NO RECORDED INTRODUCTION TO HEARING

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: (s.u.o.)

MR VERSTER: That is correct, yes. At some stage he was manager of Region 1 and I think he managed Region 3 as well.

MR BIZOS: What did Region 1 deal with?

MR VERSTER: I think in the documentation that was supplied yesterday, Region 1 is mistakenly given, Region 1 was the Botswana Region. I think it is not minuted here.

MR BIZOS: Would you say Botswana was or was not?

MR VERSTER: Region 1 was Botswana, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And who was in charge of that?

MR VERSTER: It was David Fourie.

MR BIZOS: Yes and we know about Mr Wouter Basson. What was his position?

MR VERSTER: He was the Co-ordinator of Region 6 and he also performed certain other functions. I think he was always also the Co-ordinator of Zimbabwe Region, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: What stage was he in charge of Zimbabwe?

MR VERSTER: He was never in control of any region, he was the Co-ordinator.

MR BIZOS: And ...(indistinct) Kruger, what was his function?

MR VERSTER: He dealt with finances, he was not involved in any activities with us. He also functioned from another Head Office, Special Forces Headquarters, that's where he worked from.

MR BIZOS: And Lafras Luitingh?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos, could you please spell that name?

MR BIZOS: Yes, L-A-F-R-A-S L-U-I-T-I-N-G-H, Mr Chairman.

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, Mr Luitingh was the Co-ordinator in this regard of Mr Ferdi Barnard.

MR BIZOS: We read in the documents that there was a "binne kring", is it, or inner core were the persons whose names I mentioned in addition to you members of that inner core?

MR VERSTER: Members whom you have named now were, as we put it, aware members, in other words members who knew each other and they knew that they were part of Special Forces and were attached to the South African Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: Did you refer yourselves to the inner core, as the inner core?

MR VERSTER: No, if I recall correctly, one of the members of Region 6 in his statement started speaking of the inner circle, but one may see it as such. Those were the aware members and I was part of them.

MR BIZOS: You are happy with that. And in addition, was Christoffel Nel part of that inner core?

MR VERSTER: Chris Nel was also an aware member.

MR BIZOS: Part of the inner core?

MR VERSTER: The inner circle was a non verbal term that we used so he was an aware member of the structure.

MR BIZOS: I don't want to become too involved in semantics with you, Mr Verster, but where you were referred to as the Managing Director, would they be regarded as the members of the Board so to speak, because you were holding out that you were a sort of commercial undertaking? Could we refer to them either as the inner core or the members of the Board? You can choose. I just want a frame so that I don't have to repeat myself all the time.

MR VERSTER: If we may call it in English, one can call it the inner core. It sounds easier. In Afrikaans I refer to the aware members.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Inner core. Alright we'll speak about the inner core.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos. When you say you're comparing the inner core to the aware members, we heard yesterday that there were over 100 aware members, I've forgotten the exact figure, but there were many, many of them. Were all of those aware members that 100 plus, or 200, whatever it was, part of the inner core?

MR VERSTER: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So I think it's something, what Mr Bizos is talking about is something more than just the aware members. It's decision - people involved in management or decisions.

MR VERSTER: Chairperson it may be on various levels. It is Management, the management of the structures and Mr Chris Nel was in the Intelligence structure. He was part of the inner core there. Let us say, the core management there.

MR BIZOS: And Mr Charl Naude, was he part of the inner core?

MR VERSTER: In the initial stages of the CCB, he was the Regional Manager of Region 1 before Mr Fourie came in and thereafter he retired.

MR BIZOS: Did he thereafter become a member of the inner core?

MR VERSTER: No Chairperson, he then quit.

MR BIZOS: Was he never a member of the inner core?

MR VERSTER: When he was the Regional Manager of Region 1 in the initial stages, he was part of the inner core.

MR BIZOS: And Corrie Neerholtz, was he a member of the inner core?

MR VERSTER: That is correct. He was also a Regional Manager. If I recall correctly it was Region 2 and Region 4, the Angola Region.

MR BIZOS: Now this inner core, how often did it meet?

MR VERSTER: There were weekly meetings, co-ordinating sessions, I think once a week and thereafter the regions elements which were needed for projects met, Chairperson, so it varied from one group to the other and not all of them together.

MR BIZOS: If you were to estimate, would you say that this inner core met at least weekly?

MR VERSTER: Once a week, yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos if I can just inter ... these names that we've been talking about now, Neerholtz, Chris Nel, etc., were they code names or were they ...?

MR VERSTER: In certain instances - the two names that have been given now are their proper names, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Are all of them correct names?

MR VERSTER: The ones that you have given so far are correct names.

MR BIZOS: Now please tell us specifically did this inner core have to study the information that may have become available in relation to a specific proposed victim? Did they get the information, this inner core?

MR VERSTER: We functioned in a cell structure, Chairperson, only when it was applicable to him, so there was no discussion of all the projects by everyone together. The weekly meetings dealt with co-ordination and if it was applicable to him, he did the planning on the information which he had and he processed the information in order to glean intelligence from it.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well let's just take as an example the proposal made to kill Minister or then Mr Dullah Omar. You would have been informed because you were the Managing Director.

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And would you take this proposal to a meeting at which the other members, the other persons that I have mentioned were present in order that each one of them can make a contribution in relation to the proposal that Mr Dullah Omar was a legitimate target?

MR VERSTER: No Chairperson. We functioned in cell structures, so only Region 6 knew who the targets were. Not any of the other regions knew of it, for example in this case, because the other regions did not know the Regional Manager of Region 6, therefore for example Mr Staal Burger was never present at these meetings.

MR BIZOS: We're not talking about Mr Staal Burger at the moment, we are talking about the other people here. You say that you operated on a cell system. Would it be wrong to say that the inner core was a cell in itself?

MR VERSTER: No, it was the core management who dealt with the co-ordination of the management.

MR BIZOS: And for the purposes of co-ordination you needed to discuss the finance, you needed to discuss the financial - the administrative production and you needed intelligence, so each one of these persons that had a specific function and was a member of the inner circle or the core, the inner core, obviously had to be present in order to have an input as to whether Mr Omar was a legitimate target or not.

MR VERSTER: Chairperson there are volumes of documents that have been supplied to the TRC about the functions of the CCB and the inner circle had nothing to do with, except for its own administrative business and its own region, so not one of these members had anything to do with Region 6. region 6 had nothing to do with any projects of these members who have been mentioned.

MR BIZOS: But by its very name, its function must have been an overseeing and co-ordinating function. How could it oversee as the inner core and direct the performance of the particular act, whatever the region may have been, if they didn't get together to discuss it?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, I did not say that they did not supervise anything, they co-ordinated their own things with me. Every Regional Manager co-ordinated his activities with me. All the activities of the region was handled in a cell structure. It was attached to my statement and it has been supplied to the Commission over the course of 11 years.

MR BIZOS: Just answer the questions, not necessarily by reference to other documents. We don't want to read all of them, we want your answer, we don't want any references to the documents. If your counsel wants you to produce any of them, he'll do it. But let us take as an example, was Mr Lafras Luitingh referred to as the Administrative or Production Manager? Was that his designation?

MR VERSTER: No, if I recall correctly, he was the Co-ordinator of specific members, he was not a Production Manager.

MR BIZOS: What was he to co-ordinate, do you say?

MR VERSTER: For specific projects for which one, in this regard, was the handling initially of Mr Ferdi Barnard, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos, if I could just ask a question after something that was said a moment ago by Mr Verster. Mr Verster, did I hear you correctly, did you say that the other regional managers of Region 1, 2, 4 etc didn't know that Staal Burger was the Regional Manager of number 6?

MR VERSTER: They did not know Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was Region 6 then even within the inner core, a sort-of secret type region, or why didn't they know that he was a manager?

MR VERSTER: It was only how we worked Chairperson and that was because it was the group of Region 6 who came from the police and as the threat escalated against South Africa, Region 6 later came about. It was only in that way so that if someone did not know the other person, they stayed away from each other, for example in the training that Region 6 dealt with, only they and a few other people, for example myself and someone from Intelligence and so on and logistical people, gave them training, but the rest of the regions, there was no bond there because there was no purpose in taking persons who came from Special Forces who knew each other, now to keep them apart, they were kept apart for projects but not in terms of knowledge or co-ordination.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it not so that when the CCB was formed, that its initial purpose was to operate abroad, out of the country, externally? Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 were all external, nothing to do with ...

MR VERSTER: That is so, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And so when Region 6 was later developed and formed, that was internal. Did the Generals, the people at the top, know about Region 6?

MR VERSTER: Yes, the whole function of the structure was in terms of a plan, so the threat was evaluated, a plan was made, it was submitted.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Bizos, sorry.

MR BIZOS: You said yesterday that you had regular meetings. Sometimes once a week with all the Regional Managers. Did you say that?

MR VERSTER: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: That clearly indicated that all the Regional Managers came together from time to time.

MR VERSTER: That is correct. If they had reason to meet and knew each other. If anyone did not know each other then he did not meet in this manner and in that instance I went to them, which I also said yesterday.

MR BIZOS: Let us just confine ourselves to what you said yesterday, that you - the Regional Managers and you had regular meetings with the District Managers. How could you have told the Chairman this morning that the one Regional Manager didn't know any other Regional Managers?

MR VERSTER: That is how it worked and that is how I put it yesterday.

MR BIZOS: Don't you see the patent contradiction in your evidence, Sir?

MR WESSELS: With respect, Mr Chairman, I don't see the contradiction in the evidence and I object to the statement to the witness. That is a matter for argument.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) respect to say, the two statements are contradictory, I don't know why my learned friend describes them as non-contradictory. Have you any - if they are found to be contradictory, have you any explanation for that contradiction?

MR VERSTER: As I can recall, yesterday I said, Chairperson, that we me just about weekly. The Regional Managers met. There was doubt here yesterday with regard to certain administrative names of the persons. I also said yesterday that we had various venues, so that we did not occupy a building, everyone on the same floor, every region worked from his own position. It was only a technical point. If a group gets together, or I go to the group, we still meet once a week. It was not an issue yesterday, whether we came together in a group or did whatever in a group.

MR BIZOS: Did you or did you not meet the Regional Directors in the same room regularly, once a week or once every two weeks, or once a month? Did you or did you not?

MR VERSTER: Not necessarily, it depended on circumstances.

MR BIZOS: Were there circumstances where you did meet all the Regional Managers together?

MR VERSTER: Of course there were circumstances, except when the person was not supposed to be there, then he was not there.

