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CHAIRPERSON: As I was saying, this morning we are going to start with the applications of eight applicants in the incident called the "Silent Valley" incident, involving victims Kruschev, Marx and Moatshe. Is that not so Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Will the legal representatives who will be appearing in this matter kindly state their names for the record?

MR VISSER: Madame Chairperson, may it please you, my name is Louis Visser for the record. I appear for the applicants in this matter, all seven of them. In fact I may just rectify what I've just stated. There is one applicant, number 6 in bundle 11, W C C Smith for whom we do not appear. We don't know who appears on his behalf.

CHAIRPERSON: I may just probably given an indication that Advocate Roelf du Plessis advised us yesterday in chambers that he will be appearing on behalf of Mr Smith and requested to be excused for this mornings session because of an engagement that he couldn't dispose of and he has been excused by the Committee. Ms Lockhat, are you the evidence leader in this matter?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson. Just for the record that there are no victims in this matter, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Before we commence may we express our appreciation to you Mr Visser for having made serious attempts to be hear before half past nine, we know your matter was not expected to have been commenced with this morning but you accommodated the Committee when you were requested to do so. Thank you.

MR VISSER: Our gratitude for your kind remarks Madame Chairperson. Before we start with the "Silent Valley" matter and least I forget, may we give you a report back on the efforts of Mr Crause sitting next to me in request to the request by the Committee regarding where the deceased in the "Nietverdiendt" matter might have been buried? What I have is the following to report. Mr Crause, through a person by the name of Prayer spelt as in prayer, Makoane, M-a-k-o-a-n-e of Rustenburg made enquiries and his cell telephone number is 0826990780. What Mr Makoane has found out is the following. He states that he was informed by a Sergeant Lefakane, L-e-f-a-k-a-n-e, of Mogwasi, M-o-g-w-a-s-i, police station apparently, that the remains of the victims were transported to Garankuwa. I have no dates to give you but they were transported to Garankuwa where an Inspector Kgoele K-g-o-e-l-e, who is now a retired police officer, received them and he apparently signed for the receipt of the remains of these people. He was stationed at Garankuwa. Apparently, the information is that the probabilities are that a funeral undertaking by the name of Sopara, S-o-p-a-r-a, is the probable funeral service who buried or which buried the ten activists. For obvious reasons, Chairperson, we didn't pursue the matter any further and we thought it more appropriate that Ms Lockhat would take it up from there but that's what we were able to establish.

CHAIRPERSON: We are indebted to you for this kind of information. We would have expected our investigative unit to have been the one to have made serious - followed up in respect of this kind of information. We do hope that Ms Lockhat will take it up with the unit concerned in order to further the investigation commenced by Mr Crause of his own accord.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I confirm that I will take this up with our investigative unit to pursue this matter further. Thank you.

MR VISSER: Chairperson if I then may proceed with the "Silent Valley" applications. In the course of the evidence we will be referring to certain volumes and documents which are already before you. May I mention to you which they are. Ms Lockhat this morning placed the relevant bundles before you, not disappointing the efficiency we have come to expect of her. We will refer to bundle 1 - the decisions, to bundle 2(i), to bundle 2(g) and bundle 2(j). I don't know whether I have mentioned it, we will obviously refer to bundle 11, that's the one that contains the applications. Then apart from that, Chairperson, we will refer to Exhibit A. Now Exhibit A, that was the affidavit which was the evidence of Colonel Crause, when he gave evidence in the Nietverdiendt matter. Exhibit B is not really going to be relevant because perhaps for the sake of Mr Lax, the paragraph 10 questions and answers of the application form had been left up of most of the applications of the applicants for whom we appear and they're all identically the same and we just place that before you in case you want to refer to it. It was Commissioner Lax in any event, superseded by the affidavits which contained the evidence so it's not really necessary to refer to Exhibit B. We will however also refer to Exhibit C which is the affidavit of Loots, because he will give evidence again. We will not refer to Exhibit D, E, F or G because those relate to matters in which we're not concerned. We then come to Exhibit H, Chairperson, and perhaps it may be convenient for you to deal with those immediately. You will find a pack of documents placed before you in the same format as the affidavits, Exhibits A and B. They will be the affidavits of Steyn and I'm told that you have now reached the letter Exhibit H and if it would please you, Chairperson, to mark Steyn Exhibit H.

CHAIRPERSON: The affidavit of General Steyn?

MR VISSER: Steyn, yes, that's Exhibit H. Then we have Senior Superintendent du Preez Smit.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR VISSER: I don't know whether you have the same objections as Justice Wilson against the letter I, but it can either by I or J, it's your choice.

CHAIRPERSON: I have no objection.

MR VISSER: I. Then we have the affidavit of Nieuwenhuis who will testify next and his will be J. We then come to Van Zyl who will be Exhibit K, which leaves us with Marais. Now we have a problem with Marais because as we informed the Committee yesterday, he will not be here probably today and his affidavit has not been discussed with him or signed and what happened is we had a preliminary consultation with him and then further consultations over the telephone and we have already drawn up a document for him but he'll just have to have the final say as to whether he is satisfied with it and we will deal with that the minute it comes to hand.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Are you expecting Mr Marais to be present today at all?

MR VISSER: Not today, probably tomorrow only. Chairperson, if I may commence, we would like to call first of all Colonel Crause because not in a sequence of higher to lower ranking officers but more in the sense of chronological order to make better sense to you to understand the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it's a good suggestion Mr Visser.

PHILIP RUDOLF CRAUSE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, I have omitted to refer you also to the fact that for the sake of saving time we will refer to our heads of argument which we handed up. I have made arrangements that those be made available, that a copy by made available to Mr Lax seeing that he hasn't been here and may I say by way of introduction that when we started with the proceedings we led Mr Crause a little bit more extensively and then the rest of the witnesses we led very briefly in their evidence in chief. The idea was that because these incidents that we are now going to deal with all concern the Western Transvaal and Botswana. Of course, as we know, Commissioner Lax has now come into the picture. Knowing him from before I have no doubt that he will catch up very quickly, but perhaps in deference to him, I should perhaps spend a little time with Mr Crause just again to sketch the background a little bit to place Mr Lax into the background. However, we believe Madame Chair that we will comfortably finish today with the evidence, particularly seeing that there is no objection to the applications.

CHAIRPERSON: We would request you to be very brief in leading evidence as to background.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lax is to some extent familiar, we have already brought him up to speed with the evidence led in the previous incident.

MR VISSER: Oh, well thank you for indicating that to me, Madame Chair and of course the other answer to that situation is that it's all on paper ready in front of you.

CHAIRPERSON: He has a copy of your heads of argument marked the "Nietverdiendt 10".

MR VISSER: Pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: He has a copy.

MR VISSER: Oh, I see yes, thank you and perhaps if I just -make the last remark? If Commissioner Lax is uncertain about anything, please do feel free to interrupt at any time. We then call Colonel Crause.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, you probably were too concerned about what you wanted to address us on before you commenced?

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: He has already been sworn in, you may proceed to lead evidence in chief.

MR VISSER: But apart from that I'm also old and getting senile Madame Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: I hope I wish I could agree with you.

MR VISSER: Madame Chair, the application of this applicant you'll find in bundle 11, pages 81 to 85. Again, that has been superseded by his affidavit so unless there is some contradiction which you want to take up with him flowing from that, from the original application, it will not be relevant in any other way.

MR VISSER: Colonel Crause, you are the applicant in this matter and you are requesting amnesty for any illegal or unlawful deed or omission committed by you with regard to ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: May I just interrupt, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: One of my members does not have Annexure A, I think it's important for him to have Annexure A.

MR VISSER: Oh, certainly. Annexure A?

CHAIRPERSON: Whilst Mr Crause is giving evidence. I do have a copy, there seems to have been a mistake. Maybe we can rotate a copy?

MS LOCKHAT: I've got copies thank you. Can you just, Mr Visser, regarding those annexures, is it Annexure A just to clarify so we can bring Mr Ilan Lax up to speed? Annexure A you referred to? B? - that's Crause's.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you just give Mr Lax all the annexures but for purposes of Mr Crause's evidence just make available Annexure A to Mr Lax. I take it, Mr Visser, that all these annexures are supplementary affidavits to the original applications contained in bundle 11?

MR VISSER: Indeed, Madame Chair, you might from what is stated in the original application form, perhaps attach some value to aspects thereof which you wish to take up with the witness of course that's always a possibility, but what we have attempted to do is to deal in the affidavits which we will hand up to you any matters where they do not follow exactly what is stated in their original application forms and where mistakes were made or there were matters which weren't properly explained, we take it further but we certainly do refer to everything which is referred here.

