MR PRIOR: Good morning Mr Chairman, may I proceed? Mr Chairman, it is the 6th of April 1998. We proceed today with the amnesty applications of the following applicants:

Mr Chairman, the requisite notices in terms of Section 19(4) were issued to the implicated persons. There's no appearance on behalf of implicated persons. There were substantial notice given to victims and there are several victims in attendance today, the names of which will later be furnished to the Committee. There is no legal representation on behalf of victims at this stage.

As evidence leader I've explain the process to the victims present and they are happy to go along with the evidence leader representing them in a fashion, up to a certain point. They would also require, as in the other applications, for the Committee to allow them an opportunity to ask questions and/or address the Committee at the relevant stage.

May I place myself on record for the Amnesty Committee Evidence Leader, P.C. Prior. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Could the applicant's attorney place himself on record please?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman. My name is Lungelo Mbandazyo for the applicants.

CHAIRPERSON: All four of them?

MR MBANDAZAYO: All four of them Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps for the sake of those who have to transcribe the record, I ought to put on record the members of the Committee. It's Ms Gcabashe, myself, Judge Wilson, Mr Lax and Mr Sandile.

MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, before we proceed with the applications proper, may this be an appropriate time to introduce the documentation onto the record, which I understand has been agreed to by my learned friend, Mr Mbandazayo?

Mr Chairman, I have provided the Committee with a bundle of documents, may I first refer to the PAC Submissions, with respect, or the APLA submissions made at the HRV Hearings in October last year. I don't intend to refer at all to the hearings or the submissions made in August Mr Chairman, but the bundle that commences with the small type which relates specifically to the evidence given from the 7th of October.

And may, for convenience, may we refer to that bundle as Exhibit A for the purposes of these proceedings?

MR LAX: Just for our convenience Mr Prior, that's the same bundle as we used last week?

MR PRIOR: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Thank you.

MR PRIOR: But for the purposes of these hearings, yes Mr Chairman. Could we mark that Exhibit A? Mr Chairman, Exhibit B, I would request the Committee to accept at this stage the bundle of documents which is headed Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Hearings with the comprehensive index, if that could be marked Exhibit B?

Copies were handed to my learned friend, Mr Mbandazayo. At this stage we accept that the documents are what they purport to be and may be referred to in the bundle as Exhibit B. That is confirmed by my learned friend.

MR MBANDAZAYO: I confirm that Mr Chairman.

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, this morning the Committee was also handed a separate bundle of documents, it is actually affidavit with annexures from Thobela Dlambisa. May we conveniently refer to that as Exhibit C?

CHAIRPERSON: Shouldn't it be part of bundle B and discontinue as it will now be page 123, we go on from there.

MR PRIOR: As the Committee pleases. Mr Chairman, an additional document is the bundle of photographs that is available, the master copy is available and copies are presently being prepared. If we may just at this stage mark it Exhibit C, that is with the exception of the photographs which the Committee didn't think necessary, thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Chairman sorry, there's just one other matter regarding a notice. Given the large number of persons affected by this matter in King William's Town at the time and given the difficulty in tracing all the persons from records that were available, it was felt desirous to make publication in the local newspaper, the Daily Despatch, which I understand was arranged by Mr John Allen of the Media Departments of the TRC which had run an article about the King William's Town attack, the fact that the amnesty application be running this week, the 6th to the 9th of April.

I unfortunately do not have a press clipping but one is available I understand at the East London office. In addition thereto, the club captain was contacted at the King William's Town Golf Club and a general notice was pinned up on the notice board of the clubhouse two weeks ago, which set out in general terms that all persons having an interest in this particular matter had to contact the TRC as a matter of urgency.

I must say Mr Chairman, as a result of that several persons have contacted the Amnesty Committee to that extent. I simply place that on record for what it's worth.

CHAIRPERSON: And have all the persons who are mentioned by the applicants as implicated parties, been given notice?

MR PRIOR: Yes, Mr Chairman they have, I do have the notices in my file.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I think the applicant, before he starts giving evidence, will be sworn in.

CHAIRPERSON: Which applicant is this?

MR MBANDAZAYO: The first applicant Mr Chairman, will be Thembelani Tandekile Xundu.

CHAIRPERSON: Now which application, there are various applications that he has made, do you rely on?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairman, both applications, there's no major difference, there's no difference in those applications Mr Chairman, but we would request the Committee to rely on the typed one which I think will be the second one and we start from page 7 Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Because there is no indication before me that the applicant has complied with the provisions of the Act in regard to the first application, in that it has been sworn to.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairman, that's the reason - I've noticed that Mr Chairman. Also I've gone through with the applicant Mr Chairman, regarding this application and also he is of the view that the second application which should be referred to by the Committee because it was never sworn in, he just appended his signature Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: Is that to say Mr Mbandazyo, we shall work basis of the second application only? At no stage will you refer to the first one? What is the exact situation?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, we will work on the basis of the second application which starts at page 7, we will not be using the other one Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Mr Xundu, will you please stand?

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: (sworn states)

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I will be leading the applicant and I'll be reading from his affidavit. As we go on I will request him to expand on some of the issues which are being raised by him in his affidavit.

MR LAX: His affidavit, just for the record, starts at page 15, is that correct?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Thank you.

MR MBANDAZAYO:

...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think it's necessary for you to read the whole of the affidavit. I take it your client has read it and he can confirm the correctness of it? And then I think you should lead him on the points where you wish him to amplify or explain.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Xundu, for the benefit of the Committee, can you confirm that the contents of the affidavit, that you have read it, and what appeared in the affidavits is what you have written down?

MR XUNDU: Yes, I confirm.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairman, I will start then at page 15, paragraph 5. Can you, for the benefit of the Committee, explain the last sentence"

MR XUNDU: Okay, if I may explain. What I was trying to say here is that I started off as an ordinary force within the Azanian People's Liberation Army and rose through the ranks as per the hierarchy which existed and noticeably changed from time to time, up until the position of Regional Commissar. And ultimately, when I say ultimately I mean just before 1994's general elections, I held the position of regional commander.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairman, I will proceed and go to paragraph 9 at page ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Before you do Mr Mbandazyo:

What area were you regional commander of, so we can situate where you were posted and so on? Just give us that background please.

MR XUNDU: Okay. To start with, being a regional commander was a position or a responsibility that was given to a particular person because of whatever reason, It was not a position that made somebody to be area bound.

In may case particularly, I was regional commander in the Eastern Cape. When I say the Eastern Cape, it started from across The Kei up until the former Eastern Cape, as it was demarcated in the previous apartheid system.

MR LAX: When you say: "across the Kei", do you include what was formally called the Transkei or how far up towards that area and so on, just so that we can be clear about this because it's getting bit vague?

MR XUNDU: Although, if I'm at Transkei, I don't cease to be a regional commander but I don't have control over the forces and the programmes that were carried out in the Transkei, there was a regional commander for the area. So my area of responsibility started across the Kei.

MR LAX: So it was from across the Kei, South to - how far South did that are extend?

MR XUNDU: Can you come again?

MR LAX: How far South did that area extend? As far South as Port Elizabeth or as far as East London? We are just trying to get a sense of what the jurisdiction was that you had.

MR XUNDU: As far South as Port Elizabeth.

MR LAX: And then to the East, how far inland did it go?

MR XUNDU: Well, it seems as if I'll have to ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Sorry, to the West, I beg your pardon, the East is the sea.

MR XUNDU: It's seems as if I will have to revisit my geography but I think it should make some sense to you when I say across the Kei up until the former Eastern Cape in as far as the demarcation of this country was concerned during the apartheid era.

MR LAX: That's fine, thank you.

MR MBANDAZAYO: May I proceed Mr Chairman? Mr Chairman, I will proceed for the benefit of the Committee, at page 16 of the affidavit, especially paragraph 9.

Can you explain that to the Committee, what does that mean?

MR XUNDU: I think the first sentence that:

is self-explanatory in the sense that it reveals that I participated. And then in respect of this operation, I received instructions from comrade Leklapa.

I mean comrade Leklapa was the director of operations and it is common sense and common knowledge that it should be the person who sanctions the operation if it is an APLA operation. In this case particularly he sanctioned the operation or he approved the operation, that is what I'm trying to say.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Mbandazyo.

Mr Xundu, I notice that at paragraph 8, immediately before the one you are on at the moment, you say that units were only formed for specific operations. Was a specific unit set up for this operation? Would you like to tell us about that?

MR XUNDU: Not necessarily. I mean to - why I saw the point being relevant to be mentioned for the consumption of the TRC, was simply for the reason that we - or I put you in light of the modus operandi of the Azanian People's Liberation Army.

In this particular case it was not a specific unit, in fact it was a detachment, a ...[indistinct] detachment with a full area of responsibility under the capable command of comrade Skumiso Nxunuba.

MR LAX: Repeat the name of the detachment again, you said it quite quickly and I couldn't hear it properly.

MR XUNDU: Aside detachment.

MR LAX: Thanks.

MR XUNDU: Aside detachment under the Sobukwe regiment. That was the landup of the hierarchy by then.

MS GCABASHE: Just to go back to Mr Leklapa Mpashlele, as the director of operations you say that he sanctioned all APLA operations if they were APLA operations?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MS GCABASHE: And this is just for my general background information, he would have to know about each and every one of them from the regional commander. Was that a given, he had to know about them?

MR XUNDU: I think I'll have to say: "Yes", given the way the command structure was structured. Right from the director of operations he had two deputy directors. From the two deputy directors there were regional commanders. From the regional commanders, regional commissar, area commanders, area commissar, the list goes down.

Now in the case of Ekudu detachment, in the area of responsibility that it was given, it means an operation that is to be executed within the area of the Ekudu detachment are of responsibility. The regional commander is playing and the regional commissar, the two of them, the command structure is playing a pivotal role and he reports directly up to the deputy directors or reports straight up to the director of operations. In that way the director of operations is aware and the operation, if it is and APLA operation, has his blessings.

