TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
AMNESTY HEARING
DATE: 23-02-1998
HELD AT: PORT ELIZABETH
NAME: JOHAN MARTIN VAN ZYL
CASE NO: 5637/96
DAY 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- CHAIRPERSON: Good morning. Will the representatives of the various parties, please announce themselves and indicate who they appear for for the purpose of the record?
ADV BOOYENS: May it please the Court, Mr Chairman and members of the Committee, J.A. Booyens, I appear on behalf of the applicant number 5, Johan Martin van Zyl, instructed by Mr Werner Nolte and on behalf of applicants numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6, instructed by Mr Francois van der Merwe.
I also appear on instructions of Mr Van der Merwe, on behalf of a Mr Fouche who has received notice that his name may be mentioned at some stage.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Booyens.
MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you Mr Chairman. My name is S.W. van der Merwe. I appear on behalf of Mr Eric Winter who is the implicated in the application of applicant 7, Mr Eugene de Kock.
MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman. My name is Schalk Hugo. I appear on behalf of Mr de Kock who is one of the applicants in this matter.
ADV BIZOS: Mr Chairman and member of the Committee, I appear on behalf of the widows of the four deceased, together with my learned friend Mr Patric Mtshaulana and instructed by the Legal Resources Centre in Johannesburg and Grahamstown.
We appear for the purposes of opposing the applications of the applicants for amnesty and we will try and show both by examining them and by leading witnesses, to show that they have not made a full disclosure and that they are protecting persons who were involved in these killings.
There will be other grounds as well which will emerge during the course of the proceedings.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Bizos.
MS PATEL: May it please the Committee. I am Ramala Patel, evidence leader for the Amnesty Committee.
CHAIRPERSON: Just for the record, this is the application in respect of the killing of what is known to be, or who is known to be the Cradock 4 of Messrs Eric Alexander Taylor in matter 3917/96, Gerhardus Johannes Lotz, matter number 3921/96, Nicolaas Jakobus Janse van Rensburg, matter 3919/96, Harold Snyman, matter 3918/96, Johan Martin van Zyl, also known as Sakkie, matter 5637/96 Hermanus Barend du Plessis, matter 4384/96 and Eugene Alexander de Kock, mater 66/96.
Mr Booyens, I understand that you will start?
ADV BOOYENS: That is correct Mr Chairman. I call as my first witness, applicant 5, Mr Van Zyl. The witness will testify in Afrikaans.
JOHAN MARTIN VAN ZYL: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed.
EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Van Zyl, your application appears on page 42 of the record, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You are applying for amnesty as set out on pages 45 for those aspects set out in paragraph 9 of your application, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, if you could perhaps just go back to that page. If we can go back to page 42, the aspects set out on page 42, do you have anything that you want to add to that?
MR VAN ZYL: No.
ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm the correctness thereof?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Page 43?
MR VAN ZYL: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Anything you wish to add? Page 44, anything to add?
MR VAN ZYL: No.
ADV BOOYENS: If we then turn to page 45, we have already dealt with paragraph 9, paragraph 1, anything to add there?
MR VAN ZYL: No.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 2?
MR VAN ZYL: No, nothing to add.
ADV BOOYENS: As far as paragraph 3 is concerned, you there refer to alternative structures. Could you just perhaps elaborate on that, there will be more complete evidence later, but what did you understand under the term alternative structures?
MR VAN ZYL: The alternative structures established during that period by the activists, included street committees, the so-called people's courts, that is more or less what replaced the existing structures to such an extent that it led to a great deal of intimidation of the local population.
ADV BOOYENS: Do you further confirm that which is said in paragraph 3 of your application?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 4, there you refer to the JMC meetings, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And to a strategy which was eventually developed to be able to deal with this matter. Now, did you yourself attend JMC meetings?
MR VAN ZYL: No.
ADV BOOYENS: The information contained herein, is this information which you obtained as a result of lectures and feedback and so forth from the officers who attended the JMC meetings?
MR VAN ZYL: Correct.
ADV BOOYENS: You also refer to the so-called G-Plan. What was your personal knowledge in respect of the G-Plan?
MR VAN ZYL: The G-Plan according to my knowledge, entailed the establishment of these alternative structures - that is more or less what it entailed.
ADV BOOYENS: On page 47, paragraph 5, there you refer to a data base and the identification of people involved in political unrest and violence. Once again, that is something which was the result of an overall information gathering process, you did not only partake in this but you had knowledge of it?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 6, you there refer to pressure by means of the JMC exerted on yourselves and you also refer to addresses made by politicians and the type of language they used.
That is also something which you learnt about from some of these politicians did not actually tell you these things personally, but you leant from other people this is what had been said and the pressure exerted, you actually learnt about this in the course of your work?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. The pressure was exerted by senior officers to my level.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 7, there you deal with so-called field work and that is the physical gathering of intelligence and what did that mean in practise?
MR VAN ZYL: My field work included the handling of informers, but especially giving leadership to the junior officers who also had to deal with and handle informers and they needed some guidance in respect of the interpretation of intelligence.
ADV BOOYENS: You refer to the fact that you were aware of the activities of - the names that you mention there are the four deceased, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct. I mention the names of the four deceased because my amnesty application is actually directed at those deceased.
There were quite a number of other political activists who also were operating on very much the same level of activity at the time.
ADV BOOYENS: Just to clarify, you mention the same level or very close to the same level of activity. Are you referring specifically to the activities in the rural areas such as Cradock and elsewhere in the Eastern Cape interland?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 8, you there make the statement that some weeks, you refer to that phrase, exactly how long was that?
MR VAN ZYL: It was about two to three weeks before the incident.
ADV BOOYENS: You also refer to the fact that Colonel van Rensburg made certain statements to you in his office?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, I think we are starting to move to a rather sensitive area here, so I am not going to lead you any further. Could you perhaps just tell us what was the nature of the conversation between yourself and Mr Van Rensburg?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Van Rensburg summoned me to his office and told me that the situation at that stage had become so critical that there was only one way in which to try and stabilise these areas, and that was by means of the elimination of Mr Matthew Goniwe and his closest colleagues.
ADV BOOYENS: You have already referred to the situation which existed. Now what did Mr Van Rensburg say about the situation, what exactly was the situation at the time?
MR VAN ZYL: It was commonly known what the situation was. We had been engaged in this situation for many months in which many black townships and areas where there was complete chaos and during the day and at night, it was extremely difficult to perform normal policing duties.
It was virtually impossible to obtain evidence. We still got sufficient information via our informers and sources. The intimidation in respect of the community was such that we were not really able to take matters to court with any degree of success.
That was the situation which was discussed every day at the Security Police level. Colonel Van Rensburg did not elaborate in respect of the specific situation at that stage.
ADV BOOYENS: You knew what the situation was?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Page 48. You say that after you spoke to Mr Van Rensburg, you then also discussed the matter with Major Du Plessis?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct. We discussed it the very same day and my impression was that Colonel Van Rensburg had already spoken to Du Plessis.
Colonel Van Rensburg's words to me were that a drastic plan should be made very quickly with these particular people and that I accepted to mean that they should be eliminated.
ADV BOOYENS: Now after these two discussions Mr Van Zyl, what happened then, could you tell us how matters then developed in chronological order?
ADV POTGIETER: I am sorry to interrupt, who would have been these people referred to in respect of whom a plan had to be made?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Van Rensburg specifically mentioned Mr Goniwe's name and said that his hangers on and closest colleagues, that a plan should be made with them.
ADV POTGIETER: Did you know who these people were?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, at that stage we knew all the suspects and political activists in the Eastern Cape quite well, and I had a reasonable idea.
At that stage I had returned from a border duty in Ovamboland, not too long back and I was fairly aware of the activities in the Eastern Cape.
I would like to explain further. As a result of my conversation with Major Du Plessis at the time, I gave very intensive attention to these activities, specifically in respect of Mr Goniwe and the people whom he had contact with especially in the rural areas as well as in Port Elizabeth.
During this time, a considerable number of names of suspects or people came to the fore, it included the names of the four deceased and these names came from various parts of the Eastern Cape.
They were active in various parts of the Eastern Cape. In that time, I activated other members of the branch in a subtle way to be able to activate their sources so that I could obtain information in respect of the activities of these activists.
After having familiarised myself with the most effective of these activists, in other words, the activists who posed the biggest problems and threats for us in the sense that they were responsible according to our information, for the destabilisation and chaos in these areas, I spoke to Major Du Plessis again.
We actually had conversations on a daily basis. We then went back to Colonel Van Rensburg to notify him of our information, of our intelligence and of whom we regarded as the most prominent suspects, the most important suspects from our point of view.
ADV BOSMAN: I am sorry to interrupt you here. The members that you mentioned, you wanted to activate their sources and that they should look at Mr Goniwe and his sources, now these other people, who fell into the category of hangers on, assistants, Lieutenants, colleagues, are these the people that you were referring to that you had to investigate specifically?
MR VAN ZYL: Correct.
ADV BOSMAN: You told the Chairperson that names surfaced and that the names of the four deceased were among those names?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOSMAN: Were there also other names, other people?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOSMAN: So it wasn't only the four deceased, there were other names as well?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. Obviously, Port Elizabeth and the whole of the Eastern Cape contained many activists in the smaller towns and areas, there were also quite a few prominent people, so there were quite a few names.
CHAIRPERSON: I think the point to the question is, how many people falling into this category of hangers on, or colleagues, how many of these was a plan to be made with?
MR VAN ZYL: Chairperson, that was never specified. I would say now and perhaps at that time, the idea was that Mr Goniwe was the most important and that the activities closest to him would form the actual target group.
CHAIRPERSON: Now, would it have been four people in total or five or three or what was the case?
MR VAN ZYL: The position is that there were more people who had the same level of importance. It wasn't necessarily ever said that they all had to be eliminated.
CHAIRPERSON: What I want to know is this, as I understand your evidence, Mr Goniwe and his colleagues formed the target group. Now what I want to know is how many people was the actual target for this plan that had to be made?
MR VAN ZYL: That is what we had to ascertain with our investigations.
CHAIRPERSON: And as far as you were concerned, how many people were there potentially that a plan had to be made with?
MR VAN ZYL: Well, that will be very difficult to say.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you know at the time?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I don't think so.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Booyens?