Colonel, the amnesty application has to do with the murder of two who you describe as uMkhonto weSizwe commanders, those being MK named Kruschev and Karl Marx who were killed as well as one as you have described as a conspiratorial Andries Moatshe, as well as any other unlawful deed or offence which you may have committed during this matter, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And we know that this matter or this incident occurred on the 4th May 1983 in the Derdepoort environment at a place with the name Silent Valley in Thabazimbi area?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: You have your application before you, that is in bundle 11, page 81 to 87. On page 3 of your affidavit you have referred to various other submissions and evidence which have already been submitted to the Amnesty Committee and you request that that evidence be considered in the evaluation of your amnesty application, not only this application but also the Nietverdiendt as well as the McKenzie application which we will hear shortly?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you refer on page 3 to the amnesty applications which have already been heard and you request that those decisions be considered with regard to your specific case?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: You have sketched your personal circumstances and background and approach on page 4 beginning at paragraph 1 leading up to page 5 and on page 5 you have referred to a quote from the amnesty decision of Brigadier J H Cronje, which according to you is a synopsis of what was of application to you during your formative years and the situation during the struggle?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Your police career in South African Police has been set out also on page 5. The relevant aspects thereof are that from 1971 already you were stationed in the Western Transvaal, firstly as a detective and thereafter you went to the Security Branch in 1972 where you became the Branch Commander in 1985 of the Zeerust Security Branch, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: The rest speaks for itself, do you confirm all of this?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Then on page 6 you describe the struggle of the past as you experienced it. Once again on page 7 you refer to a summary by the original Amnesty Committee in Brigadier Cronje's decision that you say that you agree with?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And if we may continue, on page 8 and 9 you provide some particulars which are not contained within the amnesty decision of J H Cronje or any other applicant to whom amnesty was granted and you also discussed this until page 10 and from paragraph 17 onwards you provide a more actual description of the situation on ground level for the ordinary policeman such as yourself and you finish on page 11 where you state that in paragraph 21, where you refer to numerous bomb attacks which took place all over the country during which injury and damage to property took place. You say in paragraph 21 that weapons and ammunition and explosives, let's just call it weapons to be brief, and with that we refer to weapons, ammunition, explosives, limpet mines and anything else associated with that, that such weaponry was smuggled into the R.S.A. into the neighbouring country, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: There on page 11 you have given your knowledge of the role played by Botswana during the struggle. Then for the sake of Commissioner Lax we would just like to deal with that somewhat more thoroughly, it is true that Botswana from 1977 began to play a more important role with regard to the ANC/SACP Alliance's organisational exercise of their strategies, planning, provision of weaponry and human resources with regard to fighters for the revolutionary struggle in the R.S.A. as you have set it out in paragraph 23?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: General van der Merwe would at the beginning of these hearings have given evidence however as a result of the course of the hearings has not yet testified. However, you do agree with the allegations regarding Marius Schoon approximately in 1977 after he had left the R.S.A. and the network of infiltration routes which was largely established and maintained by him and on page 12 you continue. In paragraph 28 in which you say that as the war - and that would be in the R.S.A. waged on, Botswana began to achieve greater importance with regard to the maintenance of routes, support and assistance to persons leaving the R.S.A., that would be in Botswana, assistance to returning terrorists which included logistical and financial aid as well as the smuggling of explosives and weaponry?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Madame Chair, may I at this juncture refer you to the written argument where this has been summarised with reference to relevant evidence given before other Amnesty Committees, particularly the Amnesty Committee hearing the amnesty application in regard to Jeanette and Katryn Schoon and Mr Marius Schoon himself, London Bomb etc., which was chaired by Justice Wilson and in which Commissioner De Jager was in fact one of the Commissioners. Chairperson, the relevant portion regarding Botswana you will find at page 3 and the only reason why I now refer you to it is for the sake of the references which we have given there. Now I have broken a promise Chairperson and I hope that you will allow me at this stage to rectify that. I undertook to extract a few short passages from an exhibit which served in the Marius Schoon London Bomb amnesty application which was marked EXHIBIT RR. You might remember I referred to it, unfortunately I've forgotten to refer you to the exact passages and perhaps just for the record, you might allow me just to read a few passages at this juncture. It would make in my submission, would make sense just to keep the matters together. In exhibit ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Are they long passages Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: I'm sorry?

CHAIRPERSON: Are they long passages?

MR VISSER: No, no, they're very brief, it's just to illustrate the principles of what the witnesses will testify about and where it comes from. Chairperson ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed with it.

MR VISSER: Thank you. In Exhibit RR, it starts off with saying, it's a memorandum and it says this memorandum has been prepared mainly as a study piece in or to give an insight into the methods and contacts of Marius and Jeanette Schoon of the ANC/SACP and to should be read in conjunction with another memorandum which I'm not going to bother you with. In the middle of that page on page 4 it says:

Then it speaks of letters that had been intercepted and are attached, Chairperson, and I turn immediately to page 8 where a little bit of history was set out as to the development of infiltration or using Botswana as a springboard and that started in the words of Exhibit RR as follows:

And then names were mentioned, Oliver Tambo, Alfred Nzo etc, etc, etc, and then it goes on to say:

And then it goes on to say - it refers to Mr Fillers Naidoo and it speaks of the co-ordination with neighbouring countries, which I'm not going to bother you with, Madame Chair, if I may go over the page, it says:

I'm sorry, may I just find the passage. There's a reference to what Schoon had stated Chairperson, but what I want to refer you to is page 9, paragraph 2, where it states:

Chairperson, barring one last reference, but that is what I wanted to inform you about and the last reference is at page 14 and it says this:

I leave out a sentence and it continues to say:

and then the last sentence is:

And having done that, Chairperson, we can now set aside Exhibit RR because that is all that is relevant for purposes of these applications.

Might I then return to you, Mr Crause? This has to do then with the significance of Botswana. On page 13 in paragraph 29 you refer to the fact that weaponry and explosives which were used in certain attacks on the R.S.A. were indeed brought in from Botswana such as from example the Robert McBride, Gordon Webster explosion?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: You've then referred to incidents in paragraph 30 and then we get to 1983 and that is the time when the Silent Valley incident took place and you say in paragraph 31 that at that stage the activities of the ANC/SACP alliance within and without Botswana were already very evolved and by that stage the informers of the security branch had infiltrated Botswana and many weapons and explosives were smuggled from Botswana to South Africa. Then you refer to bundle 2 J.

In the original of annexure A, Chairperson, the bundle had not been renamed but it was renamed later from 2 IL to 2 J, that is why that reference to bundle 2 IL is still there.

You had personal knowledge at that stage of the activities of eminent and important ANC/MK leadership figures such as for example Aboobaker Ismail, MK name Rashid, Lambert Maloy, Johannes Manisi, Lester Damakude, Lekota Phule and others in Botswana, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: You also have personal knowledge of the fact that various complaints came to the knowledge of the Botswana authorities, by name the Botswana Police but there was never any satisfactory management of these complaints?

MR CRAUSE: No.

MR VISSER: And the consequence thereof was that the pressure on you escalated with regard to the insurgence of people and ammunition from Botswana and your attempts to prevent it?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You refer on page 14 paragraph 35 to the state of emergency and the fact that this was not of much assistance in combating the onslaught from Botswana?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: If we could then go to your summaries on page 15, paragraph 37, for the convenience of the Commissioners, you go to paragraph 16 where you give a summary of the affidavit of Brigadier Loots in Exhibit 2J.

CHAIRPERSON: What page are you at?

MR VISSER: Madame Chairperson, I'm now at page 16, paragraph 38. May I ask you to make a marginal note with a reference to the heads of argument at page 7, paragraph 20 and onwards up to page 9 where we have attempted for your convenience to give a summary of what the witnesses are referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: In bundle 2J and if once you've read that you don't have to bother yourself with reading 2J either, we've done that for you. Now, Chairperson, if I may continue then?

Mr Crause we then come to page 17, the position of the applicants, you have there stated that you worked extremely hard, that you made desperate attempts to prevent the insurgence of people who came to commit acts of terror in South Africa and smuggled weapons in and so forth. We're not going discuss all of that, you will confirm everything up until page 19, paragraph 45, that what you state there is according to your opinion true and correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: It is not necessary for you to state anything further about the smuggling of weapons, we will ask General van der Merwe for a brief explanation regarding that when he comes to give evidence because Trevits for example has been mentioned numerous times before this Committee. We will ask him to place these matters into perspective. The political motivations speak for themselves. Do you confirm what you have stated there in paragraph 52, on page 20 up until page 23, paragraph 63?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Now that Madame Chairperson really replaces Exhibit B and that is why we didn't really refer to Exhibit B because that passage - that heading refers to all the issues and other issues.

On page 24, paragraph 64, you have asked for the understanding of the Commission because the matters regarding which you are giving evidence took place quite a long time ago and your memory regarding details may not be precise?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You've also informed the Committee in paragraph 65 that you had the benefit of discussion with some of your colleagues and perusing the applications and as a result of that there are certain aspects which you may have forgotten about which have been brought back to your recollection?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you have included those aspects in the evidence which you are delivering before the Committee?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: If we could then go to page 25, the Silent Valley incident and I refer you to paragraph 68, that's page 25, paragraph 68, you refer to the amnesty application of Brigadier Loots who will be giving evidence and you agree in essence with the facts as they are given by him?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you then look at paragraph 69, begin there and just tell the Committee how you recall the matter and I will interrupt you as we proceed to ask you to explain certain aspects. If you may just begin?

MR CRAUSE: On the 4th May 1983, I and other members of the security branch were busy with an operation with the objective of arresting PAC insurgents as they came over the border at Derdepoort.

MR VISSER: May I just interrupt you there? A good concept perhaps only needs half a word but just to explain, on this day you say that you were busy with an operation because there was information that PAC insurgents were coming into the country?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And what happened then? Paragraph 17.

MR CRAUSE: Well, Captain Du Preez, Smit and I were under way with an official vehicle to Derdepoort. I heard a radio report, that is on the police radio from the border post commander that there was a person at Derdepoort who wanted to speak to me.

MR VISSER: Mr Crause, I would just ask you to move somewhat slower just to give time for the interpreters?

