CHAIRPERSON: Everybody, can we settle down? It's half past eight and I really want to start at half past eight as it - eight thirty strictly today.

We have a very long programme and some very important role-players talking about their submissions today. Essentially dealing with the - again SANLAM which spreads across many areas of our economy, The Mining Sector and of course the Trade Union Movement. We also have some submissions dealing with the agricultural sector today.

Let me just say that - and it's always difficult at this time of the morning when we have so few people talking, but it's on record. We in the Commission have a few regrets about this hearing. Part of that of course is that one always feel - we always feel that we're pressurising people as they make their submissions and not enough groupings have been allowed to come forward and allowed to be able to speak to their submissions.

This morning, for example, I heard on the news that the Exford workers marched in Port Elizabeth and they have made - they made quite a substantial submission dealing with the issues of that time and relating to their particular problems. We hope that COSATU will be able to deal with the sentiments of what's coming out within their submission.

Let me also say so that it's on record. When we consulted with the trade union movement, there was a possibility that each trade unions movements, that each federation, each grouping affiliated to the federation, would be allowed to make a submission.

In fact the agreement went the other way that COSATU, through their discussions, decided that they would only make one submission, but that we would have to allow them more time to speak and I think it's only fair given the submissions that we've had from the business sector over the last three days; a number of submissions - that COSATU is allowed that time this morning.

So with that I want to welcome the representative from SANLAM. Sir, would you please introduce yourself for the record.

MR SMITH: Chairperson, my name is Desmond Smith. I'm managing director of SANLAM.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Smith, a warm welcome to you.

Again, can I say, we have your submission and it's quite a lengthy submission. We would like you please to speak to the important points in your submission. We had some discussion earlier on and you told me that you will speak within in the 15 minutes allocated and then there will be questions.

Can I just introduce the panel. On my left is Dr Russel Ally who is a member of the Human Rights Violations Committee, based here in Johannesburg.

On my right is the deputy chairperson of the Commission, a Commissioner and a member of the Human Rights Violations Committee.

Next to him, is the Rev Bongani Finca, who is a Commissioner and member of the Human Rights Violations Committee and is in charge of the East London office.

Next to Bongani is Ms Hlengiwe Mkhize, who is the Chairperson of the Reparation and Rehabilitations Committee and a Commissioner and is also based here in Johannesburg.

On that table I see Prof Simkins has removed himself, but he's welcome to sit on the table if he wishes. Two of our researchers, Mr Simon Segal and Ms Tracy Steyn.

Thank you, Mr Smith, the floor is yours. Before you do that, can you please stand to take the oath or affirmation. Russel, will you assist?

DR ALLY: Mr Smith, the oath or the affirmation.

MR SMITH: The oath.

DR ALLY: The oath.

DESMOND SMITH: (Duly sworn in, states).

DR ALLY: Thank you.

MR SMITH: Chairperson and members of the Commission, also just for the record, it's 25 to now and not half past.

On behalf of SANLAM's board and management, may I thank you that from the many representations and submissions you got from business, we have been given the opportunity to speak to our submission.

If it's okay with you, I will speaking in English. If you don't understand, we do have an Afrikaans submission that you can look at.

With your permission Sir, I'd like to speak to our submission, but furthermore I was here yesterday. I would like to comment on one or two issues which were raised yesterday afternoon which I'm - I believe I can add a further perspective to.

With regards to our submission, we, the individuals constituting the present board and management of SANLAM, acknowledge that in conducting its business, SANLAM functioned in a political and social environment which violated human rights on enormous scale and was fundamentally wrong, immoral and unjust.

We furthermore acknowledge that this environment caused untold hardship, suffering and grief to the people of colour and further that SANLAM as a member of a privileged group benefitted from Apartheid in one way or another, relative to members of disadvantaged groups.

Chairperson, this unjust system which I have just described and the suffering it caused people of colour, leave us with a deep sense of sadness and regret. Regret and sadness that we, the enfranchised citizens of the country allowed the system of hurtful, institutionalised violations of human rights to be established and developed in this country.

In our submission we refer to a specific issue which I should like to address. Steve Biko was tortured in a SANLAM building in Port Elizabeth. I refer to paragraph 13 of our submission. In cases where the security police of the former Government were tenants of SANLAM property, we had no access to such offices.