MR LAX: Just for easy reference, if we look at page 72 of the papers there is a ...[intervention]

MR MBANDAZAYO: Sorry Mr Chairman, if we can get an extra copy for the applicant or must he use this one of mine?

MR LAX: Perhaps you could share Mr Mbandazyo. There is a breakdown of the Sobukwe regiment, I think it's been correctly prepared. I'm not quite sure on what base it was prepared but are you saying that above that there would then be your area commander, are there your area commanders, district commanders and above that, your two deputy directors of operations and the director of operations? That is what is not reflected on that organogram, if you can call it that.

MR XUNDU: Okay. This particular organogram, I don't know whether the SAC, SAP managed to get hold of this thing, but in as far as the operation of King William's Town Golf Club's timing is concerned, this is outdated, this one. I think ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Just point out to us what changed at the time this golf club ...[intervention]

MR XUNDU: Okay. I think, once again let me run through the structure which existed at the time of the golf club.

MR LAX: Alright.

MR XUNDU: Right at the top is the director of operations, he had deputy directors.

MR LAX: Alright. Now let's just do this slowly. That was Mpashlele right?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR LAX: Then he had two deputies, you've told us that. Who were those two people, just give us that information.

MR XUNDU: It was Bulelane Nxuma and late comrade Skumiso Nxunuba. But after this golf club, and then there were regional commanders ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Just stop. At the time of the golf club, who was the other deputy?

MR XUNDU: Okay. It was only one.

MR LAX: So it was just Nxuma?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR LAX: Okay.

MR XUNDU: And then regional commanders. Now regional commanders would be regional commanders in different departments, intelligence, logistics, repossession units, commanders for the operations department. It then runs down to area commanders down to a cell.

MR LAX: What is the difference between a cell and a unit?

MR XUNDU: Okay, there isn't that much difference but I understand there is a difference, conventional speaking, but that's not the point for today. The emphasis between a unit and a cell, you say that a cell is relatively smaller than a unit. It may be a cell of two people of three people but when we are talking about a unit it would be a commander, a commissar and a logistics officer, ordinance officer, depending on the tasks and the purpose of setting up that unit.

MS GCABASHE: And when you went out on a mission you are talking about a unit, a unit goes out on a mission and not a cell, would that be correct?

MR XUNDU: No, not necessarily, a unit, a cell could go on an operation. I mean, an operation is not necessarily going to a golf club and attack people.

MS GCABASHE: So it depended on the complexity of the mission whether you'd have just a small number, which I'm assuming would be the cell, or the larger logistics, intelligence whatever or the components making up a unit, is that what we determine?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR LAX: Please proceed.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Sorry, before you continue, there was just one matter that my colleague raised with you and I wanted to just pick up on it and finish before we move on, so it doesn't get lost.

You've said that generally speaking the director or his deputy would know about all operations, is that correct?

MR XUNDU: Yes, generally, but I can only be an expert for this particular operation.

MR LAX: In regard to this particular operation, how did the order to execute this operation and to embark upon it, how did that mechanism actually work, as far as you are aware?

MR XUNDU: Can you come again?

MR LAX: Well, this operation, the target was chosen presumably, then a reconnaissance of certain intelligence must have been carried out and then a decision was taken to execute the operation. At what stage was the director involved and at what stage would his permission have been required? That is what we would like you to explain to us.

MR XUNDU: I will start with the last part. The approval from the director of operations for an operation would be obviously before the operation is carried out, where the political objectives for the operation have been discussed thoroughly and it has been established that it will not run out of the mandate of APLA, as given by the PAC and it did not have adverse political effects on the image of APLA and the image of the PAC.

MR LAX: Who would have discussed that?

MR XUNDU: I think to put the record straight and so that you are clear in any questions that you may ask, let us just confine ourselves into the run-up of the golf club attack until it was carried out.

MR LAX: Just answer my question, you don't have to give a longwinded thing. You're explaining and as you are explaining I'm interjecting with small little bits and pieces.

So you said it would have been discussed and these would have been the implications.

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR LAX: Who discussed those political objectives? Just give me a straight factual answer. If you don't know, say you don't know. It's really quite simple as far as I'm concerned.

MS GCABASHE: If I might just interject. I understand the applicant simply to be saying that it's easier for him to relate how questions to this specific application that is before us ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Well, that's precisely what I'm doing.

MR XUNDU: Yes, but you are talking about those operations, not this operation.

MR LAX: With all due respect, we're talking about this operation. You are busy telling us about this instance, you've made that quite clear, that you want to talk about his instance.

MR XUNDU: Yes, and therefor you must not say: "those operations", say: "this operation".

MR LAX: Please just answer my question, this operation.

MR XUNDU: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this operation, who would have thoroughly discussed this operation to have decided that it would not have an adverse effect on the political image of APLA or the PAC?

MR XUNDU: Okay. Particularly in this case you had myself, comrade Skumiso and comrade Leklapa.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand, and I'm looking at your affidavit now, the original suggestion came from comrade Leklapa, he gave you instructions and identified the target and then you had discussions after that?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

ADV SANDI: Mr Mbandazyo, I think you will have to help me here. I thought you're still busy trying to lead your client, to go through the main parts in the affidavit?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman, I was going to ask whether they are through with the questions they are asking so that I may proceed.

Let's go to paragraph - I think they have covered it, I was in paragraph 9, let's go to paragraph 10.

Explain that to the Committee, what does that mean?

ADV SANDI: That's a very broad question Mr Mbandazyo, do you mind if I ask a very specific question?

What sort of armament was used?

MR XUNDU: In paragraph 17 where I have given the breakdown of the armament. I don't know whether it's ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Can you just confirm that paragraph? Do you confirm that is what was used?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR LAX: Then we don't have to ...[intervention]. Please continue Mr Mbandazyo.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: One point that you could perhaps clarify which I was a little confused with. On paragraph 17, is it correct that two of the handgrenades were offensive grenades and two were defensive?

MR XUNDU: Yes, I think there was a balance between offensive and defensive grenades.

MR LAX: Was there any difference in the actual makeup of the grenades or was it just the intention of how you intended to use them that made the difference? Do you see what I'm saying?

MR XUNDU: I don't know what drags you to ask that question because perhaps you are, you have an interest in these reinforced hand grenades or what?

MR LAX: Just answer my question. Was there any difference between, is there a difference between an M26 offensive grenade or an M26 defensive grenade or is the only reason they are listed differently because of the purpose for which they were intended to be used? It's really a very simple question, I'm not emphasising anything.

MR XUNDU: Okay, that's enough now, I've heard you.

MR XUNDU: There is a difference between an offensive and a defensive grenade.

MR LAX: What ...[intervention]

MR XUNDU: In the shrapnel effect.

MR LAX: Thanks, that's fantastic, that helps me a lot.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Let's go to paragraph 11:

Now my question, and what I want you to clear for this Committee, was that:

Can you explain to the Committee what that means?

MR XUNDU: Okay.

was- merely tries to say, as the regional commissar part of my functions included logistic functions, included the intelligence function like the information collection or data collection, as you may call it in civilian terms, and the ...[indistinct] of the security situation in my area of responsibility.

And thereafter I give feedback to my senior commanders, particularly in this case, comrade Skumiso and make recommendations so that at the end of the day operations can take place.

MR MBANDAZAYO: With particular regard to this one, golf club, can you tell the Committee what data or information you collected and what role you played in doing that?

MR XUNDU: It was a small division. There was a lot of other targets that we had so it was my duty to collect information from them and keep my senior commanders up to date with regard to the developments operationally and security wise.

At some stage it was my responsibility, when I saw it appropriate, to make a recommendation such as that equipment must be deployed in the area for this and that, personnel must be deployed in this area, looking at the challenges that we have operationally speaking, looking at the logistical resources that were available to our present organisation.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Now, I think my question is still, with regard to this particular operation, can you tell the Committee how you went about collecting data regarding

the target, that is the golf club itself.

MR XUNDU: Okay. Regarding the golf club, the method of information collection that I did was that I went to the golf club, was there playing golf for practices and as I was one of the bagmen I used to converse with them, build up the cover story that I was a student, I was a student five years back, my parents couldn't manage fees so I'm in a drive to collect some fees for me.

And then, there were a lot of other black guys who did that there, we were given 50c, some paid 20c, ridiculous enough, R2. So I got to know everything, every development and I was giving feedback to my commanders almost after every two days. Used to go the Transkei or comrade Skumiso used to come to this side if I have information that I cannot relate over the telephone. That is how we managed, that is why the information we had was accurate.

In fact, if I may add, after some time, because I presented interesting stories, comrade Lester, if it is worth mentioning for the conjunction of the TRC, but comrade Lester could not believe for instance, when I tell him: "Comrade you see I was given 20c for having carried that bag the whole day", he couldn't believe it.

He came down to King William's Town and then we went together, the two of us, and if - but I don't know if it's Mr who?, but there was a certain gentlemen there if I remember very well, what I understand is that he was either an official or secretary or what but he had an office right in the club there.

He used to come there and we used to talk to him. That's the person from which we got that there will be a party on such and such a day and that is how we got that information. So he came down and I remember his first payment was 25c.

MR MBANDAZAYO: May I proceed?

CHAIRPERSON: Before you do, can you tell us who Bheki and Vido are? See paragraph 11.

MR XUNDU: Okay. There mere fact that they are here, it means that they have not applied for amnesty, that is the first point. The second point is that the names I can recall, know about them, I don't know if they are real names and I have just recalled that comrade Bheki was also Jerry and Vido, it ends there, there's nothing else that I know.

Perhaps if the administration of APLA at that point in time which was under the late comrade Power or the former captain Ngigelani, he died in certain conditions in Cape Town, I mean, if I look at this big file there is also something which he alleges. Ama policeman forced him to write at a time when he was ...[intervention]

MR MBANDAZAYO: Just the names.

MR XUNDU: Now he was a person who was in charge of administration, who had record of the names and what and what or even perhaps some other intelligence, I mean officers, for one reason or another they could have that, I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Just to follow up on Mr Chairman's question on Bheki and Vido, can you tell the Committee how it was possible that you know Skumiso Nxunuba, the real name Skumiso and Togela Mlangwesa?