MR CRAUSE: Very well. Page 26, paragraph 71, with our arrival at Derdepoort border post I met one Andries Moatshe as well as Colonel Venter who was at that stage still a captain. Moatshe was known to me from previous occasions. He was suspected by me of being an ANC conspirator ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: Would you just stop there please? Madame Chair, may I refer you to bundle 2G?

CHAIRPERSON: That's the evidence of Mr Venter?

MR VISSER: That is the evidence of Mr Venter. Page 861.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you announce to locate 2G, there's a pile of bundles?

MR VISSER: 2G, it's a thick bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And it is at page 861.

CHAIRPERSON: You may continue.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. I will refer you to the middle of the page where Colonel Venter talks about the nature and particulars where he says:

If I may stop there?

Mr Crause, is that how you recall the situation as Mr Venter has given it here?

MR CRAUSE: No, I was not present when Moatshe arrived at the border post and I was also not present when Venter arrived there.

MR VISSER: So what you're trying to say, are you're saying that if he had appeared to be shocked and surprised it would have been before you arrived there?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Because when you arrived there you were already aware that he had requested to speak to you?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct, I just didn't know who the person was at that stage.

MR VISSER: Very well, can we just refer to the other aspect here and that is the evidence of Colonel Venter in which he says that:

What exactly was your knowledge of Mr Andries Moatshe?

MR CRAUSE: I was aware by means of informers that he was involved in Botswana with the transport of trained ANC operatives, that he provided assistance and accommodation to them, that he transported weaponry, that he acted as a courier for them.

CHAIRPERSON: May you be a little slower to enable us to transcribe your evidence and also to enable the translator to be able to translate at a pace that's not going to make her gasp for air?

MR VISSER: Yes, just a little slower. Madame Chair, we're at paragraph 73.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware.

MR VISSER: Yes? Could you repeat what you've just said Mr Crause?

MR CRAUSE: I was aware by means of informers that we had in Botswana that Moatshe was involved with ANC, that he provided safe accommodation for MK members, that he transported them, that he concealed and transported weapons for them, that he acted as a courier and that he was also involved in the infiltration of trained MK members to the R.S.A.

MR VISSER: Is it correct that before the 4th May at a stage you had had a discussion with Mr Moatshe?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Could you tell the Committee what the content of that discussion was?

MR CRAUSE: If I remember correctly, I found Moatshe at a border post.

MR VISSER: When approximately did this take place?

MR CRAUSE: It was quite sometime before then, approximately five to six months before the incident, approximately if I recall correctly. I then informed him that we were aware of his activities and I also warned him that he would be harmed in the process.

MR VISSER: And what did you mean by that?

MR CRAUSE: I meant that he would be arrested.

CHAIRPERSON: May I interpose Mr Visser on this particular aspect of evidence?

When you say that you were informed by your informers of the activities of Mr Moatshe, that amongst others he provided safe accommodation, conveyed weapons as well as conveying MK who wanted to infiltrate the country. Were you not aware of all these activities at the time when you recruited him as your own informer?

MR CRAUSE: I never recruited him as an informer.

CHAIRPERSON: That is your evidence?

MR CRAUSE: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: He wasn't at any stage?

MR CRAUSE: He was never, at no stage was he an informer of mine.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, that's the point, that's the point.

CHAIRPERSON: It is a point which immediately worried me when he gave this kind of viva voce evidence and as contained in his supplementary affidavit which point was not clearly made in his original application?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You're obviously aware why I'm worried about this?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Because this is the evidence given by Mr Venter and this is the evidence that is already before us.

MR VISSER: Yes, I know, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You will cover this point though, I believe as you progress with your viva voce evidence in chief?

MR VISSER: Well I believe we've already covered it, but may I refer you to page 84 of bundle 11 where Mr Crause describes the situation as follows. It's page 84 (iv) and it's the third paragraph, the second sentence he says:

And then he goes on. Now if you refer back to Exhibit A, you will see in paragraph 73, and perhaps I should ask you, in your application you have stated that Andries Moatshe would only report certain information if it suited him. Could you inform us about that?

MR CRAUSE: What I meant by that was that if he had been a recruited informer, he would not have been the sort of person that one would be able to trust and that one would be able to receive information from.

MR VISSER: Very well, on this day the 4th May he did indeed provide information?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 73 you say that this was the first time that he did indeed provide information to you?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: May I just take you back on to page 84 wherein you stated that this Mr Moatshe reported certain information if it suited him. Now in what capacity did he make such reports?

MR CRAUSE: No, he never made any reports.

CHAIRPERSON: But as you're saying he made certain reports when it suited him? It's there is it not, Mr Visser?

MR CRAUSE: I stated here that he was a suspected ANC collaborator who would only report certain information if it suited him. He did not report it, I regarded him as someone, who for his own gain, would report information if it suited him.

MR VISSER: If it suited him?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, if it suited him.

CHAIRPERSON: Now in what capacity did he provide you with information when it suited him?

MR CRAUSE: He didn't, that was the first occasion upon which he provided information to me.

MR VISSER: It's the pointedness of the Afrikaans language, Chairperson, what the witness is saying and I don't want to interrupt but we can take it no further.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: He's saying with hindsight what I know is that only when it suited him would he give us information and this is what happened on the 4th May, that's what he really is saying.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but is my question that difficult to understand, because what I'm basically wanting to find out is when he would come to him to give him certain information, he would give such information as what? As an honest Botswana citizen, given information to a member of the security branch? This is what I want to find out from Mr Crause.

MR CRAUSE: I regarded him as a person who would only provide information, this was the first information and he would only provide it if he could draw some kind of benefit from it for some or other reason. That is why I put it in my original application, where I described him as someone who would report certain information only if it suited him.

MR LAX: Can I assist here? What we have here is a grammatical problem and it's as Mr Visser says a matter of language. The word "sou" in that context is "would have" "might have" "could have been an informant in certain circumstances". Your evidence is that he never gave you personally any information prior to that day?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: But you saw him as a person who potentially could have been an informant but under circumstances that were not very trustworthy because you didn't trust his motives, you thought well maybe he's in it for his own gain. That's the impression that I'm getting of your evidence.

MR CRAUSE: That is exactly what I meant.

MR VISSER: Yes, we're indebted to Mr Lax.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, may I just take this further because I understand what Mr Lax is saying and to make speculation, that's not what Mr Crause has said. This person might have given information to you for his own benefit. What benefit would he have derived by giving such an information?

MR CRAUSE: It would be rewards, that he would not be arrested.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Madame Chair?

CHAIRPERSON: Don't put words into Mr Crause's mouth.

MR VISSER: Certainly, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, let him speak for himself, he is a witness and you are his counsel.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you may proceed Mr Crause in explaining to us the benefit that he might have derived?

MR CRAUSE: As I've stated, he would be able to escape arrest, he may have received financial rewards and he could have abused me to bring people in, to bring weapons in and he could also have provided disinformation to me.

CHAIRPERSON: But your evidence is that prior to this incident you had never had any kind of contact with Mr Moatshe?

MR CRAUSE: No.

MR VISSER: No Madame Chair, he spoke to him before, perhaps he should just repeat that evidence?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: He spoke to him before, he was aware of his activities.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Just repeat that?

MR CRAUSE: Approximately five to six months before the incident at Silent Valley I encountered Moatshe at a border post, I think it was a border post. I knew who he was but he didn't know who I was. I introduced myself to him and explained to him that we were well aware of his activities and that he would run the risk of arrest.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You may proceed Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

MR LAX: Can I just interpose for one second? Did Moatshe provide, to the best of your knowledge, prior to this time information to any other of your colleagues who may have been working in the area alongside of you?

MR CRAUSE: Not as far as I'm aware, it is not impossible.

MR LAX: Thank you.

MR VISSER: If you would then continue with paragraph 74:

Next to the border on what side? The R.S.A. or Botswana side?

MR CRAUSE: It would be the R.S.A. side, that would be after they had climbed over the border fence. The point of pick up would be approximately ten kilometres North East from the Derdepoort border post. He would drive with them to a shop at the Swartklip Mine in the vicinity of Saulspoort where he would drop them off. He wanted me to wait in the vicinity for him so that he could inform me about where he had dropped off the terrorists so that I could arrest them there.

MR VISSER: This information which you received, what did you do with it?

MR CRAUSE: I immediately contacted my commander, Colonel Steyn, telephonically. He came through along with Colonel Loots to Derdepoort and there it was decided that the plan to attempt to arrest the terrorists at Swartklip was to risky do to the approximate distance of about 100 kilometres from the border where Moatshe would pick them up. Anything could happen during that time and the possibility that we could miss them was too dangerous from the view of the terror which they could commit in the R.S.A.

MR VISSER: So you maintain that it was too far, they could turn away, anything could happen? Would you attempt something closer to the border?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And what would you do? Paragraph 76?

MR CRAUSE: Consequently it was decided that a roadblock would be established closer to the border at an appropriate position and that then it would be attempted to arrest the persons.

MR VISSER: With this aspect I would just like to pose the following to you. From the second that the information was made known to you what was the intention with these persons.

MR CRAUSE: From the very beginning it was decided that they would be arrested.

MR VISSER: You had already received information according to your evidence that they would be armed?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Proceed, paragraph 77?

MR LAX: Where did you get this information that they'd be armed from? It hasn't come out at all. What is the source of that information?

MR CRAUSE: From Moatshe himself.

MR LAX: That they would be armed?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, for the benefit of Commissioner Lax at page 84 in the original application, you will see in that same paragraph which we've just dealt with, the next sentence:

Very well, you may continue on page 27, paragraph 77?

