NICOLAAS JAKOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (sworn states)

MR BOOYENS: The witness' application appears on page 20 of the record, Mr Chairman. Mr Van Rensburg - Mr Chairman, just before dealing with this, there is just a formal aspect, although I do not know whether it is strictly speaking necessary, but in paragraph 9(a)(1) I would just ask for an amendment to add to abduction and killing of the four mentioned persons, and any other offence of delict arising from that.

I do this ex abundanti because I do not really think it is necessary. My impression is if you get amnesty, you get amnesty irrespective, but I know in some instances some of your colleagues have said, was of the view that one should actually specify it wider than it has been specified in this.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you are asking for an amendment to include any other possible crime that may flow out of the same action?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, well, crime or delict.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Van Rensburg, in front of you you have your application for amnesty, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm what is stated on page 20?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I confirm it.

MR BOOYENS: Page 21? Is it correct, do you confirm that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And page 22, to where paragraph 9 starts, do you confirm that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, the acts for which you are applying for amnesty, that includes murder is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I can't hear?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I see on the top paragraph on page 22, you allege that you had never at any stage acted for your own personal gain or with any mala fide motives. What exactly do you mean by that? Especially the mala fide part?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That I didn't commit the acts with any criminal intent or objective. I did it because at that stage I believed it was in the interests of the country and the State.

CHAIRPERSON: How can murder be a bona fide act?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, it can never be bona fide, but I am saying that there was a reason for acting in such a way. In my view there can never by any justification, legal justification for what I did. If there was, I wouldn't be sitting here today, but I did it based on the very firm convictions which I had at the time.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, just in fact if the Committee would be so kind to look at Section 20(2)(b), that any offence must be committed with bona fide, so this is as opposed to mala fide.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it as a result of that Section?

MR BOOYENS: I beg your pardon Mr Van Rensburg. In paragraph 9 it says that during 1984, what happened in that period, I will come back to this, but I would just like to deal with this provisionally, I am dealing here with pages 22, 23, 24 and 25 as far as the paragraph which starts with the words "Major Du Plessis", do you confirm all of that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I do.

MR BOOYENS: At this stage you were second in command of the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Please describe your functions and duties very briefly?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: My function was about 80 percent administrative and virtually all correspondence or post, came to my desk. Depending on the contents of the correspondence, I would then decide where to channel that particular correspondence or letters for further attention.

Documents or correspondence which I thought was of importance to the Commanding Officer, I would refer it to him first and he could then issue further issues based on that. Orders which went further than the orders which I could have given.

I also sometimes wrote instructions or orders on the documents for the attention of the particular Section Commander, or I perhaps penned a question to him, something that required clarification.

Some of the reports which went from PE to Security Headquarters in Pretoria or any other section anywhere else in the country, I would check these as far as the content was concerned, and I would decide whether that would also first have to go to the Commanding Officer before it was sent, so that he could possibly comment on it.

That was in the main my task, the distribution of information and receipt thereof. And the taking of certain decisions in respect of that.

MR BOOYENS: So, by virtue of that you had quite a broad overview of what was going on because I am assuming that before you could make any decisions, you would have to make the documents?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Correct.

MR BOOYENS: So you had a broad overview of the local security situation in Port Elizabeth and vicinity and over the provincial security situation, in the region as a whole and also to some extent you had an overview of the national security situation, because all this documentation came to your desk?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And your knowledge also enabled you to make a reasonable evaluation of people and organisations and threats that they posed, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, broadly speaking.

MR BOOYENS: Your Security Police experience at that stage had gone as far back as 1968?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: That is when you started in the Durban Security Branch?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: During the 1980's, and I want you to specifically testify on this point because the members of this panel have perhaps not heard this particular evidence so it is important that we deal with it, during the 1980's there was a system which devolved from the State Security Council which is known as the Joint Management System or Centre, the so-called JMC, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Die State Security Council was based on the legislation but the State Security Council, I think Mr Bizos also referred to that, the SCR consisted of virtually all members of the National Cabinet and certain departmental heads, senior Defence Force Officers and other important officials, State officials, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Now this was devolved down to a local JMC, which actually would have been a provincial JMC? I am not talking about provincial in the sense of the whole of the Cape Province, but provincial in the sense of the Eastern Cape or Natal or that kind of situation, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I don't want to split hairs on that, but my recollection of it is that Eastern Province Division, the Police Division was a sub-JMC and border was also a sub-JMC, and once or twice a month these two would meet as a JMC.

I may be wrong, but that is more or less how I can remember it. Maybe Eastern Province had its own JMC, I can't recall exactly.

MR BOOYENS: One can understand that, it is a long time ago. Let's just talk about the EP JMC, whether it is a sub-JMC or not, I don't think anything turns on that.

Now, the JMC normally functioned under the Chairmanship of the local Commanding Officer of the Defence Force, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And at the JMC there were representatives from the Police, which included the Security Branch and several other important or interested parties from State departments?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: In this respect one thinks of departments such as Education, several State departments which have an interest in the governing of the country?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Were there also some sub-Committees of the JMC who acted in a more specialised way?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: In this respect, was there a JIC, Joint Intelligence Centre?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: There was a JOC, Joint Operational Centre?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: There was "Veikom", Security Committee?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And there were also a number of other committees, I don't think it is necessary to list them all. These committees or meetings of the committees were attended by heads of certain departments, sometimes there were different permutations of people who would attend these meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you on occasion also attend these meetings when the Commanding Officer wasn't present?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: These smaller committees, I have for instance referred to the JOC, the Joint Operational Centre, JOC, representatives on that committee - did that include the non-uniform people, I am talking about the Police and Defence Force?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, not normally.

MR BOOYENS: So some of these sub-committees only consisted of the uniform Police or Defence Force?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: So apart from the JMC meetings to be attended, there were also some of these joint sub-committees that had to be attended?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Van Rensburg, during the period that Colonel Harold Snyman was the Commanding Officer, that is from 1984 onwards, he in his capacity as Security Branch Commander, did he attend the JMC meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Did you sometimes attend with him or if he wasn't available, did you attend on his behalf?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: When he wasn't available, yes.

MR BOOYENS: The Chairmanship of the JMC in the Eastern Province at that time - that resorted under the Defence Force, the Commanding Officer of the Defence Force or the command in the Eastern Province?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, as far as I can recall.

MR BOOYENS: Colonel Snyman, did he attend any of these other meetings of these other committees?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Colonel Snyman when attending these meetings, did he give any feedback to you as members, did he give you any feedback as to what happened?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, he did sometimes. Sometimes he didn't.

MR BOOYENS: Let us bring the matter a bit closer to home. The security situation in the Eastern Cape as far as you were personally aware in 1984, 1985, what exactly was it like?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I would say that the security situation in the Eastern Province was in a very bad way. There were areas where there was absolutely no law and order.

There were areas that were known as liberated zones. There were places where alternative structures had been established to supplant the legal governmental structures.

And there were necklace murders. People had been actually driven out of the townships. The policemen and here I am specifically referring to black policemen at the time, some of them had also been driven out of their communities and they had to find homes elsewhere.

Some of them had to live in tents for long periods of time. So undoubtedly in my opinion and in the opinions of other people at the time, there was a revolutionary onslaught or conflict and activities, these were the order of the day during this period in the province, or in certain parts any way.

MR BOOYENS: This revolutionary battle that was being waged, I think it is common knowledge that it was waged by the so-called liberation movements?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And drawing on your knowledge and experience of security matters, was it so that the purpose and objective of the liberation movements was to overthrow the government and to supplant it with another government?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: As far as the methods were concerned, as far as you knew, were the methods used always of a peaceful nature or was there sometimes violence?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, there was definitely use made of violence at times.

MR BOOYENS: The violence begot further violence. There would be cases of arson, riots, unrest and there would be shooting incidents between the Police and the communities, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: The task of the Security Police in this context, what was your task?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: We had to gather information and intelligence regarding the activities of the activists and persons who were busy orchestrating the violence or inciting it or fermenting it as well as the organisations within which this took place.

MR BOOYENS: Once you had gathered the information, very wide powers were granted to the Security Police under the then existing legislation to prosecute people, to place them under banning orders and restriction orders, detain them without trial, there were many different methods?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Correct.

MR BOOYENS: You have already mentioned the fact that there were alternative structures established. Were there certain areas where the normal governmental functions had ceased to exist? I am here referring to for instance police patrols and that kind of thing, did it collapse?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, especially in respect of normal policing duties, there were certain areas that were only accessible by means of armed vehicles, such as Caspirs and at times obstructions were placed and ditches made in certain areas, so that even those armed vehicles had problems to enter certain areas.

MR BOOYENS: The Bobby on the Beat, to call it that, that simply disappeared, it was no longer there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not at all. That is so, not in the black areas.

MR BOOYENS: When we refer to normal policing, we are talking about your ordinary Detective, uniformed Detective who would go and investigate housebreaking and things like that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Or simply to do crime prevention patrol?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: It was your task as the Security Forces to gather this intelligence?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Reference has already been made to the alternative structures and so on that had been established in certain places.

