DATE: 23 FEBRUARY 1998

NAME: ADRIAAN PIETER VAN NIEKERK

CASE NO: AM4353/96

DAY 1:

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CHAIRPERSON: First of all I will introduce to you the panel. On my far left we have Mr Jake Moloi, a Committee member who is an attorney from Welkom. On my immediate left we have Mr Chris De Jager, also a member of the Committee from Pretoria who is a member of the Pretoria Bar, an advocate there. On my far right, we have Mrs Leah Gcabashe who is a member of the Committee and who is a member of the Johannesburg Bar and on my immediate right is Mr Justice Sandile Ngcobo from the Cape Bench, a member of the Committee and I am Selwyn Miller, also a Judge from the Transkei Division of the High Court.

I would like to ask those legal representatives representing the Applicants and members of the family to kindly place themselves on record.

MR PRINSLOO: I act on behalf of Mr Van Niekerk, the first applicant and the fifth applicant, Mr Zeelie. My name is H J Prinsloo.

MR VAN DER WALT: Chairperson, I appear on behalf of Mr Mostert, Mr Engelbrecht, Mr Du Preez, Mr Visser and Mr Van Loggerenberg and I am L Van der Walt.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, for the record, my name is Louis Visser. I am instructed by Attorneys Wagener Muller & Du Plessis. We act, Mr Chairman before you for three Applicants. Generals Van Der Merwe, Erasmus and Du Toit and we also act for the interested party Mr Adriaan Vlok.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Chairman, my name is G Rautenbach. I am an advocate from the Johannesburg Bar. I have been instructed by the firm Cheadle Thompson & Haysom in Johannesburg and we act on behalf of the Bopape family.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. We can then commence with the proceedings and I think perhaps the best way to do it would be to call upon those persons representing the Applicants, perhaps for convenience sake in order of sequence to deal with their application.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, I don’t know whether you have been informed but normally before we start we attempt to get together with all the Applicants’ legal representatives to work out a scheme which would make most sense to the Committee and perhaps in the process serve to save some time. What we have done in the meantime before this Hearing, we got together with Mr Prinsloo and Mr Van der Walt and Mr Steenkamp and we held two pre-trial conferences at which it was decided that perhaps the logical way to do it in this particular Application is to follow the chronological way of doing it. That would entail Mr Chairman that Mr Prinsloo will start with the proceedings and we thought we’d do it strictly in chronological order as that would probably make the most sense.

You will also notice Mr Chairman that really there are two categories of Applications before you. We don’t want to make too much of it at this stage but there’s the category of the persons who had to do with Mr Bopape on the ground and then what followed later. They’re basically two categories but we’re not making anything of that at the moment except that just drawing your attention to that fact. So it makes sense that the "doers", if I may call them that, should start.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Then I call upon Mr Prinsloo.

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, the first Applicant to be called is Mr Adriaan Van Niekerk.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names Mr Van Niekerk? Could you please stand?

ADRIAAN PIETER VAN NIEKERK: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, you are the Applicant in this particular situation with regard to the death of Stanza Bopape?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MR PRINSLOO: Is it correct Mr Van Niekerk that your Application for amnesty as exposed in the bundle before the Committee is Page 1.

Problem with microphones

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, your Application is put in bundle 1 and is from Page 1 to Page 20, is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct, your Honour.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk in the Application in Annexure ‘A’, you give what happened and then also in ‘B’ issues that pertain to the questions as related to 10(a) and (b), is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: Do you confirm that?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, you’re a member of the South African Police?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MR PRINSLOO: When did you join the South African Police?

MR VAN NIEKERK: In 1969.

MR PRINSLOO: And you had the rank of Lieutenant when you retired?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MR PRINSLOO: Can you please tell the Committee what your career was in the Police where you served the different branches.

MR VAN NIEKERK: When I joined in 1969, for a short period I was at the uniform branch then I was transferred to the detective branch where I spent most of my time on the East Rand as detective and in 1976 I was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant and I was transferred to the security branch in Johannesburg. And there I worked at John Vorster Square, up to approximately 1991.

During my time with the security branch at John Vorster Square I was mainly concerned with the investigation of acts of terror and sabotage and so forth and also treason.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, the investigation that you did at John Vorster Square with regard to acts of terror, who were mostly the accused or the suspects?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It was mainly the ANC activists within the ANC, trained terrorists, members of Umkhonto weSizwe movement and then also to a lesser degree members of the APLA movement.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, where you in any way involved with the unrest during 1976?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes. When I arrived at the security branch in 1976 I was also part of a team who were involved with the investigation - in the investigation that started in June 1976.

MR PRINSLOO: The unrest raging at that time on the one hand, was it the ANC and on the other hand the police forces? How can you picture it for us?

MR VAN NIEKERK: At that stage it was large unrest, wherein the community was involved and where there was large scale unrest and shortly after in ‘77 I, for the first time met with the ANC and then also members of Umkhonto weSizwe and came to know that they infiltrated into Soweto and were involved with acts of terror.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, did you do any specific courses to give you information on how to conduct interrogations?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I did a detective course while I was a member of the detective branch. At the security branch I did a course in security and later also a course in interrogation.

MR PRINSLOO: The course on interrogation that you refer to, broadly what did that entail?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It entailed interrogation methods, also how the enemy should be identified and how information should be gathered. There was a distinction made between the different kinds of information, tactical intelligence, strategic intelligence and so forth.

MR PRINSLOO: You refer to the enemy. Was there an enemy identified at that stage?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes. It was the ANC with it’s military wing which was identified as an enemy in South Africa.

MR PRINSLOO: At that stage, was there in any way an onslaught against the country by the ANC?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Since my involvement with the security branch at the end of ‘76 and in the years following that there was definitely a very serious onslaught by the ANC on the former Government and it also presented itself in different forms.

MR PRINSLOO: This particular onslaught, did it diminish or did it increase? How can you explain it to us?

MR VAN NIEKERK: My experience was that since 1976 the onslaught increased dramatically.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, relating to the case in which we are applying today, it’s the Stanza Bopape case, where were you stationed at that particular time?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I was stationed at the security branch in Johannesburg at John Vorster Square and I was part of the investigation unit.

MR PRINSLOO: What was your specific position that you had?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I was a major at that stage and I was the commander of the investigating unit at John Vorster.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, would you tell the Committee what happened and - that gave rise to this particular case, with regard to the arrest and interrogation of Stanza Bopape.

MR VAN NIEKERK: Your Honour, on Friday the 10th June 1988 I was called in by my Commanding Officer, that was Erasmus and I was informed that between himself and the Commander of the West Rand Security Branch there was communication and that a number of people had been arrested in terms of the Act on Internal Security or perhaps I can put it this way, it was in relation to acts of terror, involvement with the ANC and acts of terror and General Erasmus requested me to join the West Rand Investigation Unit and the instruction was to be involved and assist with the interrogation of people.

At this stage, 10 June, I was not, - I didn’t have any knowledge of any arrests but it was pointed to me by people under my command that the previous day people were arrested in Johannesburg in Hillbrow and the people who were arrested was Mr Stanza Bopape, the deceased and another person by the name of Simonbeki Mkosi. It was also known to me at that stage that these two people whose names I have just mentioned had been taken away after arrest by the West Rand Unit and they were detained on the West Rand.

After I had spoken to General Erasmus, I contacted Captain Jan Kleynhans who was the chief investigating officer of the Krugersdorp Security Branch and I met him at the Roodepoort Police Station in relation to this incident. At the Roodepoort Police Station Captain Kleynhans gave me information with regard to the two people that I have referred to earlier, that those two people had been arrested in relation to ANC terror attacks and activities and that Mr Bopape was involved in the Maponye Terrorist Group. And that he had contact with the group and was involved with the group.

The request was and the arrangement between myself and Captain Kleynhans was that in the light of the assistance that we should give, that I would interrogate or have the other two people interrogated further.

MR PRINSLOO: The other person was that Mr Mkosi?

MS GCABASHE: Had you had a report from your junior officers who work in your unit about the arrest?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Chairperson, if I can remember correctly, the morning of the 10th I found out from the other members that the previous night they were out and the arrests took place although I was not informed of the operation of the previous night.

MS GCABASHE: Was that Mr Kleynhans?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MS GCABASHE: Did you have any idea as to why they had gone out to arrest Mr Bopape?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I was informed that the West Rand Security Branch requested them to go along to assist with the arrest.

MS GCABASHE: ... ...(inaudible) would not first ask for your authority before using your junior officers?

MR VAN NIEKERK: The practise was that they would have asked. The fact that some of our members went along that night was an indication that in my absence, perhaps I wasn’t available that day that permission was obtained and a request was submitted that some of our members had to accompany them and to assist them. The rule was that when the one security branch operated within the area of another one that the Commanders in fact confirmed this with each other.

MS GCABASHE: ... ...(inaudible) circumstances, who authorised them to accompany the West Rand Police men, in your absence?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I have no knowledge of that.

MS GCABASHE: ...(inaudible) opportunity to find out yet, to date?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No, it never came up and I didn’t ask at that stage because I accept that it could have been that General Erasmus or any of the other senior officers could have given it.

MS GCABASHE: Even after the circumstances of the death of Mr Bopape, when you started investigating what had gone on, did you not think to ask who had authorised them in the first place, to go out and arrest?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No, I didn’t do that, because as I said when one security branch acts in the area of another one then the senior officers contact each other and then get permission and later on I came to know that Zeelie and them had the instruction to go and I think when they testify they will perhaps be able to give you clear information on that.

Chairperson, after that was Bopape and the other person Mkosi who were transferred to John Vorster Square that was on the 10th June. At John Vorster Square, I gave instructions to Mostert and Engelbrecht to handle the interrogation of Mr Bopape.

MR PRINSLOO: Mostert and Engelbrecht are some of your Co-Applicants, is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct. Yes, that is correct. The other person, Mr Mkosi, I asked Warrant Officer Syvert and Wilkin to interrogate him. During the course of that particular day, the 10th June, and if I can remember correctly, the people were interrogated at John Vorster Square but in the process, there was also the necessary administrative duties that go along with such an interrogation and that was also handled and that took some time but at a particular stage, Mostert and Engelbrecht were in fact busy with the interrogation of Mr Bopape.