MR CRAUSE: A roadblock was established with Colonel Loots as the Commander. At this point various members of the security branch gathered. Persons that I recall being present were myself, Major General Steyn who was then still a Colonel, Colonel W J Loots, Commissioner Jan Truter who was at that stage still a Major, Senior Superintendent C J du Preez Smit who was still a Lieutenant at that stage, Colonel A J Venter then still a Lieutenant, Superintendent G J van Zyl at that stage still a Sergeant, Captain I J Marais also still a Sergeant, Warrant Officer Smit and then there may have been other members who I cannot recall.

MR VISSER: Yes, if we could just return to what you said in paragraph 77, you said that a roadblock was established with Colonel Loots as Commander. Perhaps that is somewhat misleading. Colonel Steyn was the overall commander, correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Was he present during the incident which you are about to describe?

MR CRAUSE: No he was not present during the incident. however, during the establishment of the roadblock he was present.

MR VISSER: Who was your commander during the incident itself?

MR CRAUSE: Colonel Loots.

MR VISSER: Very well, please go to page 28, paragraph 78?

ADV DE JAGER: At this stage when the discussion or the planning of the roadblock took place he was present?

MR CRAUSE: Yes he was present.

ADV DE JAGER: Was he present when it was decided not to arrest?

MR CRAUSE: No he was not present.

MR VISSER: Who are you speaking of? Colonel Steyn?

MR CRAUSE: No, he was not present.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he present when a decision to make Captain Loots a commander was made?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And that was before a decision was made with regard to the setting up of a roadblock?

MR CRAUSE: Could you please repeat your question?

CHAIRPERSON: Was General Steyn present when a decision was made to make Captain Loots a commander?

MR CRAUSE: Yes it was Colonel Loots. At that stage he was a Colonel and he appointed him as the Commander at the roadblock.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and when it was decided to set up the roadblock where was General Steyn?

MR CRAUSE: He was also there.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I just wanted to correct the reading of paragraph 77 which would give an impression that whilst he was there, Captain Loots was in command which obviously only happened after he had left and after somebody had appointed Captain Loots a commander of the operation to be carried out further?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Yes that is indeed as we tried to explain it, it does seem to give the wrong impression and it's more my fault than anyone else's Chairperson. I drew the document.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware, that's why I wanted to have Mr Crause setting the position straight.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

If you would then continue, what happened on the scene which you had selected? This is paragraph 78.

MR CRAUSE: On the scene, which had been selected by Lieutenant du Preez, there was a farm gate in the road which we could swing in order to close approximately three quarters of the Mariku Draai Dwaalboom Road in order to block off a section of the road just after a bend. The remaining section we obstructed with stones and branches that Moatshe's vehicle would have to stop as it came around the bend.

MR VISSER: So what you are trying to say is that a vehicle which was moving in the direction of the border in the direction of the Swartklip Mine, on that road, if it came around the bend it would have to stop there and it would not be able to go anywhere else?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct. Colonel Steyn and Major Jan Truter then left to undertake observation closer to the border in order to warn us when the vehicle of Moatshe would be approaching the roadblock. After Colonel Steyn had departed an exercise was undertaken.

MR VISSER: How many exercises, was it one exercise or various exercises?

MR CRAUSE: No, we undertook numerous exercises as far as I can recall. Colonel Loots, myself, Captain Roelf Venter and Captain du Preez Smit, once again discussed the entire action and after thorough consideration decided that it was way to dangerous for the members to attempt to arrest these persons. The reason for this was that there was too little shelter for the members and that the members would necessarily have to fire upon one another should the terrorists open fire. It was clear to us that we would have to shoot before the terrorists realised what was happening. This meant that the plan was abandoned to arrest and instead it was decided to eliminate the persons.

MR VISSER: Can we stop there? The picture is now that the decision had been made to arrest them, the gate was positioned, stones and branches were placed, Steyn and Truter departed, you practised the whole operation, according to your expression, what exactly did it involve, this exercise with the objective to arrest, how would you have exercised it, what did you do?

MR CRAUSE: There were members on both sides of the road where the vehicle would have to stop. Persons would also stand in front of the gate, we had a very strong light system there.

MR VISSER: How would this have worked?

MR CRAUSE: As the vehicle stopped ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: How would you have started it up?

MR CRAUSE: Two members of the unit would have activated it for us.

MR VISSER: With a generator?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, with a generator.

MR VISSER: Then?

MR CRAUSE: The initial planning was for us to hit the windows out and to arrest the persons, that was the initial plan.

MR VISSER: Now you have exercised it or practised it and with this practise session, the people that you have referred to conferred and started a discussion and realised that there was somewhat of a problem?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: This decision not to arrest but to start shooting immediately upon the bakkie's arrival, that was an order which ultimately was given by Brigadier Loots?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Before that you have already referred to a discussion, was this discussion among all of you and was it agreed by all of you that it would be like that or what was the situation?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct, at first it was four of us then we informed the rest of the members on the scene and they also agreed with it.

CHAIRPERSON: May I just get clarity, when you say that the decision not to arrest but to shoot as opposed to kill was taken by Captain Loots? Was it taken by him alone or was this a joint decision taken by Captain Loots in consultation with you amongst others?

MR CRAUSE: It was the four of us who discussed the matter. All four of us decided upon this, Colonel Loots, me, Captain Venter and Captain Smit. However, seeing as Colonel Loots was the commander, he was the ultimate decision maker.

CHAIRPERSON: He ultimately approved but the four of you had decided?

MR CRAUSE: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: However, you also involved the other members and discussed the matter with them in order to test their sentiments?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And they all agreed that it was too dangerous?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us, Andries Moatshe was not one of the insurgents as far as you were aware because on that day he had become an informer of yours and he had provided the information to you. Then why was he also shot dead?

MR CRAUSE: I suspected him and we decided that he was of no worth for us in future terms and then I would like to mention one thing which also contributed to the decision and I have mentioned this in my affidavit, that is the fact that he wanted to drop off the people at the mine and that I would have to wait alone at a distance and that he would then inform me.

MR VISSER: Why did this create suspicion in your mind?

MR CRAUSE: Because he didn't want us to work together to arrest the people before the time.

MR VISSER: What were the words that you used, you stated that you didn't think that he would be of any value to you in the future. In what sense did you mean this?

MR CRAUSE: I didn't trust him.

MR VISSER: Very well, you've also said that the order was given by Colonel Loots ultimately and you received the message that the bakkie was under way from the vehicle of Colonel Steyn and Truter. When the bakkie arrived there the generator was activated, the lights were switched on and the members immediately opened fire on the bakkie. Did you fire?

MR CRAUSE: Yes I also fired.

MR VISSER: How many shots?

MR CRAUSE: Approximately two.

MR VISSER: Could you have hit some of the passengers?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: What did you shoot with?

MR CRAUSE: An R1 rifle.

MR VISSER: Was it set on automatic fire or on individual shots?

MR CRAUSE: Single shots.

MR VISSER: And all three passengers in the bakkie were killed?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you recall whether any weapons were found which they had in their possession before the incident?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct, they had weapons.

MR VISSER: And while we are dealing with the matter of weapons, bundle 2G, Chairperson, page 862, I'm sorry - it's at the foot of page 861, there's a sentence which reads in the evidence of Colonel Venter which says:

Now can you comment on that?

MR CRAUSE: I cannot deny that there were weapons but I cannot remember the incident and I'm being very honest regarding that.

MR VISSER: If we discuss weapons, we know that there were weapons on the scene and we are discussing weapons which would usually be used by MK fighters, ANC MK soldiers, namely Russian manufactured weapons, limpet mines, hand grenades and the usual AK47s, Makarov pistols and so forth. Those are the weapons which we are discussing now?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you give an order to anybody to take weapons to the scene?

MR CRAUSE: No, I gave no such order.

MR VISSER: Is it correct that during the time of the struggle members of the security forces or certain members of the security forces did indeed have such weapons at their disposal?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct, they did, there were members who had such weapons.

MR VISSER: And who might have even had it on the scene?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's possible.

MR VISSER: So you did not exclude that as a possibility?

MR CRAUSE: No, I don't.

MR VISSER: Did you see any such weapons on the scene?

MR CRAUSE: No, none.

MR VISSER: Then may I just refer you in case you don't understand me entirely correctly? On page 84 of your application, the last paragraph underneath (iv) you have stated the following. Could you read it please?

MR CRAUSE: I would just like to amend something. Where the two persons who sat in the middle and left were armed I misunderstood.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, you discussed weapons which were taken with and you referred to such weapons.

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, I was just busy stating that I was confusing the witness. Let me begin again. We're talking about weapons which were not taken along. You've already given evidence to that effect. I'm at the point whether you saw any other weapons other than the normal standard issue police weapons, in other words, the sort of weapons which we have discussed, Russian, Eastern Bloc manufactured weapons which were not brought along by you but arrived there in another manner.

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct, they were there.

MR VISSER: And what were they according to your recollection?

MR CRAUSE: As far as I recall they were hand grenades, I don't recall if they were four or six and two Makarov pistols.

MR VISSER: And you saw these weapons with the person sitting in the middle and on the left, these were the two persons other than Andries Moatshe?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also mentioned this in paragraph 84 on page 29?

MR CRAUSE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: After the incident the scene was cleaned up. Can you tell who cleaned up the scene?

MR CRAUSE: I can't say who was there. I would like to refer you to paragraph 86 at this stage. If I might read this I would like to?