MR BIZOS: Mr Verster, you will not detract me from the gravamen of my question. Don't give me the exceptions. I am asking you as a general rule, did the General Managers meeting with you, yes or no?

MR VERSTER: I will not answer it as a general rule. I say what I've said. I say that if it was necessary, then they met, if they did not and not all together, depending on how - if they can meet one another.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Did they meet one another in their capacity as Regional Managers with you and the other members of the inner ring, inner core?

MR VERSTER: Mr Bizos, I have no trouble in saying that these persons who could meet, met and we met once a week and the persons who could not be there were not there, so I will never say that everyone was there, because you want me to say that.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos. Did you used to call the meetings? Did you used to say, there's going to be a meeting next Thursday in my office or some other office and then call all the people who were meant to be at that meeting, or was it a standing arrangement that on a particular day of the week at a particular time, they were expected to be there unless they were told not to be there? How did these meetings come about? How were they convened?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, there was a more or less standing rule that said that we might meet on Mondays or Wednesdays, those who could meet and then we kept the groups apart. It also happened for example that one meets with the one group at one premises, those who could see each other and if there were people who did not know who worked with us, then we would - one would meet with another group at another place, or one would go to these people's offices.

MR BIZOS: Let us try and deal with a specific instance, in view of the answer that you gave to the Chairman, which your counsel says is not contradictory. Did Mr Burger, Staal Burger, attend a meeting at any time together with other Regional Managers under your Chairmanship? Yes or no?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, the only time when Mr Staal Burger met with other people was during training where persons who could meet and who could see him, were brought together. Mr Staal Burger did not discuss his regional activities with everyone else.

MR BIZOS: But did he not attend the meeting under your Chairmanship in the presence of other Regional Managers, yes or no?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, that question I cannot answer that specifically because, for example, if I may analyse the question to you, I would see that this is a very important point here. Let us take for example Mr David Fourie, he was my assistant, or he was the Deputy Manager, but it could also be that because Mr David Fourie had to stand in for me if I had to go away, then he would be at a meeting with Mr Staal Burger, that could happen.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the question put, well I know, the question put by Mr Bizos was, did you yourself personally ever attended a meeting, and by a meeting I'm sure Mr Bizos means not a sports meeting, or a training meeting, a meeting in an office, a business meeting, with other Regional Managers? Was there an occasion where other Regional Managers together with Mr Burger and yourself were present?

MR VERSTER: The example that I have just mentioned would be such an example where Mr David Fourie who was a Regional Manager of another region and I am present and Mr Staal Burger is there, Mr David Fourie who is another Regional Manager is there in his capacity as Deputy Manager of a project of such a specific meeting.

MR BIZOS: Why do you choose to answer the question by example and you do not answer it directly? Why don't you say yes or no, so that we can have some certainty and we can make submissions to the Committee on certain evidence and not examples and not references to documents. Please answer the question directly.

MR VERSTER: I cannot answer the question more directly. After 12 or 13 years, I'm trying to think of possibilities and I am trying to answer.

MR BIZOS: If that is what your state of mind was, why did you tell the Chairman that Mr Staal Burger did not know any of the other Regional Managers, clearly implying that he never attended such a meeting with other Managers present? Why did you say that to the Chairman?

MR VERSTER: Because it was not normal that Mr Burger attended general meetings and Mr David Burger who was the Deputy Manager and Mr Fourie would have continued and on that basis, I answered the question. To me, Chairperson, it is very logical.

MR BIZOS: You know His Lordship Mr Justice Stegmann, and I'm going to read it into the record soon, described you and your colleagues as absolute experts in evasion. Would you agree with that judgment of His Lordship, because we are going to argue that this is what you are busy doing now, a master of evasion?

MR VERSTER: I want it also taken up Chairperson, that I think it is nonsense what happens here now and if we look now what was said in the Webster incident I was proved correct. What was said in the Harms incident, I was proved to be correct. The previous government are trying to do footwork to get away from its responsibilities and anything is possible, so I am answering the question as I think of it and I am not answering what Mr Bizos wants to hear.

MR VERSTER: I won't argue with you any further, we will make submissions to the Committee in relation to this. But now let us take Mr Christoffel Nel. You've already told us that he was a member of the inner core.

MR VERSTER: He was an Intelligence Officer.

MR BIZOS: Now was he present when the proposal came to you that the then Mr Omar was to be eliminated?

MR VERSTER: I cannot remember this, I do not know Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well, you had to make a decision on the information placed before you, didn't you?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Who would have been the best person to advise you as to how the information was gathered, what the information was, from whom it had been obtained, how reliable it was thought to be, other than Mr Nel?

MR VERSTER: There were many other Intelligence Officers. Mr Nel, as the system functioned then, had the connection with the formal intelligence channel of the South African Defence Force and of Special Forces, so the Co-ordinator, Mr Christo Britz, was the person that would then speak to him and would confirm information. There were not meetings and meetings held. It could be that I spoke to Mr Chris Nel and I do not have a problem with this. He was not necessarily present at the final planning, he only gave the information, but it could be that he gave it through Christo Britz.

MR BIZOS: Was Mr David Fourie when the proposal came to you that Mr Omar was to be eliminated?

MR VERSTER: I don't think so, I don't know, but he wouldn't have been there, not normally.

MR BIZOS: Was ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry. Sorry, Mr Bizos. Can you recall when the proposal was brought to you for the first time regarding the assassination of Mr Omar?

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairperson, no, I cannot remember the specific incident. Because region 6 was only one of the regions, our primary function was outside the Republic of South Africa, so for me it was in big group projects and this was just one project and I cannot remember the specific circumstances, but I can remember the structure and I can remember how the channels worked and according to this we functioned.

MR BIZOS: Why did you say that Mr David Fourie was not there?

MR VERSTER: Because Mr Fourie was the Regional Manager of another region. He was also the Regional Manager of Region one and because we worked in a cell structure, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: But I thought that this inner core was there in order to evaluate and plan the operation and that was the responsibility of the inner core.

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, this is what you think, this is not necessarily correct what you're thinking.

MR BIZOS: Further, was Mr Wouter Basson present in this inner ring when the proposal to eliminate Mr Omar came?

MR VERSTER: Mr Basson was the Co-ordinator, so I would say yes. Whether he was always present, I do not know, but he co-ordinated between the region and myself.

MR BIZOS: So are you saying that Mr Wouter Basson was present when that proposal was made?

MR VERSTER: I think he was there, yes.

MR BIZOS: You only think, you're not prepared to commit yourself?

MR VERSTER: I don't care about committing myself, it is 11 years ago. I do not know, Mr Chairperson, I accept because he was the Co-ordinator he had to be there.

MR BIZOS: Were there financial implications in the proposal of eliminating Mr Omar?

MR VERSTER: Yes, there should have been a budget Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Was Mr Theuns Kruger there in order to approve the expenditure that would have been incurred for the elimination of Mr Omar?

MR VERSTER: No, Mr Theuns Kruger had nothing to do with any operations. He worked from another premises and he could also not authorise it. Not even I could authorise it. The Chairperson authorised it and I was the second level that authorised finances.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but didn't he have to at least administer once the project was agreed to by the head of the CCB, didn't he have to administer the finance and wasn't his presence necessary?

MR VERSTER: I already said that. He had nothing to do with any operations. He only received an order to give money. If he had to give the money, it was done in terms of our financial plan.

MR BIZOS: And was Mr Lafras Luitingh present?

MR VERSTER: No, not at all, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And was Charl Naude present?

MR VERSTER: Not at all, he was not a member of the CCB anymore.

MR BIZOS: And was Mr Corrie Neerholtz present?

MR VERSTER: It could be that he was already dead by then.

MR BIZOS: Now you know, there is something that I want to draw to your attention in relation to your evidence this morning. You admitted the presence of only one person and it happens to be one person who is a co-applicant of yours for amnesty, Mr Basson, isn't that correct? Everyone else wasn't there.

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: I am going to submit to the Committee, that you still owe a loyalty to your fellow conspirators and this is why you distance them from every act because you owe them a loyalty greater than the truth.

MR VERSTER: I reject it for what it's worth, what you are saying, but if I do have loyalties towards anyone, then I'm very proud of it. I do not feel bad about it at all.

MR BIZOS: Oh, does that mean that you are prepared to lie for the people that you consider as people as a higher loyalty than telling the truth to the Commission, is that how we are to understand you?

MR VERSTER: No, I think that point is irrelevant because if there had been members who were involved, then they would have applied for amnesty, so it would then be logical that only those people involved would apply for amnesty. Why would someone be here who didn't have to be here, so I do not really understand the question.

MR BIZOS: Maybe because they thought that their presence, that the facts would not come to the fore, but be that as it may. Let's take another - in relation to the ...(indistinct - no microphone) Mr Evans, I don't want to go through the whole process. We have the names, you remember them well, tell us who was present at any inner core meeting where the assassination of Mr Evans was discussed.

MR VERSTER: It should only have been Mr Wouter Basson, it couldn't have been anyone else.

MR BIZOS: So that we again have the same pattern that the only person that you remember being present, is the one person that has applied for amnesty. Very well, let's proceed.

MR VERSTER: No, Mr Chairperson, the insinuation comes from Mr Bizos that I am busy lying.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry. Mr Verster are you saying that it was only Wouter Basson that was present when the assassination of Mr Evans was discussed, or are you saying he's the only person that you can remember who was involved in the discussions relating to Mr Evans?

MR VERSTER: What I am saying is that it is only Mr Wouter Basson, because we worked in cell structures, Mr Chairperson and because the other persons who are mentioned here, had nothing to do with this incident and there is a clear perception from Mr Bizos's side, that the inner core was a management core, which you can find in story books and at the back page of a newspaper and this is not at all the way in which we worked and even if he says that I'm lying, this is the truth.

MR LAX: Can I just go - sorry Mr Bizos, if I may. Can I just go back to a theme I put to you yesterday, because the impression I get listening to you is that once again you don't have any independent recollection of any of these meetings. You simply are implying that from your modus operandi, from the structures that you used, you are reasoning and assuming that certain people would or would not have been there, because of the nature of their involvements and other people's involvements. Do I understand that correctly?

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, I want to answer it in the following way. There were many regions, 10 regions and there were many projects and I applied for these incidents and I do remember that I gave authorisation. I know which projects the region was busy with and I cannot remember the day, date and the time of this alone, but it is so that it fell within the responsibility of a region and it was specific incidents of a region and because there were so many other external projects outside the country, this is the way that I can handle it.