The arrangement was between myself and Captain Kleynhans that on the next day the 11th June, we would get together in Krugersdorp in order to have further discussions. On the 11th June, myself and some of the members, if I can remember correctly it was Warrant Officer Mostert who accompanied me to Krugersdorp where there was a meeting and during which meeting the detention of different people, inter alia, Mr Bopape was discussed.

MS GCABASHE: Mr Van Niekerk, up to this stage, did you have an idea through the types of questions the West Rand wanted you to ask of Mr Bopape?

MR VAN NIEKERK: The information that I got from Captain Kleynhans, namely that Bopape was involved with the Maponye Terrorist Group and that he was part of them would have given an indication that during interrogation that the people who did the interrogation would have lead the interrogation in that direction.

MS GCABASHE: .......(inaudible) entail asking specific questions because you had a particular objective in mind?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I cannot remember whether there was anything specific that Captain Kleynhans wanted or specific questions that should have been asked, it is possible but perhaps he could have told me to determine whether the person knew any other people, weapons and so forth. I cannot say today that that was indeed the instruction.

MS GCABASHE: What was the instruction you gave to your junior officers? What did you want them to find out?

MR VAN NIEKERK: My instruction was that they should interrogate the people and that the information that was at my disposal I conveyed to them and then it would have flown from that that they would have questioned the people with regard to what we already had in our possession. It wasn’t the policy that we set to ask the person specific questions.

MS GCABASHE: Is it correct then that they would have had all the information they needed about the Maponye Group and they could therefore ask questions relevant to that aspect?

MR VAN NIEKERK: At that stage was the information that we had, that was the information that Captain Kleynhans conveyed to me and that I then conveyed to my members. It wasn’t a lot of detailed information as I have indicated.

MS GCABASHE: Exactly the sense that I have Mr Van Niekerk that you had very little information to work off. This is why my question is, what were you interrogating him about? What did you want to know, at this stage, before the major meeting with Mr Kleynhans?

MR VAN NIEKERK: The interrogators could have concentrated on the facts whether Mr Bopape was involved with the Maponye Group. Whether he was involved with any acts of terror, whether he was part of a terrorist cell, a unit, are there any weapons. Was he trained. Does he have any knowledge of any other groups, terror groups. That’s typical questions that would have flown from the information.

MS GCABASHE: .......(inaudible) utter no, no, no, to each one of those questions. The interrogation would go on because your junior officers did not really know what they were looking for, am I right?

MR VAN NIEKERK: If I had conveyed the information that I got from Captain Kleynhans then they would have asked similar questions and the questions that I have just related to, and they could have continued asking that to the person.

MR PRINSLOO: Could you just tell us about when you discussed it with Mr Kleynhans.

MR VAN NIEKERK: I said there was a meeting at Krugersdorp Security Branch, the chairperson of the meeting was Colonel Johan Le Roux. He was the Commander at that stage of the West Rand Security Branch. There were approximately 15, perhaps more members from Pretoria Security Branch, the West Rand, myself and then one or two members from my own staff.

The investigation with regard to the Maponye Group was discussed and from that it was quite clear and it was also the instruction that the information was of such a nature that Mr Bopape was involved with the Group, that he was trained and that he moved between Pretoria, Johannesburg, the West Rand and the Vaal Triangle.

It was conveyed to us that this Group was involved in many acts of terror, mostly in Pretoria, among others, attacks on 3 police men, a bomb at ......(inaudible). Many attacks on the houses of members of the South African Police. Several attacks on buildings, a train carriage.

MR VISSER: ....(inaudible) assistance Mr Chairman. The witness is mentioning a list of attacks. We have drawn up a list which we have typed out and which we are going to hand up later to you in any event. It might be convenient, perhaps if you had the list now, it might save you the effort of having to write it all down and perhaps the witness can identify what he knows from that list. I’m just trying to be of some assistance. I’m not sure whether we’ve got sufficient copies but we have some copies here Mr Chairman. I don’t know whether you want to accept that at this stage or wait until it’s our turn.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, if it would assist in the leading of the evidence and make things go quicker then perhaps we could get that list now, thank you.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, we will have copies made, perhaps it may be convenient just to hand it to the witness. I don’t want to confuse the witness at all but it may save time.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. If you could proceed.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, you received a list from my learned friend, Mr Visser of acts committed. Could you just have a look at that? Now, you are aware of ........

[microphone problem]

MR PRINSLOO: That is correct Chairperson. Would you just have a look at that. That is the list that Mr Visser has made available.

CHAIRPERSON: [inaudible] do you have anything about the handing in of the list at this stage? Do you have any objections at all?

MR VISSER: I don’t have any objections at this stage, but I would like to see the list.

CHAIRPERSON: And Mr Steenkamp?

MR STEENKAMP: I have no objections Mr Chairman, I just would like a copy of it please.

CHAIRPERSON: So this list is then being used without prejudice at all and without any admissions going along with it or anything of that nature.

MR PRINSLOO: Do we have photocopying facilities here?

MR STEENKAMP: Yes, I have enquired. Yes, I understand that later in the morning the facilities will be made available. At this stage we don’t have the facilities.

MR PRINSLOO: Chairperson, I have the list that Mr Visser handed in. I also took from my briefcase the Deed of the accusing. I’m just going to look at the two lists together. There’s also a list of the crimes. Chairperson, if I looked at the Deed in the case of [inaudible], then there are four murders, that’s on the charge sheet. [inaudible] one from Bane Mope and Mpushlela, Nelson Funyane and according to the charge sheet it was indicated that they were members of the Municipal Police.

Chairperson, before you spell it, the first three names, the three murder charges, those are members of the Police is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that is correct.

MR PRINSLOO: It was also said that those three members were shot dead. Is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes. In Attridgeville.

MR PRINSLOO: Can we just have some clarity. You said they were Municipal Policemen? Whilst you were reading the names. Were they members of the Municipal Police, the first three that you mention or were they members of the South African Police?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Chairperson, I was under the impression that they were Municipal Police but I think I’m confusing this, there was an attack on a Municipal office. I believe that these were members of the South African Police and the fourth charge, this does not have anything to do with a police official. The fourth charge of murder was on a black child, a one year old, Patience Kulele.

MR PRINSLOO: Please spell the names for record purposes.

MR VAN NIEKERK: Patience - P-a-t-i-e-n-c-e, and the surname K-u-l-e-l-e. Chairperson, then there are other acts, attempted murder incidents and I cannot recall specifically that they were mentioned. The murders that I mentioned were mentioned during the meeting. There was also a mention made of the attack in Beatrix Street, Pretoria. If I can remember correctly that was at the Sterland Theatre Complex.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, just to interrupt, is it correct that at the Sterland Complex there was an explosion where Maponye, the leader of this group, where he was killed?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: And is it also correct that it was mentioned in the specific act that will be made available that there was an explosion at Juicy Lucy in Pretoria on the corners of Andries and Vermeulen Streets?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Chairperson, it is correct that the Juicy Lucy incident was also mentioned during the meeting and that several people were injured during that explosion.

MR PRINSLOO: And you also mentioned earlier in your testimony and people that you confused with the Municipal Police that the Municipal offices in Attridgeville was also damaged in an explosion?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that is correct.

MR PRINSLOO: And that there was also an explosion where a train carriage was damaged at Saulsville in Pretoria? Did you have knowledge of that?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes that is correct. On the list given to me Mr Chairman by Mr Visser is other incidents that does not relate to what happened in the meeting and what I’ve been told in the meeting. Mr Chairman, it is quite clear to me from the meeting that Bopape was involved in the Maponye Group and also involved in several serious acts of terror and the request was made that he should be interrogated and with that me and the other members returned and I’m not quite sure about this but I think that Bopape was questioned further on the Saturday.

MS GCABASHE: Now, Mr Bopape was arrested in terms of Section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act on the 9th, midnight?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MS GCABASHE: On the - I’m reading from Page 5 of your Affidavit here, or the Annexure to your Affidavit and trying to reconcile that with what you’ve just told us. On the 10th June, he was interrogated by your junior officers, people under your command. After that he was then detained in terms of Section 29 of the Internal Security Act. Now all of this before this major meeting with Mr Kleynhans, Captain Kleynhans, yes? Is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That’s correct that he was detained in terms of Article 51 and on the 11th, no sorry on the 10th he was transferred and kept in terms of Section 29 before the meeting of the 11th, that is correct.

MS GCABASHE: Now all your detailed substantive information you received at the meeting of the 11th, that’s right?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That’s not quite correct because the 10th, the morning, Captain Kleynhans gave me information which was confirmed on the 11th. There was just more detail given on the 11th.

MS GCABASHE: Now there are two questions that arise from this. One, do you know why he was arrested in terms of Section 50? Was there no clarity on what he had done? That’s the first question.

MR VAN NIEKERK: I expect he was kept according to Article 50 because he was involved in the Maponye Group.

MS GCABASHE: [Inaudible] - to detain him in terms of Section 29 before this major meeting?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It would have been taken by the West Rand Security Branch because, to take such a decision, the head office should have been informed and should have approved of it and it was also regulations which I also got from Mr Erasmus that West Rand would have made the requests in terms of Section 29. I can’t remember but Captain Kleynhans said he would have handled it so I’m not quite sure about that but to answer the question, yes, we have asked for the permission even though we at John Vorster Square transferred to him in terms of Article 50, arrested him in terms of Section 29 and was warned by Du Toit that he was kept because of Section 29.

[microphone problems]

MR VAN NIEKERK: Mr Chairperson, on Sunday the 12th June there was a regulation or arrangement that Mr Mostert and Engelbrecht would have questioned Mr Bopape with regards to the information we had at that time. I was at the office myself at John Vorster Square, Police Station on the 10th floor and Mr Mostert and Mr Engelbrecht was in the office next to me on my left side busy questioning Mr Bopape. I was in my office busy with other matters and in another office to my right was Lieutenant Zeelie who was also an Applicant and he was busy with other matters.

At first, that morning Mr Engelbrecht and Mr Mostert, they did the interrogation. Every now and then I walked in. Lieutenant Zeelie sometimes walked in and at one stage during the morning the two members, I can’t remember which one indicated to me that Mr Bopape is not co-operating with them and our information with regards to the information we had did not expose any of that information.

MR PRINSLOO: When you interrogate a person do you give him the information you have or do you try and obtain it from the person?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Mr Chairman, it was the norm not to give the information the person you were interrogating. Our aim was to get the information from the person and then to test it. And of course a lot of the information you did not have but if the allegation was made, for example, that he was involved in the Maponye Group then quite a few questions arise, which he then has to present. The information would not be given to him. The questioners, interrogators probably would have said to him concerning Section 29 because of why he’s been detained that he was involved in ANC involvements and Maponye Group and that they would like more information concerning that. That will be the only guidance he will get.