As is the case with the current Government, our leases specified in respect of such properties and I quote:

SANLAM thus had no prior knowledge of cases of violation of human rights on its properties and like the general public we had to rely on available public information through media reports on that time - at that time the allegations against security police actions.

As these violations on our properties and others as are revealed in courts and through this Commission, we share in the perplexity and the pain of the nation and we regret that such atrocities were perpetrated and furthermore; that our property was misused by the security police of the previous Government.

We distance ourselves from any violations of human rights and we convey our most sincere condolences to the victims of such violations in our buildings. Also to those of bomb explosions on our properties in Amanzimtoti and elsewhere in our country.

Chairperson, although the submission reports to be that of SANLAM it is really an expression of sentiments by individuals. I and individuals constituting the present board and management of our organisation.

A corporation such as SANLAM is a legal entity with no independent emotions. It's decisions and actions are taken by individuals who constitute the various levels of management, non-executive as well as executive.

In making this submission, we as the present board and generation of management are really attempting to articulate what we consider were the factors and circumstances which influenced and prompted ourselves and preceding generations of management in regard to the matters under consideration.

This is a very difficult and complex task, because (a) there exists apart from the required, your minutes and similar documentation, no real reliable continuous corporate memory and (b) because various generations of management operated in different environments, were subject to different influences and had different insights.

Furthermore, one must remember that a generation span in corporate life, i.e. of members of the board and senior management, is mostly much shorter than a generation span of human beings.

What is my task today? Chairperson, in view of the acknowledgement and admission we have expressed earlier on, it seems that the fundamental question which calls for an explanation today is, why did the individuals constituting SANLAM's management over the years, in their capacity as management, failed to take a strong outspoken and vociferous stand against the injustice of Apartheid.

It is this question we attempt to address in our submission against the background of historical and environmental prospectives.

In paragraph three of our submission we say, and I quote:

My I stress we advance these prospectives, not as an explanation - as an explanation for inaction, not as an excuse or a justification.

May I furthermore say that what I wish to present is tabled with the view to contributing to learning and understanding - learning from and understanding the past and applying this to a better and more just future.

A couple of comments of SANLAM and its environment. The previous Government developed, institutionalised Apartheid since 1948, although its forerunner, segregation, had a colonial and historical origin long before that.

The previous Government was predominantly supported by Whites and Afrikaans speaking people. This explains why the so-called separate development policy was part and parcel of White community thinking at the time.

In his presentation the AHI aptly put it in this way and I see they are here. I hope they don't mind my quoting from their submission.

SANLAM had its origins in this section of the community. i'm therefore suggesting and admitting that many individuals in SANLAM board - SANLAM's board and top management undoubtedly supported the previous Government and its policy.

If I may make reference to an issue that was raised before the Commission yesterday; you do not as a businessman depart from home for the office in the morning, leaving your thinking, feeling, prejudices at home and suddenly transform into a different person. You take your baggage along with you.

The approach of the previous Government, Chairperson, turned out to be totally wrong, but undoubtedly tended to influence, re-assure and even lull earlier management into a sense of acceptance of the initiatives by politicians to establish institutionalised Apartheid.

It is a fact that disillusionment set in over time. In paragraph eight of our submission, we refer to the repugnance of many aspects of the Apartheid policy felt by individuals in SANLAM's management.

May I just rectify a possible misleading expression in our submission. The heading of paragraph eight is the "Demonising of Apartheid." We mean by this; what we say in the paragraph, i.e. that it became clear over time that Apartheid was immoral and unjust and became repugnant.

A more accurate heading, which is reflected in an updated submission would be 'The repugnance of Apartheid'.

I concede with hind sight that these noises and objections were much too weak from SANLAM's managements and board and I wish to express my regrets. However, I should like to proceed to attempt to explain why SANLAM's voice - or for that matter, the voices of its management were not as loud and critical as one now would have wished.

A couple of comments on our relations with the political establishment. Chairperson, it is our conviction that the management of an individual business organisation and I stress, an individual business organisation, cannot in their capacity as managers of that organisation afford to attempt, nor do they have the power or mandates in my view, to influence politicians by publicly attacking their policies.

I submit that it is accordingly unrealistic to expect of those managements that they should act as a watch dog against violations of human rights. We make the point in our submission that this is really a political matter and business has a total different function in society, i.e. to create wealth.