MR SIBANYONI: Excuse me, Mr Bizos. Mr Verster, when Staal Burger attended the meeting during training, was he already the Manager of a region?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Mr Chairperson. He was then already appointed as the Regional Manager of that region.

MR SIBANYONI: During such meetings obviously he would either talk or give a report about his region, activities from his region?

MR VERSTER: That is correct. It was during training that he was already the Regional Manager, Mr Chairperson and in this regard we worked, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Now let us take the Early Learning Centre. I'll ask the same question. Who of the inner core was present when that proposal was brought to you?

MR VERSTER: Only Mr Wouter Basson, but once again you have the wrong perception. Region 6 had its own projects. If we can take the example, Charl Naude was then already not a member of the structure, but he had his own projects and the same also for the other members and they did not even know of the projects of Region 6 that was co-ordinated by Mr Wouter Basson.

MR BIZOS: Now can I have an answer to the question? Can you remember which of the persons whose names we have mentioned as, or accepted members of the inner core, were present when the Early Learning Centre proposal came to you?

MR VERSTER: I've already said it, Mr Chairperson. It was only Mr Wouter Basson.

MR BIZOS: Now, in each one of these cases you do not say that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos.

MR LAX: Sorry. Just, could I just intervene.

CHAIRPERSON: If you can just repeat ...

MR LAX: Every time you touch that thing with your pen, it cuts out Mr Bizos's mike.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, could you just repeat what you said because your mike went off?

MR BIZOS: Well, are you saying that your Deputy was not present at any of - on any occasion on which any of these proposals were made?

MR VERSTER: Yes, otherwise he would have applied for amnesty, so he was not present.

MR BIZOS: Is that the only reason that you have to advance as to why you say he was not present?

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, we worked in a cell structure, so he had his own region and if I was away, then he would have needed to know about certain information or certain orders from me.

MR BIZOS: I would have thought that a Deputy would want to be informed of all the affairs of the core that he is a member of, so that in your absence, he would be able to deal with things, or was this not that kind of Deputy?

MR VERSTER: You can think what you want to, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: I'm asking you, never mind what I think, please answer the question.

MR VERSTER: You say you think what you want to and I'm telling you, you can think what you want to, but it is not like that.

MR BIZOS: Why do you say that your Deputy was not there on any one of these occasions when one would have expected on the general probabilities that a Deputy would be there in order to do the things that you might have done if you were there at times when you were absent? That is the question. Please answer it.

MR VERSTER: No, you said that you can expect what you want to, it did not happen like that. It was as I said, in a cell structure that we functioned, there was not an inner core from which anyone else, other than the Chairperson, myself, or a representative of the Region in any project then spoke about that project. There was never a group that everyone was together.

MR BIZOS: How much time did you spend out of the country in the overseas projects which you directed for the elimination of people there?

MR WESSELS: With respect, Mr Chairman, I object to that line of questioning. There was no such evidence that he was out of the country to eliminate people out there.

CHAIRPERSON: I think - well, just rephrase it, how much time did you spend out of the country on CCB business, more or less? What - how regularly were you away?

MR VERSTER: There were many times that I was away, Mr Chairperson, I do not know. I do not know.

MR BIZOS: How much of your time did you spend in the country supervising the elimination of the people inside and how much time did you spend outside on other business?

MR VERSTER: I was away many times.

MR BIZOS: A percentage of the time.

MR VERSTER: I do not know. I would have to lie if I have to say something.

MR BIZOS: Now don't you - you see let me just cut you short.

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, may I object against the public commenting, loudly, as to what is to happen here in these proceedings here and I may ask if the public cannot behave themselves, that you clear the ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Would people present please not make comments in relation to the evidence being given. We're here to receive the evidence. You can talk about what has been said in here during the break amongst each other, but please don't make loud comments during the proceedings. Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: That you say that you are sure he was not there, he did not apply for amnesty. I am going to put to you that the reason why you are not prepared to admit to his presence when any of these elimination plans were brought forward and discussed, is because you want to protect him because you know that he has not applied for amnesty, for whatever reason he may have chosen not to.

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, the Act is clear. Every person is responsible for the things that he felt he was responsible for and he can then apply for amnesty for them. You can say it like you want to.

CHAIRPERSON: What was Mr Fourie's function as Deputy? Why was he Deputy?

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, there were times when I was away and then he was responsible for the co-ordination and there was a time that I was locked up and then he was the next connection or the link with the Chairperson. He had his own region, he had his own projects. We had a shortage of people and then according to this he functioned. So his functions and his duties were as a link with the Chairperson, but he did not necessarily know the or have to do with the circumstances of every project.

MR BIZOS: He must have had knowledge of some of what you call euphemistically, projects.

MR VERSTER: I do not know, I cannot remember if he had any other knowledge.

MR BIZOS: Well how can you deny that he was present on one or other of the three instances that I have put to you?

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, I have nothing to say, I think I have already answered that.

MR BIZOS: Well the reason why you have nothing to say is because your evidence doesn't make sense. If it made sense you would have been able to deal with the improbability that I am suggesting to you. Do you want to say anything else about it?

MR VERSTER: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Right. Now, I will use your euphemism for this purpose. These projects were not static, they were developing, obstacles were found in the way and were reported to the inner circle. Decisions had to be made. A gun had to be obtained. Poison had to be obtained. Now, how could all these details have been kept a secret from your Deputy?

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, we work in a cell structure and this means that the Co-ordinator contacted directly between the region and me, between the information and the Co-ordinator, between the logistical people who gave him equipment and himself and this was their function. They were people who worked very hard.

MR BIZOS: The question was, in relation to each one of these incidents and many others, no doubt, there had to be consultation from time to time with you. Would you agree?

MR VERSTER: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: It wouldn't be a mere making of the proposal and then the, as far as you're concerned, the file is put away. You would have had to make decisions in relation to the amendments to the proposal from time to time.

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now why would you have kept your Deputy in the dark, who had to have knowledge if he was to meaningfully deal with any of the contingencies that we do know arose in these instances?

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, we worked in cell structures and Mr Fourie had a region of his own, with his own projects and what happened is that I had connections with Regional Managers, it doesn't matter where on earth I was, I could within 24 hours, speak to anyone. So Mr Fourie stood in for General Management, but we had operations that we kept away from people who did not have to know about these operations and this includes everyone. There was no formal structure with an office for a Deputy. There was a shortage of staff, so he was only the next senior person who could then carry this responsibility and if he had to know, then he knew about it, otherwise not.

MR BIZOS: How many were in the cell that dealt with these three instances?

MR VERSTER; It is all the members present here, plus Staal Burger and then the Co-ordinator. The Co-ordinator is also here.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but ...

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the complete cell, Mr Verster, all the applicants present here today?

MR VERSTER: That is correct and then there were unknowing members and the support structure that every member had and it could even happen that in the region, there were people who did not know about the supporting structure of a specific individual, only he knew them.

MR BIZOS: Now, in relation to the information, do you recall who brought it to you and who made the proposal?

CHAIRPERSON: Which matter are we talking about now?

MR BIZOS: Mr Omar, who brought the proposal to you?

MR VERSTER: It was Mr Christo Britz and then there were meetings later on, so the link between myself and the region would have been Mr Britz, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And is Christo Britz - who's Christo Britz?

MR VERSTER: This was Mr Wouter Basson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BIZOS: ...called Trevits?

MR VERSTER: Yes, I am aware of this, it was an information structure. I think it was interdepartmental. At that level, where we had no entry to, but I accept that Mr Chris Nel and all Intelligence Officers had access to this organisation, I do not know.

MR BIZOS: Did any information in relation to Mr Omar, come from Trevits?

MR VERSTER: It could have been confirmation. I do not know, I had nothing to do with it.

MR BIZOS: Well, your job was to decide on the reliability of the information that was furnished to you and you were one of the important cogs in the wheel for the decision as to who was to be eliminated or not. Why didn't you inquire as to whether Trevits had any views on the proposal of eliminating Mr Omar?

MR VERSTER: I did not say that I did not do it, I said that I had nothing to do with them. The Co-ordinator would speak to the Intelligence Officer and the Intelligence Officers would then have access to the whole Intelligence system of the country. If, for instance, you could not speak directly to National Intelligence, then through their own structures they would make inquiries. It was not my task and in terms of our operational procedures, we were not allowed to have contact in a direct way and this would not mean that we did not do it.

MR BIZOS: Now would you agree that you were the cog in the wheel in relation to the decision? Although the Head of the - the Chairman had to ratify your decision, you were, as Managing Director of this collection of people, you were the person who really had to make sure that decisions were made on reliable information and a value judgment was made that this was indeed a person to be eliminated. Would you take responsibility along those lines?

MR VERSTER: Yes, you've just said many things. I was responsible at my level, but I was not responsible for the decisions of the Chairperson. On my level I have to be responsible that I've finalised the plan and that my subordinates did it and for this I accept responsibility.

MR BIZOS: Let me ask you this. On your level, did you consider your level a most important one, in order to give the Chairman, Gen Webb, who was to put the final stamp of approval, correct information, correctly evaluated, both on fact and on the morality that you operated on?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, that was my responsibility.

MR BIZOS: Now, have you heard of the organisation for Lawyers for Human Rights?

MR VERSTER: Yes, I've heard of it.

MR BIZOS: Who was its Chairman during your stewardship?

MR VERSTER: It was Mr Dullah Omar, if I recall correctly.

MR BIZOS: He was the Chairman of Lawyers for Human Rights?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Who was its Vice-Chairman?

MR VERSTER: I do not know.

MR BIZOS: Who was its National Director?

MR VERSTER: That I do not know.

MR BIZOS: Who were the members of its National Council?

MR VERSTER: I would not know that.

MR BIZOS: How many officers did it have in the country?

MR VERSTER: Mr Bizos, I can trap you in two minutes on the same basis. I did not have to know it. I had a structure who was responsible for investigating those things if it was necessary.

MR BIZOS: If I were to tell you that if the information was given to you that Mr Dullah Omar was the Chairman of Lawyers for Human Rights, this structure of yours to gather information knew nothing about Mr Dullah Omar and certainly nothing about Lawyers for Human Rights, what would you say to that?

MR VERSTER: That is not true. Then the whole South African Intelligence structure did not know anything and I am not ...

MR BIZOS: Because Mr Dullah Omar was not even a member of Lawyers for Human Rights.

MR VERSTER: We were under that impression.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but you know people shouldn't be killed on impressions, Mr Verster.