MR PRINSLOO: You say that he didn’t want to co-operate - which are also two Applicants.

MR VAN NIEKERK: Mr Chairperson, myself went to speak to Mr Bopape during the course of the morning and I made sure that he understood how serious the situation was. That in terms of Section 29 he was detained because of Section 29 there was enough grounds for us to detain him and that it was his duty to give us information he had concerning himself, others, everything. He said to me that he was not willing to give us any information. But despite that, the other two members kept on interrogating him.

Later in the day, the members came to me and as a group we talked about the whole situation and we decided because of the fact that Mr Bopape didn’t want to co-operate with us we should give him a fright in order for him to co-operate with us, to persuade him to work with us.

MS GCABASHE: In the form the interrogation had taken, up to this point.

MR VAN NIEKERK: Mr Mostert and Mr Engelbrecht was in the office next to me, they just spoke to him. Questions were asked and that’s basically what happened. There was no other form of interrogation at that stage and so forth, to give Mr Bopape a fright and to persuade him to work with us. There wasn’t a shock appliance at John Vorster Square at that stage, not one that I was aware of and in the group, we organised, and arrangements were made and then Detective Sergeant Du Preez arrived later that day with a shock device, electrical shock device, which I learned later he got from the Sandton Investigation Unit. I agreed to this and that the device should be applied. We decided to tie Mr Bopape on a chair.

There was a strong wooden chair in my office and because of the fact that my office was quite small we pushed the chair out into the corridor which was quite broad, wide and Mr Bopape was placed on the chair. His shirt was removed, his hands were tied to the supports of the chair and his feet to the legs of the chair. Sergeant Du Preez had the shock device in his hand.

There were two cords running from the device and at the tip of it, of these cords, there were two pieces of cloth which was wrapped around the tips of the cords. This device was turned two or three times by Sergeant Du Preez and whilst he was turning it, Mr Engelbrecht pushed these cords against his body and moved it over Mr Bopape’s body.

It didn’t take very long, maybe two to four minutes, the device was turned, then it was stopped, then someone asked him whether he wanted to say something and if there was no reaction to that, then the machine was turned again and this must have happened around three times. By the third time Mr Bopape’s head fell forward and I realised there was something wrong.

We immediately untied him, placed him on the floor and Sergeant Du Preez gave him mouth to mouth resuscitation. It seemed that he was dead already and I think all of us standing there, including myself, Lieutenant Zeelie, Mr Mostert, Mr Engelbrecht and Mr Du Preez all thought that he was dead. If I remember correctly some of the members felt the pulse at several parts of his body. I believed the man was already dead. Afterwards, as a group we quickly spoke to each other about what we should do next and then we decided that we have to inform our seniors and I decided to phone General Erasmus.

Immediately afterwards I phoned General Erasmus at his home and told him what happened and immediately afterwards I went to his house where I discussed the issue with General Erasmus. I told him that I was concerned, considering the fact that he died in detention and he was kept under Section 29, that he was involved in a terror group which was causing a huge amount of anarchy at that stage and that the [inaudible] June the 16th an arrest was under way and that another death in detention would be a great shame for the political parties of the day and that we had to make some plan or other.

General Erasmus said that he would discuss it with head office. And he would come back to me on that issue. Afterwards I went back to the office and I informed the other members of the group concerning my visit to General Erasmus and the body, if I remember correctly before I left, we thought we would put the body back in the office where Mr Mostert and Engelbrecht interrogated him at first and he was placed on the floor and a blanket was thrown over him. And then we waited to receive feedback from General Erasmus.

Later that afternoon, quite later that afternoon, round about 6 o’clock General Erasmus turned up and he was in his office and General Du Toit also arrived and he was in the office of General Erasmus and we were all present, me, Zeelie, Erasmus and Du Toit. We looked at the whole issue and General Erasmus said that it was arranged that the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch would accept the body and will get rid of it.

There was an instruction that we have to organise a fake escape which would happen in collaboration with Eastern Transvaal Security Branch. On the request of Mr Erasmus I phoned Brigadier Visser which is also an Applicant here and I made arrangements with him where we will meet them and what time and the arrangement was, on the highway, outside Bronkhorstspruit.

The body of the deceased, Mr Bopape was taken to the cellar where it was transferred into the boot of Lieutenant Zeelie’s vehicle and we left in one car whilst Sergeant Du Preez and Mr Engelbrecht followed us in a second vehicle and we drove to Bronkhorstspruit. At Bronkhorstspruit we met Visser and Van Loggerenberg, also an Applicant here, next to the highway, they also had vehicles. Me and Brigadier Visser spoke about the whole thing. Also the escape. Brigadier Visser decided that it was not a good idea that the escape should be part of his duties and he asked me to deal with the matter myself.

Afterwards we spoke and decided where we will transfer the body and if I remember correctly, we followed Mr Van Loggerenberg in his vehicle and we drove on a bit and we drove on, we crossed a highway, quite a quiet road and then later a dirt road where the body was taken from Lieutenant Zeelie’s car and placed in the boot of Mr Van Loggerenberg’s car.

Afterwards we returned to Jo’burg and on the way to Johannesburg we started making plans concerning the escape which of course at that stage we hadn’t looked at yet. We got back to John Vorster Square and then we sat down as a group and we organised a fake escape. That was around 10 o’clock at night and the fake escape took place around about 12 o’clock at night so there wasn’t a lot of time to make arrangements but we did it in that time.

The escape entailed that we would say that we took Mr Bopape out to Sebokeng in the vicinity of De Deur, close to the Vaal Triangle where he would have indicated to us the address of the specific contact person. The role of Mr Bopape was played by Lieutenant Zeelie. First we took a drive in the centre of Johannesburg and we bought food, in case there were further questions afterwards. We would have been able to give that kind of evidence and from there we went to De Deur and between De Deur residential, on the way to Sebokeng there was, it was not quite a deserted road, there was an open piece of field on both sides.

We stopped in Lieutenant Engelbrecht’s vehicle. We punctured the wheel with a knife. We jacked the car up and Lieutenant Zeelie played the role of Mr Bopape, he sat in the back, both his legs and his hands chained. He had the keys in his pocket [inaudible] in the front seat, the keys were taken out. Somehow the chains were loosened and Lieutenant Zeelie who played the role of Mr Bopape, he shifted out the left hand side of the car and me, Mr Mostert and Mr Engelbrecht was busy with changing the wheels.

That was the arrangement. It was arranged like this beforehand and then Zeelie ran down the road into the field. I pulled out my service pistol and shot several shots and Lieutenant Zeelie disappeared into the dark and about a kilometre further down there was another vehicle with Mr Du Preez in it waiting for him and that vehicle picked him up and took him back to wherever they would have gone then and the fake escape basically involved only me, Mr Mostert, Mr Engelbrecht.

Mr Mostert changed the flat tyre and we went back to the police station which wasn’t far from there. All the necessary branches were informed about this, the dog unit, [inaudible] officer, I phoned him myself and told him what happened because he didn’t know what happened and later General Du Toit turned up at De Deur and right there and then the Security Branch Officer of Vereeniging was also unaware of this fake escape. He put together a report and it was sent to head office and as was the norm, to all the Security Branches in South Africa.

The next day, the Monday, I went and sat down and wrote a complete memorandum with regards to the fake escape and I explained, step by step what happened and who was involved. No mention was made of the death of Mr Bopape. The fake was well known, even at our own Security Branch that Mr Bopape escaped.

And since that stage, Mr Chairman, the investigation of the escape endorsement that was made public was not treated by the Security Branch but by the Detective Branch, I think at Vereeniging, I speak under correction. And that’s what concerns the death of Mr Bopape, Mr Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, with regard to this particular action, the escape of Bopape and the death of Bopape, was there any approval given for this in any way?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Chairperson, we acted on behalf of the Country, the Government of the day, it was practise in the Security Branch that when we were confronted by such a situation and where a person did not want to give his co-operation that methods of force, such as shock devices would be used.

It is a method that was allowed by myself and I believe that it had the approval throughout of my commanders and head office.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, with regard to Mr Bopape’s detention, according to Section 29. Section 29, how did you interpret that?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Section 29 was as is, drastic legislation, that placed force on the detainee to make available all the information at his disposal. It was one of the methods that was used, that was part of legislation to assist the Security Branch in obtaining information and it had to do with getting information. There was a need to obtain the information.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, was it of utmost importance for you that Mr Bopape should supply information?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Mr Chairperson, yes. The information was that he was involved with the Maponye Group and as has already been mentioned today, they had been involved with large scale onslaught attacks, death, damage of property, terror and that his involvement and the information that he had was of utmost importance.

MR PRINSLOO: You may continue.

MR VAN NIEKERK: The information was extremely important in order to expose the scope of the activities and should any people be involved, to arrest them and perhaps weapons that would still be available, explosives, to obtain that so that further acts of terror and death and anarchy could be prevented.

MR PRINSLOO: The former experience that you have had with regard to Section 29, did you get important information as you have just said that had prevented acts of terror, death, anarchy and so forth?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Chairperson, it is true that with interrogations and in all the years that I have been involved with it, that that was the main source of information for the Security Branch and often it lead to weapon caches to be found where a large amount of weapons, mines, AK’s and mortar bombs had been found. And this resulted because of the interrogation and therefore I would like to say to the Commission that it was a very important role on behalf of the Security Branch and I viewed it as a counter revolutionary step to work against the revolution and the anarchy that was there, to stop it.

MR PRINSLOO: And the action of you, was it on your behalf as a person or was it on behalf of someone else? On whose behalf was it?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Chairperson, I act in this capacity as a member of the Security Branch. It carries the approval of the Security Branch. It is on behalf of the Security Branch, the information that we used to stabilise the country which was experiencing extreme political problems and unrest and in no way I acted on my own behalf, nor me, nor any of the other members on that particular day.

MR PRINSLOO: Did you in any way act male fides, to just, in other words just inflict pain?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No. The aim was to obtain information from Mr Bopape that he didn’t want to give to us.