Furthermore, Chairperson, the Government is so powerful and dominant in economy of our country, that individual business cannot afford to cross swords with politicians.

I refer to our submission, paragraph ten. I believe that this is an extremely important issue which I - will have to - which will have to be addressed in future and for which I, at this stage, do not have an answer.

The dual role of the governing party in its capacity as government on the one hand and a major participant in the economy on the other, is of concern.

This is surely not the forum to debate the issue of a free market approach to the economy as opposed to alternatives and the Government's role in this regard. The fact is, Sir, that the Government and the governing political party did and still do, in their capacities as government and political party, play a dual role, namely that of a governing legislating regulating entity, but on the other hand a major direct participant in economy and as such a substantial client of many enterprises in which it also has a substantial hand in regulating.

This undoubtedly, and I speak from personal experiences, places business enterprises in an unenviable situation.

SANCOB in their submission, paragraphs 5.4 and 6.1 also refers to this vulnerability of and individual business and individuals to retaliation by the authorities. An equally important consideration is that a company such as SANLAM, operating nationally, has members, a work force in the market which covers the whole spectrum of political thought. Since a business has to be successful to survive, it cannot afford to estrange any of these stake holders. I refer to paragraphs 12 and 13 of our submission.

In the press, Chairperson, I see, that mention is made by a member of the present Government; that a common decency requires the humility of saying I was wrong. It was because of our cowardness and self-interest that we did not speak up. As far as he refers to SANLAM as a company as opposed to the individuals constituting senior management, I agree; that the company acted in self-interest and in the interest of its stake holders.

It is after all the legal and moral duty of a manager to act in the interests of the company and its stake holders. He may not allow his own actions in promoting his own views to damage the interest of his company. SANLAM, Sir, and I believe this is important to you, is a mutual company and this is of particular importance.

Without share holders, our policy holders and members own our company and control it with all its assets. Any set backs suffered by the company would therefore also have reduced the wealth of our members, many of the disadvantaged groups.

It is our position, Chairperson, that the protection of human rights should be sought in the elements of society, other than individual business enterprises. In the business arena, associations of business enterprises, for example the AHI or SANCOB could perhaps be expected to put pressure on Government, should they infringe human rights.

We say this, because due to their structure such associations are not as vulnerable to retaliation as our individuals and individual enterprises.

We also point out in paragraphs 26 - 29 of our submission that the necessary check and balances should be put in place. This can only be done by Parliament, the legislator. We deal with these aspects more fully in our submission.

In the process of re-addressing imbalances in society, SANLAM I believe took bold and pioneering initiatives, which Mr Chairman, is evidence of a serious commitment to upliftment and reparation of the disadvantaged communities.

We elaborate on these in paragraphs 22 - 25 of our submission. In view of the time I will not go into any further detail.

May I, before concluding, just address two issues, Chairperson, which were raised yesterday and these deal with the Government debts and the Government employees pension fund. A submission was made here regarding a number of alternatives in dealing with Government debt.

The most (indistinct) or the most extreme being that Government debt be written off in its entirety. I'm not in a position to comment on what the reaction would be should foreign debts be written off. All I can imagine, I shudder to think what our borrowing capacity internationally would be should we do that.

As far as the domestic situation is concerned I also cannot comment on behalf of the public investment commission to which was referred. I cannot believe - speak on behalf of commercial institution which were referred to yesterday. I believe its particularly important to note that those commercial institutions are not only bank and life insurance companies, but those are also pension funds repressing the interests of all the workers of this country.

Three comments if I may? Firstly, it's important to understand and appreciate that we did not of our own free will invest in a Government debt. There were legal and statuary requirements which, up to a stage, forced us to invest up to 50 percent of our assets into Government debt.

If I may refer to a competitor's submission yesterday, the Old Mutual who was here; in annexure B they have a number of extracts from their Chairman's addresses from 1960 - 1994 and as far back as 1961 the comment was made by their Chairman against prescribed - so-called prescribed investments which were deemed as a form of indirect taxation, which in fact they were and still are.

A second point is that should in respect of banks, the investments they have in Government stock, be written off, I can assure that Dr Stals will have to come and reply here again on why a number of other banks are being given life boats or bailed out.