MR VERSTER: Mr Dullah Omar, in my opinion, was someone who acted against the laws of the country at that stage and in my opinion, he was a terrorist just like anyone else.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos. Mr Verster, you say it was your impression that Mr Omar was the Chairman of the Lawyers for Human Rights. The Lawyers for Human Rights was never a secret underground organisation. Why is it, or can you explain why you only had an impression that he was the Chairman, because one could easily establish who was the Chairman of an organisation such as this. If I want to for instance now today establish who the Chairman is of NADEL, I just get a letterhead and I'll be told that, or I make a phone call to one of their offices and ask that, because no-one would hide that fact because it wasn't secret, so how could it come about that National Intelligence have the impression that somebody is the Chairman of an organisation such as Lawyers for Human Rights, which is so easily established by any layman, let alone an Intelligence officer?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, it was not based on the fact that Mr Omar was the Chairperson of the organisation, it was based on information which was supplied to me and information system and through the channels which I have explained to you that Mr Dullah Omar busied himself with radical structures and supported internal disruption and this led to the degrading of the sovereignty of the country and he was someone who knew of and co-ordinated activities of the ANC and SACP and thereby this could have lead to violence in the country, it could have led to problems in the country and on that basis I saw him as a threat to the State and on that basis, and I did not take that decision, it was the National Security Management system of the country and I was a fighting soldier, if they point out someone to shoot, I will shoot.

MR BIZOS: No, you had a discretion. You had a discretion. You were not on the battle ground where you saw someone emerging from the trench and you shot, you had a discretion, you had to evaluate information and decide whether or not a person who was not armed and was carrying on his profession, was to be eliminated because of the information given to you, but you know you have given us a standard description of who was to be eliminated. We know that you were told that he was Chairman for Lawyers for Human Rights and you considered that one of the factors why he had to be eliminated. Now, as the Chairman has said, you know you only had to look at the telephone book in Pretoria, in Johannesburg and you would have found out that the Directorate of Lawyers for Human Rights was in Pretoria and you would have phoned the Director or even the switchboard operator and asked who the Chairman was and they would have told you that it was Mr Jules Brody, an eminent member of the Johannesburg Bar.

MR VERSTER: It had nothing to do with me Chairperson, it was not my function to verify information. Information is information. Intelligence was confirmed information. If a plan comes before me, then I have to accept it as such, coming from the Intelligence System and I made decisions according to the intelligence which was placed before me.

MR BIZOS: Were you told where the information came from?

MR VERSTER: I knew that the information came from grass root level, from ground level from Region 6, from Mr Britz to me and it was verified and then the Intelligence staff and the rest of the Intelligence system would discuss it and eventually it would arrive at my door.

MR BIZOS: We know from the papers that your colleagues have filed, that the original information came from a gangster. How difficult would it have been to ask: "Where does this original information come from?" for you who had the - who was going to be the judge as to whether Mr Omar was to live or die. True that there was a Court of Appeal in Gen Webb, but you were to make the decision, why didn't you ask: "where does this information come from?"

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, it came from ground level.

MR BIZOS: Yes, the "grondvlak" here was a gangster.

MR VERSTER: That we found out afterwards. At that stage it was given to me, coming from the police coming from that region and I did not think that it only came from the gangster, it came from the police as well and thereafter it was processed.

MR BIZOS: Not only was he a gangster, he also hoodwinked you and took a large sum of money which, according to the evidence, he did nothing for, to earn it.

MR VERSTER: That is where the ANC crawled around, with the gangsters, that is why the people had connections there and that had nothing to do with me.

MR BIZOS: Has it occurred to you that perhaps the reason why your CCB did not succeed, is because you had a completely wrong perception about the ANC, which you refer to as the enemy, that it crept around amongst gangsters? It was your men apparently in this instance that were creeping around gangsters.

MR VERSTER: It was the same structure. The ANC was the enemy at that stage and it was the same structure who stole cars and smuggled narcotics and in Lusaka, weapons were taken ...

MR BIZOS: Let's deal with the facts here. The facts of this case were that it was your men that were co-operating with a gangster who even took them for a ride of a large sum of the State's money and not the ANC, but let us return to the question. Did you - Why would you, who had to make such an important decision, not ask: "Where is the origin of this information?"

MR VERSTER: Well I have tried to explain to you. Information does not come from one point only. It comes from sources and thereafter the information is disseminated and becomes intelligence and then it is given to me as intelligence. My training background is that from an operational viewpoint with the information to my availability, I shall make a plan. The information will say whether it's an A1, A2 or A4 source, so it is only an element from grass roots level which you know Sir, is to be doubted, which comes from a gang member. It comes from the police as well. It comes from Military Intelligence. It comes from National Intelligence and the fact that Mr Omar was appointed Minister of Justice is what his - proves his background, so I was correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos, if I could just ask one quick question. Mr Verster, when the name Mr Dullah Omar was submitted to you by, I presume, Mr Wouter Basson as a proposal for an operation, as a target, was that name a strange name to you, the first time you hear it?

MR VERSTER: At that stage it was a strange name to me.

CHAIRPERSON: So you hadn't heard of Mr Omar before a submission came to you?

MR VERSTER: Up to the moment when it was given to me, he was unknown to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Did you know whether or not he had been banned in terms of the Security legislation?

MR VERSTER: No, Chairperson I did not have that background knowledge.

MR BIZOS: Did you know whether or not he had been detained?

MR VERSTER: No, I did not know him at all, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you know whether he was an office bearer in the United Democratic Front?

MR VERSTER: I knew that he was that, but that was the police's function and they were ...(indistinct)

MR BIZOS: Did you know that he was a member of the United Democratic Front?

MR VERSTER: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now we have evidence that the decision as to how a person was to be dealt with depended upon you. It was put, whether the window pane was going to be broken or the person was going to be killed, was your decision. I know that you're going to tell us that there was a Court of Appeal and Gen Webb, but do you agree that you made the decision on the information placed before you, that this person is to be killed?

MR VERSTER: I did not decide on it. There were projects where I made a plan and where I proposed a plan and then it goes according to the channels in the hierarchy.

MR BIZOS: The plan was how a person - first of all that a person should be killed and how he or she was to be killed, that was your decision? To make a plan and send it up for approval.

MR VERSTER: I did not decide how, the plan is made by the Region, I approve or disapprove.

MR BIZOS: But you can cut it off, if you, or you can alter the plan that was made by the district?

MR VERSTER: Correct, I may disapprove of it or I may say that I support it and it is approved.

CHAIRPERSON: We know that Gen Webb made the final decision, that's what you've been saying, that Gen Webb made the final decision. I'm not sure whether that will be disputed by Gen Webb, but would you make a recommendation? When you approached Gen Webb with the information that you'd received from the ground level and confirmation through Christo Nel etc., when you went to Gen Webb with the proposal, would you just say: "Well, here's the information" and then just wait for Gen Webb to make the decision, or would you say: "Well, our recommendation is that this person should be eliminated, or we should go and slash his motor car tyres," or whatever the proposal was?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson that plan is formulated at ground roots, at ground level and two or three scenarios would be proposed to me and then I would support it and I would choose one of the options and then usually we would meet, the Chairperson and I and someone from the Region, for example the Co-ordinator or maybe just the two of us, but there were instances where speed or circumstances were of such a nature where we, for example, could speak telephonically and say that: "Listen, we cannot meet now, but this instance is like another instance" and something might have been discussed beforehand and on that basis we would continue. So sometimes it was formal and sometimes it was not so formal.

CHAIRPERSON: What I want to know is, when Gen Webb was approached for final approval or disapproval of a project, was a recommendation put to him? It is recommended that the person who is the subject-matter of this proposal, be eliminated, or whatever, would that proposal - and then he would authorise it or not authorise it, or would he himself make the decision as to what action should be taken against the subject-matter of - the person who was the subject-matter of the proposal?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, the Chairperson should only say yes or no, and I generalise now, but the Chairperson listens to the plan and it is proposed to him with the information, that is a formal - it could be the exact procedure that is followed for the planning and for the submission of a plan.

]CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. You told us that the fact that Minister Dullah Omar was appointed Minister of Justice was confirmation of the correctness of your information. Do you recall that?

MR VERSTER: Correct. Yes that is the impression that I had.

MR BIZOS: And it was also confirmation for you that your decision to kill him was correct.

MR VERSTER: It was not only my decision.

MR BIZOS: The decision to kill him was correct?

MR VERSTER: It was not my decision, Chairperson, and I wish to reiterate that Mr Omar and all the radically left persons from that time, were on lists within the Intelligence structure. I was only an executive arm of the Intelligence structure, it was not in my hands. I did not make him a target.

MR BIZOS: I'm dealing with your statement this morning that the fact that Mr Mandela's government - President Mandela appointed him as Minister of Justice was confirmation of the correctness of the decision that he should be killed?

MR VERSTER: It confirms, in my opinion, that Mr Omar was indeed - in previous times had opposed the government of the day and that he had acted against the law and that he had tried to usurp the previous government and through that a measure of trust existed between him and his colleagues and that is why he was given a senior appointment after the election.

MR BIZOS: Who was the Minster of Finance appointed by Mr Mandela when he became President?

MR VERSTER: I just can't get his name.

MR BIZOS: I'll remind you, Mr Keyes.

MR VERSTER: Mr Keyes, Derek Keyes.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps if you can tell him, ja.

MR VERSTER: Mr Keyes, Derek Keyes, yes.

MR BIZOS: And who succeeded him as Minister of Finance?

MR VERSTER: I don't know if this is a quiz now?

MR BIZOS: Everything I ask is a question, but I'll help you. It was Mr Liebenberg, the Managing Director of Nedbank. Does it occur to you that you have a warped mind, Mr Verster, in drawing inferences about guilt and innocence?

MR VERSTER: Not at all, because we all know that those persons came from the private sector. It was for a specific reason and we do know that Mr Omar was on lists back then of the Intelligence community.

MR BIZOS: Lists on information supplied by gangster informers for gain.

MR VERSTER: That's not true.

MR BIZOS: Well how do you know?

MR VERSTER: Because the gangster did not put his name on a list, it was only one of the channels which we used.

MR BIZOS: Now let us turn to another aspect. Did you not find it objectionable or dangerous to employ gangsters and pay them or promise to pay them R30 000 in order to commit a murder? Did you not find it objectionable that the State which you say you represented in this regard, should make common cause with gangsters to assassinate people?

MR VERSTER: That is and was general practice and the ANC Umkhonto did exactly the same.

MR BIZOS: You know, they can answer for their conscience, Mr Verster, if what you say is correct. Let's deal with you. We're dealing with you as a witness today and not with Umkhonto people. Did you not find that objectionable or amoral to support a State offering R30 000 to a gangster to kill a person who was practising law in the Cape?