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR CRAUSE: Colonel Venter and I immediately left the scene after the shooting incident to the Swartklip Mine in order to investigate the possibility of other terrorists being there and the result of this investigation was negative. Upon my arrival at Derdepoort the scene had already been cleaned up.

MR VISSER: What class of person would be the type to clean up a scene where a shooting incident had taken place? What qualifications would this person have?

MR CRAUSE: Usually someone from the mortuary, the experts, photographers and an investigating officer who would undertake the inquest. A demolitions expert would be the first person on the scene.

MR VISSER: Who on that scene would have been the demolitions expert?

MR CRAUSE: Captain Venter was one.

MR VISSER: And Brigadier Loots will give evidence that he was an expert. There was a post-mortem inquest under the title "Dwaalboom GO's 1, 2 and 3." Where was this inquest held?

MR CRAUSE: After the incident I did not support or provide any statements, I was not involved in any inquest and I cannot give any evidence regarding that.

MR VISSER: I would just like to place it on record that this was held at Thabazimbi.

Madame Chair, the relevant passage where the Amnesty Committee dealt with this aspect in it's decision in the Cronje matter is in bundle 1, page 52.

Thank you Madame Chairperson, that's the evidence of Mr Crause.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Ms Lockhat do you have any questions to put to Mr Crause?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: I do Chairperson.

I refer you to bundle 2G, page 869 of the transcripts where Judge Wilson asks Venter:

and his response was:

Can you respond to that?

CHAIRPERSON: What line are you reading from?

MS LOCKHAT: It's the ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: It's the first line?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, it starts with the first line of 869.

MR CRAUSE: He was not an informant of mine and at that stage I was not the commander at Zeerust.

MS LOCKHAT: Are you saying that Venter has got the wrong end of the stick here?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Because it's further down, he also says, the seventh line on page 869:

and the words "usually pass on information" relating to the movements of ANC activists and trained terrorists in Botswana. So to me, in my mind, it means that this was normal circumstances, that he was an informer and he would usually pass on information. Please comment on that?

MR CRAUSE: Not to me and he was not an informant of mine?

MS LOCKHAT: So where does Venter get this information from?

MR CRAUSE: I don't know.

MS LOCKHAT: One other question, why did he ask for you at the border post, why did he specifically contact - why did Venter contact you?

MR VISSER: No, no Venter didn't contact him. Just to make this clear so that we don't become confused. Venter did not contact this witness.

CHAIRPERSON: His evidence was that somebody radioed him.

MR VISSER: The commanding officer at the border post contacted him.

MS LOCKHAT: My question is then why did they contact you specifically?

MR CRAUSE: Because he asked for me, Moatshe asked for me.

MS LOCKHAT: So why would he ask for you?

MR CRAUSE: Because I had met him at a previous instance and I had discussion with him where I warned him.

MS LOCKHAT: You didn't perhaps guarantee that he would be paid for certain information like a normal informer?

MR CRAUSE: No.

MS LOCKHAT: Was it necessary to eliminate Moatshe as well seeing it was possible that he might become an informer?

MR CRAUSE: There was no other choice.

MS LOCKHAT: Why didn't you just arrest these people?

MR CRAUSE: As I've already described what the dangers were.

MS LOCKHAT: But it just puzzles me that here's this informer that possibly could become one of your informers, tells you he's bringing two MK's into the country and usually you say your procedure is usually to arrest these people. Why so different in these circumstances? Please elaborate on that?

MR CRAUSE: Because firstly he wanted to meet with me alone at Swartklip and because we did not want to apprehend these people so far from the border and the initial decision was to apprehend them. After we came to the conclusion what the circumstances were we decided to eliminate them.

MS LOCKHAT: You were so many policemen on that scene of the incident and they were only three people, do you think it was necessary to eliminate them and did you think it was necessary to actually feel that your lives were in danger at that time?

MR CRAUSE: I think so, I have been in contacts before.

MS LOCKHAT: Didn't you all have weapons as well?

MR CRAUSE: Yes we did.

ADV DE JAGER: In such an instance it depends on who shoots first?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: If he fires the first shot one of you would be killed, if you get in the first shot one of them would be killed?

MS LOCKHAT: I also want to refer you to page 870 of the bundle 2G. Just line 22, Chairperson, where Judge Wilson asks:

and then Venter says: "yes"

Can you just comment on the first part, that they stopped at the roadblock and they did not fire, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct, they did not have a chance.

MS LOCKHAT: So why at that stage didn't you attempt to just shoot one or two of them and then arrest them, why eliminate them seeing that they were not firing?

MR CRAUSE: If they had thrown a hand grenade at us, then four or five of us would have been killed, then we decided then that you will eliminate them and we stuck to that decision.

MS LOCKHAT: But did they throw out hand grenade?

MR CRAUSE: No but they were ready.

MS LOCKHAT: But these people did not shoot, they didn't throw out hand grenades and yet you thought it was possible to still eliminate them although there were no facts pointing to the fact that they were actually going to shoot upon you?

MR CRAUSE: Yes we shot them.

CHAIRPERSON: You shot because you had already made a decision to kill them?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Prior to the insurgents coming into the country. Once you and the others which included Captain Loots ultimately approved of your decision had met and conceded the risks which confronted you as policemen in that you could be fired at by the insurgents. You then acted in accordance with your decision. So there was no question of you holding fire for having fired some - few shoots in order to arrest whoever might have still been alive after somebody had fired a few shots? A decision had already been made, is that not so?

MR CRAUSE: That was the decision, after General Steyn had left the scene and the four of us conferred and that was the decision, to eliminate them.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, who was calling the shots, who said fire, surely there was one person who had to initiate that instruction?

MR CRAUSE: I cannot recall.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me and the commander, the Commissioner Smit - Steyn, please forgive me, it's Steyn, did he know of the operation, to eliminate these people?

MR CRAUSE: He had no knowledge thereof, that decision was taken after he had left.

MS LOCKHAT: Do you think he would have authorised this action?

MR CRAUSE: I believe so.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Crause, you're saying General Steyn was not aware of your decision to eliminate the insurgents, you are still labouring under the impression that you would make an attempt to arrest them?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct but after he arrived at the scene he said that - and we would have explained the situation to him - he said that he agreed with us.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he make contact at any stage with you before the shooting started?

MR CRAUSE: Not at all.

MR VISSER: To your knowledge he never spoke to any of you before the shooting started?

MR CRAUSE: The only contact that he had made and I apologise, is that he let us know that the vehicle was on its way and that was by means of the radio.

CHAIRPERSON: And who did you speak to?

MR CRAUSE: I don't know, I did not man the radio and I cannot recall who he spoke to.

CHAIRPERSON: So he never spoke to you?

MR CRAUSE: Not with me personally.

CHAIRPERSON: In which group were you in?

MR CRAUSE: We were all in the same group, I was with Colonel Loots' group at the scene.

CHAIRPERSON: So you would not be aware that General Steyn at one stage spoke to Captain Loots to advise him of the position of the car and to update him of his observation whilst he was at the border, you wouldn't be aware of that?

MR CRAUSE: The point where I was at there was no radio so I cannot say what radio contact there was or what was discussed there.

ADV DE JAGER: In whose division did this incident take place and in which division is this border post.

MR CRAUSE: The border post and the whole incident took place in division Western Transvaal. If I could explain further, Zeerust area runs up to Derdepoort and this resorts under the division of Western Transvaal and the place where the incident took place was resorted under Thabazimbi and at that stage that also resorted under Western Transvaal under the command of General Steyn.

ADV DE JAGER: Because Venter was also at that stage, although he was stationed at Thabazimbi but he was in the region of Western Transvaal?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: At which border post did they come through?

MR CRAUSE: They came through a Derdepoort border post.

ADV DE JAGER: You may answer?

MR CRAUSE: And approximately 10 kilometres to the north they came across the fence.

MR LAX: How did you people get to that point where the ambush was set up, where the roadblock was set up?

MR CRAUSE: We drove with our vehicles.

MR LAX: Were these your normal vehicles that you used?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR LAX: They would have all been fitted with radios, two way radios as would have been normal practise?

MR CRAUSE: Not all of them, not all security vehicles at that stage had radios.

MR LAX: But there certainly would have been vehicles with two way radios?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: It's clear that you were in radio contact with General Steyn? I'll refer to him as he is presently.

MR CRAUSE: I have said that we did have radio contact. I did not man the radio myself but we did have radio contact.

MR LAX: Did you not radio him once you four had made a decision that instead of arrest there would be an elimination?

MR CRAUSE: If we had done that then all the other police vehicles, border post, police stations, would have all been on the same frequency and they would have heard this.

MR LAX: Would that have posed a security risk for you?

MR CRAUSE: Absolutely.

MR LAX: Now I have some understanding of how roadblocks are set up and participated in many of them myself and how did this practise runs of yours, what did you actually do?

MR CRAUSE: We drove through with a vehicle of our own and later when it was dark we used a vehicle that the local had used had come through.

MR LAX: So a local vehicle came through and you stopped it as if it was an ordinary roadblock.

MR CRAUSE: It had to stop because the gate was closed. I have to say that nowhere did we have signs that there was a roadblock ahead, we just used the gate as a stop.

MR LAX: Yes, obviously, that would have been very counter-productive to alert anyone that you were there. You also chose a place where they couldn't see the roadblock, it was on a corner as you've indicated?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: Now what was - you say General Steyn's - you didn't speak to him after the event, you said you'd left the scene immediately afterwards, is that right?