MR XUNDU: Comrades Skumiso Nxunuba was also my friend, close friend so through that we knew each other, he was even known by my parents and I'm even known by his parents. And Togela Mlangwesa, I once lived at his home, I think for something like a month ...[indistinct]. That is how it is possible that I know them.

MS GCABASHE: On what basis then would you recommend, as you say in paragraph 11, the names of Bheki and Vido as being members you wanted to see carry out this mission with you?

MR XUNDU: Okay. Particularly Bheki and Vido, I think I conducted some training with them, training recruits and that is how I came to know them, under those circumstances.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairman, I proceed to page 17, paragraph 14, especially paragraph 13 almost the last portion:

Can you tell the Committee how did ...[inaudible] of Longsumzwonk Entindele and how did he assist you in finding accommodation?

MR XUNDU: Okay. When opening in a new area, because I was the first person from the department of operations to be deployed there, you would be given by some other APLA members who had done some sort of ground work, a contact, some person to work with who can, let me say, guide you in as far as certain things which are of critical importance are concerned.

So comrade Entindele was the person to whom I was referred to or a person who was given as a contact in the area, so obviously he had a role to play and also, he was also my teacher.

CHAIRPERSON: Your teacher?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR MBANDAZAYO: School teacher Mr Chairman, he was a school teacher.

ADV SANDI: Whilst you are there Mr Xundu, you've mentioned that Mr Entindele was your teacher, did he have any influence on the development of your political thinking?

MR XUNDU: No.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Paragraph 14:

Now you have already told the Committee that you went there with comrade Skumiso Nxunuba, can you then explain:

MR XUNDU: Okay. In answering that question let me first refer you to the last part of paragraph 12:

Now, we didn't inform our forces anything about the target so that we can prevent information leaking, I mean it is quite normal within the APLA. Now the way that I designed the plan for the operation, if I may come to that so that your question is at least answered, by that we had three elements which I will explain when we are at paragraph 18, the reconnaissance party, the security party, execution party.

Now at the end of the day, although we had to secure information from leading, we also had to be fair to our forces so that they can see the place which they are going to attack, confirm deployment areas and see the practicability and workability of the whole operational plan.

Now we took them in the last hours, just on the day of the operation, for final reconnaissance. Now to acquaint them with the place - well, like you see here is how the golf club stands and after that we will present the plan, did you see on that particular spot, that's where you will be deployed, you would be required to this, this and this, that is actually in a picture of what is going to happen, where what is expected of you.

And also the question of - one of the things which APLA saw as very, very important, which is retreat. We used to have about three or four options for retreating. So the forces must be, for purposes of command and control during the operation, the forces must know thoroughly that is we take option A, they do not go that way and that way and that way, we do one uniform thing, option B etc.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on, am I right in understanding you to say that the unit was also given an opportunity to discuss and confirm the practicality of the plan, they could make suggestions as to different methods of doing it?

MR XUNDU: Okay. If that is the way you want to interpret it, but I mean I will not agree with you.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that not the position?

MR XUNDU: That's not the position. Though they have an input when the plan is being discussed, they do not have the final say, the command section has the final say.

CHAIRPERSON: It's just that they have an input and they knew the commander evaluates and then has the final decision?

MR XUNDU: Can you come again?

CHAIRPERSON: If you're at the scene, looking at the thing, they can have an input, they can make suggestions but they have not final decision, it is the person in charge of the operation who has the final decision?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR LAX: Sorry, your last answer wasn't into the mike while it was one, could you just repeat that please, the: "yes".

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Can you repeat: "yes" on the mike.

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR LAX: Sorry, the problem, just so that you understand, is that the machine is recording and if you say: "yes" and the mike is switched off, it won't be picked up on the record.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Sorry Mr Chairman, I want to explain to him so that he can be able to hear it.

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Mbandazayo, please don't let him switch it off, his mike should stay on all the time, it's designed to stay on all the time. Okay? We'll switch our on and off as we work.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Let's go to paragraph 15:

Can you explain the transportation part, the road from Umtata to Thembasa until they were brought to you by comrade Morrison?

MR XUNDU: Okay. As part of my functions as a regional commissar by then, it was my duty to see that the movement of personnel, the movement of arms, was through the safe channels and through the safe route. So the route that I established was via, I think it was the turn just before you reach Queenstown to Cathcart, Cathcart, Stutterheim and then Thembasa.

And then to say I arranged for that transportation, is that it was myself who put in a requisition with comrade Power, the administrator by then, that I would need transport and recommend the type of transport, a bakkie or a sedan car to do this and that so that he can spare one bakkie for me if I want a bakkie on that particular day.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Let's proceed to paragraph 16:

Can you take the Committee through what you did in Butterworth in order to secure this car, to get this car and use it in the operation?

MR XUNDU: If we take a closer look into the way APLA operated, obviously there was supposed to be some transport used for the operation, and it could not be for instance, a car that we know is known by the police, those cars which moved around Umtata and Butterworth, it must be a car which was not known that it was being used by APLA operatives. So it was in that light that we went to Butterworth.

We couldn't take that car from King William's Town, we couldn't take that car from East London for obvious security reasons. You see, we regarded King William's Town, East London, as the heart of the security forces in the Eastern Cape. I mean, the situation security was a witness for me, there was, I think their headquarters were based in East London, there was also group 8 which was the army base here, so there was a heavy concentration of security forces.

And to take a car in East London or in King William's Town, we will just be alerting the security forces that they must be hunting for that car and then we couldn't operate in that particular area where they are busy looking for the car. So those are the facts which drove us to go to Butterworth and find the car.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Can you explain to the Committee how you took the car from the owner?

MR XUNDU: Yes, we took the car by force, in the sense that it was not through the concern of the owner, it was unexpected but because we are not criminals we were doing that for the sake of getting transport so that we can be in time with the operation of the golf club.

We explain that we are going to try, make means to bring back his car and we were very much committed to that undertaking, it was not just a sugar coated concession.

MR LAX: Sorry, you haven't told us precisely how you took the car from him, did you point firearms at him, did you threaten to beat him us, did you point knives at him, what exactly did you do?

MR XUNDU: Okay. I pointed a firearm at him and asked for the key, he gave me the key, took him into the car, ordered the drive to drive, which was comrade Togela Mlangewesa. Then at some point in time, I can't remember, we dropped him off. We made sure that he had enough coins to take the nearest transport to Butterworth and off we went.

MR MBANDAZAYO: May I proceed Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, carry on.

MR MBANDAZAYO: After taking the car you went back to Thembasa. The arms were kept in a DLB in Nxesa location:

Now can you explain to the Committee, the area where the arms were kept and the place where they were kept?

MR XUNDU: Okay. I don't whether you want me to give an eight figured reference of the DLB which, because I do not have a map of the area, it will not be possible but the arms were kept right in the location. A DLB, I think everybody here is acquainted with the language, DLB, the letter box where you dig up, make it safe so that you can store some arms there. That is where the arms were kept and constantly checked for ...[indistinct].

MR LAX: Sorry, the last part of what you said was very indistinct because you were quite far away from the mike, just repeat it please. You explained what a dead letter box was and then you just said something at the end which I couldn't hear at all.

CHAIRPERSON: You said that's where the arms were kept, I don't know if you said anything after that.

MR XUNDU: I said that's where the arms were kept and checked constantly for purposes of cleaning and checking serviceability.

MR LAX: That's what I didn't catch, thanks.

MR MBANDAZAYO: You have already confirmed that these were the arms that were used on the day in question, now can we go to paragraph 18:

Now my first point will be, how was it possible - can you explain to the Committee, that as you have explained the organogram of APLA that there was a regional commander and comrade Skumiso according to you was a senior member and also you were senior, how was it possible that you were commanded on this operation by comrade Bheki? And also that the driver of the car, comrade Togela Mkangwesa, can you explain how he was armed? Can you take the Committee through that paragraph and explain the details of the operation as you brief them?

MR XUNDU: Okay. Let me rather take the Committee through in this format. The way I drew up the operational plan was as follows: There was a reconnaissance party and the commotion of the reconnaissance party was all the operatives although they were to go there in different timings and we had to consider the security of the operation or the security of the target, but every operative, all the operatives were part of the reconnaissance party.

I have already indicated that they only became part of the reconnaissance party during final reconnaissance. Then there was also a security part. The security party were those people where there was also a command post, a command post, that means that was the commander for the operation had to be stationed, somebody who can be able to have a full view of whatever development is happening during the operation and be able to give commands.

That composed of comrade Bheki, he was appointed commander, comrade Vido and the driver. Then there was also lastly the execution party. I think that is where you get it finally. The execution party actually composed the most senior people, myself and comrade Skumiso.

The reason why we appointed or the reason why I think comrade Skumiso appointed comrade Bheki as the commander is that we were building our forces for leadership and the fact that, I think some 5 months thereafter, he was promoted from the position of being an ordinary force into an area commander. It's quite indicative of the fact that we are right on track.

And simply because we had trust and confidence over the plan, operationally speaking and that each and every force understands the role that is going to be played by each and every operative in the operation. And therefore, equipped with that knowledge, equipped with that information and coupled with the training that he had received from APLA, it was possible that given a change, he can command. And the success or the failure of the operation, I think it proves me correct.

So if I may add, comrade Bheki was to command, as soon as we entered the gate he takes over the command and as soon as we go out of the gate I take over the command, went to the RV, as soon as we reached the RV comrade Skumiso takes over the command. That was the circumstances.

MR LAX: Just for the record, the RV is your rendezvous, is that correct?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Can you then take the Committee through what actually happened in the golf club? Where were you positioned and what did you do, why the other deed?

MR XUNDU: Okay. According to the execution party, would be the people who enter the two entrances - if you have a picture of the golf club, under the command of comrade Bheki who was positioned in the security party and who was expected to give a signal for withdrawal at an appropriate time.