MR VERSTER: Not in the least because it was a specific instruction to not be connected to the State and it was just as immoral when bombs exploded that were planted by the enemy of the past and the murders that they committed from Church Street right through, so in war situations, such things can happen.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I'm not going to involve myself in an argument with you in relation to other matters, Sir, but I just want to correct, that it was R30 000 that was voted for but he only got ...

CHAIRPERSON: It was R18 000 or somewhere around there, yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes, there was a split somewhere along the line.

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, I would just like to say on this that the method in which the money was paid out, whether individuals used the money properly or not, but the manner in which the money was made available was in terms of a financial plan which was approved on Treasurer level because the Auditor-General was part of it in the final drawing up of those plans. They did not know how we would use it because covert financing was unique, it was just for us.

MR BIZOS: What was your salary?

MR VERSTER: I cannot remember.

MR BIZOS: Try.

MR VERSTER: This was 11 years ago. R60 000, R56 000 per year.

MR BIZOS: What bonuses were you getting?

MR VERSTER: I did not receive any bonus. In my instance I was a qualified Special Forces member and in our instances we qualified for parachute allowances and explosive allowances and because we were in the private sector ordered to get production from people, we called it production bonuses but in essence it was remuneration for qualifications.

MR BIZOS: What was the product of the production for which bonuses were given, Sir?

MR VERSTER: The execution of operations.

MR BIZOS: Which was what?

MR VERSTER: The disruption of the enemies of South Africa as we have discussed it.

MR BIZOS: Which at times meant killing people and you called that product.

MR VERSTER: Yes, that is definitely so. To kill the enemy was my work.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I didn't quite understand you Mr Verster, are you saying that your salary was the regular salary, your basic salary, of a Special Forces member of your rank at that time?

MR VERSTER: That was the basis, yes, that was the basis upon which my salary was determined.

CHAIRPERSON: Then you would get bonuses for successful operations?

MR VERSTER: No, I determined it myself, I did not receive any bonuses except the allowances for which I had a qualification, but members who were in our service, if he was an aware member, we changed it as such and it was approved in financial plans and then we said because he cannot jump parachute now, he gets that same amount of money as production bonus.

CHAIRPERSON: And then would you get, I've seen from the papers some of the operatives drove around in fancy motor vehicles, that sort of thing. Would you get a motor vehicle as part of your package?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, these were not fancy vehicles. It was transport because ...

CHAIRPERSON: But I've read here about and I don't want to advertise, but BMW's.

MR VERSTER; These were second-hand vehicles that they could find within the budget. We did not prescribe to a member what he should drive.

CHAIRPERSON: But there was that sort of thing as well, car allowance?

MR VERSTER: There was an approved policy of what amount and on which level could be approved and if one looks at the State structure and then the log books were filled in day and night and in our instance, all the time we would tell a person that he may drive so many kilometres a day and the rest he has to cover himself

CHAIRPERSON: You personally, Mr Verster, I just want to - you were a member of the Security Force for a long while. It was your career.

MR VERSTER: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: As the Managing Director of the CCB, now when that happened, did you continue on your medical aid, for instance, did you get the housing subsidy that you got as a soldier, that sort of thing? What happened there?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, my commissioned rank was given to me by the President of the Republic, C R Swart and I had to play that down, so my rank was the level of Colonel and then I could and stopped my medical aid and then I received a contract from the State for the work that I performed and this all included independent medical aid and vehicle allowances and so forth. I say once again, it was entailed in a plan.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: In order to cut it short, would you agree that you personally got more for your rank than the officers who remained in the SADF, even the Special Forces, that you got more?

MR VERSTER: I would not agree with that.

MR BIZOS: Pity that you don't remember your salary, so that we could check that, Mr Verster. Try and remember what your salary was and what your perks were, please.

MR VERSTER: What do you expect of me, Bizos?

MR BIZOS: To make an honest attempt to tell us what your salary was and what your perks were.

MR VERSTER: It is not important, it was 12 years ago. You can determine it in the army's books. I have no contact with them. You can go and see what is a Brigadier's salary and what allowances he gets.

MR BIZOS: Thank you for the advice. I know how to get the information from the army. I want the information from you, what you were getting.

MR VERSTER: I am not interested in the army anymore, I have no connections with them, so I have no idea.

MR BIZOS: You're not prepared to tell us what your salary was and what ...

MR VERSTER: I am prepared, if I knew, but I don't.

MR BIZOS: You've forgotten what your perks were.

MR VERSTER: It was for explosives, parachuting and I think there were some or other allowances, I do not recall.

MR BIZOS: We'll note that, but now we do have information from others. The changeover from the Forces to the CCB or the police was for starters an increase of R1000. Do you agree or disagree with that?

MR VERSTER: If you have it in front of you, I would agree with it. It is in terms of the financial plan and if the person was qualified for this, then he could receive it. There might have been reasons why he received it and that is not in front of me.

MR BIZOS: You also got a 13th cheque. Now when I say you, I mean the person, the recruited person got a 13th cheque, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: Yes, that would have been the case.

MR BIZOS: Plus at least two annual production bonuses of approximately R3 000 each, production bonuses.

MR VERSTER: That was based on what I told you. That was to get a replacement for allowances that he lost when he was in uniform and we were all seen in the same group and that is why we called it a production bonus. I have already told you that this was for my allowances and I received this money for that purpose, we only called it a production bonus.

MR BIZOS: He was also to get R30 000 - BMW which cost at least in those days, R30 000.

MR VERSTER: No that is wrong. The person got a vehicle with the maximum amount of R30 000 attached to it.

MR BIZOS: Oh I see, they could choose what car they get, yes.

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now they were also to appear as business men, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: No, they had to become that.

MR BIZOS: They had to become business men?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And did they get an office, the rent of which was paid by the CCB?

MR VERSTER: What happened is that they made a plan which would be acceptable to the organisation and then they would have to present the plan with a budget and if this included an office, then he would receive it.

MR BIZOS: And they were expected to run real businesses in order to appear as if they are business men.

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And if they made profits in their business, to whom did the profits go?

MR VERSTER: Then they would either give a part of this money to us, or they would have to declare this money and re-use it to become independent, so that it would not come from our budget.

MR BIZOS: Did anybody ever pay any money in, to your knowledge, or did they keep the profits?

MR VERSTER: Yes, there were many structures as I can remember it, where the people later would then pay for their own office, for his own petrol and then he would stop receiving it from us.

MR BIZOS: The question was, did any one of them pay any share of the profits to the ...

MR VERSTER: Yes there were.

MR BIZOS: Who?

MR VERSTER: I cannot remember this, it is too long ago Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Were they allowed to keep a portion of the profits for themselves?

MR VERSTER: For the reasons that I have just given you, to be able to make his business and his office independent and this is in a financial plan that was approved.

MR BIZOS: Do you know what a mercenary is?

MR VERSTER: I know what it is Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Do you know that, what makes a soldier a mercenary, according to international definition?

MR VERSTER: Yes, I have a reasonable idea, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: A person who is motivated to take part in acts of violence, essentially by the desire for significant private gain and is promoted by the promise of payment of material compensation. Would that fit a person into the category of a mercenary?

MR VERSTER: What you have said ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: In your mind?

MR VERSTER: According to what you said, Mr Chairperson, yes.

MR BIZOS: And also where he receives material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid, to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party. Does that accord with your understanding of...?

MR VERSTER: It could be the case, yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well, did it occur to you when you were making these proposals for people to be eliminated, that the proposals may have been made for the motives of mercenaries and that is to get extra few thousand rand at a time, every time there was a successful assassination?

MR VERSTER: Not in the least, I think that this is not in relation at all, because you cannot function in the private sector without money, you do not have the same rights and privileges as a soldier. We were all people who sacrificed our careers, we were all people who received medals. You do not have helicopters and submarines and tanks and fancy vehicles that you can drive with to get to the enemy because the enemy chose to move between the criminals.

MR BIZOS: Production bonuses are paid to managers, or workers in factories, for producing peace goods, but you were in the business of killing, Mr Verster. Did it now occur to you that the giving of these bonuses and these perks and putting up people in businesses which some of them kept as their own after their discharge, to considerable advantage to themselves, may have led them to make proposals for killing, at least partly motivated, by the fact that they were going to get what you euphemistically call a production bonus? Some may call it blood money.

MR VERSTER; Or you can say that it is qualification allowances. If you want to call it blood money, I do not agree with you at all.

MR BIZOS: Well what would you call it if a person gets R3 000 bonus for killing somebody, a member and honourable member of your military profession?

MR VERSTER: That depends on who he is and you can say it in that way, but I think the same of your position.

MR BIZOS: I don't know that anybody, any one of us has killed anybody for money, maybe we take too much money for the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think let's ...

MR VERSTER: That's debatable.

MR BIZOS: You are actually making a serious comparison that getting a production bonus for killing someone is the same as the lawyer charging a fee, or was it just a personal insult, which I don't really mind, coming from you.

CHAIRPERSON: I think, gentlemen, if we can just get on with the questioning and stop the personal jibes.

MR VERSTER: You can say what you want to Mr Chairperson, and if you think that I am going to get a fright, what I want to tell you is that I want to answer your question and I will say again that depending on who these people were, we standardised. There were highly trained Special Forces members. He, in his uniform, could receive certain allowances and because we moved over to the private sector, we changed this and we called it production money and later on we gave it to other people on the same basis, so that there would not be differences, but on Treasurer level it was authorised and it was something that was authorised outside of my control, so the questions that are put to me at the moment, should be put to the previous Chief of the Army and interdepartmental to the Minister of Finances and the good President de Klerk, who knew nothing about what happened and also P W Botha.

MR BIZOS: The rewards that eventually accrued to some of the people were substantial business which became as known as executive outcomes after the disbandment of the CCB.

MR VERSTER: It sounds to me as if you should ask - you got these questions from National Intelligence. It has no relation to what we are busy with at the moment.

MR BIZOS: Well, what did Mr Lafras Luitingh do after he ceased being a member of the CCB?

MR VERSTER: You will have to go and ask him that Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Didn't you take an interest in your erstwhile co-conspirators?

MR VERSTER: You have to remember that, I don't want to use the word co-conspirator.

MR BIZOS: Well, your colleagues in the CCB.

MR VERSTER: That is much better.

MR BIZOS: But would you mind answering the ...

MR VERSTER: No, it has nothing to do with me, you will have to go and ask them. It is not relating to what we are busy with at the moment.

