that, Mr Bellingan. As I've tried to indicate, some of the procedural consequences of a hearing of this nature are often beyond anybody's control. We ideally would have loved to, in fact I have indicated that earlier to all the legal representatives, I had thought and my colleagues here had thought it's a kind of matter that we could possibly have done in a week but it might turn out not to be a correct assessment of the matter. And then consequences follow from that, we must postpone, we must see if people are available, when they are available, whether there's a venue and so on and so on, which are things I think you understand. You would have some idea of how Court cases work and it's a similar situation here.

So about those kinds of things there's little that one can do. You are legally represented and if there is anything that really prejudices your case then of course I've got little doubt that Mr du Plessis and your attorney's will deal with that quite effectively. But for the moment I would like to carry on with the proceedings.

Mr Trengove?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR TRENGOVE: (cont)

As it pleases you, Sir.

Mr Bellingan, you said in your evidence in chief that when you murdered your wife you were aware of a broad authority to the security police to eliminate activists and you went on to explain that you were told to undertake these unlawful activities, including murder, do you remember that evidence?

MR BELLINGAN: I said that I believed that I had authority for the murder and I also believed that there is authority for other covert activity in which I was involved.

MR TRENGOVE: Do you remember that you also said when your counsel asked you, not under my examination, but you explained that you were told that you could undertake these unlawful activities and one of the Members of the Panel asked you: including murder, and you confirmed: including murder. Do you remember that evidence?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR TRENGOVE: Who told you to undertake activities of that kind?

MR BELLINGAN: Mr Chairman, I thought that we canvassed that in the general introduction.

MR TRENGOVE: No, what is the name of the person who said to you that you could undertake these unlawful activities including murder?

MR BELLINGAN: I've provided that information, it's a simple matter of providing one sing