MR CRAUSE: I know after the shooting he arrived there just before I left.

MR LAX: You didn't speak to him, did you?

MR CRAUSE: I did.

MR LAX: You did?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR LAX: And what was the contents of your discussion with him? Not word for word obviously, it was many years ago.

MR CRAUSE: He asked me what had happened and I told him that all three had been killed.

MR LAX: You've indicated already in your evidence that you felt there was no other alternative but to eliminate these people?

MR CRAUSE: Correct.

MR LAX: Now I just want to come back to the issue of these firearms and weapons as they are referred to by Venter in his testimony which you've already heard and which is just for the record confirmed again on the following page. The first reference was on page 861 and then again on page 862 he refers to it again. He gives a distinct impression and we've heard of this in many, many other operations both before this Committee, not this panel but this Committee and before other Committees in the Truth Commission, that there were numerous incidents where police would plant weapons on the people they had eliminated. It was a fairly standard practise, it was a way of showing how effective they were being to the media to creating an impression, to creating the right amount of evidence to justify their actions?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: Venter in his evidence and of course I wasn't present when he was testifying so I can't talk about his demeanour but the impression one gets from reading the record is that he is adamant that this was part of the plan that these weapons were taken along with a view to, if there weren't weapons on these people, to ensuring that there would be seen to be weapons on them. You have no knowledge of that?

MR CRAUSE: I do not want to deny it, I cannot recall it.

MR LAX: So it's possible that that might have been part of the plan, it just hasn't formed part of your recollection of the events?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: And it may be something you've just forgotten about?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you sure about that? I thought in your earlier evidence you said that it was practise of the security police to carry these weapons with them and it's possible that, you known, there might have been with the police in their cars when the incident occurred? That's the impression I got.

MR CRAUSE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Well there was a potential of this matter having been discussed when you decided to carry out the elimination.

MR CRAUSE: At that stage I was not aware of any weapons that were there that would be planted. What I do recall is that some members of the security branch did have AK47s and communist weapons.

CHAIRPERSON: But when you say now to a question put to you by Mr Lax that it's possible that this was part of the plan, that this was discussed, it paints a different picture altogether?

MR CRAUSE: No, it could be that it was discussed and it was without my knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: While you were there and discussing this operation and you were there Mr Crause, the four of you were there, when you decided that you'd rather eliminate than to attempt to effect an arrest. To your knowledge and to your recollection, would this have been something that was discussed that arms would be planted on these insurgents?

MR CRAUSE: With all honesty I can say that it did not happen in my presence.

CHAIRPERSON: No but you were there at all times when a decision to eliminate was taken?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So that is the period what we are interested in, whilst you were there and when the decision to eliminate was taken. Could this have been discussed?

MR CRAUSE: Not while I was present. I cannot remember anything of these weapons and I'm totally honest about that.

CHAIRPERSON: A discussion to eliminate the insurgents was taken in one meeting. This is what your evidence suggests so far, so there couldn't have been other discussions involving the elimination of the insurgents where you couldn't have been present.

MR CRAUSE: The initial plan was to arrest these persons. After General Steyn left we planned at the scene to eliminate them. Nobody else drove away, nobody left, so if there were any weapons I don't know who brought it there, it was not discussed where I was present. If we had decided to eliminate them beforehand we would have taken weapons with us but it was at that stage not yet planned.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed Mr Lax.

MR LAX: Thank you. So in fact your answer to my question, just before Chairperson interposed, is not in fact correct, is not a matter that you don't remember, as far as you're able to say it never happened that such a possibility might have been part of the plan?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR LAX: You see in Venter's evidence he makes it very clear that General Steyn was present when you made the discussion and the decision to eliminate these people?

MR CRAUSE: I have to deny that, General Steyn was never in my presence, present where we decided to eliminate these persons.

MR LAX: It also then makes more sense, his evidence at any rate, that if he knew about the elimination, the fact that weapons were taken along according to him to possibly plant in the eventuality of there being nothing to show, that all then hangs together much more reasonably.

MR CRAUSE: I cannot agree with that, our plan was initially to arrest these persons, not to eliminate them. That was a decision that was taken after General Steyn had left, after he had already departed.

MR LAX: Then you can't explain why Venter should make such a mistake about the issue where his impression is such a totally different one to yours?

MR CRAUSE: It's the same what he said with regard to Moatshe that I was there and he was surprised.

MR LAX: You see, there's a perfectly reasonable understanding for how he might have made a mistake about Moatshe, he might have - it's quite conceivably he could have got the wrong impression about your and Moatshe's interaction and that's clear, one can see, Moatshe asked for you, you'd had some contact with him, he may have assumed that was a much greater contact than actually was. That's an easy thing to see how he might have made a mistake there. This is a very different kettle of fish here though, because we're talking about his perception of the planning of the operation, his perception of the decision making of the operation and those are very different things. The basis and the possibilities for being confused and misconstruing the situation is quite different. Do you concede that?

MR CRAUSE: All that I can that I was not aware of weapons, there was no planning where I was present, I cannot comment any further about these weapons.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Crause, how soon after General Steyn had left with Mr Truter did you and the others which included Captain Loots was then put in command, take a decision to eliminate the insurgents?

MR CRAUSE: I will estimate about half an hour after they departed.

CHAIRPERSON: And how soon after he had left did the shooting commence?

MR CRAUSE: Approximately 45 minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: So if you had intended to inform him of the order that he had given you and that you had decided to amend for the reasons that you have already testified to, you would have been able to do so?

MR CRAUSE: He was quite a distance from there, I don't know exactly where he was, as I have said that we did not want to contact him by radio because our radio network had contact with the border posts, with neighbouring border posts, other police vehicles and we accepted that if we took the decision we will bear the consequences.

CHAIRPERSON: But he was able to make contact with you and relay sensitive information about the movements of the insurgents?

MR CRAUSE: All that he would have said was that the vehicle is on it's way.

CHAIRPERSON: And that wouldn't have been sensitive information?

MR CRAUSE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Venter has already testified as to quite a number of reasons why Mr Moatshe was killed. Before I exploring that, let me again emphasise that his recollection which to us seemed quite clear, was that Mr Moatshe was an informer and that you personally handled him and that was the information that was within his knowledge and you have stated to us that that is not so, he was mistaken when you he said that you were Moatshe's handler, that is your evidence, isn't it?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now he has advanced a number of reasons why Mr Moatshe was killed, he stated that it was initially not your intention to kill Mr Moatshe, he then changed his testimony to say, no in fact Mr Moatshe was killed because he was caught in a crossfire, which in a way went on to support his earlier reason that your intention was not to kill him, so he was not intentionally killed because he was your informer. But he went on to advance another reason, that he was killed because you no longer trusted him, that he didn't give you some information that came to light when you questioned some other people who also were from Botswana. What is your comment to that?

MR CRAUSE: I think, with all respect, Venter is confused. Amongst others he said Moatshe sat in the middle and he was shot in the crossfire. Moatshe was not in the middle he was driving.

CHAIRPERSON: So he was incorrect in his evidence?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: In fact all the evidence he gave before us would therefore be incorrect?

MR CRAUSE: I would not say all of it but certain facts are not correct, he does not have certainty to certain facts.

CHAIRPERSON: But the material aspect of his evidence which impinges on whether we are to grant amnesty or not seems to be not what you agree with, because he says the decision to eliminate the insurgents was taken in the presence of General Steyn and your testimony is that that is not so?

MR CRAUSE: Not in the presence of General Steyn.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Crause. Mr Visser do you have any re-examination?

MR VISSER: Madame Chair, no re-examination except that I do want to refer you to bundle 2I, page 127 to page 129 where at page 128 you will find where Crause dealt with the Silent Valley matter on the top of the page in paragraph 3. Just before we take the adjournment, if you will allow me one thing perhaps Madame Chair and I know I'm probably out of turn to say this now because it's really a question of argument. The point has been made before that the fact that Cronje, Venter and others had given evidence before you first before other people had does not make their evidence a holy cow and I'm sure that you'll remind yourself of that and you will also remind yourself that there was an argument before the full Committee, the original Committee, which I participated, which led to a ruling that we will not allow to cross-examine. So the result of that was that it was decided by the Committee that the appropriate way of dealing with the evidence that was going to be led was by way of affidavit and it was stated that as long as that contains a denial, well then that's it, and we will not allow to cross-examine at all. So it is a bit of a difficulty and I do not by saying what I did just said, attempt to curtail any cross-examination of any of the witnesses on the basis of what anyone else said, clearly not, but we must just remind ourselves that Venter gave evidence which was unchallenged and you will hear evidence here which is going to be in conflict. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we are aware of that, it is actually something that's presenting us with a difficulty and you will recall that that application was actually dealt with on the basis that it would be a window application for the Truth Commission, the Amnesty Committee was a little reluctant to proceed with that application in view of the fact that there was a possibility of further applicants, making applications in relation to the same incident that were contained in the applications of Cronje and Mr Venter and others. So we are aware what we are simply doing is that to afford Mr Crause an opportunity to respond to evidence which already is before us.

MR VISSER: Yes and to that we certainly have no objection and in fact we make a point of pointing out the conflicts to you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, do you wish to take the adjournment now?

CHAIRPERSON: We will take a tea adjournment and we'll reconvene in 15 minutes time.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we'll commence with General Steyn's evidence.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, we are sorry that you have no clothing to discard because of the heat but we didn't ask you formally but would you mind if we did not sit with jackets before you?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I do mind if you remove your jacket because that would entail my having the only clothing which I have on my body.