Now, according to your information, who were the architects and who advocated these alternative structures?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The information which came to my notice was that Mr Matthew Goniwe had been instrumental in the establishment of alternative structures and his plan was known as the so-called G-Plan.

MR BOOYENS: The G-Plan, was that primarily aimed at the rural areas?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I wouldn't say only in the rural areas, but here definitely yes - in some of our rural areas.

MR BOOYENS: During this period, there were certain rural areas that found themselves in the situation as you have already sketched?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Obviously these structures led to the Security Forces having to give more and more urgent attention to that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Based on what Colonel Snyman informed you, was there from the JMC side, and when I talk about the JMC, the JMC with all its sub-committees, did the JMC also attend to these matters?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You said that Snyman sometimes gave you feedback, let us draw the focus closer to the current situation. In respect of the security situation in the Eastern Cape generally, in respect of the implementation of the G-Plan and so-called alternative structures, what kind of feedback did you receive if any from Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That more attention should be given to obtaining more information as far as who the ring leaders where, who were the people directly responsible for this.

MR BOOYENS: Is that what you referred to if you look at page 24 - you say that as a result of this, there was increased activities and consultation and liaison between the JMC and the Security Branch?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You talk about a data base that was then established and that from this emerged a more complete picture as to the ring leaders and the people responsible for the situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Van Rensburg, the situation in Cradock specifically, as far as that is concerned, were you aware that there was a meeting in February 1985 which was attended by the Minister of Law and Order, Minister Louis le Grange? Barend du Plessis was at that stage the Minister of Black Education and there was a Morrison who was also the local MEC or MP for Cradock, Johan Coetzee the Commissioner of Police and a couple of other interested parties?

And Colonel Snyman was also told to attend the meeting?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I can recall such a meeting. The people that you have now mentioned, but I can't recall them all, can't remember whether I knew that they were present, maybe I had forgotten some of their names. I can recall that the Minister was there, that is Minister le Grange, or I was told that Minister le Grange was there.

MR BOOYENS: Told to you by whom?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: By Colonel Snyman.

MR BOOYENS: After Colonel Snyman attended this meeting, did he give you any feedback as to a private conversation he had with le Grange?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct. He gave me that feedback.

MR BOOYENS: To you? Please tell the Commission what Mr Snyman told you in essence about that conversation.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Snyman told me that he had a private conversation with Minister le Grange and that le Grange had told him that the situation in the Eastern Province needed attention and should be addressed.

He wanted to know why these people weren't being prosecuted, what the problem was and why people responsible for the violence, could not be brought to court.

Mr Snyman apparently answered that lawful actions simply had no effect any longer, and that witnesses was simply not obtainable as a result of the intimidation and that the other options such as detention etc, were no longer effective because it simply led to an escalation in the violence.

MR BOOYENS: We are talking about restriction orders, detention with trial, bannings, etc?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What else did he say?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, he told me that Minister le Grange told him that well, then you should make some other drastic plan.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall whether he told you what le Grange's exact words were?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I can't remember exactly but what it amounted to was that some other drastic plan should be made to counter the problem posed by the activists, to neutralise them.

MR BOOYENS: To neutralise or something to that effect?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You and Mr Snyman talked about this, what was Mr Snyman's conclusion as to what the Minister had actually told him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Snyman told me he had gained the impression or it was clear to him that the Minister had meant to say that we should actually get rid of these people in an unlawful way.

MR BOOYENS: In other words eliminate them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Now, what were your inferences as to that conversation, did you agree with that conclusion of his?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: This was in February 1985?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I assume it was that time.

MR BOOYENS: Let's come back to the pressure from the JMC - what happened after this? What kind of feedback did you receive from Mr Snyman?

Let's talk in general. The relationship between you and the Defence Force, was it a tugging of war who did not do his work? The Army told you you didn't do your work and the reverse?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, this happened.

MR BOOYENS: And on the JMC, what was the feedback that Colonel Snyman gave you about the attitude of the Defence Force in that situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, he told me sometimes that when he came from such a meeting, that the Security Branch received a slap on the wrist because of our inability to deal with these violence situation and the alternative structure situation.

MR BOOYENS: In other words, to let the violence situation cool down?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall - you heard Mr Van Zyl's evidence, that round about the 6th, 7th of June you called him in and you gave him an order.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Tell the Commission what led to this?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was where Colonel Snyman returned from a JMC meeting and mentioned to me that there was in discussion with the Defence Force in the JMC that the Security Branch was being put under pressure and it was said that the Security Police are unable to stabilise the position.

And that during the discussions it was said by Army personnel that the only manner to save the situation, was to eliminate the hooligans amongst the activists.

MR BOOYENS: What did Colonel Snyman tell you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: He said he cannot see any other solution and he asked me if I could speak to Mr Van Zyl and Colonel Du Plessis about the possibility of elimination of Goniwe and his hangers on, or his Lieutenants around him.

MR BOOYENS: The name of Mr Goniwe was specifically mentioned? At that stage it was his name and his co-warts that was named?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: How did you interpret what Colonel Snyman told you? Was it an instruction that you should look at it, or what was the situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, definitely it was an instruction.

MR BOOYENS: You have told us already that at that stage, you were up to date with the security situation in the Eastern Cape.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you continue Mr Van Rensburg, how many times before this incident, before this discussion with Snyman, was Goniwe arrested?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, it is a long time ago and I could be wrong, but I imagine, I just remember once. But if somebody tells me that there was more, I couldn't argue this point.

I am not sure. I know he was detained once from April 1984 to approximately September 1984, he was detained for sixth months. I cannot remember any other incident where he was detained. I cannot say that my memory is so good that I can remember everything.

MR BOOYENS: The Chairperson asked you about the arrest of Goniwe. Do you remember whether he was picked up for questioning and then let go again?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: This is possible. I just cannot remember a specific incident where I can remember it, it is possible.

MR BOOYENS: It seems from the Judge Zietsman's judgement that during approximately March and April there was a request from you that under the provisions of the Security Act, he should be picked up again and detained?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot remember this specifically, but I won't argue the point.

MR BOOYENS: Just to explain briefly. Detention without trial, is not something you could decide on?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You had to motivate this and it had to be authorised by the Minister?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Just to continue, you said you received the instruction from Mr Snyman. Relevant at this stage, it is something that my learned colleague Mr Bizos pointed out to us, it seems that at this stage there was a signal from Defence Force that concerned Mr Goniwe and some other names, I cannot remember them, this was put to Mr Van Zyl?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I heard this.

MR BOOYENS: Do you know of this Defence Force signal?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, not at all.

MR BOOYENS: With the type of operation that followed this, would you and the soldiers have worked together with such a type of operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't think so.

MR BOOYENS: There was not good cooperation between the two Forces?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: On certain levels there was good cooperation, but maybe when I look back now, there was somewhat professional jealousy amongst us.

But I think in this field, we had much more information than them.

MR BOOYENS: Colonel Snyman gave you a directive that you had to look at the elimination of these people, what was your personal feeling?

CHAIRPERSON: What were his actual words, the directive?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: He told me that I should speak to Mr Du Plessis and Mr Van Zyl that they looked at the possibility to look at Goniwe and his co-warts or the people who were responsible for this revolutionary onslaught, violence - to eliminate them in a manner that would not point the finger at the Security Police.

MR BOOYENS: I know you can only talk about the impression you got, was this the impression that came from Mr Snyman, did you form any impression over where this came from?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I got the impression that he received this instruction from elsewhere, because at that time I believed that he would not act on his own and give these instructions.

And because of what he told me about his discussion with Mr le Grange and the Defence Force personnel at the JMC, I got the impression that he got it from higher up.

MR BOOYENS: I think you have mentioned previously that the discussion between the two of you was just after he came from a meeting?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What I just asked you earlier, you personally told us that you had a broad insight to the security situation at ground level, not that you were a field worker, but you have seen all the reports. Is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Van Rensburg, what was your feeling, your personal feeling when Colonel Snyman gave you this instruction in respect to the necessity of such a directive? Did you agree, did you differ?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I agreed.

MR BOOYENS: Explain to the Commission why?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I agreed on the condition that the right persons were identified, and at that time I agreed because in my opinion this country was in an inexplicable war situation.

People died all over, on both sides. Both sides were involved in illegal activities. We killed each other. We did not act according to the rules on both sides. Legal acts was in my opinion just not sufficient enough.

There were continuous attacks on police stations and on members and their houses. Structures collapsed and I believed that by doing this, this revolutionary violent onslaught against the State could be stopped.

MR BOOYENS: And to bring it closer to home, concerning this application - you have spoken broadly, can you just come back to what you have said now specifically. What role of Mr Goniwe and the people who were active with him, did they also fall into this category?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, definitely.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, tell me you talk about a directive and what you did and at the same time you say you agreed with what was meant.

In this light, this directive, does it matter?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it does matter.

CHAIRPERSON: How so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, it matters that an authorised instruction as I saw it.

CHAIRPERSON: If you were willing to participate in these murders, how does the fact that there was a directive, affect it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Probably not in the doing, but in the context I don't believe that I felt at that stage that I could give such authorization myself.