MR BIZOS: Did Mr van Zyl go into, or rather continue with a very lucrative business, which he established at the expense of the CCB?

MR VERSTER: That you will have to ask him Mr Chairperson. I read in the newspapers that he has his own business. I do not know how successful he was. I have no idea.

MR BIZOS: The reason why I am asking you these questions is because we are going to submit that they are relevant. That the terms of employment and the monies and other benefits that they were getting, should have made you particularly careful about what they were proposing should be done in the name of the State. Do you have any comment on that?

MR VERSTER: It was all authorised structures and decisions and we were the only structure who had an authorised financial plan.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Because you were able to keep away vital documents from the Auditor General, to wit the operational files.

MR VERSTER: I think you read this in the newspaper, Mr Chairperson, I do not know what you're talking about.

MR BIZOS: Well did you, never mind where I read it from, did you in fact make the operational files available to the Auditor-General?

MR VERSTER: The financial plan had a written guideline that no operation should have been shown or had to be shown to - there were two files, the financial part of the file he could receive and this was an authorised procedure on a level above my level and this is where it was authorised.

MR BIZOS: My learned friend Mr Khanovitz reminds me that we didn't get it from the newspapers but from the evidence given in the Harms Commission as to how unspecified Defence figures were used in order to cover up the operations.

MR VERSTER: Never, we never hid anything from our side, it was done on financial level. In the Army it was a level above me and I do not see any one of those members here.

MR BIZOS: Please tell us who recommended or put a plan before you to kill Mr Evans?

MR VERSTER: This came from Region 6, for its Co-ordinator, Christo Britz and from Staal Burger regarding the activities of Botha.

MR BIZOS: Which Evans was to be killed?

MR VERSTER: It was Gavin Evans.

MR BIZOS: What were you told about him? What was his occupation?

MR VERSTER: If I can remember correctly, then he was working in the media profession and on the same basis, information was given that he was busying himself with radical leftist activities which was a threat to the safety of the State and a threat to the sovereignty of the State.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well that's the formula but lets get down to facts.

MR VERSTER: That was how it was presented to me Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, when you heard Mr Gavin Evans' name, when it came through from Region 6, was that the first time you'd heard his name?

MR VERSTER: Yes, I did not know him at all.

MR BIZOS: Which newspaper was he working for?

MR VERSTER: I do not know this Mr Chairperson. This was information, or the Intelligence community's problem, my problem was the operational decision.

MR BIZOS: Were any of his writings put before you in order to persuade you that he was a person worthy for elimination, having regard to his writings?

MR VERSTER: No this is an Intelligence problem to determine this.

MR BIZOS: Now if you say that you nearly put a stamp of approval on the information, who in the information services, gathered the information in relation to Mr Evans.

MR VERSTER: I just want to correct that. I did not say that I put a stamp on the information that I received from them. What I did is that I would approve a plan after it was confirmed that the individual was a target and what I would then do is that I would act on the information and the plan in front of me and on my level I would approve it and then I would present it one level higher and in the case of the question that you're asking regarding the information itself, it came from the regional level, once again through the Co-ordinator to me and the Co-ordinator would then present it to the information people who are functioning on his level and then it would leave our structure to Special Forces and once again to intelligence and then to Trevits that you spoke about and then quite possibly the South African Police and even National Intelligence and we did not have direct contact with them apart from the approved Intelligence staff.

MR BIZOS: Now the information people didn't decide whether a window pane would be broken or whether there would be elimination, that was your decision.

MR VERSTER: They do the recommendations or they give the position of the individuals and then an evaluation is done of the information and the threat and an operational evaluation is done and then the plan is made.

MR BIZOS: Do you know whether he had a brother?

MR VERSTER: No, I did not know him at all Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: In the information that you were given, was there anything about the involvement of an Evans in the end conscription campaign?

MR VERSTER: No, Mr Chairperson, I do not have any knowledge of this.

MR BIZOS: You have never heard of any of the Evans brothers being involved in the end conscription campaign.

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, that knowledge and those activities were activities for the Security Police and they were responsible for the internal intelligence and intelligence system and the Defence Force was responsible for the rest of Africa and I was not in the intelligence community at all, I was an operational officer and I determined the targets and, based on the information at my disposal and then we made operational plans for the attack.

MR BIZOS: An operational soldier is told, go and do this specifically, he is given orders. You were not given orders, your function was to decide whether the windowsill was going to be broken or a window pane was going to be broken, or a person was going to die.

MR VERSTER: I was part of the planning system. I approved the plans on my level and then I presented them, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos. Mr Verster, when you got a proposal put, would that proposal contain an intelligence report saying: Mr Evans is a member of this organisation. He knows such and such a person. He walks in such and such a circle, that sort of information?

MR VERSTER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So you would have all the information before you that was gathered by, either from your cell people on the ground, or from the Intelligence services?

MR VERSTER: That is correct, Mr Chairperson. The region would come to me and these activities would happen over a certain time and it could then happen that the region via the Co-ordinator, would then start talking to me long beforehand and they would tell me that they are looking at one specific individual and that one specific individual is someone who is busy threatening the sovereignty of the State and it would develop like that and on a day when the presentation is made, after it was co-ordinated beforehand, then it is said: "These are the current facts" and I am then told, it is confirmed by the Intelligence channel, or it is like this or it isn't the case and this was then a factor that would be considered in making a decision.

CHAIRPERSON: When you answered Mr Bizos's question to the effect that you have no knowledge whether Mr Evans was involved in the end conscription campaign, are you saying that that information was not in that proposal, or you can't remember?

MR VERSTER: No, as I understood it, is that I did not have the detail of the background of articles that he had written or whatever the case may be and if his brother for instance had been part of a specific plan, then I would have known about him, but I cannot now remember the specific information detail of this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: ...Make a decision as to how the intended target was to be dealt with? What were the options available to you?

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, that would depend on the options that had been evaluated and that had been placed in front of me by the region itself. It has to do with disruption. It did not necessarily mean that the individual had to be killed. Sometimes it was possible for me to say no, it is not necessary to go that far and on my level, I would then give my opinion and I would help formulate the plan and refine the plan and then if it was a very heavy decision, it would be processed from the Chairperson up and I do not know who the Chairperson spoke to, that was his matter, and in certain cases it would then - well I would accept that the Chairperson always spoke on a higher level, but I did not have access to this level, but this is basically how it worked.

MR BIZOS: But tell us the options. You say that this was not sufficiently serious to kill the person. What other options could you have ...

MR VERSTER: I think we've already said it, in terms of what the definition of disruption is. Please wait, let me finish. What we could have done is that we could have recruited Mr Evans, we could have decided that we wanted to use him. We could make him independent regarding money for instance, but in the specific options, the region's decision, if they say that they proposed that the following would happen, his house be burned down for instance, or he had to be shot, or whatever the case might have been, I just want to confirm to you, because we are talking about region 6 all the time, but these activities Mr Chairperson were only a drop of the CCB's activities and our activities were mostly outside the country and we had to keep the enemy from the borders of the country and in certain cases there were incidents such as these that we are now applying for amnesty for, so it was not as if it happened every day, it was an exceptional case.

MR BIZOS: Was it any part of your function or culture in this CCB to use the tremendous powers that the State had in terms of its legislation in order to avoid to deal with people that you had information, by banning them, detaining them, house arresting them, and not killing them or burning their houses, or corrupting them by bribing them. Was this no part of your equation at all?

MR VERSTER: No, Mr Chairperson, we did not have any other function other than what I've already told you about. I think that was a police function. I know that was a police function.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Verster, we know that a large number of the people who operated in Region 6 were in fact policemen. Did they lose their status as policemen when they joined CCB or did they still have the powers of a policeman to arrest people, you know, the powers that go beyond the normal civil arrest?

MR VERSTER: No Mr Chairperson, they were all members who quit the police and they also gave up their commissions and there was even a six month waiting time, where an arrangement would - and an arrangement between departments that they could not be used by other departments and this was also the case regarding them.

MR BIZOS: But ... (indistinct - no microphone) state of emergency during your period as head of the CCB, did you ever on any occasion apply your mind when a proposal was made to you, that you had to commit crimes against citizens, rather don't let us commit crimes, there are statutory powers, please deal with this person, did you ever do it? Please deal with this person in terms of the law of the country, such as it was?

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, any such incidents had nothing to do with me. At that time where from my side any presentations had been made, or made to me from ground level, I would send it up and if it came from the top, then I would see it as something that had already been considered and I did not have the authority to decide about life or death myself. This was not within my powers. This was found in the total structure.

CHAIRPERSON: What Mr Bizos is getting at is, you get info from the ground, right? This person is an activist, he's a member of the UDF, whatever it is, or he's a journalist who's associating with activists, couldn't you, at that stage, without sending it on through to the Intelligence Services, merely say: "Well look, go to the local Security Branch and ask them to pick him up and detain him in terms of Section 29" because the activist wasn't - was Mr Evans and Mr Omar, were you of the view that their continued freedom would result in people dying?

MR VERSTER: Mr Chairperson, I was an operational soldier and I would like to put it to you in the following way, that written procedures prevented us from contacting other departments, other than through the process that I had explained to you already, so if we had information and this happened many times, that we only sent information through and then it would end up with Special Forces for instance and then we would function as a source of Special Forces' combat information and then we would be protected and details would not be given about where that information came from, so this happened quite a lot. We would do it as you said it, but we could not present it left and right. This was not our function and we were prohibited from contacting other departments directly.

MR LAX: Sorry, I know it's almost tea time. Just to pick up on this. The impression one gets from you is you say you were just a professional soldier, you didn't consider those legal options that were open to you and from the answers you've given, you never considered any legal options, you only considered in your whole method of operation, extra-legal options?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, it was never taken up lightly, it was seen as a last resort after it came from grassroots level. What I am saying is that I was not supposed to liaise with other departments.

MR LAX: We're talking here about you evaluating particular projects and conduct. It's plain and simple as that. Now that conduct was either legal or it was unlawful and the simple question I'm putting to you is, did you consider lawful methods or not?

MR VERSTER: It happened many times, but it was not my function.

MR LAX: Just give me a straight answer.

MR VERSTER: I wish to explain myself, Chairperson. What I wish to say is that was not my function. My function was only the war part, but many a time I gave it to the rest of the structure and it was on another level and eventually it lands up in Parliament, let us say, but it has nothing to do with me. My function was to be a soldier and to shoot where I am told to shoot.

MR LAX: So the simple answer is no, you didn't consider lawful methods because that wasn't part of your work.