As far, point three, Chairman, as far as assurance companies and pension funds are concerned, it's important to note that the beneficiaries of those institutions of policy holders and members of pensions funds; any intervention such as those advocated yesterday, will have a major impact on the benefits and beneficiaries of those funds.

This is an issue which was of major importance prior to the election in 1994 where members of pension funds were concerned that the potential writing off of Government debts and also were concerned about the possibility of the so-

called nationalisation of those funds.

The situation was so critical that our now president, Mandela, put out a document to all members of pension and provident funds, reassuring them and I won't go through the document, that an ANC Government will make sure that your money is secure and that you will receive all the benefits you are entitled to when you retire.

Chairperson, I say this just to indicate that this is an extremely complex issue and a very far reaching issue that should be dealt with with great circumspection.

Secondly, a number - one or two comments on the Government pension funds. A reason was put forward why shortly before, towards to the end of the '80', beginning of the '90's, efforts were made to fund the Government pension fund to a larger extent that it had been in the past and the notion was presented here that prior to that the Government pension fund was based on a pay as you go approach.

This is in fact, I believe, not true. That the intention all along was to have a funded scheme and that after one of our previous chairmen, Dr Andreas Wassenaar's book, ON ROUTE TO FAIRY LAND, in which the Government pension fund, or where the management of it was attacked, efforts were made to reassure the employees of Government by commencing to fund those schemes.

I would advocate that we not look at approaching the Government pension fund on a pay as you go bases. One only need look at the experience in Europe in respect of national pension funds where they were in fact approached on that bases and one finds that it is very easy for politicians to make changes to those funds to enhance benefits and reap the early political benefits of those enhanced benefits that members will be receiving. The financial implications only being moved to future generations who will have to bear the burden of those funds.

Chairperson, in conclusion, the process of reform which culminated in the release of our President, Mandela, and indeed also the revelations at the hearing of this Commission, have I am sure, convinced all right thinking citizens of the country as they convinced me and my colleagues of the importance of being ever-vigilant in the protection of human rights.

I conclude by expressing the sincere hope that the TRC through its activities will in fact succeed in its aim of healing the deep wounds of the past and achieving reconciliation and national unity.

We wish you every success. Thank you, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Smith, for that very honest submission. The questions from the panel today will be primarily Dr Ally and Rev Bongani Finca.

Rev Finca?

REV FINCA: Thank you, your grace. My questions are going to bases on your main submission, Mr Smith. Your submission of the 13th of October and I will refer to specific pages. I'll start with page three, paragraph five, where you deal with the origins of SANLAM. You sketch there how your people, the Afrikaans speaking people, were destitute after the Anglo Boer War and how they pulled their resource together in SANLAM, to empower what you call poor Whites.

My question is, after 30 of years Apartheid, perhaps Black people in this country find themselves in exactly the same position. Would you recommend that they learn from SANLAM and follow what SANLAM did at the time when they responded to a particular situation?

MR SMITH: Chairperson, thank you very much. I believe it's a very relevant question and I do indeed agree with you. I think the Afrikaans speaking population in 1918 found themselves in a very similar situation to what the Black population in South African find themselves at the moment.

A situation that we as an organisation can identify very strongly with and have identified very strongly with. If I could then just refer you in this context to page ten of our submission and in particular page 22 and if I may quote from this:

I believe of particular importance, Sir, in regard to your question, the empowerment of Black investors by way of financial services organisations as opposed to a manufacturing company, creates further opportunities for Black advancement as additional capital can be provided and leveraged. The recent Johnnic transaction by NAIL is evidence of this.

If I may conclude, I believe there's a great deal to learn from SANLAM and there's a great deal we would like to share. Thank you.

REV FINCA: My second question which is related to the first one, is that on page 13 of your main submission, you recommend a number of proposals which the TRC must take to Government in order to avoid violations in the future.

You seem to be saying that you are opposed to reverse discrimination. You want to see check and balances to ensure even-handedness. You want a robust repress which will promote transparency.

My question is, did SANLAM believe in these values in 1918 when they were established and in 1948 when the National Party came into power or are these new values which you want to see now that the National Party is no longer in power?

MR SMITH: Chairperson, that's a very relevant question. Not as easy to answer as the previous one and as I say I cannot speak on behalf of management in 1918 and 1948.