MR PRINSLOO: At that stage, Mr Van Niekerk, was it the case that the aim of the ANC’s - well the aim was to overtake the Government or to force them to capitulate?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, it was a fact that the ANC at that stage had already progressed far with the attack in the country itself and also in other countries from the outside and the terror onslaught escalated where initially only hard targets were attacked, such as buildings but at that stage, soft targets was also used, car bombs exploded and for example, where people were sitting at a restaurant, bombs exploded.

MR PRINSLOO: Did you attend to any of these particular incidents where bombs exploded, where acts of terror were committed by the ANC?

MR VAN NIEKERK: At many of these instances I was personally involved at a few explosions at Wimpy restaurants in Benoni and also in Johannesburg and also in Pretoria at the Church Street bomb, I also went to look what happened and then also the motor bomb that exploded at the Magistrate’s Court in Johannesburg where four policemen were killed on the scene, I was also present there. The car bomb that exploded at the Wits Commandment, I was also present and also in Soweto at several scenes, I went to several scenes and I saw it.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, at that stage, was the Government of the day prepared to give the country over to the ANC?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No. Not at all, Chairperson. If I can recall the political statements made by the politicians, it was said throughout, we would do anything within our power to stop the onslaught of the ANC.

MR PRINSLOO: And how did you interpret that?

MR VAN NIEKERK: The total onslaught that was propagated by the politicians that they would stop.

MR PRINSLOO: How should it be stopped?

MR VAN NIEKERK: My position as member of the Security Police lead me to the interpretation that I was part of this process to stop it. That in my capacity at work, I should do everything in my ability to fight against this onslaught and where necessary, violence with violence and that is how these methods were then used.

MR PRINSLOO: In the Bopape case, was it in any way very important for you or urgent that you should get information or was it - or could it have happened over a period of time?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It was important as it was conveyed to me, it was a boiling pot, there were many other arrests and it was important that information should be gathered.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, the death of Bopape and the mock escape, was this conveyed to head office, according to your knowledge?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Chairperson, as I said, the day just after the mock escape, there was a complete report given to head office and they were informed in this regard and at a later stage I personally discussed this incident with General Joubert.

MR PRINSLOO: You referred to General Joubert, in which capacity did he serve in the South African Police and where was he at that stage?

MR VAN NIEKERK: His function, I could be wrong but General Joubert at that stage was at the Security Head Office and he had a senior position there and I know he had the task, with regard to the whole escape situation and I was under the impression that he had reported to the Minister.

MR PRINSLOO: Did you convey the real facts to General Joubert as it happened in reality?

MR VAN NIEKERK: At some stage during a discussion with General Joubert, I in fact informed him with regard to the real facts of the matter.

MR PRINSLOO: Was that before the escape or after it took place, that you discussed it with him?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It was only afterwards.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, was that after this issue had already been reported to head office, the escape?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MR PRINSLOO: According to your impression, why was it necessary for you to inform him about this? What was his interest in this?

MR VAN NIEKERK: At more than one occasion I talked to General Joubert about the escape and at a particular stage General Joubert wasn’t happy about the way in which certain parts of information appeared in the media and he confronted me about this and I then referred him to the report that I had written, and that that was correct. And that I don’t have any knowledge about how it could be possible that other allegations could be made that appeared in the media and during this discussion, he also started asking questions about, for example, should the body be found, what would the position be and it boiled down to the fact that, would the man have had a hand, would he have had a broken leg and I gave him the assurance that this person was only shocked, that he was never assaulted.

General Joubert, if I can remember correctly, he also wanted to know whether the - what was put into the occurrence book. Whether that in fact corroborated with the whole escape story. So there were quite a few questions that he asked me and it was quite clear to me that he had information about this incident.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, could you perhaps tell this Committee what you thought caused the death of Bopape?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Chairperson, I was puzzled. I did not believe that he could have died as a result of the shock that we gave him and it bothered me that he died so quickly.

MR PRINSLOO: On face value, as you saw him on that day, did he look ill or can’t you say?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It seemed to me that he wasn’t ill, he was - he looked quite normal.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, are you aware of any explosion that would have taken place in Ellis Park during or just after that period, any period?

MR VAN NIEKERK: After the death of Mr Bopape there was a bomb explosion at the Ellis Park Rugby Stadium. It was approximately a month later.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, was there at a particular stage an identification done by a particular lady where she referred to Mr Bopape as a person that she had seen?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that is correct. What happened was that with the mock escape, we made the photos of Mr Bopape available and it was distributed widely through the country and I understand and at the police stations where I came, these photos were seen of this suspect and this lady was at the rugby and she a person and later on she saw a photo at a police station and then she brought the two together and this then lead to the fact that we approached her for an affidavit and an identification parade and a statement was

obtained.

MR PRINSLOO: That person, the lady, was she known to you before hand?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No. Not at all.

MR PRINSLOO: And the reason why she had to make the statement, why was that?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Well she knew that Bopape had already died. The investigating officer into the case of the Ellis Park bomb wasn’t aware of the fact that Bopape had already died but only that he had escaped and therefore I could not tell him, don’t get the statement because if he had escaped he could have been there and therefore this statement became quite relevant in the docket for the Ellis Park bomb explosion.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Van Niekerk, the documentation that you also have, you see the statement of Mr Peter Maluleka, it’s on page 761, in that confirms that Stanza Bopape was in fact an MK member and was also involved in this particular case?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that is correct. Yes, I had information about that. I saw that on page 761.

MR PRINSLOO: And is it true that Mr Peter Maluleka - just for the record purposes, also just refer to which volume.

It’s page 761, volume 3. Mr Van Niekerk, is it correct that Mr Peter Maluleka was accused No. 7 in the Case, State against Toka and 8 others which served at the Circuit High Court in Delmas and this also referred to this particular case?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that is correct.

ADRIAAN PIETER VAN NIEKERK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Advocate Van der Walt do you have any questions you’d like to put to this witness?

MS VAN DER WALT: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Advocate Visser do you have any questions you’d like to put to this witness?

CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I do have one or two questions. Mr Van Niekerk, perhaps just to explain to those who have not done a course in interrogation as you had, would you perhaps just briefly explain and perhaps I could give you a question to which you can explain it.

If you place yourself in the time frame when the struggle was raging in our past, 1980, thereabouts and perhaps also later, if you as a person involved with the investigation unit who had to investigate ANC activities, if you had only received information from an informer that a specific person was a member of Umkhonto weSizwe and you or one of your members in your command would have arrested such a person? Are you following?

You now have a person in front of you and all that you know of him is that there is an allegation that he is a member of the ANC and Umkhonto weSizwe. There’s no one to dictate to you what you should ask him. There’s no one that you have to give you any other information in regard to this man’s activities. Does this now mean that you have no interrogation for such a person? What is the position?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Chairperson, no, there will still be an interrogation based on the information that you have received. You would still interrogate the person.

MR VISSER: And you said the typical thing that you would have liked to know is where he is connected, whether weapons are involved, where the caches are, these kinds of things.

MR VAN NIEKERK: If that is the information obtained from the informer that the person is connected to the MK, a military unit, then the questioning would follow that route but you could find him in another terrain and you would have other questions.

MR VISSER: Mr Van Niekerk, something else. You testified here today and also during the Section 29 interview into investigation, you also testified to this regard and you said that you, as a member of the Security Branch were under the impression that Head Office or your Commanders were aware of the fact that in certain circumstances, force would be used and was used by members on the ground, if I can put it that way. When they were of the opinion that the person interrogated was in possession of very important information, can you remember that?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, I can remember that.

MR VISSER: Isn’t it true that in the South African Police, all the branches that there were rules and regulations, certain prescriptions that warned against the assault and torture of people being interrogated, is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it perhaps also the case, according to your knowledge that should a member would go overboard and assaulted a detainee, and he was then caught out, that that member would then personally have to take responsibility for the assault?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It happened that in certain instances, that members were made responsible for their acts. There were prosecutions, there were disciplinary hearings and so forth. We know that, it’s a fact of life, isn’t it. There were only a few of such prosecutions and disciplinary steps within the Security Branch.

MR VISSER: Mr Van Niekerk, we have to be quite stupid or very naive if we think that in the struggle of the past, violence had not been used during interrogations. I don’t want to detract you here. I think we should be very naive if we believe that. All that I’m putting to you is and there will also be evidence in this regard. There has never been an official condonement of torture or assault on people who have been interrogated from the side of Head Office, what is your comment?

MR VAN NIEKERK: As I see it, is that it was condoned and if you take the case of Bopape, we know it was condoned and we exclude that.

MR VISSER: Are there any other instances that you have knowledge of, that it was in fact condoned?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Over a long period of time I can’t really refer you to specific instances but in general, during informal discussions we talked to our Commanders of these ideas and the use of force and violence was mentioned and as a senior officer and my Commanders were aware of the fact that it was taking place and it was tacitly accepted.

MR VISSER: While I have put to you that we would be naive to think that it had not taken place. Let’s continue with something different. The discussion that you had with General Erasmus on the afternoon of the 12th June, 1988, can you remember, was it approximately 2 o’clock in the afternoon?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I would not contest that.

MR VISSER: Now it’s a long time ago and nobody could blame anybody else if he can’t recall the finer detail but is it possible that you could have mentioned to General Erasmus that Mr Bopape, according to your opinion, that is now you, yourself, Mostert and Engelbrecht and perhaps if there were any other people present, they are included then, that according to your opinion that the moment of death of Mr Bopape was something inexplicable to you. Did you mention that to General Erasmus?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, it is possible.

MR VISSER: And that the death was something totally unexpected based on the violence that was executed on Mr Bopape?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And did you also mention to General Erasmus that the members were worried about the situation and that they were not prepared to follow the normal legal process in the case of the death of a person to be prosecuted, or that this should be followed?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I can’t remember that. I think it was rather put in the way that the members were worried about the fact that the person died in detention and that it could have a political implication for the country because he was detained under Section 29.

MR VAN NIEKERK: And the commemoration of the unrest was around the corner and that was the main point of concern and that is what I can remember that I conveyed to General Erasmus. Yes, I think it’s two sides of the same coin. I hear what you say and that would be in fact correct.

MR VISSER: Did you also tell General Erasmus that because of these considerations, you did not inform the District Surgeon about the death of Mr Bopape?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No, I don’t think the District Surgeon was mentioned at the stage that I phoned General Erasmus. The whole issue was still being weighed and at that stage I would have received an instruction telephonically that, correct this, report the death, and had I received that I would have done it but the person was dead I would not have gone to the District Surgeon.