As soon as we get off the vehicle, went through the entrance of the golf club and as per the plan, comrade Lester went to the right, to the bar if I remember very well, I haven't been to the place since then, then myself to the party hall.

The plan was as follows and we adhered to it, that to first to catch the inning with the element of surprise, create confusion, we must first throw the grenades and I think I must have thrown the reinforce offensive grenade. I'm saying reinforced because it is the way that, apart from its original form from the factories, we glued in quite many nails to reinforce the shrapnel effect so that it can cause much more damage.

So it means that an offensive grenade, we could make if a defensive grenade in terms of the shrapnel effect and a defensive grenade, we could make it something more. So I threw that grenade, waited for it to explode. I made sure that I threw it in-between the -okay right in the passage, in the middle of the passage, so that it can injure or kill as many people as it possibly could.

After that I fired some shots. Now the reason I fired shots was, it was appreciated that if there is such a senior National Party member, Mr Radoo or Radu or whatever you call it, then it means there will be his VIP team, there will be senior police officers, senior army officers and national intelligence, the CIS and in fact right on that note, the information that we received from the man that I do not know, I cannot recall his name but he is the person I referred to earlier on as the person who was either the secretary or the person maintaining the club, but I understand he had an office there, he said, he described to us the way - it was historic, I mean that occasion, senior citizens would be there and he said in his own words: "Learned people" because he knew we were hungry for education,: "Learned people, senior army officers, senior police officers".

So we expected that some member of the security forces would be conscious enough, in light of the confusion that is made by the grenade, to respond or to fire back. So I shot some, a few shots so that I can actually pin down that particular person. I think comrade Lester did the very same thing on the other side and then the withdrawal signal as planned, then we withdraw.

Now the manner in which we were going to withdraw was as follows: The car, whilst the grenade is going off and some shots are being fired, was idling, moving very slow, prepared for moving at any time and as soon as we withdrew, the car moved very, very, slowly, idling. The other comrades got into the car and then I was to be the first person, I mean the last person to get into the car so that I can cover the back because now we are facing the other side and the target was this side so we had to make sure that nobody comes out and gives us some problems whilst we are going away.

As soon as the car exceeded the, or passed the gate I got into the car and took over command as per the plan. I don't know whether I've made myself very clear.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairman, can I proceed if the Committee has no questions?

MS GCABASHE: Can I just ask, you talk of the gate, and I know we will be given photographs later of the scene, was there a barrier at the gate or where they gates that opened and shut? Could you just describe that?

MR XUNDU: No, I don't think there was any gate to open and shut, if my memory serves me well.

MS GCABASHE: So you simply just drove past?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MS GCABASHE: There was nobody who stood there, stood watch or anything like that? There wasn't a post, nothing?

MR XUNDU: No.

MS GCABASHE: Thank you. Sorry, before you continue Mr Mbandazyo, the other point was, the presence of Mr Radu and the security people, the senior people of East London, do you know if in fact they were there?

MR XUNDU: Perhaps I've used a ...[indistinct] I say it was appreciated that they are there.

MS GCABASHE: The question is, do you know if in fact they were there?

MR XUNDU: I don't.

ADV SANDI: Were you expecting them to be there, according to what this gentleman you've mentioned said to you?

MR XUNDU: Yes. And in fact, away from that gentleman being the source, there were many other sources. I mean today we used to serve this particular boss, today this boss, today this boss, we were collecting information and when we do a debriefing at the end of the day we compare the information received from that Mr and that Mr and then it made one thing.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Let's got to paragraph 23:

Now can you explain to the Committee how - you told the Committee that comrade Ntintili provided you with accommodation, how was it possible that he did not know that you were going to attack the golf club, in view of the fact that in paragraph 22 you already said that you have given to him weapons? Can you explain that to the Committee?

MR XUNDU: Okay. As I have indicated earlier, there was no way that somebody who has nothing to do with the operation could know about it before the operation, even after the operation, there was no way that they could go to him and say: "We have done this, and that", for obvious security reasons.

So he only got an indication when the situation demanded so because we had to dispose the car. I mean that is what the situation operational demanded otherwise you get caught by the enemy forces. So comrade Ntintili knew absolutely nothing about the operation until I ordered him to accompany us so that we can dispose of the car.

And I think, if I remember very well, he asked: "What for"?, because a Jetta that could take us from point A to point B within a short space of time and he knew that we had problems with regard to transport. So I told him that: "This car is a most wanted car in the Eastern Cape", at the time. To him, as I could look to him, I mean ...[indistinct] did not have given him enough signal that it was the car used there.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Now, can you explain to the Committee, you wanted to dispose the car, the reason why you wanted to dispose the car, as you indicated earlier on that you promised the owner that you will bring back the car?

MR XUNDU: Can you come again?

MR XUNDU: Can you tell the Committee the reason why you wanted to dispose the car, yet you promised the owner that you will bring back the car?

MR XUNDU: Okay. In other words you want me to explain the operational circumstances that I'm talking about?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Yes.

MR XUNDU: Okay. It is worth mentioning that in that point in time, 1992 November or let me say, right from June, that was the time marked by a high level of tension between the people and the security forces and that was at the height of the conflict brigadier Gqozo and the ANC.

And subsequent the that the apartheid system reinforced Gqozo through providing him assistance, we noticed the deployment of the SADF and if I remember very well, they had three patrol bases, one right in town, one in Zwelitsha, one behind Xnesha which served, I mean which used to take some small detachment and do mobile patrols in Thembasa, Thembisa.

So given that heavy presence of the security forces, we had to get rid of the car as soon as possible. But furthermore, when we took the car, we initially intended to drive it as far as Queenstown and just drop it near a police station with the key in because we knew that at the end of the day the owner was going to get it.

Now we drove off and as we drove off Thembasa right to King William's Town - brigadier Gqozo had what was it called? a peace force, a certain paramilitary click that wore a black uniform, if I remember very well, so as soon as we were on the national road we were noticed by these gentlemen. And also there was another chap driving a Monza, it was part of the apartheid spies that was stationed or deployed in the Ciskei system, the chap was driving a Monza and he was staying in Thembisa.

He spotted the car and I think I can confirm because he could provide a little bit of information to his bosses the SAP, so those chaps could not give us enough chance to do as we have planned. In fact they tried to stop us, we couldn't stop and we were not armed so we had to drive very fast, get into one of the locations, I think it was Mzanzi location.

Then we disappeared away from their scene and went back to Thembasa and then when we went back to Thembasa, ...[inaudible] so that he must assist us, I wanted him to drive the car and then we organised, we armed ourselves for any eventuality because it seemed that contact was inevitable at that time.

And we were not prepared to be caught, those were one of the principles we agreed upon as a unit, the ...[indistinct] detachment, so under those operational circumstances we went into the Alice line and we passed Alice there was a hastily prepared roadblock by the SAP. I mean the - it was pretty obvious it was a roadblock hastily prepared for a specific reason and I mean, we were the guilty party but they let us pass through them, but as we passed they must have realised that okay, these are the people that we are looking for. I mean the purpose of a hastily prepared roadblock, it's for a specific reason. If the police want a certain vehicle, they have the registration, what, what, what, they would make it just a hastily prepared roadblock for that specific purpose, so it was very clear that they were after us, they tried to chase us. We went as far as Fort Beaufort and then on the way to Grahamstown we saw that they were closing up and there was a police station in front, I think it was Tamaga I don't know, but we decided no, there is no way you must dispose the car right here.

Then we went back with the Rover, back to Thembasa and we passed SAP right this way. So those were the circumstances why we couldn't stick to our undertaking.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Now you just told the Committee that you disposed the car, how did you dispose the car?

MR XUNDU: Okay. We got it off the road and I think the terrain was slopey and then we opened the petrol tank and we had some ...[indistinct] with us, we just ignited one and threw it in through the window inside the vehicle and off we went.

CHAIRPERSON: But I understood you to say that: "on the way to Grahamstown they were catching up and we then decided we had to abandon the car", surely it would have drawn their attention to you immediately when you started burning a car by the side of the road while they were catching up with you?

MR XUNDU: Can you come again?

CHAIRPERSON: As I understood your evidence, you said that after going through the roadblock they tired to chase you and you went to Fort Beaufort and on the way to Grahamstown they were catching up, so you could see them if they were catching up, and you then decided to abandon the car, you pushed it by the side of the road and set it on fire. Surely this must have drawn the police's attention to you if they were coming along behind you?

MR XUNDU: They were quite a distance from us, that is what you must understand. Because the road was at an angle, this way, so when the siren is on you actually see from a distance when they are actually on ...[inaudible] yes, on the right. Okay, you hear the siren going on and you can actually judge the distance, how far they are from you. It's normal, you ...[indistinct]

ADV SANDI: Are you able to estimate Mr Xundu, the distance between yourselves and those who were chasing after you?

MR XUNDU: It was not less than five kilometres.

ADV SANDI: Was it at night or during the day? I do not recall what you said on that.

MR XUNDU: It must about past seven or seven, round about there, in the evening.

MR MBANDAZAYO: May I proceed Mr Chairman?

Mr Xundu, you can - I'm going to paragraph 27 Mr Chairman, I'm almost through.

Can you confirm what is written in paragraph 27 of your affidavit, that it contains what you have written down yourself?

MR XUNDU: Yes, I can confirm what is in paragraph 27 because paragraph 27 puts into context the whole action carried out by ...[indistinct] detachment on the 28th of November 1992. It just puts it clear that this was part of the national liberation struggle as seen by the PAC.

And it further puts it clear that, if I may take you back to certain historical factors, that peaceful means to wage a struggle have been exhausted by the African people for three centuries, the 17th, the 18th and the 19th century.

And after the 19th century, the African people were totally disarmed. And if we remember, the last war of resistance must have 1912, and that in 1912 the oppressors continued to use violence against the African people who were using peaceful means to protest against the political system. That is evidenced by the 1912 march by the women which was crushed violently by the security forces who were on horseback.