ADV BOOYENS: Arising from the Chairperson's question, Mr Van Zyl, perhaps I should ask you this. You say that you intensified this investigation and certain names started surfacing?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: With the exception of the, with the exclusion of these four names, were there other names and if so, can you remember any of these names?
MR VAN ZYL: Chairperson, there were a number of suspects who were definitely responsible for the destabilisation in the area at that stage. The names which I can remember, perhaps it is unfair after such a long lapse of time, to try and mention them - we were always busy trying to canvass and recruit new informers and we were always discussing the possibility of recruiting new names.
Possibly some of the people weren't considered for elimination because they were informers or they were potential informers in future.
I actually can't remember the names very well.
ADV BOOYENS: But in any event, you then had a number of names, namely Goniwe and his so-called colleagues and hangers on?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: And amongst those names that you had, you also had the names of the deceased or some of the deceased, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: The four deceased's names yes, they were contained in that group.
CHAIRPERSON: I am assuming that there were more people than just the four deceased involved?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. Because what we were looking at was who was responsible for the destabilisation according to our information at the time.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, ...
ADV BOSMAN: I beg your pardon, just to be thorough, you say in paragraph 10 that you had pertinently asked Mr Taylor and Mr Lotz to assist you?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Goniwe's activities were established in the rural areas, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOSMAN: Cradock was a branch of Eastern Cape Security?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chair.
ADV BOSMAN: Were there any requests for information, Mr Goniwe was in Cradock, were there any requests made to Cradock, you spoke in general that others were subtly activated.
Were there any requests made to Cradock in relation to this?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, there were.
ADV BOSMAN: And the eventual group which you identified, was this compiled from information which was derived from all these sources, which was collected by your own people, by people from Cradock, by people who tapped phones, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Also from other Security sections or departments. Information which applied to us, was sent to our division from Colonel Van Rensburg's desk and then was added to our own information.
ADV BOOYENS: You have already stated that you were in liaison with Major Du Plessis. Eventually you reached a situation where in you had identified a group of persons, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: What happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: As I have said, we spoke again to Colonel Van Rensburg about the situation. He informed us that final permission to proceed with the elimination operation had been received from Colonel Snyman, who was the Commanding Officer.
Myself and Colonel Du Plessis, or the then Mr Du Plessis, went to Colonel Snyman's office where a submission was made to Colonel Snyman by Colonel Du Plessis about the situation. This was no news to Colonel Snyman but our biggest source of worry was in the branch at that stage, and he then stated that he agreed with us and I think his words were that we should do what would be in the best interest of the country.
ADV BOOYENS: Just to state it in all clarity. The submission which was made to Colonel Snyman by Major Du Plessis, was the submission based upon the fact that this was a group of persons who was working with Matthew Goniwe and that they were his co-hordes and that they should be considered for elimination?
MR VAN ZYL: I think that it was that some of them should be eliminated, yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Were these specific four identified individually as persons who should or can be eliminated or were there any more in the discussion with Mr Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: No, there were definitely more. Mr Du Plessis might remember who they were.
There were several activists who were mentioned.
ADV BOOYENS: Thank you. Colonel Snyman tells you that you should do what is in the best interest of the country, what happens then? How did you understand or interpret this when he told you to do what would be in the best interest of the country?
MR VAN ZYL: I understood it that it would be final approval for the procedure of the elimination.
We returned to Colonel Van Rensburg and informed him of this and we discussed the method or modus operandi of the operation with him.
ADV BOOYENS: Would you please tell us about that?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Van Rensburg proposed or gave order that the attack should appear as if it was a vigilante or AZAPO attack.
In other words we should use sharp objects to eliminate the individuals and that we should burn their bodies with petrol.
ADV BOOYENS: That would be the method that would be followed. Did you then begin to investigate the how component of the operation?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct. We felt that with our information that we had at our disposal, the best method would be to place them in a deserted road, they moved around a lot because of the activities, they were often travelling.
It would be impossible to eliminate them in a concealed fashion.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Zyl, whose plans were these? Was this the result of one person's innovation or was this an actual discussed plan? A plan discussed by a number of people?
MR VAN ZYL: It is difficult for me to say at this stage Chairperson. It could be that I proposed it, but it was discussed between myself and Mr Du Plessis and also with Lieutenant Taylor and Lotz.
They had a smaller share in the planning and the proposal so it actually came from myself and Mr Du Plessis.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Zyl, would it have been only one operation?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairperson, I cannot recall whether this was actually discussed whether it would only be one operation. I think that it is logical that we at that stage thought that we should first see what the effect of such an operation would be and the situation was so desperate that if the effect had been positive, it might not have been necessary to proceed further, but the facts of the matter was that at that stage we reasoned that the head of the destabilisation process should be chopped off, so to speak.
We were in no position to determine whether the rest of the activists were in any position to proceed with the activities with such intensity. So I cannot say for certain whether or not it was ever discussed.
ADV POTGIETER: When you were talking about this operation, who would have been the subject of the operation? Which persons had to be eliminated?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Matthew Goniwe was isolated as the most effective activist in the environment. He had a number of Lieutenants which co-operated with him or followed orders that he gave, and carried forth similar activities, some with more efficiency than others and in that manner, they were categorised.
ADV POTGIETER: But when you planned this operation, it was basically about Mr Goniwe, he was the subject of the planning?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV POTGIETER: You did not at that stage plan to eliminate anybody else with him?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, we did. We planned as I said, to eliminate the most important co-hordes we could implicate with him.
If we could only have eliminated Mr Goniwe, we would have done so, but I speak under correction.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Goniwe was actually the main figure, if I might put it that way, in the planning, thus when you first sat down to discuss and plan, the objective was actually to eliminate Mr Goniwe and the plan surrounded him?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV POTGIETER: And at that stage there weren't any other names which you wanted to eliminated immediately? You wanted to determine the effect of the first elimination and then determine what other steps had to be taken?
MR VAN ZYL: That is not entirely correct, from the time that Colonel Van Rensburg told me to go ahead with the investigation into such an operation, I think it was common issue that the most important activists should also be eliminated.
ADV POTGIETER: But the point is that you did not know that someone else would be accompanying Mr Goniwe at a certain place at a certain point in time?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Goniwe almost always travelled with certain co-hordes, such as Mr Calata and Mr Mkonto and sometimes I recall Madolla Jacobs was often in his company and others who were regarded as effective, and it was discussed that they would form part of the elimination.
ADV POTGIETER: So did you discuss that you would collectively eliminate them?
MR VAN ZYL: If the opportunity presented itself.
ADV POTGIETER: And if the opportunity did not present itself, would you simply eliminate Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: In that event, that would have happened Mr Chairperson.
ADV POTGIETER: So the chief objective was to eliminate Mr Goniwe, but if one encountered a situation where one could eliminate other prominent activists, would one do so?
MR VAN ZYL: Those who would be considered significant Mr Chairperson.
ADV POTGIETER: Thank you.
ADV BOOYENS: Just to go along with what Commissioner Potgieter has asked you, was there ever any talk during the discussion with Colonel Van Rensburg and the Commander and Du Plessis, was there any talk that Mr Goniwe was a single target or were there other targets as well?
MR VAN ZYL: I am trying to think Mr Chairperson. I think that the idea always existed that Mr Goniwe never was alone or acted alone as such.
ADV BOSMAN: That is the point. With that information, or the idea that he would never have been alone, who else would be murdered or killed along with him?
MR VAN ZYL: Those persons who moved the closest to him, who assisted him, who were his Lieutenants in other words, who enjoyed the same prioritisation as him.
If he would for example move along with someone who had nothing to do with politics, or nothing with the activities in the Eastern Cape, we would not even have considered the operation.
ADV BOSMAN: Thus, if these are the facts, there had to have been a list of people, listed in priority who should be eliminated?
MR VAN ZYL: There did not exist such a list.
ADV BOSMAN: Not a written list, but an idea - a general notion of who should be killed. Number 1 was Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOSMAN: And who were the others?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairperson, there were a number of suspects during that time in the Eastern Cape, who enjoyed discussion among us, whom we categorised as important enough that their elimination would actually stabilise the destabilisation, if I put it that way, I cannot recall the names.
ADV BOSMAN: Can you recall any names apart from Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: The three persons, then there was a Mr Mbolelo Goniwe, Mr Madolla Jacobs and several others whose names I can't recall.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Van Zyl, to formulate the question in another way, if there was someone that evening when the individuals were killed, if there was someone there whom you did not know, this is very speculative, but how would this have influenced the matter?
MR VAN ZYL: We certainly would not have continued with the operation.
ADV BOOYENS: And for the sake of clarity, to take it further back in terms of your answer to Commissioner Bosman's question, you say that there was not a list, but these other individuals, were their names ever mentioned to Colonel Snyman during the submission of Mr Du Plessis?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: And did the authorization of Colonel Snyman include these individuals as well?
MR VAN ZYL: One can accept it that way.
ADV BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I would appreciate it if on vital issues such as the last question, my learned friend should be careful not to lead the witness.
ADV BOOYENS: I think we were last at the point where you had begun planning the method of the operation. Your aim was to intercept the individuals on the road. The where and the when, could that have been included in the planning at that stage. We have the how, but now we need the date and the place?
At that stage, would that have been included in the planning or would that have happened on an ad hoc basis?
MR VAN ZYL: That would have occurred on an ad hoc basis if the opportunity presented itself.
ADV BOOYENS: So you have mentioned that the activities of these individuals had been monitored intensely in order to collect information regarding a proposed conference in Port Elizabeth. Could you expand?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairperson. Just before 27 June, information was received that a number of activists would be in Port Elizabeth.
This was confirmed on the day of 27 June that they were actually in Port Elizabeth for a conference or a meeting. It was a UDF meeting at Mr Swartz's home. The persons who were with Mr Goniwe were identified by means of informers during the day.
And I reported to Mr Du Plessis that that evening we would make an attempt or investigate the possibility of undertaking the operation.
ADV BOSMAN: Your initial planning, that would have been yourself and who else that would undertake the operation? Who are the people that you included?
MR VAN ZYL: Before the time Taylor and Lotz received orders that they would assist me in the operation, and they were supposed to prepare the day before and meet me that afternoon at five o'clock at the police station.
And Sergeant Faku was given instruction to assist me that evening, if I should need him. Shepard Shakati and Mokadeka would have to accompany him.