MR VISSER: Where would you have gone to?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I would have contacted the Investigating Service Officer and he would then have taken over the investigation as in the case with a death.

MR VISSER: Mr Van Niekerk, just to put it bluntly, you spoke to General Erasmus to cover this, isn’t that true?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And one of the reasons was that you, the men who interrogated Mr Bopape knew very well that you were perhaps guilty

of murder and attempted murder or rather homicide. And Erasmus then said that he would take it up with Head Office and that he would then report back to you?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also testified about the rest? [intervention] I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Advocate Rautenbach, would you prefer Mr Steenkamp to go first?

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Chairman, I don’t have any questions but I would like to hand in a document marked Exhibit A, a document which was referred to by Advocate Van Der Walt earlier on which [inaudible]. [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Is there any objection to this document going in from any of the parties?

MR VISSER: We have no objections. May I just add that we attempted to have copies made of the other document but without success at the moment but we’ll do so as soon as we can.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR VISSER: The only document is the indictment, Mr Chairman, which we already have now.

MR STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, maybe for record purposes we can mark the two pre-trial minutes as, Exhibit B and C, the of the 5th February, marked Exhibit B and the one of the 16th February, marked Exhibit C, sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps shouldn’t we, Mr Steenkamp make those Exhibits A and B and this Exhibit C because we got these first. So the Minutes of the 3rd February will be Exhibit A, the Minutes of the pre-trial meeting of the 16th February will be Exhibit B and then this indictment, that’s been handed in now will be Exhibit C.

MR STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Advocate Rautenbach, do you have any questions you’d like to ask?

CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, I act on behalf of the family of Mr Stanza Bopape and at the start of my interrogation I would like to say to you that the family is not satisfied with certain of the explanations that were given for his death and in that light, I will continue my interrogation. The first aspects I would like to talk about is that you referred to the process of interrogation and a process which was general practise. If I understand the evidence correctly, concerning the use of the electric shocks and other forms of torture, am I correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I’m not following the question very clearly. There were several kinds of interrogation.

MR RAUTENBACH: Well, let’s first look at the use of a machine which gives a person electrical shocks. Would I be correct if I say that it was general practise in the South African Police? I would just like to qualify, to say, was it the general practise in the Security Branch? As far as other divisions are concerned in the South African Police, what was the position there? Was it a practise?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I understand it is used but I don’t have knowledge of it.

MR RAUTENBACH: I refer you to page 221, Mr Chairperson, that will be volume 1, page 221. Mr Van Niekerk, there’s a transcription of your evidence which was given in the Section 29 investigation, you can look at the bottom of the page. You are here questioned about methods which was used in interrogation. Is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: The question that was asked to you,

and the answer was,

Do you still confirm that evidence you’ve given? Now I would like to ask you where you’ve indicated that you have not learned these methods in the Security Branch division, where have you learned it?

MR VAN NIEKERK: As I have indicated, and as you’ve read, whilst I was in the Detective Branch.

MR RAUTENBACH: And you say it started a long time ago. If I understand your answer correctly, the practise has been in use for quite a long time?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It’s a practise that I got to know within the Detective Branch.

MR RAUTENBACH: Regarding this answer, would I be correct if I say that this is a practise which existed, generally within the Police Force?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I can’t answer positively to that because I believe that in the Detective Branch it should be considered as the Detective Branch. The detective behaves differently in different situations, other than what we would have done in our situation.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, let’s look at it like this. Would you then say that these methods, as I understand your evidence in the Section 29 Investigation, these methods were also used when it came to people who was accused of normal misdemeanours? You see Mr Van Niekerk, would I be correct in saying that the methods that were used by the Detective Branch, for example, the investigators, they were also used within the Security Branch?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That’s correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: So it was not something reserved specifically for political crimes?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That’s not what I’m saying. What I said and what I testified is that in the first instance it’s not legal. It’s illegal to use any method of force but in the Security Branch I experienced, they were sanctioned, approved methods which was not the case in the Detective Branch.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, we’ve already determined that they were methods used when it came to common law cases and other people. On this we agree, correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: These were practises that existed for quite a long time. How would you distinguish between a person that was accused of robbery and then shocked by a shock device and a person who was detained because of a political crime?

MR VAN NIEKERK: In the Security Branch we had the situation where we dealt with the ANC, the onslaught of the MK, acts of terror and it was of crucial importance that that onslaught should have been stopped. And within this whole national political context, the Security Branch was allowed to do this whilst at the Detective Branch it was a completely different situation.

MR RAUTENBACH: You see Mr Van Niekerk, it seems that the handling of people, this handling of people came down to a system that was followed by the Police. It was [inaudible] more than only political criminals. It also involved other people in other categories.

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is so, that it was used by other branches of the Police but with different goals.

MR RAUTENBACH: You see Mr Van Niekerk when people are, for example, detained because of political activities then it happens - would you agree with me - that people made admissions when they were interrogated in this way?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is possible that admissions would have flown from that, yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: Would you say admissions were made by people who were not detained for political crimes and was similarly treated?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: So what I want to put to you in this case that these torturing of people and the use of electrical shock devices form part of the system. It wasn’t for a political objective only, it was part of the system anyway?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I do not agree with you. In the Security Branch, it was a method used to obtain information. Urgent information that we had to acquire and it was approved and it was used generally.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, when you used that method, when a policeman uses that method in a non political situation, he’d also use it again in political circumstances. Then I submit to you that, it’s not about the objective, it’s by accident that it’s now one’s political objective. It was part of the policeman’s system. There was no political motive behind it.

MR VAN NIEKERK: No. I do not agree with you. I found myself within the Security Branch and for a long time I was there, and that process, we developed this method to use force. It was necessary. We must make a distinction, I did this with a political objective, I’m within a political mêlée. It’s violence against violence. And it’s known that the Security Branch did everything that they could to avoid the violent onslaught. It was a method to oppose the violent onslaught and it was a way to interrogate terrorists. When I was practising these things, it was about the politics around it and how serious the situation was and the situation the country was in.

MR RAUTENBACH: It seems from your previous evidence where you’ve learned about theses methods of force, you said that you’ve learned this in other divisions of the Police, is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: As far as Section 29 is concerned, the goal of Section 29 was to detain a person until information is received? Do you agree with that?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Would you also agree with me that the fright this person experienced kept in terms of Section 29 that if he did not give the information his detention would continue longer than he would have liked it himself? And would you also agree that attacks happening in which either way in terms of Section 29 would have been illegal at all times?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: If it was not illegal, it was not necessary for him to apply for amnesty. It’s because of the fact that he’s committed a crime, that’s why he’s applying for amnesty today. I think we all agree that he has committed a crime.

MR RAUTENBACH: Well, can I put it like this, the question is asked to him, because of the fact that in his evidence he indicated to the fact that this has become accepted, this method has become accepted within the police community. Even if it is accepted within the Police it’s still a crime and it was still an illegal act and the Police are not supposed to do it so he still committed a crime even if it was approved. I take note of your remark.

MR RAUTENBACH: As far as the East Cape is concerned, I’d like to ask you the following questions. There were, in your evidence you stated that you linked with General Joubert and that you phoned him. General Joubert I understand gave a report to the Minister.

MR VAN NIEKERK: I gave a report to General Joubert. I saw him I spoke to him and I was under the impression that he was responsible to give a report of this to the Minister. If it happened like that, I do not know.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you just give us an indication around when General Joubert became aware of the fact of what actually happened, the true facts?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I cannot tell you the exactly because shortly after the incident I spoke to him about the escape as well as the memorandum and afterwards I saw him and then we spoke about the true facts.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you just tell us as far as General Joubert is concerned what was his position within the Police at that stage? Why did you have to contact him? What was his role?

MR VAN NIEKERK: He had a very senior position at the Police. Exactly what his duties were and the definition of his job I’m not sure. But I gathered that it had something to do with media and linking with the Minister’s office.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, at that stage, who was the head of the Security Police, in general?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I think it was General Van Der Merwe.

MR RAUTENBACH: And who was the Commissioner at that stage?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Commissioner De Witt. I speak under correction.

MR RAUTENBACH: In 1988, what was your rank in the Police?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Major.

MR RAUTENBACH: I would just like to ask you with regards, you’d agree with me that after the death of Stanza Bopape, the steps you took, was a very important issue that you had to address?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Could you just repeat that?

MR RAUTENBACH: It was very important to make arrangements to hide his death?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that was the plan.

MR RAUTENBACH: With regards to the escape scene which happened - or created fictionally - it seems a lot of planning went into that. Is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: As I said earlier today, in a question of one to two hours, this preparation was made.

MR RAUTENBACH: So you actually told us you drove out to where the scene was created and Lieutenant Zeelie played the role of Stanza Bopape. Is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that was part of the mock escape.

MR RAUTENBACH: What I’m trying to get at, Mr Van Niekerk is, you went through a lot of trouble with this whole escape scene and the docket afterwards.

MR VAN NIEKERK: We went through a lot of trouble with the arranging the escape because if that did not work, a lot of things would have gone wrong. But with the docket, as I’ve told you earlier, was not handled by the Security Branch. So I cannot give you comments on that. I don’t know exactly how it was treated.

MR RAUTENBACH: But you will have to agree with me that as far as what would happen to the body was also very important?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Very important, I agree.

MR RAUTENBACH: The decision that one had to get rid of the body, who gave this decision? Who made this decision?

MR VAN NIEKERK: General Erasmus told me that after talking to head office that Visser was asked to get rid of the body.

MR RAUTENBACH: When you spoke to General Erasmus, you got the impression that Visser was already informed about all of this?

MR VAN NIEKERK: At that stage, it was already discussed, that’s what I deduced, between Brigadier Visser and General Erasmus.

MR RAUTENBACH: The arrangements as far as Brigadier Visser is concerned, you spoke about how you drove out, how the body was transferred and handed over to Visser and whoever was with him. Is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that’s correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: After Visser and Van Loggerenberg went away with the body, from your side, did you do anything to find out what happened to the body?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No.

MR RAUTENBACH: If the body should appear in any way, then the statements concerning the escape, it would have caused great shame, if this body appeared in some way. Is that not true?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No. It would have worked with the escape because today we know that the body was thrown in the Komati River, so maybe the body washed out and then we could say that the man escaped and we could have corroborated with that.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, the question is this. If the body appeared, for example, the next day, then it would have lead to great shame as far as you are concerned.