MR VISSER: Which is your dress.

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, with your leave, just before I lead the evidence of General Steyn, may I refer you to volume 2G, page 875 and let me introduce the reference to you by saying the following. It appeared to us during your questioning of Mr Crause that you might be under the impression that Venter stated that the decision to eliminate rather than to arrest was taken in the presence of General Steyn, that at this page Venter deals with that issue, he starts at the third line on page 875 by saying:

"No, I understand that" says Commissioner de Jager.

And we submit to you, Chairperson, that it is quite clear from that passage as well as from another passage at page 871, the middle of the page, the last sentence of that paragraph:

That it is clear that he never intended to convey the impression, that is now Venter, that Steyn was present.

CHAIRPERSON: I concede Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

General Steyn, you are also applying for amnesty in the Silent Valley incident and that is the only case which you are applying for amnesty within this hearing of the Amnesty Committee?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have referred once again to previous submissions and evidence which you request to be incorporated with your evidence in the evaluation of your application?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: On page 2, paragraph (e) you've also referred to evidence which you have heard or delivered in other amnesty applications so that the Committee can be aware that you have already been placed on record under oath with regard to amnesty applications and you have listed the applications there?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Your personal particulars and background and circumstances as well as your police career, do you confirm this?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: That which is relevant is that you were in the Western Transvaal until December 1983 and that from 1983 onwards up until 1986 you were in the Western Transvaal as the commander of the Western Transvaal, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And in 1986 you went to Port Natal?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: You repeated what has already been said by various applicants with regard to the struggle, on page 5?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you have elaborated somewhat on page 11 in order to refer the Committee Members to certain aspects in Sitchaba in order to support your submission which you continue with until page 13?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: With regard to the role played by Botswana, before 1983 you didn't really know much about it but it was within the knowledge of the security branch due to information that what you say in paragraph 29 and following, according to your opinion this is correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: If you could bear with me just a moment, I've received a note, Chairperson. At December 1982, at page 5 - oh, I'm sorry there's a typing error. There's a typing error, it's December 1982 to May 1986 in the third line at page 5.

MR LAX: I was just checking the date of this incident to confirm because it suddenly struck me that this was '83 and then if this wasn't corrected he wouldn't have been there.

MR VISSER: Right. It slipped my attention and I apologise for that.

And on page 19 you reiterate what the other applicants have also stated before this Committee with regard to the position within which members found themselves. We don't have to discuss the exchange of intelligence, neither do we have to discuss the political motivations, you confirm what you have said in your affidavit regarding all these aspects?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also confirm the application form that you filled in and the information which you set up within that form insofar as it is confirmed in Exhibit H?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You pointed out in your form and I omitted to say, Chairperson, that this is in bundle 11, page 15, you have pointed out that your recollection is not of the best and that you are trying to obtain documentary information but that not much documentary information was still available in order to supplement your recollection?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And just as Mr Crause, you were able to have the benefit of the applications and evidence of others?

MR VISSER: Can we get to the Silent Valley incident, General, and if I may, let me lead you. You referred to Loots and Crause's applications on page 27, paragraph 80 and you state that when you filled in the Amnesty Application you had Colonel Venter's application before you and you suspected that his recollection could be better than yours and consequently you referred to this application with agreement. Later, in retrospect, and after having had more time to improve your recollection regarding the facts, you realised that there were certain aspects of Colonel Venter's evidence which according to you were incorrect?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you will deal with this in the course of your evidence?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Might I then lead you further? To sketch the background to this incident as set out in paragraph 81 that during the course of the 4th May 1983 you received a telephone call from Colonel Crause during which you were informed about a planned illegal infiltration of two armed MK commanders to the R.S.A. You and Brigadier Loots, who was then a Colonel, thereupon departed for Derdepoort?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Where were you physically, in which town or city?

MR STEYN: Chairperson I was in Potchefstroom.

ADV DE JAGER: And this Derdepoort, how far away from Potchefstroom would that be, approximately?

MR STEYN: If I had to make a quick approximation, I'd say 250 kilometres, perhaps a bit more.

MR VISSER: I should perhaps have highlighted that when you at that stage were in the Western Transvaal you were the Divisional Commander?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then from paragraph 82 onwards, on page 28, could you please submit to the Committee what your recollection is to the best of your memory regarding what took place on that day?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, Brigadier Loots and I went to Derdepoort where we found Colonel Crause as well as Colonel Venter. Colonel Crause informed us that a suspected collaborator of the ANC had spoken to him at the border post, Andries Moatshe was his name, and that this Andries Moatshe had said that during that night two armed ANC MK commanders would infiltrate the R.S.A.

He further informed us that according to Moatshe, the two insurgents would be picked up next to the border in a red Toyota bakkie after they had climbed over the fence. It was some distance north or north east from the Derdepoort border post. These suspected collaborators or MK commanders would then be taken to a point in the vicinity of Swartklip where he would drop them off. He would then contact Colonel Crause and inform him of where he had dropped them off upon which Colonel Crause would be able to act against them.

I was not satisfied with this plan seeing as there was great danger that the insurgents would have too much time over such a distance to climb off at any point or give other instructions to the driver. It was a very risky plan to me in the sense that these persons could disappear, we could miss them and I gave the instruction that a roadblock be established with the purpose of attempting to arrest these persons.

MR VISSER: Did you yourself go to the point where the roadblock would be established?

MR STEYN: Yes I did.

MR VISSER: And what happened?

MR STEYN: At this point we used a gate that was in disuse to place it over the road as well as branches from trees and stones in order to close off that section of the road which was situated around a bend with the consequence that when the vehicle with the insurgents arrived there they would necessarily have to stop there upon which this action would be executed by our members.

MR VISSER: In order to save time and with the indulgence of the Committee, your recollection was that the persons who were there were Major Jan Truter, Lieutenant Colonel Loots, Captain Crause, Lieutenant du Preez Smit, Warrant Officer van Zyl and then Marais and that your memory has been refreshed and that you also accept now that the following people were also present and that would be - or at least this is a repetition of some names who have been mentioned such as Senior Superintendent C J du Preez Smit, but Colonel R J Venter was there, Warrant Officer Smith and D J Nieuwenhuisen, you say that is correct?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: We also know that there was a generator on the scene which was manned by the counter-insurgency unit of the South African Police. It belonged to TIN the counter-insurgency unit?

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson

MR VISSER: We are now on page 30, paragraph 87, you say that the scene was selected by Lieutenant du Preez Smit, you've already indicated that there was the farm gate. If you would just proceed with paragraph 88.

MR STEYN: After the roadblock had been established and the situation had been analysed, Commissaris Jan Truter and I left Brigadier Loots at the scene in command and we took up position near the Botswana border in order to observe the infiltration.

MR VISSER: What was the objective with that?

MR STEYN: The objective was that as soon as we had observed the infiltration we would then inform Brigadier Loots and other persons on the scene that the vehicle was under way.

MR VISSER: So you would then be in radio contact with the persons on the scene?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Before you get to paragraph 90 would you just explain to the Committee Members what exactly you did with the vehicle and what you and Truter did?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, Truter and I concealed the vehicle that we were driving in the bushes a little way away from the road and we lay in the grass near the road so that we would easily be able to observe the vehicle going past.

MR VISSER: So in other words you were not with your vehicle, you were near to the road and your vehicle was hidden in the bushes?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: How far away from where you were was the vehicle?

MR STEYN: It's difficult to say but I would say that it was approximately 30 to 40 metres.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed, you saw the bakkie?

MR STEYN: Yes, we observed the bakkie and we ran to our vehicle after which we followed the bakkie and if I recall correctly we contacted either Brigadier Loots or somebody else on the scene by radio that the bakkie was under way and that we would follow this bakkie in our vehicle without the lights switched on.

MR VISSER: When you arrived upon the scene what did you find?

MR STEYN: Upon my arrival I found that all three passengers of the vehicle had been shot dead. I also established that weapons, pistols and hand grenades had been found in the bakkie.

MR VISSER: General, your evidence or your application form which runs from page 15, began on page 17 to deal with this incident and on page 18 of bundle 11, the final paragraph, you stated:

Would you forgive me a moment Chairperson? Thank you Chairperson.

Now we are discussing specifically the final paragraph on page 18 and we're discussing weapons that were allegedly taken to the scene. To which information are you referring here? Who would have given this information to you or from where would you have obtained this information because you say that you were informed?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I later studied the application of Colonel Venter in which I drew the inference about the weapons.

MR VISSER: And that is what you are referring to here?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: What is your recollection today if we were to discuss not the weapons which were brought along with the infiltrators but specifically weapons which were taken by security branch members to the scene? What would be your recollection today, did you see anything there or not?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, according to my recollection, I gave the order, I did not give the order that any weapons be taken to the scene to plant on the persons. I cannot exclude the possibility that some of the members themselves may have decided to take weapons to the scene.

MR VISSER: And to plant them?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct. I do indeed recall that during the incident that evening on the scene after the incident I found an AK47 on the scene.

MR VISSER: An AK47 assault rifle?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you recall where you saw it?

MR STEYN: No, I can't remember precisely. I'm really not certain.

MR VISSER: General Steyn, just to explain to the Committee, Brigadier Loots will give further evidence regarding this AK47 which you have mentioned. If we can then return to the passengers of the bakkie, what can you tell the Committee regarding weapons in the bakkie itself. If you look at page 30, paragraph 90?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, upon my arrival on the scene I established that there were weapons in the vehicle of these three persons. I was informed that the two MK Commanders were armed and not the driver, Moatshe. Insofar as my application form may create another impression it is incorrect.