ADV BOOYENS: Can you just expand on the details regarding the commands issued to Taylor and Lotz?
MR VAN ZYL: I told them to prepare and that they should have an extra vehicle. That they should bring along knives and I think that is all.
ADV BOOYENS: Where would you have met them?
MR VAN ZYL: At the police station, five o'clock that afternoon.
ADV BOOYENS: At what time did you receive information that day?
MR VAN ZYL: During the morning Mr Chairperson.
ADV BOOYENS: Late morning?
MR VAN ZYL: Just before lunch.
ADV BOOYENS: And what time did you ask Lotz and Taylor to prepare?
MR VAN ZYL: Early that afternoon Your Honour. I can't recall the exact time. Taylor was involved with the collection of information and the identification of activists.
It could have been during his report back to me that I informed him.
ADV BOOYENS: In either case, during the course of the afternoon, you gave the command to meet at the police station five o'clock the afternoon. When you arrived, were they there Taylor and Lotz?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, we met one another there. I can't recall whether I arrived before them.
ADV BOOYENS: Okay, fine, you met there with two vehicles. What happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: We then travelled with the two vehicles in the direction of the Olifantshoek Pass. I drove with my vehicle and along the road, we found a suitable place where we stopped and parked the two vehicles off the road from where we could actually observe the road.
ADV BOOYENS: You are speaking of the Olifantshoek Pass, I don't think everybody is familiar with this area. Which road is this?
MR VAN ZYL: That is the road between Port Elizabeth and Cookhouse or Cradock.
ADV BOOYENS: Is that before Grahamstown?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. We have referred to it as the Grahamstown road.
ADV BOOYENS: Approximately at what time did you arrive at the Olifantshoek Pass?
MR VAN ZYL: Approximately 18h00, 18h30.
ADV BOOYENS: Was it winter at that stage, was it already dark or was it still light?
MR VAN ZYL: It was approximately twilight, dusk.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you know for which vehicle you should be looking out, the vehicle that the deceased would be travelling in?
MR VAN ZYL: We knew that they had travelled with Mr Goniwe's Honda Ballade with the CAT registration number.
ADV BOOYENS: What happened as you were waiting?
MR VAN ZYL: At approximately eleven o'clock that night, we saw the vehicle passing on the way to Cradock. We followed them.
ADV BOOYENS: Both vehicles?
MR VAN ZYL: With both vehicles. Lieutenant Taylor and Lotz drove in front of me, I drove behind them and after about eight or ten kilometres I told them by radio to overtake the vehicle and pull them off the road.
I parked behind the vehicle, they parked in front of it.
ADV BOOYENS: You said that they moved them off the road, how did they do this?
MR VAN ZYL: They used a blue light.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, geographically just for clarity, how far were you from Port Elizabeth if you had to take a guess?
MR VAN ZYL: I have not been in this area much, it was approximately 80 kilometres.
ADV BOOYENS: How far apart are Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown?
MR VAN ZYL: Approximately 130 kilometres.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, can we adjourn?
ADV BOOYENS: Yes, Mr Chairman.
COMMISSION ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION:
JOHAN MARTIN VAN ZYL: (still under oath)
EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: (cont)
Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Van Zyl, before the adjournment we had stopped at the point where the people had been pulled off the road by means of the flashing blue light. Please take it from there?
MR VAN ZYL: We then got them out of the vehicle, we asked them to get out of the vehicle and we handcuffed all four of them.
ADV BOOYENS: How did you cuff them?
MR VAN ZYL: By means of handcuffs with their hands behind their backs and we then loaded them into Lieutenant Taylor's vehicle and two of them into my vehicle and Sergeant Lotz then drove their vehicle and one activist also accompanied him.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, did you tell them anything when you stopped them?
MR VAN ZYL: I can't recall the exact words, but it was to the effect that we wanted to question them.
ADV BOOYENS: Did they know who you were?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You had had some dealings with some of them personally before, so they knew you?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: All of them?
MR VAN ZYL: No.
ADV BOOYENS: Who?
MR VAN ZYL: I had had dealings with Mr Goniwe personally and the other three, I knew from photographs and from my own observation.
ADV BOOYENS: So I am assuming that you are now in the vehicle, what happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: Sergeant Lotz then placed some CB number plates over the number plates on their vehicle, by means of a rubber band or something and we then drove back in the direction of Port Elizabeth.
ADV BOOYENS: Continue.
MR VAN ZYL: In the vicinity of St George beach, Blue Water Bay area, we then turned off onto a gravel road and drove in the direction of a wooded area along the coast.
ADV BOOYENS: Please give us an indication more or less how far is that from the central business area?
MR VAN ZYL: Approximately 10 to 15 kilometres.
ADV BOOYENS: So you drove into the bush, what happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: I instructed Lieutenant Taylor to guard the three activists and the one activist Mr Mkonto, we then put him in the back of my vehicle and the child proof lock was activated and the two of us then drove away from there.
My intention was to kill him some distance from there by means of a knife and that I would then thereafter kill each one of the activists in the same way.
ADV BOOYENS: Who is this we, you and Mr Mkonto?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. Mr Lotz and Mr Taylor stayed behind with the other three activists.
ADV BOOYENS: Yes?
MR VAN ZYL: I can't recall why I drove in the direction that I did along this path that I did, I suppose I wouldn't even be able to find it again, but I was driving slowly along a very bad little path or road and Mr Mkonto suddenly grabbed me from behind, around my neck and it was a total surprise because I was of the impression that his hands had been cuffed behind his back.
Although his hands were still handcuffed, he had managed to bring his hands to the front of his body.
ADV BOOYENS: How was this possible Mr Van Zyl?
MR VAN ZYL: I am assuming that he climbed through his handcuffs in a way, it is all I can imagine that happened.
CHAIRPERSON: He was still cuffed but his hands were now in front of his body?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, he had brought his hands to the front of his body in some way.
ADV BOOYENS: When you are saying that he actually climbed through these cuffs, I think I know what you mean, but perhaps you must try and clarify that for the benefit of the audience and the panel.
What do you actually mean when you say that somebody actually climbed through his handcuffs, when his hands are cuffed behind his back?
MR VAN ZYL: What I am trying to say is that he brought his hands through underneath his legs and his feet so that he could in that way have his hands in front of his body. I didn't actually see how it happened.
ADV BOOYENS: So you first became aware of this when he grabbed you from behind, grabbed you around the neck?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Yes?
MR VAN ZYL: He caught me in a very firm grip and I brought the car to a halt, I couldn't break free from this grip and there was a weapon at my feet, it was an unlicensed .22 weapon which I had brought with me from Rhodesia illegally a couple of years ago, it was in 1975.
I grabbed this gun, weapon and I hit him over my shoulder, try to hit him to try to get him to relax his grip. He didn't relax his grip, this all happened very quickly and almost instinctively.
I then shot one shot in his direction over my shoulder, I didn't know where the bullet actually hit him. He let go of me and I pushed my hands over his head and immediately jumped out, pulled open his door, grabbed him from the car, threw him down onto the ground and I immediately shot him in the back of his head.
It was an instinctive happening and I realised that I had jeopardised the operation by trying to take this person to an isolated spot all by myself.
Before I had taken this person away from that previous point, Lotz and I had gone somewhere to the Aldo Screbanti race course to burn the activists' vehicle.
We poured petrol onto it and then burnt it.
ADV BOOYENS: Please let's just clarity the chronological order here. This was after you arrived in the bush?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: At Blue Water Bay which you already mentioned?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You and Lotz then left with the vehicle?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: I am assuming with one police vehicle and the Honda?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, with my vehicle and the Honda. We left Taylor with the four activists.
ADV BOOYENS: Where did you go to burn this vehicle at the Also Screbanti race course?
MR VAN ZYL: Next to the road.
ADV BOOYENS: How did you do that?
MR VAN ZYL: We poured petrol over it and I think or I know that Lotz tampered with the petrol pipe or he cut if loose so that the petrol would flow out.
ADV BOOYENS: And the vehicle then burnt out?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, and we drove back to Taylor.
ADV BOOYENS: So this bit of evidence must actually be slotted in to the point before you left Lotz and Taylor with the activists and before you left with the one activist as you have just described?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: You say that you realised that you had jeopardised the whole operation by trying to do it by yourself, how so?
MR VAN ZYL: As a result of the fact that the vehicle had already been burnt out, we couldn't actually afford any one of them escaping, so the situation or the gravity of the situation then hit me and I realised that I wouldn't be able to carry it out all by myself.
I removed the handcuffs from the person. I then drove to the meeting point where Sergeant Faku, Mokadeka and one other person, I met these three persons and they were waiting in a ten seater bus for me.
ADV BOOYENS: Can you remember exactly where they were waiting for you?
MR VAN ZYL: No. It was at some rendezvous point which we had previously agreed upon. I had various places of rendezvous with them and I can't remember exactly where we met.
It wasn't too far away from the New Brighton police station because we then drove to the New Brighton police station where we parked their kombi. They got into my vehicle and I sketched the situation to them.
I explained the operation and the purpose of the operation to them and they then drove with me to the point where Mr Mkonto's body was.
I told Faku that we had to stab him with a knife. Mr Faku and the other two members then all took part in that. They all stabbed the corps using knives.
They then took petrol from my vehicle, it was in a petrol can, they poured it over the body and set it alight. From there we drove back to the point in the Blue Water Bay area where Lieutenant Taylor and Lotz were waiting with the other three activists.
ADV BOOYENS: I beg your pardon. I think you should perhaps just give us a little more detail as to what you told Mr Faku and his colleagues and what was their reaction?
MR VAN ZYL: When I met them?
ADV BOOYENS: Yes, when you met them at the rendezvous point?
MR VAN ZYL: I can't remember my exact words, but what it amounted to was that we had arrested or intercepted four activists and we intercepted them along the road and that on the instructions from up high, we were busy eliminating them and that I needed them to actually take part in the operation.
ADV BOOYENS: What was their reaction, were they loath to take part or not?
MR VAN ZYL: No, they were not loath to take part. Mr Faku was quite agreeable because in the past, he had been one of the black members who had actually proposed this because he felt and his words were that the black members of the branch and their families were on the receiving end of the activities of these people who had been emotionally swept up and that we weren't doing enough to actually protect these members and their families, so there was actually no opposition from their side.
At that point I actually felt that I could trust them.