CHAIRPERSON: [inaudible] ... wrapped up in plastic bags.

MR RAUTENBACH: Is that so? If the body was wrapped in plastic, then it could have lead to a problem because it would not have tallied with the escape. In other words, in your thoughts, it must have been of incredible importance that this operation had to be successful?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes. Positive.

MR RAUTENBACH: Is there any reason why you would not like to question the fact whether it was successfully concluded or what would have happened to the body?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Probably, I had trust in the people conducting this.

MR RAUTENBACH: Specifically Brigadier Visser and Mr Van Loggerenberg. I mean, I am under the impression that they were aware of the fact that the person died in detention and it was really important that the body should be disposed of properly. So you’re saying you merely trusted in them that they dispose of the body properly.

MR VAN NIEKERK: At a later stage I learned that the body was disposed of. How, I do not know. This happened in consultation with the Advocate.

MR RAUTENBACH: You later learned that the body was disposed of but you never learned how it was disposed of. Is that correct? And you also did not want to learn that?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I don’t think it was a question of I did not want to know. I just accepted it like that, at that stage. I did not have the means - of other colleagues, to think that it was not done properly.

MR RAUTENBACH: Were you never worried that the body might appear?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Initially. At first I was worried but as time went by, even if the body was found, today I know they mention plastic bags, but if the body was found, surely one could have referred it back to the escape.

MS GCABASHE: Are you saying you did not even ask Mr Visser or Van Loggerenberg how they were going to dispose of the body?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Do you mean at the stage when we gave them the body?

MS GCABASHE: The time that you handed the body over.

MR VAN NIEKERK: No, I did not ask.

MR RAUTENBACH: You testified and I would just like to go through this with you, that you came onto the scene and became involved after Bopape, Nkosi had already been arrested, is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: On the 10th June I became aware of the arrests.

MR RAUTENBACH: And where were the two at that stage when you became aware of it?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I was informed that they were detained at the Roodepoort Police Station and I also ascertained it myself later on.

MR RAUTENBACH: When were these people specifically transferred to John Vorster?

MR VAN NIEKERK: With regard to Mr Bopape, I personally took him from Roodepoort to John Vorster Square on the 10th after I had talked to Kleynhans with regard to Mr Nkosi, I’m not quite sure.

MR RAUTENBACH: With regard to the 10th, can you perhaps tell us whether there was any interrogation on the 10th of Mr Bopape.

MR VAN NIEKERK: As far as I know, there was interrogation in an office and it had to do mostly with administrative processing about the persons history, his family and things of that nature.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now, the first interrogation, where did that take place?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That you refer to now? It must have been at John Vorster Square. I take it that it was there and it would have been on the 10th floor.

MR RAUTENBACH: Who did that interrogation?

MR VAN NIEKERK: The people that were appointed to work with the person was Warrant Officer Mostert and Constable Engelbrecht.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you remember how long that interrogation took?

MR VAN NIEKERK: As I said, I can’t say for sure whether there was any specific interrogation from a specific period to a specific period but what was told to me was they were busy with the person and then questions were put and the administrative process was finalised and I just assumed that they were busy with the interrogation. Not necessarily pertaining to the facts at our disposal.

MR RAUTENBACH: If you say not necessarily, you mentioned earlier that it had to do with administrative issues but it seems to me that you can’t really say whether it was really, the case was really handled then?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I’m not quite sure. I think the other members might perhaps give more information on that.

MR RAUTENBACH: After this interrogation on the 11th, what knowledge do you have of the 11th June with regard to the interrogation, if any?

MR VAN NIEKERK: If I can remember correctly, I was informed and - I could be wrong. Nkosi was interrogated similarly on the 10th and the 11th. If I remember correctly Bopape was interrogated on the Sunday.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, with regard to the 11th, you say that you can’t remember whether he was interrogated on the 11th?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: With regard to the 12th, what time did the interrogation start?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It was in the morning.

MR RAUTENBACH: Could you perhaps give us some indication, we want to have a look at the duration?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I can’t really give you a specific time frame. It was approximately 9, 10 o’clock in the morning.

MR RAUTENBACH: You have already said that the two people who were directly involved were Mostert and Engelbrecht and that you and Zeelie went to look from time to time to see how the interrogation was going.

MR VAN NIEKERK: We walked in. We were in the vicinity.

MR RAUTENBACH: At approximately what time did Mr Bopape die, as you remember it?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I think it was after 12 in the afternoon.

MR RAUTENBACH: If we give an estimate of this period that Mr Bopape was questioned, would you agree with a guesstimate of approximately 3 hours? That he was interrogated for 3 hours?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, it’s possible. I think it could be correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you tell us, with regard to Du Preez, who came on to the scene from Sandton, what time did Du Preez arrive at the office, at the interrogation?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I can’t say.

MR RAUTENBACH: Was it quite early in the morning, late in the afternoon? When did he arrive?

MR VAN NIEKERK: He arrived after the interrogation. After Mr Mostert, Engelbrecht, Zeelie and myself decided that we were going to use the shock device. Only after that, he was contacted. And then he arrived. He was totally out of the picture.

MR RAUTENBACH: Is it possible for you to give us a time framework? When did this decision take place, to get this shock device from Sandton?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I can’t tell you. It was during the course of the morning, I really didn’t keep a record of the time. I can’t help you in that regard.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, while these people were interrogated and we know that Zeelie was with his own work and every now and then he has a look to see what’s going on with the interrogation. We also know that you were busy with something else in your office. Who was in command of the interrogation at that stage?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I was in command.

MR RAUTENBACH: You?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: What did you find at the points when you had to go and look at the interrogation? What was taking place?

MR VAN NIEKERK: The interrogators, Mostert and Engelbrecht were sitting at a desk. If I remember Mostert was behind the desk with documents in front of him and Mr Engelbrecht, I can’t really remember where he was. Mr Bopape was sitting in front of the desk, that is how I can remember it.

MR RAUTENBACH: To put it to you in this way, did they make use of an interpreter or not?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I don’t follow the question.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did they make use of an interpreter?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No, there was no one else.

MR RAUTENBACH: Which language were they using?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It was English or Afrikaans. I’m not quite sure.

MR RAUTENBACH: So it was English or Afrikaans in which the conversation took place?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No, I’m not quite sure. It would have been in Afrikaans or English. I almost think Mr Bopape could speak Afrikaans.

MR RAUTENBACH: I read from your testimony and you can also qualify it, that you had a look at more than one opportunity to see how it’s going with the interrogation?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I didn’t necessarily go to see what’s going on with the interrogation, I moved in and out but I did move in and out a few times.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did you in any way notice, whilst you were going in and out that there was frustration on the side of Mostert and Engelbrecht with this person that they were interrogating?

MR VAN NIEKERK: If I can remember correctly, Mr Mostert, at a particular point indicated that this man wasn’t going to co-operate.

MR RAUTENBACH: And did you, because of that information talk to Mr Bopape to get his co-operation at a particular stage and perhaps that gave rise to it?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I sat with him alone and talked to him, as I testified earlier.

MR RAUTENBACH: And what was the result of that?

MR VAN NIEKERK: He just said that he had nothing to say. He didn’t want to co-operate and it was quite clear to me that he didn’t want to co-operate.

MR RAUTENBACH: The decision to get the shock device from Sandton, was that taken by you?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It was an idea mentioned in the group and I said, "right, let’s do it", I sanctioned it.

MR RAUTENBACH: Who proposed it?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I can’t tell you.

MR RAUTENBACH: When the device was obtained, it’s on the scene, it’s going to be used, what was the reason for Bopape being tied to the chair?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It was part of the tactic. To keep his body stable. Otherwise when the shock was administered, his body would have pulled away and he would have moved and then he could be injured. It was a method to tie him.

MR RAUTENBACH: If you say, if he pulls, moves, you have experience, when people are shocked with these devices, what happens? Especially in the sense of having been tied down, in other words giving a very strong twitch or pull - it would of course depend on the extent and the intensity of the shock, but his body would start shivering. Do you have any technical knowledge of the number of volts, amps, involved when using these machines?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No.

MR RAUTENBACH: You referred in your testimony to the fact that this particular device is applied for approximately 2 or 3 minutes?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is the process, yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: Is it possible for you to give an indication that when such a person is shocked and it is turned, how long does this one shock take? I don’t know. Is it seconds? 30 Seconds? What is the duration of a shock?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It’s approximately 10, 20 seconds at a time. Yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: And you say that this took place over a period of approximately two to three minutes?

MR VAN NIEKERK: What happens is that the device is turned, the handle is turned and at the same time the poles was moved over the persons body and then the person stops turning it and the person who has been interrogated is then asked, "what do you say now?" and that is how it proceeded.

MR RAUTENBACH: As I understand it, you put the electrodes on the body, someone turns the machine, there’s an electrical shock and then it is said to him "what do you say now?", your words? In other words, have you changed your opinion?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, it was a method that was used to frighten the person. There’s a shock going through his body. He gets a fright and then he can decide to give the information.

MR RAUTENBACH: How did Bopape react to the first shock?

MR VAN NIEKERK: He never reacted.

MR RAUTENBACH: Didn’t even talk?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No.

MR RAUTENBACH: Didn’t he protest in any way?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No.

MS GCABASHE: Was there no body jerk at all? You said he didn’t react. I didn’t quite understand - the physical - did his body jerk, at that point?

MR VAN NIEKERK: When the shock went through him, his body shivered, it jerked, however you would describe it.

MR RAUTENBACH: I’m interest by the fact that you say that his body shivered when the shock went through him.

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, it’s a shiver, it’s a jerk. Because he was tied down.

MR RAUTENBACH: And after he’s been shocked you say there was no reaction on his side? He didn’t say anything, he didn’t say "right, I’m going to tell you now what the information is". He also didn’t protest in any way?

MR VAN NIEKERK: What do you mean with protest?

MR RAUTENBACH: For example, when he said, "please don’t do this to me", did you think of the possibility that after he had already been shocked the first time, that something could be wrong with him? That that could have been the reason why he’s not reacting?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No, it didn’t come up.

MR RAUTENBACH: After the second time that he was shocked, he also didn’t react?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Once again, it didn’t occur to you that something is wrong with him? The fact that he is not reacting in any way?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did you ask the members present specifically with regard to the treatment they gave him before he was shocked, whether he was assaulted, were there any method of coercion was used on him?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I can’t remember. I doubt whether I asked that. I saw him myself and according to me, he had not been assaulted.