The mowing down of innocent Christians were led by Enock Nkijema in Queenstown. The brutal crushing of the strike of the mineworkers in 1946. It served to reason Mr Chairman, that violence against peaceful protest, African people was the standard practice of the security system. And that violence against African people undoubtedly had legacy.

But it was to intolerable levels in 1960 when our, 69 people were killed by the security forces. It is worth mentioning that in the formation of the PAC in 1959, no provision by its leaders like Mangusuto Buthelezi was made for an armed revolution, it was never an option that our people could think of right from the beginning despite the facts that they have been killed from time to time, 1912, 1922 and you name the African wars of resistance.

Those, Sobukwe indicated that the political situation in our country was pregnant with untold possibilities but this possibility of ...[indistinct] an armed revolution was not in the line at the time. Now the killing of our people or the time when our people were killed, I mean, it means the clouds of war were looming the horizon.

In 1961 APLA was formed and APLA, you must understand that it was formed out of these objective conditions, out of a sheer demand for revolutionary violence against settler colonialists. And for those people who always chose to beat the mountains out of the words settlers.

I refer to them as settlers because if we can visit history, history tells that some people outside the continent of Africa came here to colonialise our country but the colonialisation of our people, particularly in the occupied Azania, had a unique character from the rest of the African people. It was not the same one which happened in Kenya, it was not the same one which happened Guinea ...[indistinct].

The colonialists colonised Azania and then settled here, hence they are called settler colonialists or settlers. So the words derived from history itself. But the PAC have further chosen to give it a ...[indistinct] definition and said: even all those who worked for the perpetual existence of that evil system.

And it is also worth mentioning that the white people in this country are very proud of being settlers and I think nobody, not even a professor can nullify that fact because the erection of the settlers monument which is still called settlers monuments in Grahamstown, is indicative of the way that they are attached, or they attach importance to them being settlers.

And furthermore, the task of directing the armed action against the settlers was given to the revolutionary council in 1961 by the presidential council of the PAC. That on its own is indicative of the nature of the violence that we had to direct to the white people, it was revolutionary violence.

Now the golf club incident is no exception from that revolutionary violence. And I want to put it to you Mr Chairman, that they members of Ekude detachment moved from those premises and that mandate given by the PAC. And it is also worth mentioning lastly that in 1992 the PAC congress resolved to intensify the armed struggle and subsequently the commanders of the Azanian People's Liberation Army launched a campaign, Operation Great Storm. And Operation Throw Stones, as the operation of the golf club was named, was an integral part of Operation Great Storm.

So we had the full mandate that was given to us by the PAC, given to us by the APLA command structures.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Now the last part, paragraph 28 ...[intervention]

ADV SANDI: I'm sorry Mr Mbandazayo, can I ask to interpose here for a moment?

Mr Xundu, I notice that in paragraph 27 you say:

Would you be able to elaborate a little on that?

MR XUNDU: Okay, no problem. In paragraph 27 I've indicated that:

But I've also mentioned that in the same breath it must be appreciated that the PAC was not part and parcel of the negotiations and not just out of the negotiations, was consciously not part of the negotiations for political reasons. ...[indistinct] reservations about a negotiated settlement. I also as an individual had reservations a negotiated settlement.

The mere fact that we have more than 300 cadres of ...[indistinct] still languishing in jail for actions they committed or for their contribution in bringing about this product, this democratic dispensation and at a time when we have a democratic government in power, voted in power by the majority of the people. I cannot reconcile that, I'm really failing to reconcile.

And the mere fact that I myself Thembelani Xundu, I'm here in front of you gentlemen to ridicule myself, say that I've done that and to ask why I've done that, why? I mean I would expect myself, in the shortest or the longest political imagination that I've had, that by now I'll be in front of the information department of the PAC or the information department or the intelligence department of the Azanian People's Liberation Army, perhaps let me say Colonel Mzamba, relating the experiences of the revolution.

Or even in front of historians, relating the experiences of the revolution and the contribution that, as a force, as a soldier or as cadre of APLA, I have done, in a relaxing situation, not in this situation. This is certainly not a mechanism that I've ever foreseen in my thinking. It clearly vindicates the suspicion that the PAC had over a negotiated settlement because I'm asking myself, what is it that is blackmailing the Government so that they cannot release our cadres.

What concession have they made to say: we'll keep them in jail but you must do this for us? What is it? You see, de Klerk being a product of the oppressive system, took a bold step to really spoil our prisoners. In the light of that I cannot understand why our government cannot have the courage to release their comrades, not just people, their comrades.

The liberation movements, the broad liberation movements was composed of the PAC, the ANC, Azapo, but our government cannot be courageous and strong and bold enough to take the cadres of the PAC out of jail. Now it seems successfully our ...[indistinct] have been criminalised and that is why today, I mean, somebody has the audacity to ask me: why did I do that.

MR LAX: Let me remind you, let me remind you Mr Xundu, that you are here voluntarily, at your own request. If you want to withdraw this application and go home you're welcome to do so. If you're going to be here, then with all due respect, you should remember that you are here voluntarily.

No-one asked you to come before us, you chose to come here, it's your choice. I would be very careful about my choice of words if I was, this is not a political grandstand. Let's get on with the work we are here to do.

MR XUNDU: Yes, but I don't think your statement is reasonable. I mean, you cannot tell me - I know that I have come here consciously and hence I've said:

I know I have come here consciously and nobody pushed me, I know that.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, Mr Mbandazayo, when I came in you were just about to lead the witness on paragraph 28, was it 28?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Yes, Mr Chairman.

Mr Xundu, can we go to paragraph 8. Can you tell the Committee how did you go about reaching the family from which you took the Jetta away?

MR XUNDU: Okay. It must be appreciated first that after the 28th November incident, I mean the police were after me, they had my photo by hook or by crook, so I could not even go to or try and trace the owner of the Jetta and try to make some peace with him. I mean, I concentrated on my hiding.

The circumstances operationally demanded so. But I've stated here that the incident is one that my conscience cannot come to terms with, that was the whole drive why I did that. I went to the family of the owner of the car together with the director of operations, because this was reported to him and he knew very well about it, and together with some other PAC leaders like comrade Sneki and others, where we - where I gave them a full account of all that happened and apologised to them. That is how I reached them.

MS GCABASHE: When was this, just give us a date?

MR XUNDU: I'll not be sure about the date but somewhere, it should be last year.

MR MBANDAZAYO: That is all I wanted to lead the applicant on Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, I'm not sure if we've been told or whether we've put it on record or not, about a discussion we had before we started. Have there affidavits been signed and attested to?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman not to inform you, that has been done. I handed the copy over to the leader of evidence Mr Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I know it had been arranged but we haven't been, it has now been done so we can accept that, thank you.

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I confirm that I have a bundle of signed documents as the original and refer to it as the original bundle. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRIOR: Mr Xundu, I am a leader of evidence for the Amnesty Committee and because victims who are present here today, people who were injured and who lost loved ones in your attack, are not regally represented and they are relying to a large extent on the evidence leader to put questions to the applicants in this matter. Do you understand that position?

MR XUNDU: I understand Mr Chairman.

MR PRIOR: Now, as a soldier of APLA it would seem, from my understanding of your evidence, that there was a code of discipline within that organisation, is that correct?

MR XUNDU: Yes, correct.

MR PRIOR: And is it correct that there was political accountability by APLA to the political organisation, that is the PAC?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: And every military act, as I understood your evidence, had to be politically accountable or be able to be politically accountable?

MR XUNDU: Yes, it had to fall within the mandate given by the PAC and the whole strategy of the PAC.

MR PRIOR: And is it also correct that as a soldier of APLA you were also a member of the PAC, you were not removed from membership of the PAC, is that correct?

MR XUNDU: Absolutely correct.

MR PRIOR: So whilst you were a soldier fighting the war of liberation you also had to be mindful of the political decrees and political policies by the PAC, is that correct.

MR XUNDU: Yes, to that effect I was a Commissar.

MR PRIOR: And sometimes that those political decisions were not always popular within the broad membership of the PAC, which included APLA?

MR XUNDU: What are you now referring to?

MR PRIOR: I want to lay a foundation for asking specific questions. Political decisions weren't always popular amongst the members, for example the agreement or the decision to participate in the constitutional negotiations and the ultimate suspension of the armed struggle. Those political decisions were not always popular amongst the soldiers, is that correct?

MR XUNDU: But at no stage did they effect me.

MR PRIOR: No, but answer the question.

MR XUNDU: Okay, if you want me to speak on behalf of the other people, I may say: "yes".

MR PRIOR: Well you even said in your evidence that you were not, as an individual you had reservations about negotiated settlement.

MR XUNDU: And that was the broad position of the PAC.

MR PRIOR: What I'm saying is, at some stage the membership of APLA, the soldiers, weren't entirely happy with the decision by the PAC to participate in a peaceful and negotiated settlement.

MR XUNDU: Would you ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Can you say the members of APLA, indicating that all the members of APLA were not?

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I indicated it and I qualify that the question, it was a genuine question, a genuine proposition. I certainly don't mean to include each and every member. I said there were certain instances where political decisions were made which were not popular among for example, the soldiers. I don't know how to qualify the ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Maybe I can help Mr Prior. Let's try and direct the question to Mr Xundu on the basis that he commanded certain people, his experience would entail those people and the people he was in contact with. So if the question is specifically directed to encompass people he was in contact with and were under his command, were there instances in your knowledge and in your experience where aspects of the political programme were not accepted by the cadres that you had contact with?

MR XUNDU: Not to my knowledge Mr Chairman.

MR PRIOR: Was there ever the situation that operations were carried out without the political mandate and then were simply, because of the psychological impact of those attacks or those operations, they were then embraced by the PAC as being sanctioned by them? Do you understand what I'm getting at?

MR XUNDU: I understand but I don't have such experience.

MR PRIOR: For example King William's Town, you said that you had the authority or the go ahead from the director or operations, Leklapa Mpashlele, is that correct?

MR XUNDU: Yes, it is Chairman.

MR PRIOR: And who was he answerable to, do you know? Who did he have to report to in turn?