ADV BOOYENS: Now, to fast forward a little bit. Faku and yourself and the two other men went back to where Mr Lotz and Mr Taylor were waiting, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. Myself and Faku and Mokadeka then loaded Mr Mhlauli into my car and took him to a point about a kilometre from there - near the coast, near the dunes.
We were driving in that wooded area and we then got Mhlauli to get out of the car. One of the black members then hit him with a rubber truncheon over the neck or on the neck or head and the two black members then stabbed him with knives whilst he was laying on the ground.
ADV BOOYENS: Where did this truncheon suddenly come from?
MR VAN ZYL: It was a police truncheon or baton. It was in my possession, I can't recall exactly where I got it.
ADV BOOYENS: No, what I am trying to ask is, the man who actually hit the deceased, where did he actually get the baton from, did you give it to him?
MR VAN ZYL: I can't recall whether I gave it to him or whether he took it from the vehicle.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Zyl, this Sergeant Faku and his two colleagues, were they members of the Security Police?
MR VAN ZYL: Sergeant Faku and Mokadeka were members of the Security Branch. Mr Shakati was a trained ANC guerilla who had been turned and who started working for us.
ADV POTGIETER: And they were willing participants in the whole operation?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Was it planned beforehand that he would be hit so that he would fall down on the ground and then stabbed, or what was the position?
MR VAN ZYL: I could have told Mr Faku that that was the plan at that stage, I can't recall when I told him that.
ADV BOOYENS: Now, after that had been done, what happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Faku told me that the person was dead and we then left the corps there and returned to where Mr Taylor and Mr Lotz were waiting with the other two activists.
ADV BOOYENS: Yes?
MR VAN ZYL: Sergeant Lotz and some of the black members then took one of the activists and they walked away from me with him.
When Lotz came back he reported to me that he had knocked the activist unconscious and that the black members then stabbed him to death.
Lieutenant Taylor then with the same black members, or some of the black members then, I can't recall who went along and who remained with me at the car, they then also walked to some point in the dark and Taylor made a similar report to me when he returned, namely that the activist had been knocked unconscious and that the black members then stabbed him and that they were both dead.
ADV BOOYENS: When the three remaining members or activists had been killed, what happened then?
MR VAN ZYL: I then gave the order that petrol contained in two petrol cans in my car, be poured over the corpses and that the three black members and myself would then return to the corps of Mr Mhlauli and also pour petrol over his body and then I would give a radio signal so that all three could be set alight at the same time.
The reason for this was that I knew that fire in that area might attract attention and that the time that we would spend on the scene after the fire was already visible, that we should actually limit this to the minimum and after that the members and myself, would then all go back to New Brighton, or the members would go to their homes and that we would meet each other later at the office.
I can recall that I told them not to forget to remove the handcuffs. The three black members and myself then went back to where Mr Mhlauli's corps was and I took petrol from the boot of my car, whilst Mr Faku and the other members removed the handcuffs from the body, from the corps.
CHAIRPERSON: Whose corps are you referring to?
MR VAN ZYL: It was mr Mhlauli's corpse. When Mr Faku took the petrol from me, they then told me that they could not get the cuffs off the body and that they had to remove his one hand to get the cuffs off.
CHAIRPERSON: You did not see this?
MR VAN ZYL: No, at that stage I was not close to the corps. They then poured petrol over the body and in a short radio broadcast to Taylor I told Taylor that they should set alight the other corpses and they did that and we then left.
ADV BOOYENS: They set the bodies alight?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes. Myself and the black policemen returned to New Brighton, this was early in the morning, but it wasn't light yet.
And then for the first time in the light of the parking area, I saw that there was blood on the seat of my car and I washed it off while I was there and then I returned to the office where I arrived at about seven and I reported to Mr Du Plessis that the operation was concluded and Mr Du Plessis and myself went to Captain Snyman's office and we reported to him that the operation was concluded. The four activists were dead.
ADV BOOYENS: So at the end of the day, there were six members of the Security Branch involved, is that correct/
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Do you know Eric Winter?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Was he also involved?
MR VAN ZYL: No, not with the operation itself. He was the branch Commanding Officer and he participated in the gathering of information of activists, but he was not aware what the objective of this was.
ADV BOOYENS: You also had insight in a testimony of a Van Jaarsveld mentioned in the middle of 1984 that him and another person of the Intelligence Agency Police Head Office was sent by Graig Williamson to come and look at the possibility of the elimination of Mr Goniwe, this was the previous year and that he reported to General Erasmus and a member of Koevoet, he assumes that it is you, and you drove with him to Cradock - do you remember this?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not remember this at all.
CHAIRPERSON: Is it possible that he was right?
MR VAN ZYL: I think it is a minimal chance that I drove with him. I cannot remember this, this was a long time ago.
I can just say that he confuses me with somebody else or he has his time wrong, but I cannot remember that I participated in such a planning or operation.
CHAIRPERSON: It may be so that you cannot remember this, but this does not mean that it did not happen, that is what I want to ascertain.
MR VAN ZYL: It could have happened, the chance of it happening is minimal, but there is a possibility, but I cannot remember this.
ADV BOOYENS: He says that he reported to the Commanding Officer Gerhard Erasmus.
MR VAN ZYL: If this is so that he reported to General Erasmus, this eliminates me because I only started working at Security Branch in Port Elizabeth in 1984 and his service period as Commanding Officer ended at the end of 1983. I have never worked under him.
So he is confusing myself or General Erasmus.
ADV BOOYENS: When you arrived here, was Colonel Snyman the Commanding Officer?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Just to paint a picture, when did you leave PE?
MR VAN ZYL: In 1986.
ADV BOOYENS: You also had insight into Mr De Kock's amnesty application, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Do you have an independent recollection of a discussion with Mr De Kock?
MR VAN ZYL: Not that I can remember, but it is possible. Myself and Mr De Kock were friends, we trusted each other and I do not remember the discussion itself, but it could have happened because we knew each other to an extent and we trusted each other to an extent.
ADV BOOYENS: You cannot remember the conversation, but as far as you are concerned as Mr De Kock states the facts and as you remember the facts, is this how this incident happened?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I don't have Mr De Kock's statement in front of me. I can remember seeing it, there are definite points that I think he is confused with.
If I have discussed it with him that he may have confused the conversation with that of other persons, but his version of our conversation is not just and the facts are not as he states it.
ADV BOOYENS: This is as far as you can take it because this is how much you can remember?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember the discussion itself.
ADV BOOYENS: If we can come back to the reason why you became involved in this incident, in other words your political motivation. You have already stated a political motivation on page 51 and 52 of your application, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, early in your application, you gave your personal background. Basically your history in border incidents and in shooting incidents, is this correct?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: As you see it yourself here today, you as Security policeman, take us back to 1985. You as Security policeman when you became involved in the murder of the four activists, what was your objective?
MR VAN ZYL: I agreed with the principle that the situation was so desperate that only desperate action could stabilise the situation, whether it be permanent or temporary.
But apparently no help came from political side that could render a solution to the situation at that stage. At that stage I did not like it, but I agreed that the elimination of certain activists were necessary.
But the foundation was laid down according to me, that violent revolutionary war is in the country and there was nothing being done by the political people.
ADV BOOYENS: On the other hand, you have already referred to a Commission's statement, if we can look at your own situation. Did you have any knowledge about any instructions to the stabilisation of the situation, did you have any knowledge of that?
MR VAN ZYL: The pressure was there and the pressure worked up to my level and lower, that legal activity was counter productive.
That lawful detentions would simply lead to an escalation of the violence and the violent crime at the time.
ADV BOOYENS: From previous testimony given by Colonel Snyman, he said that during the month of February he attended a meeting to put this short, he was in discussion with the then Minister of Order, this was Min Louis le Grange and he had told him that you should make a plan with these activists.
You have told us previously that between January and March you were in Ovamboland?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: Did you hear of this conversation?
MR VAN ZYL: I knew of this conversation, but I cannot remember when was this relayed to me, by whom or how, but I know of this conversation.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Van Zyl, what you have done, do you agree that this was in contradiction with the laws of the country, did you act on own initiative, did you receive instructions, was this an authorised operation, what is the position?
MR VAN ZYL: I knew strictly speaking that it was an illegal operation, but I knew and I felt that it was an authorised operation and that I could never be covered because it was not authorised, but it was decided on such level as an authorised operation, that I could and should continue with it.
ADV BOOYENS: I just want to touch on this lightly, and I am talking of personal knowledge, do you know of the involvement of any other persons or institutions with this operation, besides these that you named in your amnesty application?
MR VAN ZYL: No.
ADV BOOYENS: And you are not able to tell us what happened above Colonel Snyman, this is just what concerns you?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: It may be suggested that the Defence Force was involved with this operation, what is your reaction on this?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not have any knowledge of Defence Force involvement in this.
ADV BOOYENS: I want to talk about your operation, would you have been prepared to work with the Defence Force people on such a sensitive operation?
MR VAN ZYL: No, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Why not?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chair, the sensitivity and the delicacy of such an operation and the implications that it could have later, I do not want to attempt this with any one else and any Defence Force involvement in the operation, would entail that people would be involved that I did not have control over.
ADV BOOYENS: From the judgement of the post-mortem there was testimony of a roadblock which involved the Defence Force, do you have any knowledge of this?
MR VAN ZYL: There were no roadblocks.
ADV BOOYENS: A roadblock is the impromptu pulling off of people off the road?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BOOYENS: When you came back, were there any roadblocks?
MR VAN ZYL: No, there were no roadblocks.
ADV BOOYENS: If the Commission would just bear with me Mr Chairman. In so far as you have not done so, do you confirm the correctness of your application as supplemented by your evidence?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV BOOYENS
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Zyl, as I have understood your evidence it was important that you or Mr Goniwe in particular, that Mr Goniwe should be taken or removed from the community so that his influence on the community should not endanger the security of the country, is that how your evidence was?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, it wasn't only Mr Goniwe.
ADV POTGIETER: Yes, but him in particular?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, in my opinion he was probably the most prominent of the activists in the area. The other activists whom I had mentioned and the names I can't even recall, were mentioned in the same breath and they were also discussed, or the principle that they be eliminated, was also discussed.
CHAIRPERSON: Now you said that you had before this day, had contact with Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: How many times?
MR VAN ZYL: Once as far as I can recall.