MR RAUTENBACH: With regards to methods of coercion, we already dealt with the electrical shocks that was used from time to time. Can you give us any examples of any other methods of coercion used?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Other members would have assaulted the person.

MR RAUTENBACH: Could you perhaps describe this?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Often it is referred to certain methods of coercion which afterwards could not be easily be detected. Methods that don’t show any signs.

MR RAUTENBACH: Examples perhaps?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I have heard that they put a bag over a person’s head and then they suffocate him. I don’t know quite how it works, I’ve just heard about this.

MR RAUTENBACH: The whole question of using water, I suppose you must have heard about this that water is used in this process with the so-called tube pulled over the face?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, it’s also a way of suffocating someone where they place it over his nose and mouth and you basically suffocate him.

MR RAUTENBACH: With regard to the process of interrogation, is it possible for you to just give an indication? I take it the process first starts with ordinary interrogation?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes. Normally 90%. It is by discussing.

MR RAUTENBACH: And if the discussion doesn’t help? What would be the second step?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That would depend on the person interrogating. He might decide that he is going to assault the person or he might make use of a shock device or perhaps a different method.

MR RAUTENBACH: The use of the shock device, isn’t that something very drastic?

MR VAN NIEKERK: When the interrogators become really desperate. This shock apparatus could be very drastic if it’s used for a long period of time, then it can become quite drastic.

MR RAUTENBACH: And in this particular case, your testimony is that you weren’t aware of any other methods of coercion before the shock device?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Do you mean on Mr Bopape?

MR RAUTENBACH: Yes.

MR VAN NIEKERK: No. I was there the Sunday morning and I would have seen had he been assaulted or had a wet bag been used over his head. I would have known about it.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, is it possible for you to say and I think it is of crucial importance to give an indication of how long this interrogation took before the point was reached where it was said, "we are not progressing, let’s get this apparatus from Sandton."

MR VAN NIEKERK: It could have been two to three hours. I’m honest with you when I say that I’m not quite sure, I didn’t really keep track of time on that particular day.

MR RAUTENBACH: But at all times you had the impression, right from the start that he did not want to co-operate?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: You don’t know at what time Du Preez was contacted to say "bring the machine"?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I’m guessing. It could have been in the vicinity of 12 o’clock. It can’t help the Commission, I am honest, I am speculating.

MR RAUTENBACH: Am I correct when I say that there was a practise, I think it was prescribed when someone is detained in terms of Section 29 that that person shortly afterwards he has been detained, to be taken to a District Surgeon?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, that is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: What was the position with regard to Mr Bopape? Was he taken to the District Surgeon after his detention?

MR VAN NIEKERK: If I can remember correctly, he was taken to the District Surgeon.

MR RAUTENBACH: When would that have been? You were in command of the interrogation? When was it that he was taken to the District Surgeon?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I think it was on the 10th June, the day that he was transferred from Roodepoort to John Vorster Square.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you give us an indication, if it’s possible, what time would that have been, that he went to the District Surgeon?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I can’t say.

MR RAUTENBACH: If he was taken to the District Surgeon, does the District Surgeon give a report?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes. A report is then completed and then it is placed in his detention file.

MR RAUTENBACH: Who was in charge of that file?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Usually it comes back to the detention or interrogation file and it is then available for the interrogators or whomever wants to have a look at it.

MR RAUTENBACH: Are you aware of such a report or where such a report is?

MR VAN NIEKERK: If I can remember correctly, I saw that report. I also testified at the previous sitting. I’m not sure whether I saw it before Mr Bopape’s death or afterwards but I can almost imagine that I saw it.

MR RAUTENBACH: You don’t know what happened to it?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It must have been in the detention file. That is where I should have seen it, or in a copy at the District Surgeon.

MR RAUTENBACH: In other words, it might still be something that can be obtained, this report. Is that how you see it?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, it’s possible.

MR RAUTENBACH: And then also you referred to the 10th June that he was referred to the District Surgeon, you don’t know when? I suppose he would have been taken by Mostert or Engelbrecht?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Not necessarily. Any member could have taken him for that purpose.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk the decision, could you just tell us how is a decision taken, which requirements have to be met to put someone in detention under Section 29?

MR VAN NIEKERK: If I can remember correctly, there has to be enough facts because the Act states certain requirements for detention under Section 29 and the report is then sent to head office with the motivation report. It is then approved and when it .....[end of side ‘A’] ....... reasons why he is then detained under Section 29. MR RAUTENBACH: The decision that the person be detained under Section 29 is that, as I understand you, a decision that is taken by someone at head office?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I think the decision comes from the particular Security Branch where they decide that there are enough grounds. It then goes to head office where the approval is given. And then an officer designated by the Act that has to inform him. So I think the decision actually lies with the Security Branch.

MR RAUTENBACH: I just want to say this to you, because it will become of importance later on as I understand you, it is a question of recommendation made by the Branch who then has to motivate why this person has to be detained under Section 29?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is why I said earlier that West Rand Security Branch would still be involved with the detention and the application of that.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now that recommendation is then given to head office to say "these are the grounds why this person has to be detained under Section 29"? Correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No. Head Office just then gave a specific order.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now this person is not detained before that particular order is given, Court Order. Now before that, the Law determines that a senior officer with the rank of Colonel or higher had then the competence that when he had the information that he then could detain the person. I don’t want there to be a misunderstanding, as I understand it, we have initial arrests, according to Act 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act, that it initially and then certain information is sent to the Head Office, in other words to get a Warrant to detain the person according to Section 29. And waiting for that Warrant, there was another process where an Officer was authorised to detain the person. When is this person then viewed to be in detention under Section 29 where he is now informed that you are being detained under Section 29?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I accept it’s the moment when he is not subject to the stipulations of Section 50 and then that Officer says, "I am now detaining you under Section 29", and then a document is signed, that is then an initial Warrant.

MR RAUTENBACH: A document is signed? Now with regard to the signing of this document, who would have done this in the case of Bopape?

MR VAN NIEKERK: If I remember correctly, it would have been General Du Toit.

MR RAUTENBACH: And with regard to the Warrant, it says - that would then follow from Head Office later on?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now the documentation, with regard to the signing of the document by General Du Toit, as well as the Warrant from Head Office, where would we get that?

MR VAN NIEKERK: The document that was signed by Du Toit would be in the detention file and the Warrant from Head Office, I believe in the light of the deceased and the escape that that never realised because the person wasn’t there anymore.

MR RAUTENBACH: Do you think that this file would, in any case, still exist or has it been destroyed?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Chairperson, I left the Police in ‘95, I don’t know what the position is with files. I have no idea.

MR RAUTENBACH: Was there ever, while you were there, that instruction that you had to destroy files?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, there was.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now, if there had been such an instruction, had it been executed or not?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, a few files had been destroyed. I don’t know whether the detention files had been destroyed.

MR RAUTENBACH: Which kinds of files had been destroyed?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Files on suspects, activists, personal files, as we knew them.

MR RAUTENBACH: A file on a suspect, is that not a personal file?

MR VAN NIEKERK: This is a detention file. It’s a file with the regard to the history, it’s something else.

MR RAUTENBACH: The process, which you have already explained, the taking the person to the District Surgeon. You’ve brought this into relevance with Section 29. Was this done - Mr Bopape, was he taken to the District Surgeon before or after his official detention in terms of Section 29?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I cannot tell you.

MR RAUTENBACH: You cannot tell me? Something I just want to clear up with you, this question of Du Preez. He comes from Sandton with the machine, the device, is there any reason why Du Preez had to be present during the interrogation? But was he present?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: Why then was he present?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I can’t tell you, maybe he was asked, I cannot answer you.

MR RAUTENBACH: I’m going a bit further, it seems to me that at this stage when the body was removed to the vicinity of Witbank in Bronkhorstspruit was Du Preez - did he go with you? Why did he go with you?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I don’t think there was a specific reason why but we’ve got a body in the car and we drove and I think we wanted two cars in case something happens along the way.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did he know - just one minute - as far as Du Preez is concerned, the fact that he went with you in the transportation of the body seems to me it was coincidental?

MR VAN NIEKERK: After Mr Bopape died, he was involved in the whole issue, and maybe that caused the fact that he remained involved.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did you know anything of Bopape before he was arrested at this specific incident?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No.

MR RAUTENBACH: So you didn’t know he was in detention before?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I have realised this now but before I never knew that.

MR RAUTENBACH: What concerns the role Mr Kleynhans played, what was his rank? I forgot, what was his rank, Mr Kleynhans?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I think he was a Captain.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then we’re talking about Captain Jan Kleynhans which I met in Roodepoort but in this incident there’s also another Kleynhans which comes - . as far as Mr Kleynhans was concerned [inaudible] Roodepoort, that’s where I met him but he was in Krugersdorp. It seems from his evidence that these people, Bopape, Nkosi, come to your knowledge after investigations done by the Krugersdorp Branch and Pretoria?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: The involvement of your member in the arrest, I’d like to get clarification on that. It was because of a request placed by Krugersdorp because they operated in your area?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That’s correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: So there were members of Roodepoort, as well as members of your branch which had a hand in the arrest?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, they told me that afterwards.

MR RAUTENBACH: Something I would like to have more clarity on. Here’s a group of people from Krugersdorp and they are looking for certain suspects. This is how the situation starts?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I don’t know how Krugersdorp’s investigation went.

MR RAUTENBACH: Right, you don’t know what happened with the Krugersdorp investigation?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Exactly.

MR RAUTENBACH: When these people were arrested on the grounds of - .. because of the fact that Krugersdorp requested this. How does it happen that interrogation takes place at John Vorster Square without the knowledge of the people at Krugersdorp who was actually after this person?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I gave evidence this morning that after the arrest of these people I was informed that they were transferred to Roodepoort and not John Vorster.

MR RAUTENBACH: Okay, to Roodepoort. Now the second thing happening. From Roodepoort he’s transferred to John Vorster, is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you just give us more information with regards to this. How does it happen that the people who are at Krugersdorp, these are the people who looked for them at first, now they are in detention at Krugersdorp. Why, for what reasons are they transferred to John Vorster?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Because the Security Branch in Krugersdorp probably asked General Erasmus for assistance at that stage because if you look at the whole issue and the whole case, there were a big group of people arrested and probably there was not enough room for detention. Maybe they didn’t have enough people to interrogate them so we helped them out as far as interrogation is concerned.