May I just address the first question as it relates to a new reverse discrimination. We subscribed to the new labour acts which as yet have not finally been promulgated dealing with the questions of employment equity and more particularly with affirmative action and we subscribe to the definition of affirmative action and to the definition of discrimination as defined in those acts.

So that just from a company perspective and what we are doing within the organisation with regard to employment equity and with regard to affirmative action. I can only, thinking back and thinking back to the individuals that I have known with our - within our organisation over many years; they have been very strongly - strong-willed. People with very strong personal views and within the constraints which I have described in my oral submission here, placed on us by the mandate we have as a mutual company from our stake holders who don't have a mutual company, I believe these views that you are speaking to here were held in 1918 and 1948.

Whether we were vociferous enough as I have also indicated, my oral submission in conveying these views, I don't believe so and it's a source of great regret.

REV FINCA: On page six and seven, you acknowledge all be it very tentatively that a special relationship existed between SANLAM and the National Party and you go on to, what the lack of a better word, rejoice that a similar sound relation exist between you and the ANC Government.

Many people find this rather strange. They say that you're having the best of both worlds. Do you care to comment on that?

MR SMITH: Chairperson, as a business person, may I say that I'm delighted we're having the best of both worlds and I really am delighted that we have been able also with the new ANC Government to establish a very warm relationship.

That is the object of business. The object of business is regardless of the Government that is in place. We have to operate, we have to create wealth within the confines of the Government and the policy of that Government and regardless of the Government that is in place, we will do our utmost to - upmost to have cordial relations with that Government.

So, in so far as we have succeeded, may I say, I am delighted.

REV FINCA: Congratulations. There are those who argue that the English speaking business did not benefit from Apartheid. It is guys in the Afrikaans speaking business who benefitted.

I would like to have your comment on that and also your comment on the relationship that ANGLO had with you after Sharpeville, 1960?

(not into mike) ... English speaking business and Afrikaans speaking business in reality or was this just perceived to be a distinction in times of liberal and those who were conservative?

MR SMITH: Chairperson, if I may, I cannot comment on the relationship with ANGLO. We are not particularly close to ANGLO as an organisation. What I can comment on is in our industry, whether we as an Afrikaans speaking, predominantly Afrikaans speaking organisation, had advantages relative to our English speaking competitors.

I believe, no. I believe that we as White organisations had an advantage relative to disadvantaged - organisations within the disadvantaged community. I do not believe that there was significant advantages based on the language or on the predominant language of the business organisations.

REV FINCA: My last question is on violence. On page nine of your submission, you say that you did not support the struggle for justice in this country, because you're opposed to use of violence by the liberation movements.

Just in passing, I don't whether you know that the ANC and the PAC spent many years negotiating with the NP Government before they ultimately resorted to violence, but my real question is this one.

If it is true that you were opposed to violence, why did your Chairman, Dr Fred du Plessis, agreed to serve in the NP Government defence advisory council? Can you say in fact before this Commission, that SANLAM did not involve in the activities of ARMSCOR in any way or was it the violence of the liberations organisations which was - which you're opposed to rather than the violence of the state that is beginning to be coming out before the country in the hearings that are taking place throughout the country on amnesty?

MR SMITH: Chairman, I cannot comment on the late Dr Fred du Plessis's considerations in serving on the board of ARMSCOR. What I can imagine is that there was no appreciation for the facts of the situation of the violence taking place, being perpetrated and that it was an ignorance of this and in an effort to make a contribution to a particularly meaningful element of the economy in South Africa, namely ARMSCOR, that it was in that spirit that Dr Du Plessis served on the board of ARMSCOR.

I'm afraid I have no other comment. Thank you.

REV FINCA: Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Rev Bongani. Dr Ally, one question.

DR ALLY: This will be a long question. You just before - this is actually a follow on on the themes which Rev Bongani were developing. You said that regardless of the Government, business has to adapt, but it would seem that in SANLAM's case it was not regardless of Government, it was precisely because of the nature of the Government that SANLAM did so well.

That until 1948 SANLAM was not that big a player in the economy. That subsequent to 1948 when the Nationalist Party came into power, SANLAM's position grew quite significantly and a lot of that had to do with the direct role which Government played in moving pension funds of civil servants to SANLAM and other favours.