MR BOOYENS: Would you have taken the steps to initiate this operation without having received this instruction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I wouldn't have.

MR BOOYENS: So, you said you did not have a - and you agreed that - let me put it in another way, it is something that we asked Mr Van Zyl - if the information that you had in your possession was that the people who were identified as targets, were totally innocent or that they were to be killed because of another motive that had nothing to do with the safety of the State, would you have had anything to do in this process?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BOOYENS: So you say in this context that you did not have any problem with this directive and you agreed to it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: After the discussion between yourself and Colonel Snyman, what happened then?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The same day I went to Mr Du Plessis but he was not available and I called in Mr Van Zyl, and informed him of what Colonel Snyman's instruction was.

MR BOOYENS: Just to get a clear picture, Mr Du Plessis was then in command of the black situation and he had the rank of Major?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, Mr Du Plessis I think he was a Major or Lieutenant Colonel.

MR BOOYENS: And Mr Van Zyl?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think he was a Captain.

MR BOOYENS: Both of them were junior in rank in relation to you, were you a Lieutenant Colonel or a full Colonel?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think I was a Lieutenant Colonel.

MR BOOYENS: I see you became a full Colonel in 1986?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What did you tell Mr Van Zyl?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I told Mr Van Zyl what Mr Snyman told me. I told him that Colonel Snyman expressed his opinion that the only way to save the situation, was the elimination of Goniwe and his immediate ring leaders who moved with him.

And that Colonel Snyman requested the possibility to do this was to be investigated and the right persons had to be identified who acted with Goniwe.

And also that we should not act before it was discussed with Colonel Snyman.

MR BOOYENS: It was your order that they didn't have to do anything?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, this was his instruction.

MR BOOYENS: Now, did you discuss this matter later with Mr Du Plessis, why was he brought into the picture?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Because he was the Head of that unit in which Mr Van Zyl was and he was Mr Van Zyl's senior.

MR BOOYENS: You give the order and did Van Zyl indicate that he would carry out the instruction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: If we can just take what happened in the meantime. During this stage, let me put it to you as such, at some stage him and Du Plessis came back to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Was there also liaison between yourself and Mr Du Plessis and or yourself and Van Zyl and or between all three of you to identify the final members?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, there was.

MR BOOYENS: Tell us about this.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was mostly that they acknowledged to me that Mr Goniwe travelled a lot in this division.

That he usually met with people like Mr Mkonto and Mr Calata and sometimes others or that others travelled with him, and visited other places with him.

They acknowledged that certain persons were important persons who were part of Goniwe's activities, and helped realise his objectives and that they felt it was possible to intercept them without being seen and to eliminate them.

MR BOOYENS: You have mentioned, that is feedback while the investigation was ongoing?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Eventually did they come with a final decision or let's call it a final group of persons, did they come back to you with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Can you remember this group, how many people were in this group?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The people I can remember was Mr Fort Calata, Mr Goniwe, Mr Mkonto and then they had a cousin or a brother of Mr Goniwe, and there was Mr Jacobs and then they spoke about a man from Oudtshoorn - afterwards we knew it was Mr Mhlawuli.

I would guess it was about seven or eight in total.

MR BOOYENS: Did you receive feedback why in their opinion these persons qualified as cohorts of Mr Goniwe?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes. They told me that these persons were responsible especially in the rural area of the Eastern Province, for the unrest and the collapse of the council's or the local management level law system, that was replaced in some places by people's courts. Policing was not possible by the driving out of police members and they caused that normal flow of the government could not continue.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, when you get to a convenient stage?

MR BOOYENS: I was actually going to suggest that this might be Mr Chairman.

ON RESUMPTION:

NICOLAAS JAKOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.u.o)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: (cont)

Mr Van Rensburg, just before we adjourned to a man from Oudtshoorn, can you expand on that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The information that was given to me with regard to Mr Mhlawuli, is that he was a person from Oudtshoorn and that he sometimes was seen with Mr Goniwe and others in Cradock among other places, and that he had played a pivotal role in Oudtshoorn with regard to organisations similar, youth organisations and community organisations and alternative structure organisations, which he would have established and maintained in Oudtshoorn in order to increase or elevate the revolutionary climate in Oudtshoorn to such a degree that it would transgress to an ungovernable situation.

MR BOOYENS: Can you remember - would you like to add something?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was also communicated to me that he apparently would also recruit some youths for training in other countries.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall whether they possessed certain documents or papers, that is Mr Van Zyl and Mr Du Plessis?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I cannot remember that. It was communicated to me by Mr Du Plessis. I cannot recall which documentation they had.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Van Rensburg, at this stage when they approached you with the final group, what did you tell them to do?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I told them that they should go to Colonel Snyman for his authorization, for his further instructions.

MR BOOYENS: And you did not accompany them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not.

MR BOOYENS: Did they return to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: What did they tell you, anything about Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: They told me that Colonel Snyman had approved an operation whereby Mr Goniwe and some of his cohorts would be eliminated.

MR BOOYENS: Did you engage in further discussion regarding - now it is about the how, the when and the where?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: If you would refer to page 27, at the top. You state here that you engaged in discussion with the two and this concerned the modus operandi of the operation. Can you tell us what was said and what occurred?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, the modus operandi which would be used, was discussed. The modus operandi regarding the execution of the instructions, that the Security Police could not be pointed out.

My opinion was that it should be considered that the operation appear as a robbery or a vigilante attack.

MR BOOYENS: You also state the AZAPO UDF situation in your statement, what is that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: At that stage, there was conflict between the AZAPO group and the UDF group which had already led to bloodshed in the black townships of that time in Port Elizabeth.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you think would happen if the operation was a success and the people believed in the situation that you created, that Mr Goniwe and his colleagues were killed by an opposing organisation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, I cannot imagine that we actually considered that. The objective was to divert it away from us.

CHAIRPERSON: But the point is that some of the problems which you considered, were the attacks in the areas where there was unrest.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So these murders or would these murders not have aggravated the situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It could possibly have done so.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't the probability that it would have worsened if the people thought that it was an opposing organisation who carried out these activities?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It is probable.

MR BOOYENS: Was it considered at that stage?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, it was not.

MR BOOYENS: And did it play any kind of role in your discussions, in other words did you want the situation to escalate?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, we did not want that. If I recall correctly, the other group, the AZAPO group was by far the minority at that stage, that is my recollection.

MR BOOYENS: So, the planning was undertaken regarding how the operation would be executed and the where and when would have to be a reaction to information received, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall whether you again had contact with them or received any kind of communication with regard to the specific planning for the time and place of the operation?

I beg your pardon, that is a weak question. Did you know beforehand whether they would carry out the operation on the 27th of June?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not know that.

MR BOOYENS: When did you hear of that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The following morning.

MR BOOYENS: From whom?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Colonel Snyman and Mr Van Zyl came to tell me that the operation had been executed.

MR BOOYENS: Did they give any particulars regarding who was killed and so forth?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, they told me who had been killed.

MR BOOYENS: Did they mention the names of the four deceased?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Just for clarity sake, I understood that there were more people who were identified in this group?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: This took place in June, and is it correct that during July it was a partial state of emergency that was happening in the Eastern Cape?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I can remember something like that?

MR BOOYENS: In so far as your knowledge reaches, was anything or was any action taken to eliminate any other members of the initial group?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, there was not.

MR BOOYENS: You discuss the political objectives and motivations on page 28 of your application?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm everything that is stated in the application?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I confirm this.

MR BOOYENS: If you would return to page 26. The situation as sketched by you in the second paragraph that Major Du Plessis and Captain Van Zyl approached you and that they approached Colonel Snyman after that, is that how you remember the situation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes. I provided a broader basis of what occurred. My legal counsel said that I would have to provide oral testimony at a later stage where I would provide full details of the events.

MR BOOYENS: So your summary as contained in the second paragraph on page 26 is not entirely complete, is that so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Would the Commission grant me a moment? That is the testimony, thank you very much.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: General Van Rensburg, you told the Committee that Colonel Snyman would not have done this unless it was ordered from above?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is how I believe it.

MR BIZOS: Can I take it that you yourself would not have taken part in this unless orders came from above?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: At the time that Mr Snyman told you that Goniwe and his colleagues were to be killed, an order from above, did you ask Colonel Snyman who gave him the order?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Colonel Snyman did not tell me that he received orders from above. I made the assumption and I did not ask Colonel Snyman who had issued the orders.

MR BIZOS: Now, you see I can understand that he would not have told you the names at the time, but from your knowledge of Colonel Snyman and the sort of person that he is and the way that he behaved, you assumed that somebody had told him. I can understand that at the time, you would not have wanted to ask him the name because I assume like all highly illegal activity, the rule of need to know applied. Would you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I would agree.

MR BIZOS: But now, General I want to ask you this. The time of the need to know has passed us, hasn't it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And we are now at a stage where we have to in the interests of these proceedings and general reconciliation and for the success of your own application, to be completely open and not protect anyone, would you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I agree.

MR BIZOS: Now, at the time that you were preparing your applications, and Colonel Snyman is a co-applicant, did you ask him who were the Army people that said that these, what is the word you used, I have it here, these gangsters or words to that effect, should be killed? I will find the word used by the interpreter.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I think it could have been cohorts.