MR XUNDU: The operations department was part of the senior departments in the army, all the senior directorates so I think he reported directly to comrade Subs(?).

MR PRIOR: The political commissar?

MR XUNDU: Okay. I think he directed straight to comrade Sabelo and I think also comrade Dan because Dan was a chief political commissar and therefore the second in command. MR LAX: Can I just clarify for the record, you refer to comrade Subs and then you said Sabelo, you're referring to Sabelo Pama, the late Sabelo Pama.

MR XUNDU: Yes, yes.

MR LAX: And when you refer to Dan, you refer to Dan Mofokeng?

MR XUNDU: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Presently a brigadier?

MR XUNDU: Brigadier General.

MR PRIOR: Let me put the question to you this way, you had no doubt in your mind that the King William's Town Golf Club was an operation that was okayed, sanctioned at the highest level?

MR XUNDU: I have no doubts.

MR PRIOR: And the actual identification of the target, was the done by Leklapa himself?

MR XUNDU: The what?

MR PRIOR: The identification of the target as a target for an operation, was that identified by the director of operations himself?

MR XUNDU: Yes, and quite many other operations that were within my area of ...[indistinct]

MR PRIOR: I just want to make it abundantly, absolutely clear, it wasn't a situation where you as the local command or as a local commander on the ground had come up with the idea, it was passed on and it was then approved? It was quite distinct from that, the order came from above?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: You see, why I'm asking that question is because I have some difficulty with the submissions made on behalf of APLA before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and I refer to page 81 of Exhibit A. I don't if your legal representative has taken you through these submissions at all.

MR XUNDU: Chairman, I think your leader will help us because we have the original bundle, I don't think we have this one because it was too big. When he's referring it will be difficult for us to get to the page, actual page.

MR PRIOR: Does my learned friend not have a copy of the submissions?

MR MBANDAZAYO: I've got the one which we used in Heidelberg.

MR PRIOR: Yes. Page 81 of the transcript, I'm referring not to the paginated page but the typed page, the typed page number.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Can you tell us what ...[intervention]

MR PRIOR: It starts with 1980:

MR MBANDAZAYO: Which one, the first submission or the second one?

MR PRIOR: It's the evidence given by the delegation, the APLA delegation.

MR MBANDAZAYO: In the second ...[intervention]

MR PRIOR: In the second, October submission yes.

MR LAX: Mr Prior, he doesn't have the same document that you're referring to.

MR PRIOR: May we then ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Perhaps we can just take a short adjournment and sort it out.

MR PRIOR: And maybe the witness can go through the passage before he's asked questions.

MR LAX: Absolutely. Maybe you can indicate the passages you are going to refer to and let them have a look at it.

MR PRIOR: I'm indebted to the Committee, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We will accordingly take a short adjournment. We have to reconvene and continue before we take the lunch adjournment.

MR PRIOR: All rise please.

Thank you Mr Chairman. May the witness just be reminded he's still under oath?

MR LAX: Mr Xundu, just to confirm that you are still under oath.

THEMBELANI TANDEKILE XUNDU: (s.u.o.)

MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Xundu, I want to refer you to page 78 of Exhibit A, towards the bottom of the page. This was said on behalf of the APLA delegation:

I think it is in black and white, let me read that again.

Does that accord with your understanding of the direction and the orders that you received, specifically in respect of King William's Town Golf Club?

MR XUNDU: Yes, I think it does.

MR PRIOR: Then I want you to look at page 81 because this passage of the submissions causes me particular problems and maybe you can explain that for the Committee. If you can, please do and if you can't then you must indicate that you cannot explain.

At the top of the page, and perhaps before I quote, this quotation or this evidence was given against the background of a question by the then leader of the Investigation Unit, Advocate Goosen, where he was seeking to ...[indistinct] or understand the difference between soft or hard targets and I think the reply from APLA was that at some stage there was no difference between the two.

I quote at the top of page 81:

Now the sense that I get from that is that when the King William's Town Golf Club operation occurred and had taken place, it seems to me that the APLA high command, those structures, the people in the leadership as it says here, were at a loss as to that operation. Would I be correct in suggesting that it seems that this had not been sanctioned, this attack had not been sanctioned, the operation had not been sanctioned by the military high command?

MR MBANDAZAYO: Sorry Mr Chairman, just before the applicant answers, I think Mr Prior, if you can put perspective who was saying that because my understanding is that that passage was said by Mr Mlambo and Mr Mlambo, to my understanding, was not a member of the high command, he was a member of the military commission and a leader of the PAC there. So there is a difference between military commission and high command.

MR PRIOR: I'm indebted to Mr Mbandazayo. Yes, there was - the understanding that I have is that this was submissions made by the, it was a security force hearing so APLA was represented. But I also understand, from what he now tells me, that Mr Mlambo was the military commissioner.

MR MBANDAZAYO: Yes, he was a member of the military commission which included members of high command, APLA high command and PAC leadership.

MR PRIOR: Alright. Maybe I can put the question, that according to Mr Mlambo at least, the military commission or a member of the military commission was taken aback at the news of the attack on King William's Town Golf Club.

MR PRIOR: Okay, then it means you are taking me two levels up.

MR PRIOR: I understand that if it goes beyond your personal knowledge, obviously I can't press you for an answer but maybe just for your comment, are you able to maybe put that piece of Mlambo's evidence in a context or you can't?

MR XUNDU: Okay. It is on record here that comrade Mlambo said he was lost, was surprised, taken aback many ...[indistinct] but if we have to take into account what I've said initially, I've tried to give historical factors that prompted the PAC to form, to adopt the concept of an armed revolution against the system as appropriate and legitimate.

And in that regard it received national and international acclamation. Now that was dictated by the concrete material conditions, objective conditions in that the pace was set by the inning and therefore, as it indicates here, in the '90's the ...[indistinct] there was yet another dynamism in the political situation of the time, militarily speaking and therefore APLA had to adapt to that.

So the bottom line here is, whatever Mr Mlambo was trying to say, that everything was dictated by material conditions.

MR PRIOR: Alright.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Prior, can I just come in here just for further clarity?

Mr Xundu, I think I heard you attorney saying Mr Mlambo was a member of the military commission, is that correct?

MR XUNDU: Yes, the military commission is the one initially I referred to as a revolutionary council. It was changed in 1978 to be military commission and that was a link between the PAC and the APLA as an armed organisation. Members of the national leadership of the PAC were part of the military commission. Members of the high command were members of the military commission, so it was a combination of the two.

ADV SANDI: Just to follow up on that, members of the military commission, would they necessarily play a role in the issuing of orders?

MR XUNDU: No, not issuing of orders, what they would do is to formulate broad policies that would, within which APLA have to direct its efforts.

MR PRIOR: Would I be correct in enquiring that during that time, August, September, October of '93, of '92, was there any diversions of opinion between what the PAC were saying and what APLA was saying?

MR XUNDU: Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge because I think one of the things that bring us here is the question of the armed struggle and 1992, as I have earlier indicated, that the congress of the PAC resolved to intensify the armed struggle. Now in light of that I don't see any possible contradictions, conflict whatsoever. There was some sort of political immunism.

MR PRIOR: Alright. The reference further at page 82 of Exhibit A, I don't think it would be fair to ask you because that evidence is not given in any time frame or any context of that time frame so it could well have been after 1992 but the sense of what is said at page 82, the top of the page, beginning:

That is the 1st paragraph, was that APLA was never told by the PAC that they had either acted in error or that they had not followed the policy of the PAC.

If I may just be more specific. They say:

Just to ask you around that, was that - did you ever receive any indication that anyone in the PAC was unhappy with the way APLA was conducting itself, specifically in 1992 and more specifically in respect of King William's Town attack?

MR XUNDU: No, not to my knowledge. What I know is that PAC members that I made contact with were satisfied with the operation.

MR PRIOR: Alright. Would you agree that an element of proportionality had to occasion or had to be present in your operations?

MR XUNDU: Proportionality in terms of what?

MR PRIOR: Well between the attack, the effects of the attack and your desired objectives, there had to be a balance as it were.

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: And was that part of your political training?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: I mean, for example ...[intervention]

MR XUNDU: Because we were pushing the programme of the PAC.

MR PRIOR: Yes.

MR XUNDU: We therefore could not exceed the boundaries of the mandate given by the PAC.

MR PRIOR: But just to illustrate that, I think it was well illustrated by Brigadier Fitla, I think round about page 90 of that same, or 91 - I'm not too clear Mr Chairman, when he says:

You never had the instructions to attack kindergarten schools and hospitals and old age homes.

MR XUNDU: Okay, that's why ...[intervention]

MR PRIOR: Do you understand where I'm coming from? I'm simply saying the element of proportionality was carefully considered, was it not?

MR XUNDU: That's why I asked you - you say proportionality with regard to what, because I think if I'm reading, if I have read this correctly, the proportionality that they are referring to is, for instance we had our people, so-called civilians dying every day, then we could proportionally have the white people so-called civilians dying.

Now my understanding is that if the conflict or ...[indistinct] had gone to the extent that the white security forces or if the white people could hit at lower primary schools where our African children are attending, then we would have to respond in the same way. That is the understanding that I have about proportionality in this sense. I don't know whether we are moving on the same frequency.

MR PRIOR: Yes. And do you agree with what was said at page 82 about, in fact you're bringing your answer as in accordance with what was stated there as a legitimate reprisal, is that what you're embracing in your answer?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: In other words the security forces, if they attacked a black school for example then it would be an attack on a white target or a white civilian target and in APLA eyes it would be proportional to that attack, it would be justified. Is that what you're ...[intervention]

MR XUNDU: I think that is the rational.

MR PRIOR: Okay. And I think it was put here in the delegation by a member of the delegation that APLA considered these to be legitimate reprisals?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: We had an example last week about the North Crest attack in Umtata, did that occur before King William's Town? I'm not too clear, I'm not too sure.

MR XUNDU: I think it was after.

MR PRIOR: Oh, after King William's Town.