Now, would you not concede that on the part of Black people in the country that there may be a lot of cynicism that after having benefitted in this direct way, SANLAM now says that there must not be this direct intervention of Government in economy. It's harmful, after SANLAM has benefitted.

There must not be this reverse discrimination after SANLAM has benefitted directly from discrimination. There mustn't be this special favouritism that you - that it's easy for SANLAM to say that having benefitted.

Why shouldn't the Government do the exact same that the previous Government did to SANLAM?

MR SMITH: Chairman, it's a long question. I'll try and give a short answer. I can understand, Dr, the cynicism and I think it's quite understandable.

I don't believe if one looks at the life assurance industry as such over the last number of decades, I think you will find that the growth experienced within SANLAM has not been out of proportion to the growth within organisations such as the Old Mutual and Liberty Life and Southern Life.

That is has been an industry which has been growing and this - SANLAM has been within a growing industry. I do not dispute and I cannot dispute that because of the cordial relationship that existed between SANLAM and Government and I must assume that those cordial relationships existed between the other organisations that I referred to and Government.

I concede that we were able to do good business in that environment. I also believe that we were not doing business on a bases of not providing value, but that in actual fact we were doing it on the bases of providing value and that it was not to the ....(inaudible) of the ultimate beneficiaries of our products and services that that business was being done.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm glad I have such a disciplined panel this morning.

Mr Smith, thank you very much for coming. We hope that you will stay and listen to the rest of the submissions this morning, but thank you for your openness and for the apology that you've made this morning.

MR SMITH: Thank you very much, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Whilst Mr Moosa comes from - comes forward, can I please ask individuals who have cell phones with them to switch their cell phones off.

If I can, for the benefit of groups who've arrived since I've made my earlier comments; if I can just repeat what I said earlier on.

We have a very full agenda this morning. I ask individuals or groups speaking this morning to please be concise and summarise the relevant points they want to make, because we've all read the submissions.

I'm going to be fairly strict. I have said that most groupings will be getting only half an hour to make their submissions. Fifteen minutes for presentation and 15 minutes for - Mr Moosa, will you sit, you're making feel uncomfortable - for questioning.

I also want to make one further point. In the discussions that lead up to these hearings, there was a feeling discomfort, carefulness on the part of the business community, particularly that this doesn't turn out to be a three day function where accusations are going to be made against one group against the other.

I hope people who have been participating over the last two days have come to realise that this is not the intention of the hearings and I particularly have been very happy to see so little legal intervention over the last two days.

Today, particularly we have representatives from the Trade Union Movement who will be making submissions. We have had correspondence with different legal groupings, wanting to make, if necessary, an intervention where accusations are made.

We have a process as far as this hearings go and I hope that legal representatives for companies here will come to me if there's an issue they want to raise so that we don't take up too much time during these hearings.

Let's work in the spirit of the last three days - last two days. Mr Moosa, welcome. Do you want just introduce yourself as well as the - I think it's your son.

MR MOOSA: Yes. Mr Chairman, my name is Moosa Moosa and I am accompanied by my son Abe Moosa.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Moosa. Will you please stand to take the oath. Dr Ally.

DR ALLY: The oath or the affirmation, Mr Moosa.

MR MOOSA: The oath.

MOOSA MOOSA: (Duly sworn in, states).

DR ALLY: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Moosa, you may proceed.

MR MOOSA: Mr Chairman, firstly just to assure you that I shall confine my delivery to 15 minutes. I'm mindful of the time and the problem.

Secondly, I will speaking to my paper, but through my paper I have curtailed some of the paragraphs, so I can be brief. I also want to settle that my paper is co-ed in three sections.

The one section does give an example of my own story which exemplifies the kind of problem I believe that has to be highlighted and I will commence on that bases.

My submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are based on an account of a life's experiences which epitomise in microcosm, the ...(indistinct) circumstances which were encountered by those who found themselves on the ....(indistinct) side of the Apartheid system in the business environment.

In reflecting on those experiences it is perhaps not inappropriate for me to mention that the only time I have been to court in my life, was when as a young man I had to appear with my late mother and my brothers, in the dark, to confess to the crime of living in our home in which I was born and lived until eventually we were forcibly thrown out by the agents of the Apartheid order.