MR BIZOS: Cohorts, yes, Goniwe and his cohorts. I think that another word was used, but it doesn't matter.

Whilst you were preparing these applications, surely you would have gone to Colonel Snyman and say Harold, we are at the end of the road, we've got to make public admissions that our children and grandchildren have got to hear, let's tell the whole truth, who was it that told you.

Did you go and ask him that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, after I decided to apply for amnesty for these murders, I went to my legal counsel and we prepared a preliminary application.

I then went to Colonel Snyman and I informed him of my intent to apply for amnesty. At that stage, Colonel Snyman did not wish to discuss the matter with me. It was clear to me that he had not yet reconciled the matter with himself to apply for amnesty and he would not discuss it with me at all.

I later was notified through my legal counsel that Colonel Snyman had also applied for amnesty. I initially on a very recent date, heard or saw what his application involved.

MR BIZOS: You have the same Attorney, the same counsel?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: You have a common interest in the outcome of these proceedings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Do you realise how important it is for the purposes of full disclosure, that Colonel Snyman and you should not keep anything back?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: When you knew all that and you had the same Attorney and the same counsel, did you go back to Mr Snyman and say it is in the interest of all of us that the identity of the Army people that said at the GBS that Goniwe and his cohorts must be killed, and the person that gave you the order to do this, should become known, did you do that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not do this. As I have already stated I went to see him and he read my preliminary application.

I asked him if there was any commentary or anything that he wished to add and at that stage he did not wish to discuss it with me at all.

MR BIZOS: Did he specifically say that he did not want to discuss it with you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you ask him why?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, it was a difficult situation. The man wouldn't speak to me regarding the matter and I felt that I was unwelcome at that stage.

MR BIZOS: Your applications for amnesty have consecutive numbers, they were handed in at the same time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, that may be so but I do not know how my legal counsel handled this. I can only say what happened.

MR BIZOS: Counsel usually do what their clients ask them to do General Van Rensburg, but of your own in order to satisfy your own conscience, in order to come to terms with the full truth, why didn't you ask Mr Snyman from whom did these orders come?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I did not ask him that.

MR BIZOS: The question is didn't you want to know?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would probably want to know. It could help us all with this application.

MR BIZOS: I would have thought that you would have visited him because we hear he is not well. Did you visit him recently?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not.

MR BIZOS: Wouldn't that have been a collegial duty to do, one senior officer to the other when one of them has become apparently terminally ill?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, the information that I have is that the family of Mr Snyman requested that we respect their privacy and on the basis of that and his condition, I felt that at this stage I should not visit him.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, if that is the case, and we all understand how important it was to find out who it was that was actually responsible for this order, didn't you ask your Attorney to ask Snyman if he would not be prepared to disclose the name of the person who issued the order?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't.

CHAIRPERSON: But it is the same Attorney?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is so.

CHAIRPERSON: And it is important to know who this person is?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It is important sir, but I didn't do it Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Why not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, I feel that if Mr Snyman wishes to come forward and disclose the names, that would be what I would want.

But I did visit him and the impression that I received was that he didn't wish to speak to me regarding the matter, and the choice now lies with him whether he would like to disclose who the person was.

CHAIRPERSON: But if your Attorney had asked him, he wouldn't necessarily be discussing it with you? It appears as if the Attorney would have been welcome there?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, he must have an opinion on that.

CHAIRPERSON: In either event, you didn't do so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I wish to make known an application at this stage, that I would ask and I suppose our learned friend's consent is necessary and I hope will be forthcoming, we may have to look at the statute in order to see the perimeters of the powers of the Commission if we do not get the cooperation, but I believe that this fact is of such vital importance in relation to these applications, that I am going to ask Mr Chairman, that this witness' evidence should be interrupted by calling Mr Snyman to come and tell us just that.

I do not intend subjecting him to a lengthy cross-examination as I am sure that no one else would want to subject him to any lengthy questioning if his state of health does not permit it, but Mr Chairman, I would suggest that we be given permission to employ a Doctor from a panel of two or three practising here in Port Elizabeth at our request, in cooperation with the Doctor attending to Mr Snyman, to visit him, to determine whether he is in a condition to come to the Committee for a short period and if not, what steps ought to be taken in order that alternative arrangements should be made for the Committee to obtain this vital information from him.

It is so vital Mr Chairman, however ill he may be and however inconvenient it may be for Colonel Snyman in his unfortunate condition, from the point of view of his health, I believe that this is a matter in which this is a vital piece of information that should not be lost Mr Chairman, in the interests of truth and justice.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, I want to suggest that the parties get together to determine two things.

(1), whether there is agreement that the evidence of the present witness can be interrupted and -

(2) whether an agreement can be obtained to secure the presence or otherwise of Mr Snyman.

If the parties cannot agree on it, then the Committee will have to make the ruling on the issue.

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman, I am in your hands as to whether I proceed now or whether we take a short adjournment.

CHAIRPERSON: I am going to suggest we take a short adjournment to facilitate ...

MR BIZOS: Because there are a number of Doctors on standby, one of whom will have to interrupt his or her practice and I understand that Mr Snyman is not in Port Elizabeth, but in Uitenhage, which is not very far away, but nevertheless it will be an interruption.

The sooner we know, the sooner we know, the better.

CHAIRPERSON: I am going to suggest that you take the next 15 to 20 minutes to see if we can get an agreement. If not, then maybe you can come see me.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I think speaking for myself, I think my Attorney's difficulty in this is that he will have to take instructions. We haven't got the client here to take instructions from him in this regard.

I think the 15 to 20 minutes may be a bit short, I don't know. May I suggest that we see what we can sort out and then...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, the client that you are referring to is in fact an applicant here, isn't he?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: He has then made himself open to giving evidence, isn't it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not necessarily Mr Chairman. As I understand the Act, any person who is an applicant has got the option whether he wants to give evidence, he is not obliged.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us adjourn - you people can discuss it in an attempt to come to some kind of agreement.

MR BOOYENS: No, we will certainly try to come to some type of agreement.

ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: I have been informed by the relevant representatives that attempts are going to be made to secure the attendance of one of the applicants.

I am informed further that he is extremely ill and certain logistical issues need to be attended to. In the circumstances I am going to adjourn his hearing, so as to give them an opportunity to put this into operation and we will reconvene at half past nine tomorrow morning. Thank you.

ON RESUMPTION ON 26-02-1998:

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, just before my learned friend starts, I think it should come from my side because I've got the first hand information, we took an early adjournment yesterday to ascertain what the situation is with the applicant, Colonel Snyman.

We have succeeded in speaking to one of the Specialists who is treating him, as well as his General Practitioner. We set out the proposals to the General Practitioner inter alia the possibility that evidence in this sort of a Commission like situation can be taken. The General Practitioner then said that he would revert to us and he spoke to two other Specialists who were involved also in the treatment of Mr Snyman, his diagnosis and exploratory operation done on him and the sum total and I am not suggesting that I am putting it in the correct medical terms, the sum total of what we have been told boils down to the following, that his condition of health is so bad at the moment that to subject him to any sort of stressful situation, can cause the disease that he is suffering from, to get more virulent and probably - there is a reasonable possibility that he could accelerate, or decrease his life expectancy.

According to the Doctors we have spoken to, their medical advice is that he should not be subjected to any stressful situation. We have spoken to Snyman, he is very weak, but we have spoken to him as well, and he has indicated that he intends following the advice of his medical personnel.

We have invited my learned friend to, in arrangement with Snyman's own Doctor, arrangements that can be made through the Attorneys, to have Mr Snyman examined if they feel they want to do so on a time that is mutually convenient to all parties. The Doctors would obviously have to arrange, we are not going to be present at a medical examination.

So the situation at this stage is that my learned friend and I then spoke to each other yesterday afternoon, and we were in fact advised this morning that they are considering the possibility of doing that tomorrow morning. That is so far as the situation was yesterday.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, we have made attempts to obtain the services of a duly qualified medical practitioner to visit Mr Snyman. Arrangements have been made I understand for it to take place at eight o'clock tomorrow morning.

I would suggest that we leave the matter over until we have had a report from the medical practitioner of our clients' choice and we proceed today with the examination of the witness that is now being examined.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't suppose we've got much choice in the circumstances, so let us proceed on the basis you suggest.

MR BIZOS: I may indicate that we are also in the process of examining alternative solutions such as for instance a statement being taken from Mr Snyman. The information that we are seeking is important and I do not believe that we should lose it because it is absolutely vital to this whole process.

We are not unmindful, nor lacking in consideration for his health, but on the other hand, we will make if agreement is not reached, specific proposals if we are advised by our own medical practitioner that it would be unwise for him to come here, we will make specific proposals to get the information which we consider to be vital, even if he does not attend the hearing.

NICOLAAS JAKOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (s.u.o)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

Mr Van Rensburg, you told us that as Mr Snyman's deputy from time to time, you attended the meetings of the Joint Management Centre. I will refer to the Afrikaans abbreviation GBS throughout my - is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: There were not only plenary sessions of GBS, there were also sub-committees of GBS to deal with different aspects?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Was there a special committee from which the Department of Education and the SABC and other representatives which did not emanate from the security apparatus, were excluded, were there such meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, there were.