MR XUNDU: But be that as it may, I mean if we can even then try to dig that proportionality, there are incidents like the Umtata, I mean how many massacres have we talked about since the political history of the country?

MR PRIOR: Yes. And your mind then, was the identification of a basically civilian target, a white civilian target in a white area, was basically a legitimate target for your APLA operation?

MR XUNDU: A white civilian target, what about it?

MR PRIOR: Well, you identified or King William's Town was identified as a legitimate target.

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: It was in a white area, the people that were identified to be killed or injured were white civilians predominantly or did you consider them to be white military personnel?

MR XUNDU: It could be white military, plain civilians.

MR PRIOR: Okay. I just want to understand where you're coming from.

MS GCABASHE: Paddy, if I might just interject here. Just to clarify, for me certainly, the question of reprisal. The King William's Town Golf attack had nothing to do with a specific reprisal, did it? We are just talking generally, it was a mission that was conceived and executed. It was not a payback for a particular incident?

MR XUNDU: Not at all.

MS GCABASHE: Thanks.

MR PRIOR: So what - then I just need to ask you this question. Then where did proportionality come into the King William's Town operation that was predominantly your operation?

MR XUNDU: I think the Commissioner who just talked, that we were generalising, we're not talking specifically about the golf club when we talk about proportionality.

MR PRIOR: Alright. Now I'm asking you specifically, what proportionality was applied or did apply in the golf club operation?

MR XUNDU: That was not the paradigm where we ...[indistinct] proportionality.

MR PRIOR: Wasn't that considered at all?

MR XUNDU: We were attacking a target.

MR PRIOR: Was it maximum destruction?

MR XUNDU: Maximum destruction?

MR PRIOR: If you could have killed every living soul on that property, was that your intention?

MR XUNDU: Yes, if it was possible.

MR PRIOR: And you set out to achieve that?

MR XUNDU: Ja, that's why I drew up an operation plan. I mean the ...[intervention]

MR PRIOR: I need to understand what you mindset was and it's important for the Committee to understand. Was the intention simply to destroy or wipe out every living person on that property on that evening?

MR XUNDU: Okay, the intention was to inflict maximum loses, to kill as many people as we possibly could. Now to say we could kill or destroy everybody in the party, I don't think it would make logic otherwise we would have organised to get, let me say, LMG's or RPG's. I mean, it was not possible.

MR PRIOR: Alright. So I understand from that the operation was launched to cause the maximum loss of life and damage as you could with the armaments that you had?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: And to just clarify further, if you wanted to destroy the entire place you would have had much heavier weaponry or armaments, is that what you're explaining?

MR XUNDU: Now the armament use would correspond with the aim of the operation. For instance you couldn't, you wouldn't find an APLA unit attacking a police patrolled van by knives.

MR PRIOR: Alright. What would use if they attack a police patrol van?

MR XUNDU: Ja, they would have to look for a weapon that would be effective in that regard.

MR PRIOR: Like what, give us an example?

MR XUNDU: Like even and R4 could be used.

MR PRIOR: R4. Wouldn't an R4 be sufficient?

MR XUNDU: We could even use a 9mm pistol, it depends how do we plan it.

MR PRIOR: Okay. And against civilians sitting eating a Christmas dinner, what would be proportionate or what would be the adequate weapon there?

MR XUNDU: Okay. Against military trained civilians we could use any weapon, even an assault rifle.

MR PRIOR: And a handgrenade?

MR XUNDU: Yes, even a bomb shell if we've got.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Prior.

Mr Xundu, can you explain a bit about what you've just said, did you say against militarily trained civilians you could use any ...[intervention]

MR XUNDU: Yes please.

ADV SANDI: Could you explain that?

MR XUNDU: Okay. The white community in this country are the one people I have never considered as civilians, pure civilians, in the true sense that I could just point at that old man there and find out that he doesn't know anything, absolutely nothing or anything about a weapon.

The militarisation of the white community was something which was, let me say, legalised or institutionalised, I don't know what is the appropriate word there, but the true conception for instance, we know every white adult man at the age of 18 or above have undergone military training and right from there you ...[indistinct] the distinction between the African people and the white community in terms of training.

You can easily refer to the African people as civilians because you will not attach anything that is military but with the white community it is a different concern, it's a different situation. They have undergone military training and after having undergone military training they are part and parcel of ...[end of tape]

...[inaudible] explain my point. Even before they are conscripted there was a cadet system and there is still a cadet system only for white persons in this country.

MR PRIOR: Cadets?

MR XUNDU: Cadets. You see I've seen those boys, they can shoot perhaps more than many of the soldiers you can get in the national defence force, in the SAPS. They can shoot, they have been shooting. Now when they reach that level of being conscripted they quite know everything.

MR PRIOR: Alright.

MR XUNDU: So I mean, how do you refer to those people as being civilians?

MR PRIOR: Yes, I want to just point out to you that that may be a dangerous generalisation but certainly that seems to be your perception of the situation.

MR XUNDU: But you are free to challenge it.

MR PRIOR: Yes.

MR XUNDU: But what - I'm laying down fact. The commanding system is still in place, it was in place, it's history. The cadet system was in place, that's history and it stayed in place.

MR PRIOR: You see ...[intervention]

MR XUNDU: The white children at primary school, they know the difference between an R4 rifle, an R5 rifle, 9mm pistol an Uzzi. Something that our people do not even have an idea.

MR PRIOR: Sorry, can I just ask you where you got that information from, that every white child at primary school level had, knew about the difference between an R1 or an Uzzi or a 9mm pistol, where did you get that information from?

MR XUNDU: I'm working in the national defence force.

MR PRIOR: Now?

MR XUNDU: Now. And I'm SO2 training there, now.

MR PRIOR: Alright, I don't want to engage in a debate with you about that, we're talking about the situation in 1992 but I accept your answer. You see, with the generalisation that every white person, and particularly, I'm coming back to the King William's Town Golf Club, do you concede that there were possibly many people there that did not have military training, that were not members of a commando, that had not had cadets at school? Or does your perception exclude that possibility?

MR XUNDU: No, because I did converse with them at length, quite many of them, while I was still bagsman and paid 50c. I mean I could talk to them ...[intervention]

MR LAX: When you say, excuse me?

MR XUNDU: Ja?

MR LAX: You say, when you were what sorry?

MR XUNDU: Okay, that might be military language but bagsmen, those boys carrying the golf kit.

MR LAX: Okay, a caddie?

MR XUNDU: Caddie. So I did converse with a lot of them. I mean, when we were there with comrade Xumiso this day he used to take this side and I take the far and then after that we ...[indistinct] that we have received.

That day he takes this and I take the other end, ...[indistinct] so we have talked to them. They have related their military, I mean experiences.

MR PRIOR: So part of your intelligence gathering was enquiring from members who played or people who played at the gold regarding their military experience, is that correct? It was one of the information gathering exercises that you conducted, is that what you're telling this Committee?

MR XUNDU: That is one of the information we received.

MR PRIOR: Alright. The other bit of information, did you know that there was - you said there was the Nationalist Party member, Mr Radu, his VIP core with security policemen and army officers, did your intelligence gathering indicate that any other people would be there at the club on that evening, other than military or security personnel?

MR XUNDU: From the proud members of the golf club with whom we were talking, they told us who was going to be there and I can only remember, in their words, talking about senior citizens.

They talked about the members of, hiring members of the military, hiring members of the security forces, the SAP. Okay, like for instance there was a certain mention of a certain Lieutenant Colonel, I've just forgotten the name sorry.

MR PRIOR: Yes.

MR XUNDU: But he was busy in East London. And subsequent to the attack, he was Gerring Inhaus(?) or something or something like that, but it was the person after the attack who was, who got a new appointment as the head of whatever division of the SAP. And I vividly, I just remember one picture of him holding something which looked like a device, I think they were looking for cartridges at the back side of the golf club, as I could see them in the printed media. So his a mention, his name was mentioned there. Now I could recall after they said he got an appointment and he's facing that challenge to apprehend or whatever, and stabilise the security situation ...[indistinct]. So that is the extent to which we were informed.

MR PRIOR: I see. Now, you were in constant contact with the other caddies at the golf club, is that right?

MR XUNDU: Constant contact?

MR XUNDU: Contact, you were getting information from them on a constant basis.

MR XUNDU: From?

MR XUNDU: The caddies, the other golf caddies?

MR XUNDU: Yes, yes, yes, in fact after each and every day.

MR PRIOR: Now, you see my ...[intervention]

MR XUNDU: Can I ...[intervention]

MR PRIOR: Sorry?

MR XUNDU: Can I, because for the purpose of your question, after each and every day we were there we used to gather around as these black people, show each other somebody has got R2, 25c and what but the two of us, either myself some of the days or comrade Lester, would got to that chap, the man that I've said I've forgotten his name and just have a chat with him you see and ask for extra money.

I remember one time he gave me R2 more, more than the 50c I got. So that was all an information gathering exercise.

MR PRIOR: You see - I don't want to belabour this aspect, but you've referred to it three or four times in your evidence, the 20c and the 50c, did that cause a particular anger in you or an embitterment in you towards the golf club, the fact that you were treated so badly as a caddie?

MR XUNDU: No. Let me say: "No" because that was not what motivated me to plan the attack.

MR PRIOR: I just want to make that clear because you refer to it constantly.

MR XUNDU: Ja. But of course, I mean, it proved a point to me that, okay real here in our own country we are being treated as underdogs. I mean you could - the way even they were speaking to us or generally to those black caddies.

MR PRIOR: So there was a strong racial tension there or element there, is that correct?

MR XUNDU: Let me say, because it was them they undermined us too much. Sad that I remember, I remember one time comrade Skumiso telling me about one of the campaigns of the PAC, the status campaign, saying: "You see comrade, Sobukwe saw this thing that status campaign".

It's really relevant to prepare the African people to wage a war against the white people because the way that our guys were, it was disturbing.

MR PRIOR: Can I just stop you there? Do I understand you that you were being prepared to wage a war against the white people, the black people against the white people? Was that the idea behind this status campaign?