MR RAUTENBACH: You see this links to other questions which was asked by members of the panel which is, and I would like you to explain, if possible. Let’s accept the fact that you cannot detain all these people at Krugersdorp. One would expect that people who know things about this enquiry and the reason why he was looked for by the Krugersdorp people, surely they would get involved at John Vorster if these people were sent to John Vorster?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I think the reason, and I’m speculating, I think the reason is, today we know there was a big group of people arrested, referring to this whole act of terror and the extent of that. Maybe they didn’t have enough members to interrogate these people. That was probably the reason why they sent them to John Vorster to help with the interrogating because if you look at the whole case, it was a very very serious case and before this incident there were lots of acts of terror, murders, bombs exploding in the vicinity of Pretoria and a lot of people are arrested and I don’t think they had enough hands to handle all of them and the information was of crucial importance. I think that was the whole idea behind West Rand. Because they could also have detained these people at another place and eventually, speak to them, but I speculate but I thought they wanted to obtain information as quickly as possible and that’s why they asked for our help.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, if I understand you correctly, as you’ve given this before, it doesn’t seem as if there were actual information from Bopape that he was involved at certain events?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No. That’s not what Captain Kleynhans told me. The Saturday afterwards he told me pertinently that he forms part of the Maponye Group and he was linked widely with them and afterwards I realised that there was a lot of information concerning this. Because you see, this was as far as the investigation was concerned.

MR RAUTENBACH: If there was so much information around Bopape and there were specific things which he was accused of, it wouldn’t have been necessary to gain this information from himself. He had to give you the information. I think, I’m not quite sure exactly what West Rand’s Security Branch had but if I look at the statement submitted to you earlier, that of Moleleke. It’s evident that even he said that he wasn’t always aware of who Mr Bopape was. He might be in Johannesburg, he might be in West Rand. They had no control over him. And in his statement [inaudible] discussed it with Maponye and he says, and Moleleke says that he gave him weapons. Would I be correct Mr Van Niekerk if I say, that in the light of all these people arrested, and in the light of the incident which took place, the Police wanted to obtain as quickly as possible, as much information as possible?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I think that was very important. I think information was quite important if you look at the whole picture of this Maponye Group and the acts that took place. I speculate when I say this, maybe there were quite a few other people they were looking for, I do not know.

MR RAUTENBACH: But were you told and I’m referring specifically to Mr Kleynhans, were you told that it was urgent to obtain the information?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I cannot remember. I think that’s what he told me.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, if there’s something from your evidence which is quite clear it’s that the Police wanted this information urgently?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I wouldn’t say it’s not so. What I’m saying is that I cannot remember if Mr Kleynhans said it was urgent but the facts that were submitted to me, it seemed absolutely urgent and because it was urgent a lot of pressure was place on Bopape.

MR RAUTENBACH: As much pressure as possible to obtain this information, is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: And it’s in this - referring to this and the evidence you’ve given that the shock device was used in order to make him talk? Is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: As far as this is concerned, I would like to put it to you that as far as the family is concerned, of Mr Bopape, is the suspicion there that the pressure that was placed on him was more than just two or three turns of the shock device. This is what the family is thinking. And that’s why I’m questioning you in this manner.

MR VAN NIEKERK: I’ve said this under oath and I’ve said it the previous time, this is what happened and I see that the family doesn’t believe what we said but this is really what happened. There were no other torture methods applied. This is all that happened.

MR RAUTENBACH: But still you say the fact that a person dies because of two or three turns by this machine is very improbable. It’s not normal.

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, I was surprised, I was shocked. It was very strange for me.

MR RAUTENBACH: You didn’t think that this could not have happened?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That’s correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Rautenbach, I’ve just received information that the caterers will only be here at quarter past one so if you want to continue a bit longer, it’s just after 1 o’clock now, we’ve got a few minutes to go.

MR RAUTENBACH: Yes, I will, thank you.

MR MOLOI: Let me just ask you one question. Why were you surprised that Bopape died as a result of the shock?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I didn’t expect it. The few times it was turned and what I’ve seen in front of me, it was just a shock, a surprise.

MR MOLOI: As I understand your evidence, you had no knowledge of the voltage of the apparatus, did you?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That’s correct.

MR MOLOI: Do you have any knowledge of the amount of voltage that had to be administered for it to result in the death of a person?

MR VAN NIEKERK: No.

MR MOLOI: Why were you surprised then?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Because from previous experience and the previous times I was involved in this and from what I’ve heard, it’s never happened and therefore it was a surprise.

MR MOLOI: Thank you.

MS GCABASHE: Just to finish a point that again still doesn’t quite - that I don’t quite understand, somewhere in these documents there’s reference to the cloths being wet. The cloths around the points of the wires being wet. Is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That’s correct.

MS GCABASHE: On my understanding you wet those cloths so you have a severe shock or severe current, so the current that’s being applied should be very severe - that’s why you wet the cloth?

MR VAN NIEKERK: So there’s a stronger current.

MS GCABASHE: And these cloths were wet from the outset? You didn’t test on drier wires at all?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I cannot remember if it was dry and then wet. I accept it was wet. I’m not quite sure.

MS GCABASHE: The intention was to induce severe shock, that’s why you wet them?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That was practise. If it was wet it gave a stronger shock.

MS GCABASHE: I have also had a look at Volume 3 of the documents before us and I notice references here on the 11th June to medication given to Mr Bopape. Do you know anything about that? It’s page 745 of Volume 3.

MR VAN NIEKERK: When I looked at all of this I also saw that medication was prescribed to Mr Bopape by the District Surgeon but I wasn’t aware of it at that stage.

MS GCABASHE: Before you apply these electric shocks, don’t you ascertain, even from an occurrence book from notes like this that are freely available to you what the persons medical condition might be?

MR VAN NIEKERK: If there was a problem, a medical problem, which the doctor would have indicated to us the investigation officer would have known about it and there would have been notes. So which would have made us aware of this but I was not aware of this. And the Security officials didn’t tell me of this. I had to make sure but I didn’t.

MS GCABASHE: [inaudible] .. he was interrogated in this manner in the passage, that’s right?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That’s correct.

MS GCABASHE: A passage that has various doors coming off and into that passage?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MS GCABASHE: So anybody who happened to be working in their offices could have come out, stood around and spectated, had a look at what was going on, yes?

MR VAN NIEKERK: If it was a normal working day, yes. But this was a Sunday, there was control as far as interest was concerned, doors locked and no one allowed entrance and as far as that was concerned, no one could have seen us and it was completely secure.

MS GCABASHE: If there any particular reason why this chair wasn’t dragged back into what I will call the interrogation room where the desk was, where they had been initially?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I don’t think there was a reason for that, I just think it was for convenience sake. It was a heavy chair, we just pushed him out and the corridor was very wide - quite big and the other office door was quite a way off. So there was no reason why we didn’t push him all the way up the corridor.

MS GCABASHE: One final question on this aspect, had Stanza Bopape not died, had he not reacted at all, you say he didn’t react at all - what would your next step of interrogation have been? What next would you then do?

MR VAN NIEKERK: We would have probably applied larger, bigger shocks or we would have taken him back to the cells and started next time, it’s difficult to say.

MR DE JAGER: But there are some of the activists who never gave any information, despite what you did to them?

MR VAN NIEKERK: There were cases like that, Mr Chairperson.

MR DE JAGER: But even though the torture wouldn’t lead them to give you any evidence?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Yes, I remember there were cases like that.

MR DE JAGER: And despite that, despite the force and the coercion, Mr Bopape received, he was not willing to give you any information?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That is correct.

MR DE JAGER: Did he tell you that he was not going to give you any information because that would mean that I betray my people or did he not give you any reasons why he didn’t want to give you any information?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I spoke to him and that morning he told me, I can’t really remember the exact words, but he said, he didn’t really say, he didn’t give me a reason why he didn’t want to co-operate with us.

MR RAUTENBACH: You mentioned, Mr Van Niekerk ... [intervention]

MR DE JAGER: Mr Rautenbach, this device used, was it a telephone or what?

MR RAUTENBACH: No Mr Chairperson, it’s a square metal container - it’s the first time I actually saw this specific device. One side had a sling - it was like an old fashioned telephone and two electrical cords coming out of it which was naked, it was covered in cloth and the sling was turned and the cords were placed.

MR DE JAGER: Is that not the inside bit of an old telephone?

MR RAUTENBACH: Yes, I don’t know what the technical name is. I think it’s something like a dynamo, something like that. I’m not quite sure, it’s generated power.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van Niekerk, regarding the same aspect, you answered and said that if he lived, what would the next step be, you said that maybe you would have applied greater shocks. Can you remember that answer? Can you just explain that to us, how do you apply bigger shocks?

MR VAN NIEKERK: The intensity would be increased by turning the device for a longer time, although the power ends would be kept to a specific part of his body.

MR RAUTENBACH: Do you carry any knowledge that should a person be shocked and he is shocked continuously, let’s say, over hours, he’s being shocked continuously, what influence would that have on a person?

MR VAN NIEKERK: If he’s shocked for hours on end he will die later.

MR RAUTENBACH: And Mr Van Niekerk, let’s assume, I give you this situation. You already indicated that you were shocked because only two to three turns caused his death, is that correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: That’s correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: I assume then that if he was shocked over a period of hours continuously and he then died, like you said, in those circumstances you would not have been surprised if he died, correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: The statement sounds correct, yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: And then I’m going to make the next statement, if he lived then you would have kept applying larger shocks, correct?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: And how long would this procedure have carried on?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Maybe another five minutes, ten minutes.

MR RAUTENBACH: Twenty minutes? Where would he have stopped?

MR VAN NIEKERK: Personally I would have stopped shortly.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you give us more, can you make it clearer to us? What do you mean when you say you would have stopped shortly? At which stage would you have stopped?

MR VAN NIEKERK: I wouldn’t have carried on with it, not how long for, I cannot tell you.

MR RAUTENBACH: How would he have to look, how would Mr Bopape have to look before you would have stopped?

MR VAN NIEKERK: It’s not how he would have looked. If after five to ten minutes he didn’t want to talk, it means he was not willing to talk at all.

MR RAUTENBACH: So his physical appearance, would it have been an indication to you for when you should stop?

MR VAN NIEKERK: At a stage, yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: What made you thi