CHAIRPERSON: Was he arrested on that occasion or did you bring him in for questioning?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I was in the office. Some member of the Security Branch had picked him up in the township and brought him to the Branch office.
I spoke to him for approximately half an hour and that was the first time that I had spoken to him.
CHAIRPERSON: What happened to him afterwards, was he released?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, he was released immediately. I can't recall what exactly we spoke about, I think it was regarding his activities, but I can't recall the detail.
CHAIRPERSON: The other three deceased, were they ever questioned or arrested or prosecuted in the courts?
MR VAN ZYL: Not as far as I am aware.
CHAIRPERSON: I am speaking now in the context of the security legislation.
MR VAN ZYL: That is possible, but I was also away from time to time, and I was also not stationed in Cradock, so I can't recall that.
CHAIRPERSON: But as far as you are concerned, there was no such occasion in respect of the other three deceased?
MR VAN ZYL: It is possible, but I can't recall it.
CHAIRPERSON: In those days there were a lot of very oppressive acts or pieces of legislation which could be used to remove people from their communities?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: The three other deceased, I am not talking about Mr Goniwe now, why was that option not exercised in respect of those three?
MR VAN ZYL: The matter was extensively discussed over a period of time and the general feeling at a more senior level than my own, was that detentions of activists, who had achieved that level of prominence, would at that stage, simply act in a counter productive way and it would lead to an escalation of the violence.
CHAIRPERSON: Even if they had been removed from the communities where they had influence?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, as a result of the mass reaction and the activities of remaining activists.
CHAIRPERSON: What did you think would happen if they were killed?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't know. I can't remember what I actually thought about it at that time.
CHAIRPERSON: Can't you recall now what the answer would have been and what you thought at that time?
MR VAN ZYL: I would have to speculate about what exactly I was thinking at the time.
CHAIRPERSON: Would there have been a difference in the reactions of the people whom he had influence over, that is now Mr Goniwe, if he had been arrested or killed, would there have been any difference?
MR VAN ZYL: At that stage that was what we thought. We were convinced that that was the case.
CHAIRPERSON: What exactly did you think?
MR VAN ZYL: We thought that if they were in detention, there might still be the occasional contact between them and the outside world.
CHAIRPERSON: And the only way to prevent that, was to kill them?
MR VAN ZYL: That was apparently the way that we thought at the time.
CHAIRPERSON: As they say, dead men tell no tales?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
DR TSOTSI: Did I understand you correctly to say that there were many activists who were due for elimination but that you didn't have a list of them? Is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: In principle, yes, Mr Chairman.
DR TSOTSI: How did you ensure that you would not eliminate the wrong people if you didn't have a list of them?
MR VAN ZYL: The members that were taking part in this operation, knew the majority of the activists Mr Chairman, and if an innocent person would have been in the vicinity of one of the targets, if I may call it that, the operation would not have been carried out or would have been aborted.
DR TSOTSI: I am talking about yourself, did you personally know these persons, these activists who were due for elimination or not?
MR VAN ZYL: I knew some of them as I said Mr Chairman, by sight, and some of them by photograph.
DR TSOTSI: Apart from Goniwe, did you know the other three men who were eliminated?
MR VAN ZYL: I had seen Mr Calata before in the presence of Mr Goniwe sir, and at that time I had seen pictures, photographs of Mr Mkonto and Mr Mhlauli.
DR TSOTSI: Would you say you knew them sufficiently to identify them?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, Mr Chairman.
DR TSOTSI: When you were chasing Mr Goniwe's car, did you know who was travelling with him?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, Mr Chairman, we had actually confirmed the names of all the activists at the meeting that day.
DR TSOTSI: I am not talking about the names, Mr Van Zyl, I am talking about your knowledge of the individuals, your personal knowledge of the individuals?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, Mr Chairman, we did.
DR TSOTSI: Did you know them personally?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, Mr Chairman.
DR TSOTSI: I saw that when you arrived at the spot where you stopped the car where you stopped, you didn't find it necessary to enquire who they were to identify themselves?
MR VAN ZYL: No Mr Chairman.
DR TSOTSI: You knew them so well, that you thought you can just go and kill them without necessarily identifying them because of your knowledge of them, is that right?
MR VAN ZYL: We would not have carried out the operation, if there was somebody with them that we did not know Mr Chairman.
DR TSOTSI: What would you have done, just suppose Mrs Goniwe was present in the car, what would you have done?
MR VAN ZYL: We might have taken them back to Port Elizabeth for questioning about the meeting and I would definitely have not gone forward with the operation.
DR TSOTSI: Let me leave it there.
ADV POTGIETER: Mr Van Zyl, is your application based upon the fact that you received instructions from Colonel Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: It was not based upon that. I am applying because I feel that the crimes in which I participated formed a part of the political struggle of that time.
Unfortunate as it was, it was nothing else but that and that is what I base it upon. The facts which I received from Colonel Van Rensburg and later Colonel Snyman personally, are part of that.
ADV POTGIETER: The point that I would like to achieve clarity on is that you say that the authorization for this behaviour or action, was the instruction that you received from Colonel Snyman?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Chairperson.
ADV POTGIETER: And what Colonel Snyman communicated to you after you had made a certain submission, was that you should do what would be in the best interest of the RSA?
MR VAN ZYL: There was no doubt what he meant about it, the submission was made by Colonel Du Plessis and it was about the elimination of a group of activists and Colonel Snyman concurred with this.
ADV POTGIETER: Why do you say that Colonel Snyman concurred with this?
MR VAN ZYL: He knew exactly what the submission was about and at several occasions before that, had discussed it.
ADV POTGIETER: However, upon what do you base this in reference to the agreement with Colonel Snyman, upon what do you base your testimony that Colonel Snyman agreed or concurred that you should kill these individuals?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Snyman was a soft-hearted person. I don't think he would ever have been able to get the words out where he would actually say that one should actually kill someone.
That was his manner of telling us that we should proceed with an operation.
ADV POTGIETER: That is the point which I have a problem with. The words which he used, could be incriminating and do you agree that the words do what is in the best interest of the RSA, the point that I am interested in is why did you say that this was an instruction to kill these people?
MR VAN ZYL: Because the submission was about that and if Colonel Snyman had wanted to stop us, and had wanted us not to do this, he would certainly have told us no.
He listened to the details, he had knowledge of everything that we had discussed over a number of meetings where the information had been discussed and there was absolutely no doubt about his interpretation of this.
ADV POTGIETER: Do you agree that Colonel Snyman did not expressly state that you should kill these individuals?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I do not agree with that. He did not state it expressly, but there was no doubt as to what the interpretation of his intentions would be.
ADV POTGIETER: That is the next step sir. It wasn't expressly stated that you should kill the individuals, but you interpreted this as permission to proceed and kill these persons, is that what you are saying?
MR VAN ZYL: That is how I interpreted it.
ADV POTGIETER: Just another aspect. Why did you stab or have the corps of Mr Mkonto stabbed with knives?
MR VAN ZYL: I think today, originally that is how it would have been done and things went wrong and I shot him.
The fact that he was also stabbed with knives, would represent the original intension.
ADV POTGIETER: The fact that he was shot through the back of the head with a weapon, would that not have eliminated that image?
MR VAN ZYL: In retrospect, yes, Mr Chairperson.
ADV POTGIETER: So it wasn't actually necessary to stab the corps with knives?
MR VAN ZYL: Well, naturally not, it wasn't necessary but nonetheless, I carried this out.
ADV POTGIETER: Thank you.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Van Zyl, just for the sake of clarity, could you please explain to us the exact line of authority, let us assume that Colonel Snyman did not intend to have the persons killed, where would the line of authority have halted?
MR VAN ZYL: Chairperson, from Colonel Snyman we went to Colonel Van Rensburg, and we reported to him that Colonel Snyman had authorised the operation, the operation thus to eliminate.
He was second in command of the division and Mr Du Plessis was in command of the division that dealt with black matters. So it went from Colonel Snyman, Colonel Van Rensburg, Colonel Du Plessis and then myself.
ADV BOSMAN: Can we once again just achieve clarity, if Colonel Snyman had not given instruction, from whom would the instruction have come?
MR VAN ZYL: We would not have been able to proceed with the operation, if he had not given authorization.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV BIZOS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Van Zyl, 63 stab wounds were inflicted on the four people you murdered on the night of the 27th, 1985.
Do you agree with the District Surgeon's report with that?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot disagree with that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Do you agree that the 63 stab wounds is evidence of barbaric conduct?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, in retrospect, absolutely. The fact is though that instruction was that this killing should look like a vigilante attack and that a more humane way of doing it, would not have had the same effect.
ADV BIZOS: Does your answer mean that you were prepared to behave like a savage barbarian in order to mislead anyone that bothered to investigate the murders that you had committed?
MR VAN ZYL: In effect yes, Mr Chairman. I thought at the time that I could do it and it turned out that I personally was not able to do it myself.
ADV BIZOS: What is it that makes an Officer such as yourself, able to command a Unit that inflicts 63 stab wounds, but you yourself want to have hands supposedly free of blood?
MR VAN ZYL: I never said that Mr Chairman. I said I was fully intentional to do the whole operation myself at the time, to try and protect the two younger members from the same act. It turned out in the end that I could not do that.
ADV BIZOS: You couldn't stab anybody?
MR VAN ZYL: I have never attempted it, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: But you could give orders to your black colleagues and supervise their inflicting 63 stab wounds, and you thought that that was better?
MR VAN ZYL: I did not think so. That is the way it happened sir.
ADV BIZOS: Now, let us take one by one what you knew about each one of the persons that you murdered.
Let's start with Mr Mhlauli. What was his occupation?
MR VAN ZYL: He was a teacher as far as I can recollect Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Of what rank?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Where did he teach?
MR VAN ZYL: In Oudtshoorn as far as I remember.
ADV BIZOS: What sort of school?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I cannot remember Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Do you know whether he was married?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, he was.
ADV BIZOS: Do you know whether he had any children?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Do you know where he was born?
MR VAN ZYL: No, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Do you know what he was doing in Cradock, or he may have been doing in Cradock in June 1985?
MR VAN ZYL: Over the time preceding this incident, he had regular visits and contact with Mr Goniwe, at various places in connection with the unrest at the time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: You have no personal knowledge of that, but let's - you agree that you have no personal knowledge of that?