MR XUNDU: The idea behind the status campaign was to remove the inferiority complex from the African people. I mean to remove the very idea that when they see you, they see you as a bas.... I mean from that position it would be very difficult to ...[intervention]

MR PRIOR: Are you addressing that directly to me as the evidence leader?

MR XUNDU: Okay, no, no, no, not in that fashion. No, not in that fashion.

MR PRIOR: May I ask the Chairman please to mention to the public that these are very serious proceedings.

MR XUNDU: Okay.

MR PRIOR: There have continued outbursts of laughter and I think detracts from the serious process of what we're about.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't agree that there have been repeated outbursts Mr Prior, but I would ask people to control themselves a little.

MR PRIOR: I'm indebted to the Chair.

Mr Xundu, may we just move on. The information that I have and the evidence that will be led is that on that particular day that you planned the King William's Town operation, the golf club operation, there certainly was a golf day that been arranged by Mr Radu, who was the Nationalist Party member of Parliament for King William's Town but that had come to an end towards the end of the afternoon and that the function which had continued, which had in fact commenced in the evening was the Wine Tasters Club which consisted predominantly of senior citizens of the area and which had nothing to do with the Nationalist Party or the South African police services or the army or whatever.

If I could just explain to you the words: "senior citizens", it has particular meaning in English, which is people who are elderly, people who are retired, not high ranking people, that's is the meaning of the word: "Senior Citizens" in English, just so you understand that.

Do you understand what I'm putting to you? It seems - sorry, first of all, do you understand the question? It's that the factual position on that day was that there was a golf club organised by this Nationalist Party figure, that that golf day came to an end, the function which was on the go when you made the attack was in fact the Wine Tasting Club that were having their annual Christmas party, their end of the year party.

MR XUNDU: Okay I understand your concern about the interpretation of: "senior citizens" and okay, that was not the only, that was not the only thing which I said I received.

MR PRIOR: Do you understand what I'm putting to you, that there was certainly a distinction, a difference between the patrons that you had targeted?

MR XUNDU: There was a difference?

MR PRIOR: Well, ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Maybe I can help you, it's really quite simple. There were two separate functions on that day, one was a golf day which Mr Radu had organised then that was finished, in the evening the Wine Tasting Club had a function. Now the Wine Tasting Club was a different organisation from Mr Radu, that's what he's putting to you. So he's saying, do you realise there were two different functions on that day?

The one involving Mr Radu was already over at the time you launched the attack and in fact the people who were present in that room you attacked were not Mr Radu's connections, it had nothing to do with him, it was a separate group of people who were part of a Wine Tasting Club.

MR XUNDU: Okay, whatever it ...[indistinct] to be, but what we knew was that the function at the golf club that day would start in the afternoon and proceed to the evening. In fact on that day I must have gone with comrade Lester but could not enter the club, just to see the situation from a distance.

We saw that there were many cars parking and therefore it means this function that we had was, it was confirmation. That's what we did before we took the other guys for final reconnaissance.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior, both you and Mr Lax have confidently said that the one function was over. If you look at photograph 15 which seems to be a photograph of the bar, it would look as if it were very busy at the time.

MR LAX: Just for the record, I was simply repeating the question Chairperson, I wasn't putting the proposition, it was his proposition, but anyway.

MR PRIOR: Yes Mr Chairman, I was trying to limit and explain the question as it went on. The golf day was at an end, I'm not suggesting that no-one who participated in that golf day was not in the bar but the bar in the dining room where the wine tasting function was held were two distinct parts of the premises.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR PRIOR: And if the witness had finished answering that part I was going on to suggest to him that in the bar there were other people in attendance.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, carry on and do so.

MR PRIOR: Could you maybe just - I didn't want to mislead you in any way. There might be a suggestion that that is what is happening but what I wanted to demonstrate to you by my question was, the impression I got from your evidence was that your target was the Nationalist Party with their VIP bodyguards, with the police and with the South African defence force present at that gathering and I wanted to draw a clear distinction that the dining room in which you threw the handgrenade was the Wine Tasting Club, they were having their year-end.

The gold day, which I understand was held or organised by Mr Radu, the NP, the golf had come to an end, there certainly may have been or probably were members having a drink in the pub but they were certainly not all concentrated and gathered in the diningroom as seemed to be suggested by your evidence, that that was the object of your attack.

MR XUNDU: Okay. The afternoon session we were told, it's the one which was going to be formal, I mean we received firsthand information. And then the informal part where people would be enjoying themselves was going to be the one in the evening and that is exactly why we saw it, that this is an appropriate time to, appropriate time to launch the attack, I mean, to achieve the element of surprise.

MR PRIOR: Yes, I follow what you're saying. So you saw the distinction, that there was a formal golf day and after those formalities had been - after the golf had been completed, there was the functions afterwards?

MR XUNDU: What we know, we didn't - to the effect that there were two different occasions.

MR PRIOR: You didn't have that information, that there were going to be two different functions?

MR XUNDU: We took it as one occasion but the first one is going to be the formal one and then thereafter people enjoy themselves.

MR PRIOR: Alright. When you arrived at the golf club, did it surprise you that there were no guards or security at the premises, given the fact that your understanding, that there were military personnel in attendance there?

MR XUNDU: One thing we were sure of, that the people there were not expecting to be attacked and because of that element there was no way - I mean, even in the military you will find a situation whereby there are no guards, were there is no threat or where senior commanders have made their appreciation so that there is no - in their threat analysis, there is no threat.

When there is threat the guard system is intensified, so they were not expecting to be attacked, so it was a complete surprise.

MR PRIOR: I'm asking you, were you not surprised to see that there was no security outside the premises, given your intelligence that fairly highranking military and police personnel were in attendance there that evening?

MR XUNDU: We - I obviously could not expect those people you have just mentioned to be manning a guard, I expected them to be part of the party.

ADV SANDI: You mean to say Mr Xundu, that you were not expecting them to be in uniform?

MR XUNDU: I expected them to be wearing - dressed to kill in their suits.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understood what you were saying is that you did expect senior police officers of senior army officers to be on guard outside the building, you expected them to be at the function.

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: But that wasn't the question, with respect. The question, with respect, was: "Did it not surprise you that there was no security outside, given the fact that you believed and your intelligence that there were senior military and police personnel attending that function?

MR XUNDU: I mean, what was ...[intervention]

MR PRIOR: The absence of any security at that function, did that not start you thinking about who was inside the premises?

MR XUNDU: Okay. Can you please, could it be so kind of you to phrase your question this way: "Any security in guard".

MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman with respect, I don't understand the distinction. I thought the question was very clear, that ...[intervention]

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Prior, I think he's answered your question because he said earlier that these people weren't expecting to be attacked, that's why he didn't even think they would have set up any guards in the first place.

MR PRIOR: So he thought, alright.

Are you saying then that it did not surprise you that there was no security of whatever nature outside the King William's Town Golf Club?

MR XUNDU: Ja, given the background that I've given you about the attack, I was not surprised.

MR PRIOR: Was there any arrangement or any discussion or any precaution taken about injuring the staff of the King William's Town Golf Club, particularly the black staff?

MR XUNDU: No, we did not plan on the base of the black staff, unfortunately.

MR PRIOR: What do you mean by that? If they were in the cross-fire, that would just be bad luck for them?

MR XUNDU: Okay. It was common sense that there could be one or two of them and if he is there he must be the one cooking.

MR PRIOR: Sorry, one?

MR XUNDU: One cooking, doing the cooking in the kitchen.

MR PRIOR: Well, according to the list ...[intervention]

MR XUNDU: I didn't expect them to be part of the - really.

MR PRIOR: My understanding is that there were two employees that were injured, a Mrs Xediswa Kaiele and Mrs Tlamata, were injured in the attack when the grenades and/or the shooting occurred, are you saying you expected those persons or those employees to be in the kitchen?

MR XUNDU: Yes.

MR PRIOR: And not moving around in the area where the attack or the danger was?

MR XUNDU: Not at all.

MR PRIOR: And you never saw them in the diningroom area when you lobbed the grenade amongst the people seated there and when you discharged your rifle at the people there?

MR XUNDU: I mean, I could not have the time to look at their faces one by one.

MR PRIOR: But you never saw them ...[intervention]

MR XUNDU: I mean, I could look at them from this way and see the whole of them and ...[intervention]

MR PRIOR: You never saw black people amongst those white patrons there?

MR XUNDU: Perhaps because I was not looking for them I didn't see them.

MR PRIOR: You've looked at the photographs that I've presented to your legal representative and which was marked Exhibit C? You've gone through those photographs?

MR XUNDU: Yes, please.

MR PRIOR: Do you accept that those photographs depict the aftermath of your operation, that is, the result of your operation?

MR XUNDU: I cannot deny that.

MR PRIOR: And you accepted them obviously? Now, I want to refer to the report at page 63 of the bundle. There's a typed copy and then page at 65 onwards is a hand-written report, it's an "operation record" and it says: "Lebene regiment". Was that written in your own hand, that report?

CHAIRPERSON: What page?

MR PRIOR: The typed transcript is 63, 64 of the bundle and the hand-written report Mr Chairman, 65, 66, 67 of the transcript.

MR XUNDU: Ja, first of all I understand this was part of the document that legitimately belonged to the PAC and APLA that the SAP ...[no English translation]. That is what I understand about these things.

MR PRIOR: No. Please, without giving a comment Mr Xundu, the question is: "Was this report written up by you"? How the police got it doesn't really concern us at this stage, but was that report written in your hand?

MR XUNDU: I'm sorry that the SAP issue irritates you.

MR PRIOR: I'm not saying it irritates me, it doesn't concern my question. My question is direct and very simple, did you write this report?

MR XUNDU: Okay. Ja, as I can see, it is my writing.

MR PRIOR: Good. And that was a report back to your director of operations, Leklapa Mpashlele, is that right?

MR XUNDU: Yes, but I don't think this is the final product.

MR PRIOR: There's