MR BIZOS: What was the name of that sub-committee?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That was the JIC, the Joint Information Centre.

MR BIZOS: And did you attend any of those meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I did.

MR BIZOS: Who were represented at these meetings, the Information Centre meetings?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: As far as I can recall it was only the Police and when I say the Police I think it was only the Security Branch and the Defence Force.

MR BIZOS: And on vital questions of security, it was this sub-committee of the GBS that really had the serious discussions and the serious decisions were made?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes. You are correct. I can't recall serious or important decisions taken as such. I suppose one could say there were decisions but these decisions were then referred to Pretoria.

How can I put it, these were proposals.

MR BIZOS: Proposals?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: The proposals from this Information Centre would go through to Pretoria for their information and their advice and direction in relation to what may happen later?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Bizos, may I just come in here for a second please. May I just interrupt you for a moment?

MR BIZOS: Yes, of course.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you. Mr Van Rensburg, this information or intelligence proposal emanating from the JIC, did you get any feedback lower down the chain of command in the PE Security Branch?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If instructions were received from above, yes, then feedback would be given.

ADV BOSMAN: I am not talking about instructions. I am talking about the whole import of what was discussed at these meetings, was that communicated lower down the levels or was it privileged information?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was reported lower down the levels where it was relevant. If a particular section of the Security Police or some other component of the Police, if they had to attend to a particular matter, then it would be reported to them.

CHAIRPERSON: What about policy Mr Van Rensburg? The policy emanating from the JIC, was that conveyed to the people below you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Chairman, I can't say that policy was formulated there as such. The Police had its own policy and at these meetings certain information was discussed and what the problems were at that time and possible solutions to these problems, and that was reported back to Pretoria and Pretoria from time to time gave their feedback as to how they saw the matter and perhaps they also gave instructions in regard to certain matters.

The men lower down, the footsoldiers, did not receive all the information which was discussed there at that level. What was important and relevant to them, was given to them, but not everything.

MR BIZOS: The question of how to put an end to the unrest and the unsatisfactorily security situation, would this be discussed in the JMC or in the Information sub-committee or both?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, the problems surrounding for instance school boycotts and the like, that would have been dealt with by the person representing that government department or he would have been present as well.

The JIC concentrated more specifically on how to actually stop the rioting and the unrest on the ground, in other words the physical unrest situation, how to deal with that.

MR BIZOS: Let us just take a concrete example. Your evidence was that Colonel Snyman reported that there was discussion at the JMC in which the Defence Force people in the JMC put the Security Police under pressure and suggested that the Security Police were unable to stabilise the position. Do you recall that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, would that have been a discussion at the JMC or the JIC?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: Where would it have been suggested that the Army personnel only appeared to be able to possibly eliminate the hooligans amongst them, where would that discussion have taken place?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know about that.

MR BIZOS: This is what you said.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't recall that.

MR BIZOS: The record will speak for itself, but I ...

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Perhaps I am misunderstanding you, I am not quite sure.

MR BIZOS: Well, let me repeat the effect of it. The effect of it was that the Army personnel at this meeting suggested that because of the inability of the Security Police to eliminate the "trawante", if you don't like the word hooligans, the word hooligans was used by the interpreter and it made an impression on me, but don't let's argue about words, where would that have been discussed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: My recollection of that is that Mr Snyman told me that that took place during private discussions of the Force.

MR BIZOS: With members of the Force?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Not at a meeting?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: Now, who were the members of the Force in JMC? Who were the regular people that attended the JMC meetings who came from the Defence Force?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The people that I can remember were Brigadier van der Westhuizen, there was a person Van Aswegen was his surname, and Du Plessis.

MR BIZOS: Let us just take that in a little more detail. The top Army man was Brigadier van der Westhuizen?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: He was the Chairman of the JMC?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Correct.

MR BIZOS: And one would have expected him as Chairman, to yield influence at least on the other members of the Army that may have been present at any given time, at the JMC or the sub-committee relating to information?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is true.

MR BIZOS: When Colonel Snyman told you that this is what the soldiers were saying, did you understand him to mean Mr Van der Westhuizen and his junior officers involved in JIC?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't recall what I understood that to mean, but I wasn't quite sure whether it was said at the JIC and what Colonel Snyman meant exactly or whether there was a private discussion with JIC members.

He referred to Defence Force members, I don't know who they were.

MR BIZOS: Well, this was a very important accusation that was made against the Security Police of whom you were the number 2 person.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Didn't you ask Mr Snyman who are these people from the South African Defence Force accusing us of incompetence and claiming the right to be in a better position to eliminate people better than we can, did you ask him that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not ask him that.

MR BIZOS: Why not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I just didn't ask him that.

MR BIZOS: Wasn't your professional pride hurt by this accusation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I would not put it that way.

MR BIZOS: How would you put it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't comment on that. I ...

MR BIZOS: Wouldn't the natural thing by a professional person such as yourself be, when you were being insulted in your professional capacity, that you would want to know who is it that made such a serious accusation against us?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I didn't even ask who these people were.

MR BIZOS: Yes, you have told us that and one of the issues here General Van Rensburg, is whether you can be believed or not.

It will help the Committee to believe you or not to believe you I would submit, if you told them why you did not ask Mr Snyman the obvious question.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't tell you, I didn't ask him that.

MR BIZOS: Could you try and put a date on when Mr Snyman said this to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't give you an exact date. If I have to make certain inferences, I would say it had to be approximately two to three weeks before Mr Goniwe and his colleagues were eliminated.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and that would have been the time when you asked for Mr Du Plessis and Mr Van Zyl to come to you and make a plan?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now three weeks would have been the week during the 6th of June 1985.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I will accept that.

MR BIZOS: It would have been the day or certainly during the week when the signal asking for a death warrant for Goniwe, Calata and Mkonto?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I will accept that. I wasn't aware of such a signal, but I will assume or I will accept that there was such a signal as a result of what I learnt later.

MR BIZOS: Yes, well let us just get the date sequence correctly and then we can carry on.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, just a matter of record. I don't think my learned friend did that deliberately, the copy of the signal appearing at page 101, 102, actually doesn't talk about Mkonto, it talks about the two Goniwe's and Calata.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon, yes, I beg your pardon. Calata and Mbolelo Goniwe. I am sorry it was a mistake, but it is not relevant to the issue, but thank you for correcting me.

You see here is - Mr Van der Westhuizen, will you turn to page 101 of your application. We know that it is the 7th of June, and it is at or about the time that two other things happened.

When Mr Snyman told you that the soldiers were saying that the Security Police can't be trusted any more to eliminate people, and when you said make a plan in order to eliminate Goniwe and his cohorts. Do you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: It is more or less the same time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, listen to what this says. "Personally" - have a look at the bottom of page 101 - "personally for General Van Rensburg, telephone conversation General Van Rensburg, Brigadier van der Westhuizen on the 7th of June 1985, refers."

Now, that speaks for itself that there was a telephone discussion between General Van Rensburg of the Secretariat of the Security Council and the Chairman of GOS in Port Elizabeth, do you accept that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: This happened at or about the same time as the other two things happened?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And names as follows: Matthew Goniwe, Mbolelo Goniwe, brother or cousin of the abovementioned, and Fort Calata.

Now these three persons had been identified by you, your Security Police in Port Elizabeth and recommended for a banning order in 1984, which was in fact issued?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, Mr Chairman I know of the order as far as Mr Matthew Goniwe is concerned, but I am not sure whether Mr Mbolelo Goniwe and Mr Fort Calata whether they, whether these orders were served on them.

MR BIZOS: Well, any way the document shows that they were identified and placed together for this purpose?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, the Chairman of GOS at about the time that you were told that you were incompetent to eliminate people and at the time more or less when you told your people to make a plan, the Chairman of GOS then Brigadier Van der Westhuizen says to General Van Rensburg of the Security Council Secretariat in Pretoria, "it is proposed that the abovementioned persons be removed from society permanently as a matter of urgency."

I want you to please put your hat on as an Investigating Officer, and you were looking for the murderers of Goniwe after the event, and you had this three bits of information that I gave you. Who would you say requested the murder of Goniwe, his brother Goniwe and Calata?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I would have to suspect Brigadier Van der Westhuizen, I would have to seriously suspect him.

MR BIZOS: Seriously suspect him, yes?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: If, of course, if the report is interpreted correctly.

MR BIZOS: If the information is correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And if General Van der Westhuizen admitted that although he may have meant something else, which Judge Zietsman rejected, he did send the signal. Would you be satisfied that there was at least a take for you to take before the Attorney-General for the arrest of General Van der Westhuizen?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would obviously have wanted to send more proof to the Attorney-General, but I would have consulted with him.

MR BIZOS: Your job as a good Detective would have pointed at General Van der Westhuizen's guilt for inciting or initiating the procedure of murdering the two Goniwe's and Mr Calata?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: If you had evidence that General Van Rensburg, not you, the other Van Rensburg at the Secretariat of the State Security Council, that he gave contradictory evidence as to what he did with this signal, would you add him into the list of prime suspects?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I would have.