MR VISSER: Yes and you refer specifically to page 18, the fourth paragraph - Chairperson, of bundle 11, because there you have stated, I'll begin in the middle of the sentence:

You say that that is not correct?

MR STEYN: No, it's not correct.

MR VISSER: Is that how you recollected it when you signed the application form in 1996?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Venter, when was this application form signed?

MR VISSER: It's bundle 11, page 18 and if you'll ...[intervention]

MR LAX: In December 1996, sorry, to just put on record that application was signed on 16 December 1996.

MR VISSER: Yes correct, thank you Commissioner and Madame Chairperson, we're referring to the fourth paragraph where the applicant said in that application form all three of them. Well it gives the impression at least that he says all three of them had weapons on them and he's now rectified that by saying Moatshe was not armed with anything.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and that mistake occurred as a result of him having had sight of Mr Venter's evidence, is that how I understood ...[indistinct].

MR VISSER: I think he must reply to that Chairperson.

General, why do you realise today that your mark that you made in your application form is incorrect?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, is this about the ...[intervention]

MR VISSER: The three passengers who were armed instead of two who were armed.

MR STEYN: Later I was informed that the two MK members had hand grenades and pistols in their possession and I myself saw hand grenades in the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Yes, but the question is why did you say in your application form that all three had been armed while today you say that only two were armed?

MR STEYN: I was corrected later and established that not all three had been armed only the two MK commanders.

MR VISSER: But just to defend yourself, did you participate in cleaning up the scene?

MR STEYN: No.

MR VISSER: Who is the person or who are the persons who tidied up the scene?

MR STEYN: Brigadier Loots was in charge of this function along with other members.

MR VISSER: And by cleaning up we mean that the bodies were removed from the vehicle and that the scene was made safe and that there were no explosives or limpet mines which would explode or go off later?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, please assist me? The reference where he would have said that all three had weapons is where?

MR VISSER: Bundle 11, page 18. This can be found in the fourth paragraph.

MR LAX: Could I just interpose here just for one second please Mr Visser? I'm just having a difficulty with what's just been said. You see, if one reads that paragraph, it doesn't say "I was informed", he says "I found that these people were there". Now one implies his personal inspection of the actual weapons and the other one is having been told afterwards. Could you just clarify that for us please General?

MR VISSER: Yes point taken Chairperson, I tried to clarify but obviously not sufficiently.

General the point is and I will repeat this question. In terms of this which you've said in your application form you stated that you saw that the three persons had been armed with hand grenades and pistols. The question is, did you indeed and you also said later today that you saw hand grenades and pistols. Could you please just clear this up because you have also stated that you were informed, that only the two MK commanders were armed. Can you just clear this up for us?

MR STEYN: The fact of the matter is that the moment upon which I looked into the vehicle I did not see weapons with the driver Moatshe. I think that when I submitted my application by saying that the three passengers had been armed with hand grenades was an oversight on my behalf and I did not define it properly by saying that only two persons were armed and that the driver was not armed. Upon later discussion it became clear to me that I could not have seen any weapons on him because he didn't have any weapons according to all the other members who were present on the scene.

ADV DE JAGER: But when you looked into the vehicle, did you see weapons in the vehicle?

MR STEYN: Yes I saw weapons in the vehicle.

ADV DE JAGER: And the three persons were still in the vehicle?

MR STEYN: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you see where the weapons were situated in the vehicle, did you attend to that?

MR STEYN: What I could see was that hand grenades were on the laps of the two passengers, that's what I can recall.

CHAIRPERSON: But do you recall how many weapons you saw and what kind of weapons were they?

MR STEYN: At that stage as a result of the shooting incident, the three persons who were dead at that stage had fallen over one another and were lying askew in the vehicles so it was very difficult to make out which weapons belonged to who, I could only make out that they were hand grenades. The other staff members later determined precisely who owned what, I simply assumed which was actually a faulty assumption that everyone was armed. That was not correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it was a reasonable assumption based on the fact that you saw a vehicle, I mean you saw weapons inside the vehicles wherein three people had died, the only mistake obviously is that in having to read your application to mean that the three dead people were armed, all of them were armed, your assumption was that because there were arms in the vehicle, you simply assumed they were all armed.

MR STEYN: Entirely correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: According to your estimation, how long after the incident would you have arrived on the scene?

MR STEYN: It was very quickly. Instantaneously, within a little while, not seconds, I held back for a minute so as not to be seen.

MR VISSER: So it was a minute or two, so it was a question of minutes instead of question of hours?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: General, when you arrived upon the scene, you knew that your instructions had not been observed. Did you then talk to Loots?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And what was his explanation? We refer to page 31 paragraph 92, beginning on page 30 paragraph 91 where you said that:

And what was this discussion which you had with Brigadier Loots in this relation?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I spoke to Brigadier Loots and he told me that after I had left the scene he came to the conclusion that it would be too dangerous to attempt to arrest these people. The reasons which he put to me were among others that it was a known fact that MK members who had been interrogated in the past without exception emphasised the fact that infiltrating MK members were very tense and would take the maximum prevention or preparation for an assault should they be encountered or should anybody attempt to arrest them. Furthermore he said that seeing as the infiltrators were MK commanders he had accepted that they would be armed and according to him he already had that information from Colonel Crause.

MR VISSER: Yes but you also had that information, no so?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct. According to Brigadier Loots should a shooting incident occur our members would have to start shooting at one another because of the way that the roadblock had been constructed and the execution of an arrest or such an attempt would probably lead to the death of injury of some of our members. Brigadier Loots also said that the place which had been selected by Du Preez Smit had been a good selection from the view that there was an existing gate which made it easy to establish a roadblock but that with regard to the aspect of shelter it had not been such a good choice. There was not sufficient shelter and this also influenced his decision and he also said that according to him that some of the members would have been exposed should a shooting incident have occurred.

MR VISSER: According to you observations it was already dark?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: It was approximately 9 o'clock in the evening?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: But according to your observations from that afternoon, what was your conclusion that you would have reached after hearing Loots' explanation?

MR STEYN: After Brigadier Loots had explained the matter to me I realised that I may not have given sufficient attention to the plan for the arrest seeing as the correctness of what he was saying immediately impressed me. I agreed with him. Chairperson, if I'd had more time to plan the strategy and to reconsider I would probably have come to the conclusion as Brigadier Loots did indeed that elimination was the only way out.

MR VISSER: Can we pause there for a moment, do I understand correctly that Moatshe spoke to Crause, Crause spoke to you and you went to the border post where you received the information from Crause and all of this took place during the course of the day of the 4th May?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Is it correct for me to say that your departure to the place which Du Preez Smit was instructed to seek you were in radio contact with one another, you arrived upon the scene, is that correct? Or was it still light or was it dark when you arrived on the scene where the roadblock would be constructed?

MR STEYN: I think it was twilight at that stage.

MR VISSER: Late afternoon, would you describe it like that?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: But it was still light?

MR STEYN: Yes I would say that.

MR VISSER: Now when you speak of your experience of the practise of obstructing a vehicle in a roadblock, what would you be able to say to the Committee or perhaps you should first say whether or not the practising of an apprehension of a vehicle was undertaken while you were on the scene?

MR STEYN: After the roadblock had been constructed and it was already twilight because we couldn't exactly construct this roadblock in the middle of the day because the message could go through that there had been a roadblock.

MR VISSER: Where to?

MR STEYN: To Botswana.

MR VISSER: Was it your experience that such messages did indeed go through?

MR STEYN: Yes indeed.

MR VISSER: And was it important to you to keep the roadblock a secret?

MR STEYN: Yes it was important and consequently this roadblock and the practise round surround the roadblock due to the fact that this infiltration would take place in the dark also had to take place in the dark.

MR VISSER: Why, could one not practise the apprehension of the vehicle in daylight even though it would be executed at night time?

MR STEYN: Apart from the fact that if we undertook the practise run during the day, it would become general knowledge, we wanted to keep it a secret because of the situation. The operation was to take place at night and it would be incorrect for them to practise during the day for something which they were going to do at night.

MR VISSER: So in other words the circumstances were not practised under the exact circumstances under which the matter or the incident would take place?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you have reconciled yourself with the actions of Brigadier Loots and that is why today you request amnesty. I've said that you have reconciled yourself with his order?

MR STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: That the MK commanders as well as the collaborator was to be eliminated. Tell me, what was your idea about Moatshe, the collaborator, the fact that he had also been eliminated.

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the fact that he had also been eliminated was impossible - it was impossible to launch this action and eliminate two out of three people in a vehicle and not eliminate the third person.

MR VISSER: The suspicion that these people would have been armed was then confirmed as we now know?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And the two deceased or the MK commanders were later identified and how were they identified, according to what?

MR STEYN: If I recall correctly they were identified according to fingerprints.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 97 you have further information surrounding these persons. You state that insofar as it is known MK Karl Marx initially or originally came from Soweto and that his correct surname was Ramokopa?

MR STEYN: That is the information which we had at that point.

MR VISSER: And that the third person Moatshe was a Botswanan subject and that according to your information he was responsible for the regular infiltration of ANC members?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You would probably would not know but nonetheless in paragraph 98 do you know whether Moatshe had been an informer of the security branch Western Transvaal?

MR STEYN: No, I don't know.

MR VISSER: Just to pause the