MR VAN ZYL: Of course I have, his activities came to our notice months before that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: From whom?
MR VAN ZYL: From sources, both technical and people that gave information Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: What was he doing in Cradock according to your information in June 1985?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, the information that we were receiving was that he was briefing and being debriefed by Mr Goniwe on the situation in Oudtshoorn regarding the school and school boycotts and unrest.
ADV BIZOS: Was there a file on him?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot remember if there was a file on him Mr Chairman. He was a subject of the Security Branch of the South-Western District at the time.
ADV BIZOS: Did you get any written report from the South-Western Districts?
MR VAN ZYL: He was a subject of written reports, yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Were those put into a file?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, as far as I can recall, they were put in a file.
ADV BIZOS: Would the file have had a number?
MR VAN ZYL: The file would have had a number Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And would that have been known to Mr Eric Winter?
MR VAN ZYL: That is possible Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Wasn't Mr Eric Winter in charge of the mechanical means of spying on Mr Goniwe's home?
MR VAN ZYL: He was Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And would that all information relating to the activities of Mr Mhlauli in Cradock, would have been communicated to you presumably?
MR VAN ZYL: Communication between Mr Mhlauli and Mr Goniwe?
ADV BIZOS: Goniwe, which was picked up on the "tamatie" that there was in Mr Goniwe's home?
MR VAN ZYL: I would think so Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And that would have been put into a file?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And that file would have had a number?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And where would that file have been kept?
MR VAN ZYL: I would think that it would have been kept at Divisional Headquarters in Port Elizabeth Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And the number would have been known to Mr Eric Winter and also the people who typed the conversations that took place between Mr Goniwe and the others in his home or on the telephone?
MR VAN ZYL: If the interception was done in Cradock, yes Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And it was important for Mr Winter to have the file number, so that there would be coordination when the telephone transcripts were sent through in order that they should be pigeonholed into the various file numbers, not so?
MR VAN ZYL: That was done Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: That was done? And it must have happened in relation to Mr Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: I would presume so Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, and you remember actually, you had access to these files, did you not at the Divisional Headquarters in Port Elizabeth?
MR VAN ZYL: Access to what Mr Chairman?
ADV BIZOS: To the files?
MR VAN ZYL: To the files in Port Elizabeth, yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes? And do you remember whether there was a file for Mr Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't know if there was a personal file for Mr Mhlauli, but he was definitely mentioned in reports regarding the UDF and the Residents' Associations and they had different reference numbers.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Now ...
CHAIRPERSON: Excuse Mr Bizos. Mr Van Zyl, having taken that drastic decision that certain people ought to be eliminated, did you not bother to look and find out whether there was such a file available before carrying out what you had planned to do?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, it is a long time ago. I cannot remember who had personal files and who had suspect files, and who were mentioned from time to time without files actually being opened on them personally.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I am not asking whether you bothered to find out whether there was any information to gain by looking at whatever file, personal or otherwise?
MR VAN ZYL: As I said, I had insight in all the source files regarding meetings and communication between people and that was not necessarily everything in a personal file, because this person was a suspect of the Division of South-Western Districts.
We would not have necessarily kept a personal file of him in Port Elizabeth.
CHAIRPERSON: But is precisely the point, having decided on these drastic measures, would you not have thought it prudent to investigate the position of any of the proposed victims of the attack?
MR VAN ZYL: We were in possession of a background study of the person. I cannot remember whether it was in the form of a style of a file or what the communication was Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: For a number of months prior to June 1985, was there increased supervision and intelligence gathering in relation to Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And was every word that was spoken in his house or on the telephone recorded and communicated to the Divisional Headquarters in Port Elizabeth?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot say that, I would presume that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Now, if I were to put to you that in accordance with the evidence produced in the second inquest, where those transcripts were produced, the name of Mr Mhlauli nowhere appears mentioned at all, would you accept that from me for the time being?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, I would Mr Chairman, that is quite possible.
ADV BIZOS: Quite possible? So that we have a situation that although you say that there was the strict supervision of Mr Goniwe for a number of months prior to June 1985, Mr Mhlauli's name was never mentioned either in his house or on the telephone in a manner which would have attracted sufficient attention in the Security Police in Cradock to record his name?
MR VAN ZYL: That would pertain only to the technical coverage in his house and on his telephone of Mr Goniwe's.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Now, do you or did you know that Mr Goniwe and mr Mhlauli were personal friends from a young age?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I cannot recall that I knew that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Didn't anybody report to you that these were old pals and fellow teachers and colleagues?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall the information of that time fully, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And did you know that Mr Mhlauli, although he was the principal of the school in Oudtshoorn, was actually born in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't recall that, no Mr Chairman, it is a long time ago.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. And for how long was a - to use your own words - a hanger on of Mr Goniwe in Cradock before the 27th of June, for how long were they around according to the information supplied to you?
MR VAN ZYL: His name came up over a period of time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Answer the question please. According to the information placed before you, for how long before the 27th of June was Mr Mhlauli in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I don't know whether he was in Cradock at that time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Can you deny that the purpose of Mr Mhlauli's visit to Cradock, was nothing more than going back to his birthplace for the midyear school holidays?
MR VAN ZYL: That was not our information at the time Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, was it during the school holidays that you killed Mr Goniwe and Mr Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: It was at the end of June Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Was it during the school holidays?
MR VAN ZYL: It is possible Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Was Mrs Mhlauli with him in Cradock for at least a part of their stay in their maternal homes in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't recall that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did you bother to find out whether there was any connection between Mrs Mhlauli and Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: Not that I can remember Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Obviously you cannot deny that she too was born in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: It is very possible Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And that her family was there? Can you deny that?
MR VAN ZYL: Of course not, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And that Mr Mhlauli's family were there in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: I might have even known it at the time, but I cannot recall that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And Mr Mhlauli's misfortune was that he was a good driver and that Mr Goniwe didn't have a driver's licence, did you know that?
MR VAN ZYL: One of the other activists were actually driving the car Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, it may be that Mr Calata was driving the car because he was the other driver. But let us deal with the (indistinct) of the first question.
Did you know that Mr Goniwe did not have a driver's licence?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not recall that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Are you able to deny that the purpose for which he came, the purpose for which he came along was in order to assist with the driving?
MR VAN ZYL: That was not our information at all Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, first of all we have to believe you as to what your information was, secondly we would have to be satisfied that the people that gave you information, gave you the truth.
But be that as it may, did you know that Mrs Mhlauli, although she had come to Cradock, had left her husband in Cradock in order to come to Port Elizabeth for the purposes of attending a refresher course as a school teacher herself?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not recall that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: And that if your information was accurate or you bothered to find out, that an additional reason for Mr Mhlauli taking that fateful drive was that if there was time and if they had finished early enough, he may have tried to pick up his wife from Port Elizabeth and take her back to Cradock. None of that was reported to you?
MR VAN ZYL: No, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: If those facts turn out to be accepted as correct, would you agree that your information was miserably sparse and inaccurate?
MR VAN ZYL: About his family life, yes Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, and also for the purposes of why he was there. What sort of meeting was there in Port Elizabeth in Swartz' house?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall what was actually happening at the meeting, it was a UDF meeting Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Of what area?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall that now Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: It had nothing to do with the South-Western Districts and Oudtshoorn and where Mr Mhlauli came from. Did it?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Wasn't Mr Swartz' house bugged?
MR VAN ZYL: It is possible yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, don't give us possibilities. You were the architect of the execution of this plan. Was his house bugged or wasn't it?
MR VAN ZYL: Either his house or his telephone was bugged Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. In the wealth of information that you obtained from the bugging of Mr Goniwe's home, was Mhlauli's name ever mentioned or what interest he may have had in any executive meeting of the UDF in the Eastern Province?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall which information we got from technical means and which information we got from living sources Mr Chairman.
At the time I was relaying of the sources of the people on the Branch in Port Elizabeth.
ADV BIZOS: Of course I do not want to deal with the subject matter of your other applications for amnesty for other killings Mr Van Zyl, but I think I must deal with it only in so far as it is necessary as to how you and your fellow Security Policemen behaved in the early 1980's.
Let us deal with the Pebco 3. You were involved in that?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: How long before the Goniwe killings?
MR VAN ZYL: About six weeks, five weeks, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Who authorised those killings?
MR VAN ZYL: That was authorised from the Divisional Commander's office as well Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Were there only Port Elizabeth people involved?
MR VAN ZYL: No, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Where did the others come from that killed the Pebco 3?
MR VAN ZYL: The people involved in the actual killing were from Port Elizabeth. The abduction which was part of the operation, there was some assistance from the Vlakplaas Unit.
ADV BIZOS: At whose instance did they become involved?
MR VAN ZYL: I take it from the Divisional Commander's instance Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Would that have been Colonel Snyman, the soft-hearted one?
MR VAN ZYL: Colonel Snyman or Major Du Plessis at the time if I recall.
ADV BIZOS: The efficiency of the Pebco killings showed greater sophistication in that it was made as if they had disappeared and had gone to join Umkonto as part of the fabrication given out to the people of South Africa by you and your colleagues? Is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct.
ADV BIZOS: Was it intended that the killing of Goniwe and his associates, should be performed in a similar manner so that their bodies would not be identified and that the same fiction or "dekstorie" I think was the current expression at the time, given out that Goniwe and the other occupants of the car had disappeared and the Police were wrongly blamed for their disappearance and or death?
Wasn't that part of the plan?
MR VAN ZYL: No, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Well, let me take you through some of the details that emerged at the inquest.
You had a motor car, the Security Police had a motor car which had been deregistered, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't follow the meaning of being deregistered?
ADV BIZOS: That for the purposes of the municipal records, it couldn't be traced, the owner could not be traced?
MR VAN ZYL: Not that I know of in that sense Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Mr Goniwe's motor car had false number plates on it, taken from that car which the police were using and in respect of which, over a dozen parking tickets had been issued, don't you remember that?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes.
ADV BIZOS: Yes?
MR VAN ZYL: It is not to say that the car was deregistered. That set of number plates was used at the Branch Mr Chairman, and that is correct as you say, that the vehicle itself from time to time, different vehicles had different sets of number plates, if you could call it that.
ADV BIZOS: Those number plates that you put on Mr Goniwe's car, were number plates on the car when it was owned and used by a member of New Brighton and you put those on after the name had been erased. The vehicle with that registration number no longer existed as far as the records were concerned?
MR VAN ZYL: I don't recall the origin of the number plates.