MR BIZOS: And presumably those working in close cooperation with these two Generals at the time that these facts became known, would also be suspects and possibly approached as witnesses to give evidence against their Generals?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Is it not clear to you now that these facts have become known that if there was an order from above, it was most certainly ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, you mean Pretoria?

MR BIZOS: Pretoria?

CHAIRPERSON: Not above?

MR BIZOS: No, these are acts of men, not of the gods Mr Chairman.

It is clear that you were in effect used as nothing more than the doers of the act that must of necessity have been authorised by the Secretariat of the Security Council?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Mr Vlok was in Port Elizabeth or was concerned with this matter, attended a meeting - could I just check where it was, whether it was in Port Elizabeth or Pretoria, one moment please - in Pretoria.

Mr Vlok was in a meeting in Pretoria. I want to refer to the Exhibit number. We will just get the exact words, but we needn't delay.

Mr Vlok was at a meeting on the 6th, now which is also round about this time, this vital period around the 6th and 7th of June 1985. It would appear that there were telephone calls from Pretoria, the signal makes it clear does it not, that there were telephone calls before the signal was sent, because it says the telephone conversation refers, do you remember that at the bottom of 101?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BIZOS: Here we have a situation which I would like your comment on, that Mr Van Rensburg of the Secretariat of the Security Council suggests - well refers to a conversation and in response he gets a request for a death warrant and at the meeting attended by Mr Vlok, a decision is made in order to appoint a committee to investigate whether or not Mr Goniwe should be reappointed to his post.

Now, what did you know about the steps to reappoint him to his post?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: All that I know regarding that is that the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth was opposed to it.

MR BIZOS: Yes, because you must know the document dated the 23rd of May which is before the Committee, as Exhibit what was referred to during the inquest as the "nooit ooit" document, that never must he be - our list of Exhibits and Exhibits have been left in a car Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: I think it is Exhibit C, that Goniwe and Calata would never again be reappointed?

MR BIZOS: That was the attitude of the Security Police, Exhibit C. Yes, and then here we have deputy Minister Vlok where I told you with many Generals and Brigadiers, I didn't tell you I referred it to Mr Van Zyl, and the proposal is that decision (1) after discussion of the Goniwe case, it is decided that a committee under leadership of the SCR regarding the fate of Goniwe would make a decision and would make a submission on the 12th of June 1985.

We are told that this was a committee appointed the next day or the day after in order to decide whether Mr Goniwe should be reappointed or not. You must agree with me obvious General Van Rensburg, that the signal on the one hand to which the Secretary of the Secretariat of the Security Council was present and a committee should be appointed in order to investigate whether he should be reinstated or not, are as far apart as Cape Town to Messina?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now, if you had been given these facts would you have requested or ordered or suggested to Mr Du Plessis and Mr Van Zyl, that they should put a plan into motion to eliminate Mr Goniwe and one or other of his cohorts?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I have no knowledge of that meeting in Pretoria.

MR BIZOS: Well, then let me accept your answer General, that you didn't know about it.

Would it not follow that either the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing, which is unlikely in view of the fact that General Van Rensburg of the State Security Council that was responsible for the detail putting together the committee and the same Van Rensburg having received a signal that should be killed, that somebody or a number of people were playing a double game?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot comment on that. I do not know what occurred there. I could agree with you yes, it appears to be a double game that creates the impression, but personally I do not know anything about it.

MR BIZOS: Yes. You see, we would have a situation would we not if there is any truth in the suggestion that there was a serious attempt to decide whether Mr Goniwe should be reappointed or not, that General Van Rensburg of the Secretariat of the Security Council, would not have disclosed the fact of the signal to Mr Vlok who attended the meeting of the 6th about a burning issue which the Deputy Minister was concerned about, the Security Council was concerned about, the Secretariat of the Security Council was concerned about and the Chairman of GOS in Port Elizabeth was concerned about.

How could there be these two contradictory processes going on?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That I cannot explain.

MR BIZOS: Well, let me ask you you cannot explain it because you do not know the facts, but assume that the facts are that I have given you, clearly appear from the documents that were produced at the inquest, and now that we know that Goniwe and his friends were killed, put on your cap as an Investigating Officer again, looking to find the truth.

Would you not say that either the Security Council including the Deputy Minister knew about this and had authorised it or the Secretariat of the Security Council in the name of General Van Rensburg was playing a double game?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is possible.

MR BIZOS: Yes. But now let us take into consideration what you did General. Do I understand that as a result of your discussion with Mr Snyman, it was decided to make a plan to kill Mr Goniwe, plus how many others, you tell me please?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It was never said how many others apart from Mr Goniwe. It was said that it would be Mr Goniwe and the persons surrounding him who along with him, created the situation.

MR BIZOS: Well, and no other names were mentioned either by you or Mr Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I cannot recall. Mr Snyman as far as I can remember did not mention any other names. I can't recall whether I mentioned other names.

My recollection is that we spoke of Goniwe and his confidants.

MR BIZOS: His confidants, very well. And this was an open mandate given to Mr Du Plessis and Mr Van Zyl?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't believe that it was at that stage with regard to who, apart from Mr Goniwe, it was said that they should investigate who else would have to be removed or eliminated.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they ever report to you sir, we have done what you asked us to do, here are the names?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, they did.

CHAIRPERSON: When would that have been?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That was approximately a week before the elimination was carried out. I can really not remember with certainty when I issued Colonel Snyman's order, whether the names of Fort Calata and Sparrow Mkonto emerged, I cannot recall that specifically.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Now, from the moment that you told them to make a plan, do you say that Du Plessis and Van Zyl had authority if the occasion arose, to put the plan into operation and execute it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No. Colonel Snyman said that I should tell the members that they shouldn't go over into action before they had cleared it with him finally.

MR BIZOS: Did they have to go to Snyman more than once?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: They could surely have gone to him. I do not know whether or not they visited him more than once.

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Van Rensburg, did you tell them before the operation was put into operation, that they should come into contact with Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know whether or not they did so?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: When do you say that they did so, because I do not recall Mr Van Zyl telling us that they went to Mr Snyman more than once?

MR BOOYENS: No, but this witness doesn't say they went to him more than once either, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Excuse me, Mr Booyens?

MR BOOYENS: I am saying, this witness didn't testify that they went to Colonel Snyman more than once either, I think there is a misunderstanding here.

MR BIZOS: Well, let's clarify it. I thought it was so. What do you say, did Du Plessis and Van Zyl go to Snyman once only when they were told do what is best for South Africa, or do you say that they went back to him thereafter as well?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I know of the one case. I am saying that it is possible that they were there more than once, but I only know of the one case.

MR BIZOS: And if Mr Van Zyl didn't tell us about another case, we can assume that they only went to Mr Snyman once for the purposes of getting authorization, correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is as far as I know.

MR BIZOS: And the authorization was do the best, what you think is best for South Africa, is that correct?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, I accept it as that.

MR BIZOS: Because presumably that was what was reported back to you if we are to believe Mr Van Zyl?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I cannot recall what his exact words were when he reported back to me. What I can remember is that it was reported back to me that Colonel Snyman had given the final approval for the operation or the final order.

MR BIZOS: Yes. The operation was to put the plan into operation in relation to Mr Goniwe if it was in the best interest of South Africa.

There was no mandate as to precisely who was going to be killed from Mr Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, that I cannot say. When Mr Van Zyl and Mr Du Plessis returned to me, they told me that Mr Snyman had given the final approval for the operation with regard to any of those persons that they had suggested to him for elimination.

MR BIZOS: But, I do not recall Mr Van Zyl telling us that a list of persons was given to Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't recall whether a list of names was supplied to Colonel Snyman or whether the names were orally or verbally communicated to him.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, why would they have returned to you with the names during that week?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, because originally the instruction was to determine who the persons were that should be eliminated with Goniwe.

CHAIRPERSON: That was your instruction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: From Colonel Snyman to them.

CHAIRPERSON: Through you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I told this to them.

CHAIRPERSON: And they returned to you with names?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you say regarding these names?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, I said that - I can't recall how many names there were - they broadly explained to me that these were the persons who were causing problems and who they deemed it necessary to be eliminated.

Names were mentioned to me and I was satisfied that they had identified the correct individuals, I was satisfied with the information and I told them to go to Colonel Snyman in order to get the final approval for the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: That is a week before the incident?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Approximately a week before the incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they go?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the first time that they went to Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: To my knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BIZOS: But wouldn't they have gone to Colonel Snyman at the time that you told them to make the plan?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I don't know if they went. I simply communicated to them what Colonel Snyman had said and to my knowledge, they accepted it as such.

MR BIZOS: The mandate that you gave them, and the mandate that they got from Snyman, if Van Zyl's evidence is to be believed, was an open-ended one. Would you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I don't know about an open mandate, what was communicated to me was that persons had to be identified who were involved. Not simply any person.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Was there anything as formal as the signal which apparently seems to have required specific identification of the people that had to be eliminated. Did that not apply to the Security Police in Port Elizabeth?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I am not following you.