MR VERSTER: I don't think it is so. I did - when I considered it, I did send it on and if it was clear that it was something that could be handled in an aggressive - could not be handled in an aggressive manner, then I would send it on, but under other circumstances, we did not, then I would just formulate an operational plan.

MR LAX: Just give us one example of one lawful method before we break for tea, that you would have prescribed.

MR VERSTER: When information comes from ground level and I'm thinking of a specific project which will not be touched upon here, because it is outside the country, we would give the information from a direct team of mine, through this Intelligence channel. It goes to Special Forces Head Office. They co-ordinate and the person is arrested.

MR LAX: Well, you see that's precisely what Mr Bizos was putting to you. Precisely that kind of thing, he was saying: "Why didn't you use the same kind of liaison to recommend that somebody be detained under the emergency regulations, or dealt with, or prosecuted, or whatever the case might be and your answer was: "That wasn't possible, we didn't have those linkages."

MR VERSTER: We had the system and I say once again, all these things are in your possession, I don't know what you know or what you have read, all of these things are in your possession. My function was not to concern myself with this. I could send it on, but my function was, there was an operational plan for a reason, where it comes from I do not know, to look at it operationally and then we formulated an operational plan according to it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and I think this would be a convenient time, or would you like to finish your line of questioning? We'll take the short tea adjournment now. Thank you.

PIETER JOHANN VERSTER: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

Mr Verster, I want to now turn to the bomb that was placed by your men at the Early Learning Centre. Who made this proposal to you?

MR VERSTER: Once again it came through the Co-ordinator to me so it was Christo Britz and it came from Slang van Zyl, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Now whose idea was it that a limpet mine should be put in this nursery school or creche?

MR VERSTER: It was a plan that was formulated on regional level, that was what the collective region gave to me.

MR BIZOS: Who actually was the person who brought it to you?

MR VERSTER: The presentation was done by Slang van Zyl, but the person who brought it to me was Mr Britz, according to the system.

MR BIZOS: Who's Mr Britz?

MR VERSTER: Wouter Basson.

MR BIZOS: Yes, let's deal with him. ...(indistinct - no microphone) to use a false name here. Did they tell you what the purpose of placing this bomb in a creche was?

MR VERSTER: It was once again to disrupt the enemy and a strong point that emanated from this was that there was information that subversive actions were planned from that building and soon thereafter there was a possibility for a bomb that would explode at some or other centre, which would be done from the planning which was done at that building and on that basis a proposal was made that we would explode a bomb beforehand.

MR BIZOS: Who made that statement to you?

MR VERSTER: As I recall it, it came from Staal Burger who then formulated it.

MR BIZOS: So Staal Burger said: "Let's do a pre-emptive bomb explosion, in order to persuade the enemy", whoever that might have been, "not to explode a bomb themselves." That was the one version that we heard. Did you ever hear any other reasons why a bomb had to be put there, from anyone?

MR VERSTER: Yes, in the same presentation it dealt with the fact that this building was used by radical elements who worked in the Cape vicinity and that's why we wanted to destroy it.

MR BIZOS: Who were you going to destroy, the building or the enemy, the individuals that used it, or abused it, for that purpose?

MR VERSTER: The planning was that we would only destroy the structure and we did not want to kill people.

MR BIZOS: Was there any other reason suggested by you, by anyone?

MR VERSTER: No, not that I am aware of, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: There was certainly no suggestion by anyone that you should try and kill the enemy that was using the premises for subversive purposes?

MR VERSTER: No, in my opinion, it was only to destroy the premises.

MR BIZOS: So that it cannot be used either by the subversive groups, nor by the kindergarten children, that was the purpose?

MR VERSTER: Yes, it was used for subversive purposes and it is a choice that we felt that they had made.

MR BIZOS: If anyone came to a reasonable person with that proposal, the first question would have been asked is, who is the owner of this property, because the greatest damage was going to be done to the owner, wasn't it, if the centre was destroyed?

MR VERSTER: That may be so, but there was a state of emergency and a war situation in the country. The consideration was as I have put it to you.

MR BIZOS: Now you see, you know when property is abused by people to whom the property doesn't belong, a reasonable person would say: "Let's go the owner and report that maybe people without the knowledge of the owner are abusing this property in order to put an end to the use of the property for that unlawful purpose. That's what a reasonable person would have done, wouldn't one?

MR VERSTER: I do not agree with you. Under the circumstances which we functioned, Chairperson, it happened many a time that the enemy, as we called them, did something on the one side and then we did something on the other side. It was an open war where we did not function through formal structures.

MR BIZOS: And whether the property of a charitable institution was destroyed or not, without the management of the charitable institution even being suspected of doing anything wrong, that was no concern of yours?

MR VERSTER: Exactly, just like Amanzimtoti or the Church Street bomb, no one goes to the guy and says: "You are the wrong person and we shall plant a bomb now." It was an instance of a war situation.

MR BIZOS: A person was sentenced to death for what he did. What should happen to you? If you want to draw parallels, we will draw parallels, Mr Verster. That person was sentenced to death and executed, what do you suggest should happen to you, get amnesty?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, it is not only a truth situation, the purpose ...

MR BIZOS: I would suggest to you that you answer questions by not drawing parallels because you are giving an indication that for you the gore is going on, Mr Verster.

MR VERSTER: That is not true, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos, perhaps if I could just ask a question. I think one of the points that Mr Bizos is getting at is, if you had gone to the owner of the building, not you personally, but if somebody had gone to the owner of the building and said: "Look, subversive activity is taking place in this building, it's got to be stopped etc., those people shouldn't be allowed in", maybe that would have stopped those groups meeting in the building. Placing a mine at the building and blowing it up, wouldn't in any way stop the people who used the building, from using another place to have their meetings, so the achievement at the end of the day would be to destroy a building without having any effect on the groups that met there, or very little effect.

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, it is true what you are saying, but such was the whole counter revolutionary and revolutionary war. That is another matter to me and it was the police's function to do what you have now proposed. When I had to act, it was not my task to do that, this was outside of my control. Other structures were responsible for that.

MR LAX: May I interpose? You say it was the police's function to follow up that thing. What steps did you take to ensure the police were able to do that? You had information at your disposal that pointed in a particular direction. What kind of liaison - you've indicated just before tea that it was possible to get information to them, what steps did you take in that regard?

MR VERSTER: By using the Intelligence structures, Chairperson, in other words the information is looked at by the Co-ordinator and the verification and whether they regard it as a problem and what their proposals are and whether it is so that it is indeed being used and by the time it arrives at my desk, it is information where there is consensus with regard to action against it and then I accept that information before me as a collective decision by the Intelligence community, upon which has to be acted operationally and that was the order of the day.

MR LAX: Again I come back to that issue that I was at with you before tea. Here was an opportunity, there was a state of emergency in place, you knew who the operators were, you knew where they met, you could have arranged for them to be picked up in terms of the state of emergency. It would have been a good lesson to them, rather than blowing up any building perhaps.

MR VERSTER: This was with the lower structures of the State machinery. My function was to destroy it or to disrupt it or that which I have told you, my function was not - then the police, the community, the rest of the Cape structures had to do that, then by the time it is a target for me, I act, because I am a soldier, I am not a diplomat and I am not a police officer.

MR LAX: Yes, but you did have to evaluate your methods. You don't have to choose an appropriate level, that's what you've told us.

MR VERSTER: Yes, but my overhead mission was to disrupt the enemy and the formal bureaucratic processes which could be used, were given to other elements of the State. I was not to use them, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Did I understand you correctly to say that: "The enemy did one thing and then we responded, we did another"?

MR VERSTER: In this specific regard what I can recall is that Staal Burger, for example, came back with particulars with regard to a bomb that would explode the following day or sometime afterwards, but soon afterwards and we made our plan from there and our action was to pre-empt their action. At that stage that was the situation.

MR BIZOS: Did anybody tell you that the reason for the suggestion that it should be blown up is that the people who were using it, had blown something up before the suggestion was made that the building that you say that they were using was planted?

MR VERSTER: I am not aware of it.

MR BIZOS: Did anybody tell you anything else as a reason for putting this bomb there?

MR VERSTER: No, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: If anybody had told you that the reason was to let the community know that the premises was used for the storage of arms and that this was not, this should be seen as ...(indistinct) was to be done that it should be seen, look what happens if you allow people to store arms in your premises, they are going to explode accidentally and blow your building up. Did anybody tell you that?

MR VERSTER: As I understand you now, that is a hypothetical example. I don't know what I would have done under those circumstances. I would have made the plan if it was before me.

MR BIZOS: It's not hypothetical, it's the version of one of your co-applicants.

MR VERSTER: That may be so yes.

MR BIZOS: Who is giving an inaccurate account for the reason for the planting of this bomb?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, I have listened to many projects. If the other applicants put it as such, then it is another factor other than the one how I was motivated, so it is not necessarily incorrect or conflictory.

MR BIZOS: It was a completely unproductive act, Mr Verster. Would you agree that now on reflection it was a completely unproductive act, or must we go through the various possibilities in order to demonstrate to the Committee that you are not prepared to accept that which is reasonable? Would you now agree that it was a completely unproductive act?

MR VERSTER: Do not interrupt me Mr Bizos. I do not think it was unproductive. I think it was part of the larger picture, the war against the threat as we regarded it at that time and it is a point for a long speculation whether it was unproductive or not.

MR BIZOS: The Chairman has already put to you that if it was to stop the people meeting there, the only thing that they had to do is to go to the next shebeen, if that was their inclination, or under the nearest tree, or in the veld, or in someone's house. Why would they go to plan sabotage, why would they stop committing sabotage because one of the venues was destroyed?

MR VERSTER: It was to deliver a message to them. It was an obvious message to them and it happened back and forth.

MR BIZOS: You were not going to make public that this was an act committed by the CCB or one of its affiliates or the police or anybody else and unless you made that public, it wouldn't have been interpreted as a threat.

MR VERSTER: Uncertainty is a specific technique, so it does not matter, it is internationally known.

MR BIZOS; Well it was not - do you agree that it was not the proper way of giving them notice that you were on their tail, if you were not going to say that you had done it?

MR VERSTER: Now you have interrupted me again Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: You started answering before I completed my question. Please wait for my question.

MR VERSTER: That is not so.

MR BIZOS: Now if you had made proper inquiries and you had learned that the Chairman of this Trust was Mr Franklin Son ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos, what Trust is that, the owners?

MR BIZOS: The owners.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have the name of that Trust?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman, it's called the Foundation for Community Work, that its Chairman was Mr Franklin Son, that that name would have meant anything to you?