My story in the business arena is unique in that it was the first time that a group from the disadvantaged the sector, namely Avalon Cinemas, took issue with a monopolistic company, Ster Kinekor, which was a beneficiary of the Apartheid system.

The issue was addressed to the competition board, which after full investigation found that Ster Kinekor was guilty of restrictive practises and an abuse of its dominant position.

I want to give evidence of what happened to me in this particular instance, briefly, because I believe that what happened to me has happened to others of the previously disadvantaged community in different ways.

Section one - background: Avalon Cinemas was established some nearly 60 years ago and is one of the oldest cinema groups within the country. The shares owned by the Avalon Cinemas have since its inception been held by members of my family who are members of the Indian group.

At one time at its peak Avalon Cinemas had many screens operating through out the country. From Durban to Johannesburg to Cape Town, Kimberley, Paarl, Worcester, East London and Port Elizabeth, which is believed, represented in excess of ten percent of the exhibition houses and market share at the time.

This would today be represented by at least 60 - 70 screens in the course of normal business development over the years in a fair and equal opportunity business environment.

As a result of the operation of the group areas legislation in the Apartheid era, Avalon Cinemas had to close down most of its cinemas. Ultimately the remaining two were located within what was locally known as the Grey Stick Complex of Durban, an Indian group area of the Apartheid era.

A five cinema complex in Chatsworth, and Indian group area under Apartheid legislation, which is a suburb inhabited substantially by members of the Indian group, was established during that era in a major shopping centre which was built there.

The developer was a company within the same land group. An application by Avalon Cinemas to be the operator in respect of those five cinemas, was rejected after protracted negotiations. Although it was well qualified to undertake the business and was a member of the Indian group which qualified it automatically for the right to establish a business in an Indian group area in terms of the racist laws of that time.

In stead the cinemas in Chatsworth were given to Ster Kinekor. Then a SANLAM, Old Mutual subsidiary which was a member of the White group and thus disqualified in terms of the Apartheid legislation from occupying premises in an Indian group area.

In other words; although Avalon Cinemas was not entitled to retain its own cinemas in what became White areas, a White controlled company allocated to itself the right to take cinemas in an Indian area.

The group area system was accordingly being applied not only to disadvantage Avalon Cinemas in White areas, but even in areas which are set aside for Indian ownership and occupation. This was duplicity at its worst.

Thus the Ster Kinekor group was able during the Apartheid era to establish itself as a major exhibitor of films in South Africa; both in White and also (indistinct) areas and also to obtain valuable cinema complex sites in group areas designated for people of colour, like Chatsworth and to which it was not in terms of the racial laws enforced, entitled.

In submissions to the competition board in 1994, the Chatsworth issues - regarding the Chatsworth issue, Ster Kinekor had the following and I quote:

MR MOOSA: ... in Chatsworth." Unquote.

If what Ster Kinekor stated in this submission is true, then if Ster Kinekor is of the view that it did not have to apply for a group areas permit unless it was asked to do so, anyone else who wished to operate as a disqualified person in a particular group area, would have had to obtain an appropriate permit before being allowed legally to occupy premises in that area.

What was it about Ster Kinekor or any other company for that matter, that they did not have to follow this course of action as was required by the racist laws of that time? If what was therefore said, is true, that Ster Kinekor or any company only comply with the laws when they were asked to do so.

As a member of the disadvantaged, dispossessed and abused persons of the time I would never have been granted a permit to take up a cinema in a White group area. I certainly would not have been allowed to occupy such premises by any land lord without such a permit being issued to me.

Had I therefore taken such occupation of premises in an area where I was disqualified, without having applied and obtained a permit, I would have faced certain prosecution and the danger that my assets will be confiscated by the state.

I believe the Avalon issue is manifest example of many such abuses and restrictive practises which took place in various spheres of the economy during the Apartheid era.

Section two - analysis of business scenario, past and present: South Africa has historically been a monopolist paradise. The economy has been dominated by a handful of individuals who have had mass fortunes of gigantic proportions, based substantially, if not entirely on the process of unjust enrichment during the Apartheid period.

The question that has to be asked is, can we as an intended free market democracy afford to allow the monopolies to continue pulling their economic strings.