MR BIZOS: Have a look at the signal, there it seems to suggest, you know when they wanted people eliminated, they named them.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I can see it.

MR BIZOS: Now was there no similar, was there no similar procedure in your department so that people were not condemned to death on a loose and untidy way so to speak, but properly identified after due consideration?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I do not know about that. The names that appear here, are also names which were mentioned at the Security Branch, Colonel Snyman and Colonel Du Plessis and there were other names as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, tell me, what was the point of your juniors coming to report to you about what they had discovered as a result of your instruction to them, in respect of those people who were friends of Mr Goniwe?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not follow.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did they come to report back to you and Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: To ensure that they would eliminate identified individuals, not just anybody.

And to determine whether or not they would be able to execute such an operation as desired.

CHAIRPERSON: So specific names must have been approved with them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you approve specific people?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not approve specific individuals as such. As I have already mentioned, names were given and if any combination of those individuals would be found at a given point in time, they would be eliminated.

CHAIRPERSON: So, you are saying you never approved of the elimination of these specific people?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, through Colonel Snyman.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't follow you.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: When they came to me with their information and with the information that we already had regarding these individuals and determined that these were the activists who were causing problems, and that they should be eliminated.

CHAIRPERSON: So in so far as you could authorise those killings, you did?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I suppose one could put it that way with the condition that the Commanding Officer first had to place his seal there on.

MR BIZOS: Is that Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now, let me just get clarity. When Du Plessis, when you called Du Plessis and Van Zyl in, they mentioned Goniwe and his cohorts?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And you didn't identify any one other than Goniwe?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Myself?

MR BIZOS: Yourself?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not that I can recall.

MR BIZOS: And there was no instruction from you to go and get authorization for Goniwe and other specific persons, but merely general authorization of his cohorts?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, when they returned to me with certain names ...

MR BIZOS: I see this is what you are saying, so that they had to go to Snyman to obtain permission for the operation, Goniwe and others?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: What did they have to ask Snyman for?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Okay, perhaps I did not understand you correctly. In this regard Goniwe and six or seven other names ...

MR BIZOS: That is what you said, you say Goniwe and six or seven other names.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I didn't say that, six or seven other names were put to me.

MR BIZOS: Was this three weeks before the death?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, approximately a week before the death.

MR BIZOS: Now, originally when you called them in, what did you tell them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I told them that Colonel Snyman had requested that they determine exactly who the cohorts of Goniwe were, who were creating the situation of unrest and that they should identify the correct individuals and monitor their movements and try to eliminate these individuals in an unobtrusive manner.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever ...

CHAIRPERSON: At that stage, was there any talk that they should contact Colonel Snyman with regards to this operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Snyman had stated it ...

CHAIRPERSON: At that stage when you told them to monitor these people in order to determine who should be eliminated, that conversation, did you tell them that they should go and see Colonel Snyman regarding this operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot recall that I told them that specifically, but I told them that the final approval had to be obtained from Colonel Snyman personally.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this when you told them about monitoring the individuals?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Let us try and get you to answer the question in another way, put it another way in the hope of getting clarity.

As to who was going to be killed, as to precisely who was going to be killed, did that have to be approved by Snyman or not?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And without Snyman's approval, nobody could be killed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is so.

MR BIZOS: And if anybody killed anyone other than persons identified to Snyman, that killing would not have been authorised?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is correct.

MR BIZOS: In order that there should have been specific authorization from Snyman, there would have had to have been more than one visit by Van Zyl and Du Plessis to Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is possible, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: It follows from the versions that we have heard.

MR BOOYENS: With respect Mr Chairman, not necessarily.

MR BIZOS: Well, we will argue it, we will argue it. It was an argumentative question.

But now, let me read to you what the application of Mr Van Zyl says in paragraph 8 of page 47.

Do you agree with that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Further -

Do you agree with the contents of that paragraph?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree that he only speaks of one visit to Colonel Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree that this only date that they mentioned there, is a few weeks before the 27th and that the agreement of Mr Snyman was obtained at that time to the operation?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I cannot argue what is contained in this paragraph, but my recollection is that they visited me approximately a week before the operation was executed, and then went to Colonel Snyman.

MR BIZOS: But you see there that they say that three names were specified right at the beginning.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, it is possible that they had those three names in mind after they had spoken to me, or after I had spoken to Colonel Snyman and that he then went to Mr Du Plessis and that those were the two names, apart from Goniwe's, which immediately came to mind.

MR BIZOS: Surely, you are not going to tell the Committee, General Van Rensburg, that a mandate would have been given by Colonel Snyman to kill unnamed persons?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't believe that Colonel Snyman had it in mind to eliminate unidentified or unnamed persons. He wanted to make dead sure that the persons who had been creating the problems, be eliminated.

I am convinced that Colonel Snyman within himself, as a result of information which he possessed, had certain people in mind.

MR BIZOS: But you see, have a look at page 59, in the application of Mr Du Plessis. Have you got it?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: yes.

MR BIZOS: How does your evidence square up with the second paragraph on page 59? "On an unknown date before the 27th of June, 1985, General Van Rensburg informed me that he had discussed the possible elimination of Goniwe and other activists, with Captain Van Zyl. He did emphasise however, that Colonel Snyman would have to approve it. Myself and Captain van Zyl discussed the matter fully with Colonel Snyman for a number of days after this, and informed him that the only manner in which the Eastern Cape and surrounding areas could be stabilised, would be to go to the extreme and eliminate the above-mentioned activists. He said that we should continue and do what would be in the interest of the RSA. We regarded this as the official authorization for the operation. Myself and Captain Van Zyl, after our visit to Colonel Snyman, returned to the office of Lieutenant Colonel Van Rensburg, and informed him that the proposed operation for the elimination of the Cradock 4 had been approved by the Commanding Officer." How do you reconcile your evidence with the contents of this paragraph?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: In what regard do you mean?

MR BIZOS: Well, let us take the obvious for a man of your standing and experience.

Although a specific date is not mentioned, the unknown date must be round about the 7th of June, according to your evidence, according to the evidence of Van Zyl, can we accept that?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: And they went to Colonel Snyman "a few days thereafter", does that make sense to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That could have been that way.

MR BIZOS: Yes, but then he says that after their visit, they returned to you. He doesn't speak about a second visit to Snyman.

So the visit to Snyman must have been a couple of days after the 7th of June, before the investigation had been done?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I know nothing of this. It is possible, but I don't know anything about it.

MR BIZOS: Do you agree that this does not square up with your evidence that there was a second visit to Mr Snyman for him to authorise specific names?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I do not mention it in my application, because I didn't know that such a visit had taken place.

MR BIZOS: And this is in accordance, and I don't want to read it out, that there was no second visit, on page 37 to 38 of your own evidence.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, that is what I said.

MR BIZOS: Why did you in answer to my questions as to whether Snyman had authorised unspecified persons, say no, they were authorised after the investigation and that you were informed of this about a week before the killing? Why did you make that up?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't fabricate anything. All I said is that I issued the instructions to Du Plessis and Van Zyl, as it had been communicated to me by Colonel Snyman.

After that, they satisfied themselves by finding those who had to be eliminated. They returned to me with the information and I advised them to go to Colonel Snyman to determine the final decision regarding this elimination.

MR BIZOS: You know why you tried to give that impression that there was a second, you made the statement that there was a second visit to Mr Snyman, General?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, he never said there was a second visit. He said he knows only about one, there might have been another visit. To say to the witness that he said there was a second meeting, visit, is not correct, that was never his evidence.

It doesn't even appear in his application.

MR BIZOS: Well, let us assume that you did not say it or you did not imply it, which I do not agree with on your previous evidence, but if you say that you don't know whether it happened or not.

Was it not necessary for Mr Snyman to authorise the death of specific persons and not persons that may have fallen into a particular class, in accordance with the opinion of his juniors?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Mr Snyman, as I have already said, asked that these people come and tell him specifically who was responsible for that current situation. That is what they did and on the basis of that, Colonel Snyman granted approval and that is as far as my knowledge goes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, according to Mr Du Plessis' statement, the matter was discussed with him and you discussed it with him. He also says in his application that when you discussed it with him, you indicated that Colonel Snyman would have to grant approval for the operation.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I said so?

CHAIRPERSON: He said that you indicated this. In his statement he continues to say that him and Van Zyl, although he doesn't have a date, went to Colonel Snyman at some stage, where they were granted the official approval.

And it was then that they returned to you and informed you that the Commanding Officer had approved the elimination of the Cradock 4.

Then there can only be one discussion with Snyman?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is what I know.

CHAIRPERSON: Then when did that occur?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: According to my knowledge, that was approximately a week before the elimination was carried out.

CHAIRPERSON: But did they not return to you with the names?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, they did.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you certain, because that is not the impression which was created by Mr Du Plessis' statements?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Well, I cannot speak for Mr Du Plessis, but that is how I have the facts.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Mr Bizos, can we - or do you want to carry on?

MR BIZOS: It is in order Mr Chairman.