MR VERSTER: No, Chairperson, I did not know him.

MR BIZOS: If you had made inquiries as to who owned it and you found out that it was a respectable leader of the community, Mr Franklin Son, he was a leading educationalist, he was the Rector of a Technikon, and you were told that, would you have changed your mind as to what to do? Would you have gone to the Chairman or sent somebody to the Chairman, a policeman, you know, use whatever way you could in order to hide the fact that this information had come to the CCB and send some person who had no apparent connection with you, to warn him?

MR VERSTER: That is a hypothetical question.

MR BIZOS: The only way we can test the reasonableness or otherwise of your conduct is by putting these hypothetical questions and I would appeal to you not to dismiss them as questions which you do not have to answer because they are hypothetical. The question is, as a reasonable man who had such vast powers, would you had done, if you had taken the simple step of finding out who the Chairman was and by telling him that the premises for which he has a responsibility, are being used for subversive purposes, that it would not have been necessary to blow up the building?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, it was not my responsibility. I will say once again, at the time when I arrived at the scene, or the persons who worked for me, then those processes and the policing and the accompanying bureaucratic systems to prevent an offensive act ...

MR BIZOS: You're seriously describing it a democratic institution? Is that still your state of mind, that you were working for a democratic institution?

MR VERSTER: That is not what I'm saying.

MR BIZOS: Oh I'm sorry, I misunderstood you. But you did use the democratic - what did you say about democratic?

MR VERSTER: I said bureaucratic. I say in other words the bureaucratic process of the State's dispensation, for example the police and the local municipalities and so forth.

MR BIZOS: I apologise, I thought that the word democratic had been uttered by you. One of the other leading people on this foundation was the Rev Leon Louw, a very well-known community leader. If he had been told, might he not have taken the necessary steps?

MR VERSTER: He could have, but it was part of the same process. The formal structures had to do that.

MR BIZOS: The church was not, particularly the Council of Churches, you were not well-disposed to them, were you?

MR VERSTER: No, I was not.

MR BIZOS: Do you know whether this centre had the support of any religious body, or not?

MR VERSTER: No, I was not aware of it, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Did you know that the Rev Louw was an office bearer of the Western Province Council of Churches?

MR VERSTER: No, I was not aware of it.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you at any stage aware as to who the owners of that centre were at the time?

MR VERSTER: No, Chairperson, I only looked at it from an operational point of view.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) just considered as one of the enemies by you?

MR VERSTER: Yes, it was generally known that money from outside the country was channelled which led to acts, even acts of terror in South Africa, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well, did they dispute that or did you regard giving assistance to the wives and children of political prisoners an act of terror, as the State did in the Dean's case in Johannesburg? Was that your state of mind?

MR VERSTER: No, I was only aware of it, Mr Chairperson, that funds - that the biggest source of recruiting funds or gaining funds came through the Council of Churches and that of that money was also used for acts of terror in South Africa and that is the only thing that I was aware of and it was generally known within the Intelligence Community as they presented it to us then and also in the documentation.

MR BIZOS: Just like they believed that Mr Dullah Omar was the Chairman of Lawyers for Human Rights. But let us just go a bit further. The use of explosives, was that one of the matters which was available to you?

MR VERSTER: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Who supplied the explosives in this case?

MR VERSTER: That came from the formal structures of Special Forces, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Who actually would the CCB approach to give them a landmine which they had?

MR VERSTER: They would approach the logistics system of Special Forces and they would then get it from a store.

MR BIZOS: We are not interested in structures, we are interested in individuals in the CCB that would go and draw explosives from where they kept them. Who did it?

MR VERSTER: In this case it was Christo Britz or Burger Basson who was responsible to do this. I know what you are playing on and this is that it is ...(indistinct) van Heerden and it is not necessarily the case. It is logistical structure and it is drawn from a store and the Co-ordinator would organise, it could have been any store person, to get it over the counter.

MR BIZOS: We are interested in finding out who the persons were that involved themselves in the supply of this explosive, Sir. In order to test your willingness to make full disclosure about who helped in these acts and we are going to submit that your giving us the names or the acronyms of organisations or unnamed storemen, isn't sufficient. Please try and help the Committee to get to the bottom of this - I haven't finished my question - as to who was responsible for this.

MR VERSTER: I cannot answer that question because I do not have access to Special Forces' stores. The system was that the Co-ordinator of the region would organise it and it would then be gotten from Special Forces and Special Forces had a Commanding General. There was a logistical officer and it would then come from the formal structure of the Defence Force. This was the authorised, approved system. Names - I could never give that name to you. If Mr Christo Britz can give it to you, you'll have to ask him that.

MR BIZOS: This was not an ordinary limpet mine, it was a limpet mine which was doctored to go off by remote control. Who was the expert in manufacturing or adapting remote controls for the purposes of letting off explosives?

MR VERSTER: The officer who was responsible for this was van Heerden, but there were various engineers. There were several store people and there was a big structure.

MR BIZOS: Who were they? Who were these manufacturers of explosives potentially to kill unsuspecting people? We would like to know about them please.

MR VERSTER: It is Special Forces Headquarters logistical system. I do not know the names. Apart from Col van Heerden Mr Chairperson, I did not have access. I was not allowed to go to those buildings for a few years, so I do not know who at that stage, those people were.

MR BIZOS: You had to know when you approved of this operation. Not only did you approve of it in principle, but also the mechanics of it. How did you know who was capable and who was prepared to make such a device?

MR VERSTER: That was a pre-approved system that had, over the years, since the beginning of the eighties been developed. It is Special Forces' Headquarters.

MR BIZOS: Who was in charge of that body that you have just mentioned, because you would have known, who was he?

MR VERSTER: It was Col van Heerden, that was the officer. It was the Commanding General, the Commanding General was Gen Webb and before that it was Gen Joubert.

MR BIZOS: The person at the time that this bomb went off, who was the staff officer?

MR VERSTER: I think at that stage it was Col van Heerden, but then for about 3 years I had not gone to the Headquarters. I accept that it is Col van Heerden.

MR BIZOS: Now in terms of the procedures, because you were in the Special Forces yourself, would he have parted company with a landmine, without knowing what it was going to be used for?

MR VERSTER: Yes, if it came from the Co-ordinator. Because there was a specific connection, he would then have made it available for a project and on that basis it was then asked for by the Co-ordinator, but the Co-ordinator would not say that I am going to go and do this exactly, or that and in this case I do not know if the Co-ordinator directly spoke to him, this you would have to ask him yourself.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos. Was there any particular reason why the operation required a remote control limpet mine, rather than the usual limpet mine that works on this lead plate?

MR VERSTER: As I see it Mr Chairperson it would be a controlled explosion so that lives would not be lost.

MR BIZOS: The additional reason why it was to go off by remote control was because there was another gangster involved in this operation. Not so?

MR VERSTER: On ground level I did not have access to them. I do know that there had been gang members that were involved.

MR BIZOS: Did you know that it was on the information of this gang member that the premises were abused and that the reason for the remote control was that he was going to place the bomb in the building and that originally for his benefit, he had to set it off by remote control, but that your men didn't have confidence in him so they broke the rules of your organisation and they went there themselves, in order to work the mechanism, if the need arose. Did anybody tell you that?

MR VERSTER: I am aware of it, but it is still a controlled explosion. Excused me, a controlled explosion.

MR BIZOS: Did you ask when you approved this operation, who was going to place the bomb and who was going to press the button?

MR VERSTER: That is part of the plan that was presented to me.

MR BIZOS: Was the identity of the person that was going to do it disclosed to you?

MR VERSTER: No. As I can remember now it might have been that the person responsible in this case, it was Slang van Zyl and later on he also involved Kalla Botha and that they would then work as a team and the people that they contacted on ground level and used on ground level was only done in presentations. To me - but whether it happened like that, I cannot say, Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: And that it was a member of the community that was really going to assist your men - are you again interrupting me? I haven't finished my question. Was it said to you that a member of the community was going to place the bomb?

MR VERSTER: I cannot remember the details of this, it was not one of my projects.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon?

MR LAX: He said: "I can't remember the details."

MR BIZOS: Yes. Oh I see. Well did you expect one of your own men to go in and place the bomb in the building?

MR VERSTER: That is possible. It depends on the circumstances. It is possible that he could have had the remote control device with him and that someone else would have placed the equipment there and if it was safe, then I assume that it could have been one of those steps. The exact detail I can't remember now.

MR BIZOS: No you see, I thought that it was a rule that you should not get involved in anything which may enable people to identify you or connect the CCB, through it the Government with any act. Wasn't it part of the plan that a member of the community was going to do the placing?

MR VERSTER: I cannot remember the detail anymore, Mr Chairperson.

MR BIZOS: Well let us assume that that was so and let us assume that Mr van Zyl or others tell us that that was part of the plan and you must have read it. If it was there, would you not have wanted to know why is this person prepared to place a bomb in a nursery school?

MR VERSTER: No, Mr Chairperson, his motives would have been obscure to me. It could have been that he - I was aware that he had already co-operated with Mr van Zyl, that he had been part of his team maybe, that he himself maybe had some political convictions and the exact reason I do not know.

MR BIZOS: Was it political conviction or money that ...?

MR VERSTER: I do not know what his reasons were.

MR BIZOS: Didn't you have to authorise money for him?

MR VERSTER: I had a budget. I authorised the budget and it also included more than just payment, it included petrol money, money for food, etc.

CHAIRPERSON: Did that budget include payment for the civilian person, the person who was going to place the bomb?

MR VERSTER: It would have had to, Chairperson. The total budget would have covered all facets of expenditure.

CHAIRPERSON: What sort of money would a person like that expect, or what would you expect to pay a person for placing a bomb or a limpet mine?

MR VERSTER: I cannot tell you with surety Chairperson, it was as a rule, the attitude would have been to connect it or bring it in relation with what actually happened. It could for example have been something that had been negotiated between the handler and what the person on ground level felt that he needed and if it was excessive, then they could have argued about the price and if he didn't ask that much, then it would have been given.

MR BIZOS: Sorry. If you've finished?

CHAIRPERSON: Proceed.

MR BIZOS: Because we know that he was to get R18 000 for putting the bomb in a nursery school. Don't you remember that?

MR VERSTER: I remember that a large amount of money had been given, but that is what had been negotiated between the two people. The reason for the exact amount is, at the end of the day, only the reasonableness of that amount is considered.

MR BIZOS: On an hourly basis, what sort of remuneration is that? Per hour, how long would it take to put a bomb into the nursery school?