ADV BIZOS: Well, wasn't it that the burnt out car should not be able to be identified as Mr Goniwe's car?
MR VAN ZYL: No, Mr Chairman. As I remember the purpose of the number plates was just to take the car from the point where we had actually intercepted and abducted the people, back to where we were going to burn it out.
That number plate was left on the scene due to miscommunication between myself and Sergeant Lotz.
ADV BIZOS: Well, perhaps in the interest of truth it was miscommunication which left the two false number plates on the car, but accidentally one of the true number plates of Mr Goniwe's car was dropped in the vicinity of the car?
MR VAN ZYL: The intention was not to mislead anybody after the burning out sir, it was just from the point where we actually picked them up, back so that the vehicle could not be seen during that time easily as a CAT vehicle, because that was a CB plate that you are talking about.
ADV BIZOS: Come to terms with my question. Had it not been for the accidental dropping of a loose number plate taken off Mr Goniwe's car, you had hoped that the Investigating Officer would not be able to identify his car, you had burnt the bodies for the purposes of not being recognised and it would make it as if vigilantes have killed people and it would be put down as one of the incidents of what you called black on black violence, wasn't that the plan?
MR VAN ZYL: Not fully as you described it, Mr Chairman, because the car's identification could have been picked up by the engine or the chassis numbers.
The burning of the bodies was not to conceal their identity at all. If it had been, I would have said so, because I am admitting what I did.
The burning of the bodies was unfortunately further part of this act to make it seem like a vigilante attack.
That was not my plan, that was what Colonel Van Rensburg told us to do. I did not like it, Major Du Plessis dit not like it at all, but I felt I just had to do it.
ADV BIZOS: And wasn't Major, General Krappies Engelbrecht, whatever his rank may have been in 1985, sent down to sweep the evidence clean and didn't he cause the parking tickets that were issued to the Police used vehicle with the number plates that had been attached on Mr Goniwe's car, away so that they would not be traced back to the Security Police?
MR VAN ZYL: I have no knowledge of that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Now, the Pebco 3 were not the first people that you killed and for which you ask for amnesty. Whom else had you killed for whom you are asking for amnesty?
MR VAN ZYL: I was involved in an elimination in 1979 or 1980 of a trained ANC cadre, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: The name?
MR VAN ZYL: His MK name was Scorpion as far as I can remember.
ADV BIZOS: Who else have you killed that you have asked for amnesty for?
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with all due respect isn't this really going outside the scope of this? As far as the Pebco 3 is concerned, the questions asked by my learned friend I could still see the relevance, but really my learned friend is now casting the net so wide, what is the purpose of these questions?
It cannot really effect, he is not applying for other murders in this application, he is applying for this murder. What is the relevance of these questions? I object, this is going too wide, quite frankly.
ADV BIZOS: May I try and justify the question? The witness is giving out that he was almost a reluctant participant in this and acting under orders of Snyman and Van Rensburg.
The questions that I am asking show that this was one of a number of known acts, I am not asking him about unknown acts.
ADV BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with respect, that is not the case. The witness, the reluctance he expressed was the reluctance for the method of killing.
CHAIRPERSON: If we can give Mr Bizos a chance to finish what he is saying.
ADV BOOYENS: My apologies to my colleague, sorry, I though he was finished.
ADV BIZOS: I was saying Mr Chairman, that the purpose was in order to show that this had happened on a number of occasions before, and that it was a manner in which people thought to be enemies of the State, were to be eliminated, and this was not the first time.
I accept that the Pebco 3 is nearer to the event and much more relevant, but I do not concede with respect that the other events are irrelevant. I want to assure my learned friend and the witness, that I am not going to enter upon the details upon that, I do not want this Committee to hear what happened, nor to prejudice the witness in any way in relation to other applications.
CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand you correctly Mr Bizos, it is merely an investigation to what you at least, perceive as reluctance?
ADV BIZOS: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Does that help you Mr Booyens?
ADV BOOYENS: Yes, except that the point that I was making is that the witness, his evidence was that he said he didn't like it, that was the fact that it was supposed to be made to look like a vigilante type killing, in other words killing by stabbing people with a knife.
I do not think it is fair to the witness to say that he was reluctant to take part in the operation. He all along said that he regarded the operation and the killing of these people, as essential.
The reluctance expressed by him was only in so far as the method was concerned Mr Chairman, that was his evidence really.
CHAIRPERSON: I am going to allow the question.
ADV BOOYENS: Certainly sir.
ADV BIZOS: What other killing in respect of which you have applied for amnesty, had you performed before 1985?
MR VAN ZYL: As I said Mr Chairman, the one in - I think it was 1980, where I was involved in the elimination of one person.
ADV BIZOS: And thereafter?
MR VAN ZYL: The Pebco 3 and the Cradock 4.
ADV BIZOS: Wasn't there an instance where you actually blew up the body with explosives?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, that was the very first instance that you were referring to now.
ADV BIZOS: We will leave it at that, I don't want to become involved in the others Mr Van Zyl.
What I want to ask you is what arises out of paragraph 2 on page 45 of ...
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, are you going to (indistinct) Can we take the lunch adjournment?
COMMISSION ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: Interpreter will you interpret the following for me to members of the public?
This process means a lot to many people, in particular it commemorates the lives of people who were respected in the community and it is a process that other people have resorted to come to terms with themselves.
And therefore this process needs to be respected. While I am not making a ruling, I would be thankful if people would remove their caps and sunglasses if they are not prescribed.
I thank you.
JOHAN MARTIN VAN ZYL: (still under oath)
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV BIZOS: (cont)
Thank you Mr Chairman. I said that I was going on to another topic, and would return or intended to return back to the question of Mr Mhlauli's position when we traced a couple of documents.
We traced them during the lunch hour and I want to return to them if I may.
I am making copies, we have asked for copies to be made, but they are short entries and we will hand them in as Exhibits. The whole record is available and there is an agreement that we will draw attention to those portions of the record, of which we will be making use and if they are sufficiently important, the documents will be handed in as Exhibits, so that they may be readily available to members of the Committee, Mr Chairman.
If any information was obtained in relation to Mr Mhlauli in Cradock, it would have been channelled by Mr Eric Winter to the Port Elizabeth Headquarters, would it not?
MR VAN ZYL: If the information was gleaned by his sources, whether technical or live, yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes.
MR VAN ZYL: If the information was gleaned from Port Elizabeth handlers on the Security Branch, handling sources in Cradock, it would have of course been dealt with directly.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Mr Koni was employed, was he not, as a Security Officer in Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: Who sir?
ADV BIZOS: Koni. He was an African Security Policeman whose job was apparently to listen to Mr Goniwe's conversations and all the activity that there was in the house picked up with the "tamatie". Do you remember that that was an instrument that conveyed information not through the telephone lines, but directly through a radio type of communication system?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not recall the name of that person that you mentioned, basically because I did not know all the members on the Branch.
ADV BIZOS: Very well. Well please accept from me, he gave evidence at the second inquest before Mr Justice Zietsman and he produced the transcripts that he made according to his evidence, and handed over to then Captain Eric Winter.
Just accept that for a moment. Now, could you please have a look at the first three pages of G9 in the Exhibit, we will hand in copies to the Committee.
If you look at the first three pages of G9, a document running to 58 consecutive pages and it may be possible that we will make reference to other portions of it in due course.
Have you got it Mr Van Zyl?
MR VAN ZYL: No, Mr Van Zyl. I have now.
ADV BIZOS: You see right in front, we might as well use this as an example of how the Security Police worked. Cradock CT/7/1721189/2/7/85 - Sergeant Koni.
Now that is a few days after the death of Mr Goniwe and his friends, do you accept that?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Right. WH11 - Technical, what does that mean?
MR VAN ZYL: It was the reference given to telephone interceptions Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Telephone interceptions, yes. Lee Bozelick (G/L) Organisation Legal Resources Centre (S7/17/21/189) - what does that mean?
MR VAN ZYL: The S7 is reference to that file which deals with Legal Resources Centre, and the G/L above that stands for no file "geen lêer".
ADV BIZOS: So that we can at least take it that what many people considered a perfectly lawful organisation like the Legal Resources Centre at which my colleagues and I now work, was a suspect organisation to the Security Police at the time and we had a number?
MR VAN ZYL: I would not say it was a suspect organisation sir, a lot of organisations had reference numbers. I did not decide on those, but not all of them were suspect organisations.
ADV BIZOS: Oh, I see, was that an alternative telephone directory for the organisations?
MR VAN ZYL: It was just a reference to the organisation.
ADV BIZOS: Oh, I see. Didn't have the telephone number, but the serial number? Be that as it may sir, liaison with Niameka Goniwe's wife and G/L, what does that stand for?
MR VAN ZYL: "Geen lêer", no file.
ADV BIZOS: No file? Above-mentioned source reports that Lee Bozelick reported from the Legal Resources Centre that in Cape Town Mr Goniwe was in connection - herewith in Security information from the discussion.
Now can we please go to the bottom of page 2? You see there Sparrow Mkonto, (OPV2950) - what does that mean?
MR VAN ZYL: That is his personal file - referring to his file at the Divisional Headquarters Security Branch, Port Elizabeth.
ADV BIZOS: And there is a number which is not very legible on the right hand side, what is that number sir?
MR VAN ZYL: That is his S4 number, refers to his personal number as Security Branch Headquarters, Pretoria, sir.
ADV BIZOS: Pretoria? Now, Sicelo Mhlauli - what does the absence of any numbers against his name mean?
MR VAN ZYL: It would mean Mr Chairman, that Mr Mhlauli had no personal file at Cradock at the Branch and that the Branch did not have the means at their disposal at the time, because they were using just an index system to ascertain whether he had a number at Security Branch Headquarters or at any other Branch.
ADV BIZOS: Can we assume that the person that was actually the ear of the informants, both technical informants in Cradock, didn't know of any Security number of Mr Sicelo Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: Yes, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes? Now if you have a look at the affidavit, may we hand in the first document, will you give it a number please Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Will that be Exhibit A. Mr Bizos, Exhibit A will consist of three pages?
ADV BIZOS: (Indistinct) which is part of the record and if my learned friends want any other portion brought to the Committee's attention, I am sure that they will do it, we would like to reserve the right to draw attention to any other portion of the document.