ON RESUMPTION:

NICOLAAS JAKOBUS JANSE VAN RENSBURG: (sworn states)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (cont)

Did you know anything about Mr Mhlawuli a day or two after the 7th of June?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't recall.

MR BIZOS: During June 1985, did you communicate with Mr Eric Winter in Cradock at all, either on the telephone, or personally or any other manner?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I can't recall anything like that.

MR BIZOS: During June 1985, and before the killing of the four people in that motor car, did you speak to the Head or any other person in the Security Police in the Southwest Districts, and more particularly Oudtshoorn?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not as far as I can recall.

MR BIZOS: Did any file relating to Mr Mhlawuli appear on your desk containing information about him?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not, that as far as I can recall.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Van Rensburg, what do you mean ...

MR BIZOS: Did anybody show you a photograph ...

CHAIRPERSON: What do you mean when you say not as far as you can recall? Is it possible that that could have happened?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: It is possible, but I can't remember it.

CHAIRPERSON: But, if you had spoken to the people in Oudtshoorn, regarding Mr Mhlawuli, then surely there would have been a formal file on him at that time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, perhaps a formal file, but not what is referred to as a personal file. I can't recall speaking to them about Mr Mhlawuli. I can't recall it, it is possible, I just can't remember.

MR BIZOS: Was any photographs shown to you or any scraps of paper on anybody's desk shown to you, relating to Mr Mhlawuli?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: You said some things about Mr Mhlawuli in your evidence in chief that I want to come to. I am going to suggest to you that it is easy to speak about people that were killed by you, who cannot speak for themselves to say things about them after they are dead.

But let us see what the objective evidence is about Mr Mhlawuli's activities. In Exhibit K, the information available to the Police in relation to Mr Goniwe up to and including the 17th of June 1985 as contained in Exhibit K and Exhibit K2 shows that Mr Goniwe, if you have a look at page 4 of Exhibit K with 87, page number relating to the inquest proceedings, sets out where he was active in 1985, Cradock, Graaff-Reinet, Somerset East, Bedford, Adelaide, Middelburg Cape, Hanover, Hofmeyr, Pearson, Steynsburg, Cookhouse, Newport, Port Alfred and Fort Beaufort. There is nothing there about Oudtshoorn.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't see Oudtshoorn listed here.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and have all those towns for the benefit of all of us who are not acquainted with local geography, did all those towns have something in common?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Those are towns in the Eastern Cape.

MR BIZOS: Yes, and within your area of jurisdiction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No. They were not all in our jurisdiction.

MR BIZOS: Was not the whole of Eastern Province in your jurisdiction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: Well, any way, it is the Eastern Province. Which portion of the Eastern Province was not under your jurisdiction?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can only tell you that the towns listed here, well Cradock fell under our jurisdiction, Somerset-East was under our jurisdiction, Bedford, Adelaide, Cookhouse, Port Alfred and Fort Beaufort, as far as I can recall, those were under our jurisdiction.

MR BIZOS: Was not Hanover and Hofmeyr?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No.

MR BIZOS: Well, let's leave them out for a moment.

Does not the absence of anything relating to Oudtshoorn, not suggest to you that as at the 17th of June, there was nothing that Mr Goniwe was doing in Oudtshoorn?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I don't see anything.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I think in all fairness to the witness, one must read the very preceding paragraph, and it says that Mr Goniwe was appointed as UDF organiser for the following towns, and then the next paragraph where these towns follows.

So, from there to jump to say that a man was never in Oudtshoorn, is not really justified under argument. One cannot read this paragraph only, you must read the previous paragraph as you will see.

MR BIZOS: Well, it goes on Mr Chairman. "He had visited these towns and addressed meetings of black people", etc. It deals with his activities during that period. He apparently kept within his jurisdiction outside, unlike if they are telling the truth, the Security Police, that they had things to do with people from Oudtshoorn.

But be that as it may. Do you agree that there is nothing in Exhibit K and Exhibit K1 and K2, there is nothing to indicate that he did anything which was noted by the Security Police in Oudtshoorn?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Exhibit K2, page 111 there is a reference to paragraph dated the 5th of March 1985, in that reference it mentions Mr Goniwe had sent a telegram to the UDF in Oudtshoorn on behalf of Cradora, in respect of the commemoration of May day.

That is all that I can see in this document, where there is a reference to Oudtshoorn.

MR BIZOS: Yes, is the sending of a telegram of solidarity of May day, underground subversive activity?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, it was a May day commemoration. Subject wrote a telegram to the UDF in Oudtshoorn on behalf of Cradora, in which Mr Goniwe makes the following statement to the commemoration of May day and then there is a verbatim quote.

MR BIZOS: Yes, thank you for drawing that to our attention. Is there anything else, or any other activity that Mr Goniwe did in Oudtshoorn?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Not in this document.

MR BIZOS: And one would have expected that if there was any information, that there was any contact with Mr Goniwe and Mr Mhlawuli in relation to the recruitment of people to join the liberation movements outside the country, or whether there was any conspiratorial conduct between Mr Mhlawuli and Mr Goniwe, having regard to the minutiae that are reported in these documents for security purposes, one would have expected if there was any truth at all in your assertions about Mr Mhlawuli, to have found something in these documents?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Sir, I cannot comment on that. There are no such indications in these documents, and I can't dispute that.

But I can't say that there wasn't any other information made available in any other way, or which came to our knowledge in any other way.

MR BIZOS: Well, you can't refer us to any other information and we can't find any facts in the information that we have.

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, I told you what had been told to me in respect of Mr Mhlawuli.

MR BIZOS: The question that we are concerned with here sir, is whether you can be believed or not.

If you were given that information, why was that information not furnished to the Commissioner of Police who had to decide, who had the responsibility in relation to the Security of the Country, that there was the dangerous conspiracy between the two of them?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I can't answer you on that.

MR BIZOS: And the information came from the Security Police to the Commissioner, couldn't have come from anyone else? In fact a member of the Committee pointed it out to Mr Van Zyl, that this information was furnished by your Branch?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: The information regarding Mr Mhlawuli that was conveyed to me, that I told you. I don't know about any other information.

I don't know what information Pretoria used to based its decisions on, I can't comment on that.

MR BIZOS: Try and come to terms with my question sir.

The information that you say you had, is not in Exhibit K or Exhibit K1 or Exhibit K2, which was sent to the Commissioner of Police. Leave out what Pretoria may have sent him. The question is, if you had that information, why is it not contained in Exhibits K, K1 or K2?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I don't know.

MR BIZOS: You said that you didn't have any comment. Will you please deal with the suggestion that I am going to make to you as to the submission we are going to make to this Committee, that this evidence that Mr Mhlawuli was involved in subversive activities with Mr Goniwe, was a fabrication in order to justify his death, because he happened to be in the car with Mr Goniwe at the same time?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: I am not party to such a fabrication. I told you what was conveyed to me about Mr Mhlawuli. I told you - you and the Committee.

MR BIZOS: But now, when Du Plessis and Van Zyl came to you and you put your stamp of approval on the elimination of the persons that they were to kill, did you apply your mind as to whether Mr Mhlawuli was one of the persons to be killed if found?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes, according to what Mr Du Plessis told me.

MR BIZOS: And you were the person who initiated this operation to your subordinate officers?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: You didn't bother ...

MR BOOYENS: Not really Mr Chairman. I think if I understood the evidence correctly, the initiation certainly didn't come from him, he might have conveyed it.

But I think one cannot really say that he initiated it because he said he acted on certain instructions.

MR BIZOS: Well, you conveyed it to your men in the Branch?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Did you feel any responsibility in helping that even with in the parameters in which the Security Police were acting as murderers, that care should be taken that persons even within their own definition, were not killed?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you not think that before acquiescing in the murder of Mr Mhlawuli, that a reasonable precaution would have been to phone Mr Winter in Cradock?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, that is not how I thought.

MR BIZOS: Did you not consider it a reasonable precaution to telephone the Police in Oudtshoorn to ask, to verify any information that may have been put before you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I did not.

MR BIZOS: Did you not consider it a reasonable precaution to ask for reports in order to, written reports, and whence they came, in order to ascertain their authenticity or the reliability of the information they contained?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No, I didn't do that. I didn't doubt Mr Du Plessis or the information of his subordinates.

The information was usually confirmed in some way or corroborated in some way, it was normal practice, and I accepted that it was correct.

I accepted that this was correct and that these were the people causing all the trouble.

MR BIZOS: You know, you consider trouble receiving the Ambassador of the United States by the looks of things, or speaking with Mrs Molly Blackburn, sending telegrams wishing people well on May day. That was trouble making?

Was it within your understanding of the instructions and authority that you had, to act illegally, that you could just put to death people that you suspected of trouble making without making any, or taking any reasonable steps to verify the correctness or nature of the information that had been given to you?

MR JANSE VAN RENSBURG: No. The information that was available, I didn't doubt. I had no doubt that the people who had collected the intelligence had done so in a proper way, that the information was correct and that they had corroborated it and that they were quite sure that these were the people who were responsible for the situation.

MR BIZOS: Now, we have an affidavit from Mr Winter who says that the name Mhlawuli didn't mean anything to him until after his death. Will you accept that as a correct statement?