We don't want to burden this record unnecessarily, nor do we want that any time that you want to look everything up, that you should look to three cardboard boxes full of record and we thought that this was a way in which we could actually facilitate the proceedings.
CHAIRPERSON: I appreciate that Mr Bizos.
ADV BIZOS: Will you please look at the next document with A28 written in heavy marking pen?
An affidavit which was filed by the Head of the Security Police at Cradock and he says "I knew Matthew Goniwe personally quite well. I had knowledge of Fort Calata and Sparrow Mkonto. I did not know Sicelo Mhlauli at all". Do you accept that Major E.F.N. Winter made this affidavit for the purposes of the inquest into the death of Mr Goniwe and others and that is what he said about Mr Sicelo Mhlauli?
MR VAN ZYL: I accept that Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Will you put in this document as Exhibit B please Mr Chairman.
Now, Mr Van Zyl, I want to appeal to you and it may even anew to your advantage once the evidence is put before you, to tell a bit more of the truth that Mr Sicelo Mhlauli was killed because he had the misfortune to be in that car and if you killed anyone of the four, everyone had to be killed in order not to prejudice the secrecy of the operation?
MR VAN ZYL: That is not so Mr Chairman, Mr Mhlauli had come to our notice before this operation. He was discussed at our level and he was prioritised as was each of the other individuals.
ADV BIZOS: But you see the Committee will have to work on probabilities and not on your say so Mr Van Zyl.
Let's just place a few other facts on record and then ask you to comment on them.
Was Mr Winter in Port Elizabeth on the morning of the 27th shortly after it was heard on the telephone monitored by Mr Koni that they had left Cradock because there was some doubt, they were supposed to come down on the Wednesday and they changed to Thursday and you having fixed the plan to eliminate them, wanted certainty that they had actually left early in the morning of the 27th?
What I am asking you is this, was Mr Winter in Port Elizabeth at Security Police Headquarters or at Murder and Robbery Squad Headquarters on the morning of the 27th?
MR VAN ZYL: Not to my knowledge Mr Chairman. As a matter of fact Mr Winter called me by telephone the next day, from Cradock, telling me that they had not received any word from Mr Goniwe and company, that they had not reported back to Cradock and that they must be in PE because they had left for Port Elizabeth the previous day.
They at the time, didn't know where they were and they were calling around to find out where they were. He then called me to say that they must be in Port Elizabeth, reporting to me that they must be in Port Elizabeth.
I told him that I would make a note of that and that is as far as Mr Winter's knowledge of this matter is concerned. If he was in PE the previous day, I didn't know about it and it was not in connection with this operation sir.
CHAIRPERSON: What was the purpose of noting it?
MR VAN ZYL: I told him that I would note it.
CHAIRPERSON: Why?
MR VAN ZYL: Because it was not his business what had happened to them at the time and he was not party of it, it would have made him an accomplice and he was never part of it sir.
ADV BIZOS: Well, if what you are telling us consistent with Mr Winter saying on the morning of the 28th when it was reported to him by Mr Koni that Goniwe's car was found burnt out in the bush, that his immediate response was AZAPO must have gotten them?
Is that consistent with what you are telling us?
MR VAN ZYL: Well, firstly I do not know about this conversation between Mr Koni, or if it had actually taken place on the date that you say. I cannot comment whether it is consistent sir. All I know is that is what happened.
He called me quite early in the morning on the 28th, and I don't know when Mr Koni told him about this.
ADV BIZOS: The "dekstorie" was going to be, was it not, that AZAPO must have gotten them, that was going to be what you were going to give out for your self-defence?
MR VAN ZYL: That was part of it, yes Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: How would Eric Winter have known about that "dekstorie" unless he was party to this conspiracy to kill if in fact he did not participate in it as Mr De Kock says that he did, according to you?
MR VAN ZYL: He did not get that from me or from anybody else as far as I know, and as far as I am concerned, that was his own deduction Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Of course, if Mr De Kock is speaking the truth in his application, and he repeats it before the Committee and he is believed, that you reported that Winter was there, but as usual he was drunk, that would not square up with your evidence, would it?
MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall a conversation between myself and Mr De Kock, referring to this instance and referring to Mr Winter being drunk Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did Mr Winter have a drinking problem at that time?
MR VAN ZYL: I do not know if he had a drinking problem, at times he could drink quite heavily Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Did he have a drinking problem even whilst you were comrades in arms in Koevoet?
MR VAN ZYL: I did not consider it a drinking problem, Mr Chairman, but as I say he could drink or he was a heavier drinker than I was.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Zyl, was he a frequent heavy drinker?
MR VAN ZYL: No, I would say at occasions Mr Chairman, he could drink heavily.
CHAIRPERSON: How often would that be?
MR VAN ZYL: At special occasions, like maybe once a week or once every two weeks, if the teams were out of the field and were together in the canteen, which was there for the junior members especially for their use, it actually happened at the time.
ADV BIZOS: Of course, a person who is even occasionally drunk would be a danger to an operation as sensitive as the one you arranged?
MR VAN ZYL: He wasn't part of the operation Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: No, I am saying - what I am saying is the nature of the operation was such that admitting to a person who got drunk from time to time, would endanger the secrecy of the operation?
MR VAN ZYL: Mr Chairman, I received instructions from General Van Rensburg here and Major Du Plessis - what I want to say is that Major Winter was my senior in this matter, he was a Major at the time, I was still a Captain.
It was put to me that I had to put together a team to do this operation. There was no way that I could pick Mr Winter to form part of this operation to work under me.
ADV BIZOS: I am going to suggest to you that Mr De Kock is telling the truth, Mr Koni told the truth in the inquest, despite certain unsatisfactory features found by the Judge in his evidence at the time when the Judge did not know that the Security Police had done the killings.
That Major Winter was there and that the reason why you and your co-applicants do not put him on the spot is because he is, he was shown to be an absolutely hopeless witness before Judge Zietsman and because of his drinking problem, you and your colleagues excluded him from these proceedings because you could not trust him to sustain a plausible story?
MR VAN ZYL: That is absolutely not true Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Not true?
MR VAN ZYL: I would not have included Mr Winter in my team if he was my junior, because I thought the team that I had put together was sufficient.
ADV BIZOS: Well, we have heard that Cradock was the "brandpunt" of the Eastern Province. How could you leave out the man in charge of Cradock when you made a plan to kill Goniwe and any one that may have been associated with him, particularly if they were from Cradock, without Eric Winter being there to say hi, this person doesn't deserve to die, he is not such a bad man or woman in Cradock. He may even have gone as far as to say that he or she was an informer or a potential informer.
How could you have left a so vital person out of this murderous group?
MR VAN ZYL: I did not regard him as vital at all Mr Chairman. He only started working in Cradock at the beginning of that year and I did not think that he knew his suspects sufficiently at the time any way, so he wasn't as vital as you would like to put it.
ADV BIZOS: He would surely know more about a comparatively smaller place like Cradock than you?
MR VAN ZYL: Definitely Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: 240 Kilometres away and responsible for a much larger area?
MR VAN ZYL: Definitely more than me, particularly sir, but there were members at the Branch at Port Elizabeth, whom I regarded very highly in collection and (indistinct) of information.
ADV BIZOS: Who?
MR VAN ZYL: The two members that I took with me, I thought were absolutely sufficient in this regard. They also helped in the gleaning of information as did every other member of the Branch in the preceding weeks.
ADV BIZOS: Is that Lotz and Taylor?
MR VAN ZYL: Taylor.
ADV BIZOS: Well, let's deal with that. They would also have had geographical difficulty between Port Elizabeth and Cradock?
MR VAN ZYL: No, Mr Chairman, we went to Cradock on a very regular basis. It is two hours' drive away. I can remember that Lotz in particular did regular stints of investigation in the Cradock area.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. Now, you knew this question of Mr Goniwe, particularly well. You were ceased with a problem and you were deputed by Van Rensburg and Du Plessis to put the plan together.
And in your application you say that this was three weeks before the 27th, is that correct?
MR VAN ZYL: That is correct Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Now, you know precisely three weeks earlier, a very important event occurred in relation to the fate of Mr Goniwe and his associates, do you know about that?
What happened at or about the time that Mr Van Rensburg told you that a plan had to be made about Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: Are you asking me if I know about what you are referring to sir?
ADV BIZOS: No, did you know about any important event that took, which may have had a result in relation to the fate of Mr Goniwe?
MR VAN ZYL: Not that I can recall of Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: You cannot recall off hand? Do you recall that it became generally known much later, that on the 7th of June, that is precisely three weeks prior to the murders, a signal was sent by General Van der Westhuizen to General Van Rensburg at the SSVR, that is the Secretariat of the Security Council in relation to Mr Goniwe, Mr Calata and Mr Goniwe's brother.
Mr Chairman, this signal appears in many places, but it is also to be found in the judgement which is in your file. I am just trying to find the page. It is on page 101 of the documents before you.
We will read this portion of His Lordship, Mr Justice Zietsman's judgement and reference to the signal. The signal marked priority and strictly confidential purports to be a signal sent from the EP GBS to the Secretariat of the State Security Council. What was the EP GBS?
MR VAN ZYL: It refers to the Eastern Province Joint Management Centre, Mr Chairman.
ADV BIZOS: Yes. The Joint Management Centre, yes. It reads as follows: "To General Van Rensburg. 1. Telephone conversation General Van Rensburg/Brigadier Van der Westhuizen on 7 June 1985 refers - names as follows: Matthew Goniwe, Mbolelo Goniwe brother or cousin of above-mentioned, Fort Calata. It is suggested that the above-mentioned persons should be permanently removed from the community as a matter of urgency. Wide reaction can be expected locally as well as nationally because of the importance of these persons, specifically the first mentioned for the enemy for example (a) interdict as recently as the disappearance of Godolozi, Hashe and Galela, Pebco Office bearers, (b) reaction of left politicians like Molly Blackburn, (c) protest as example of Oscar Mpeta in sympathy.
Would you mind interpreting that for us sir, what does it mean? What does this mean to you?
MR VAN ZYL: It is obviously a signal that we have all read about in the newspaper since then sir.
ADV BIZOS: Yes, I know but leave out the newspapers for the moment, the question is what does it mean to you?
MR VAN ZYL: That the GBS or the author of this signal was sending a message recommending the permanent removal of the mentioned persons in this communication sir.
ADV BIZOS: What did permanent removal mean?
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