It has been reported from time to time that 14 percent of the population as the privileged sector, effectively controls the excess of 90 percent of the country's wealth. Since the Blacks, be the African, Coloureds or Asians in South Africa represent almost 86 percent of the population it will seem that eventually they must also account for 84 percent or 86 percent of the nation's wealth and disposable income, or at least a substantial part of it.

Louis Stager, Chairman of Transnet was quoted in Finance Week of November 3rd 1994 to have said:

The fortune top 500 companies in the United States contribute to 10 percent of the GDP of the United States' economy, where as it is believed that the five major conglomerates in South Africa are involved in more than 50 percent of South Africa's GDP.

If one bears in mind that the revenues or turn over of any one of those top few of these 500 fortune companies alone is larger than the entire GDP of South Africa, it then becomes very significant in understanding the inequity lopsidedness of the South African economy and a lack of competitive environment.

In the competition board report of 1995 the following was stated in paragraph four, five and six. The paragraph four refers to certain statistics, Mr Chairman, which I shan't read. It is suffice to say that I quote paragraph five and which says:

Paragraph six, and I quote:

"Various factors have contributed to this state of affairs, including over regulation of the economy, (indistinct) discriminatory race laws that for many years excluded the majority of South Africans from the effective participation in the main stream of the Republic's commercial activity and a competition policy that is deficient in a number of material aspects." Unquote.

The tragedy inherent in this entire analysis is that the situation which prevailed in the past continues unabated into the present in that the privileged business establishment is going about its conduct essentially in the business's usual approach.

Mr Chairman, I want to also add that over a protected period of some years, reinforced by my experiences of the last two days and the hearings I've sat through here, I must say that I leave today with a sense of sadness and desolation.

I see no shift in the mind set of the privileged establishment in so far as the genuine desire to really try and make good for what we have experienced in the past.

Section three - recommendations, the future: The above scenario which is unsatisfactory, continues to dictate the rest of us all are forced to accept opportunity at the rate at which this corporate establishment finds acceptable.

Opportunity is our right and we are entitled to it. Even the Government has confirmed the view from time to time; that the playing field has to be levelled so that all people of our country may develop equal opportunities.

Thus brought the rate of change and the magnitude of change even in the economic arena, must be determined through joint negotiations between all segments involved in a given industry and not arbitrary determined by the corporate establishment of South Africa.

Far more extensive strategies of empowerment must be designed to seek more ways and means by which parity of opportunity in economic participation could be achieved. That must be our goal.

Mr Chairman, I would draw your attention to the list of empowerment companies we're all familiar with and without diverting more than a moment, I wish to bring to your notice that one - when one values all these companies cumulatively put together, the total cumulative market value of these companies and we're all familiar with them, we read about them, we've heard about them; perhaps (indistinct) to enough percent of the (indistinct) market capitalised value of the Johannesburg stock exchange and that too is on the assumption that that market capitalised value of few percent is totally unencumbered and is not being colateralised in some way.

Obviously their private deals one is not privileged to the deal arrangement. What I'm trying to say to the Truth Commission; that even all those deals put together do not begin to even address the issues in my view. I'm not against the process, I support it, but I'm saying it doesn't go anywhere near to begin to address the problem.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Moosa, I'm giving you one more minute to finish, please.

MR MOOSA: Chairman, I shan't be two or three minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: One minute.

MR MOOSA: Many economists in the United States believe that anti trust laws make an important contribution to economic health and American leadership in the world economy.

Mr Chairman, in this regard, so that I can begin to terminate my delivery, what I am saying is, that we ask the Government and we recommend this to the Truth Commission that urgent steps be made to prorogate anti trust laws which encompass anti monopoly provisions.

Lastly, Mr Chairman, when one looks at the situation as it stands now, I would like to advance the request that a anti - a monopolist commission be constituted so that the issues that I've talked about and has been deliberated over the last few days, can be investigated and addresses in a manner which will bring about a just end.

Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Moosa. Dr Ally?

DR ALLY: Mr Moosa, over the past two days there have been recommendations by certain individuals, also certain organisations on the question of how to address some of these inequities and injustice from the past.

Calls for wealth tax, the issues of the debt and not necessarily, we're not abandoning the payment of the debt, but looking at other ways how this could be dealt with, because of the way in which - because of the fact that this money was used to finance and strengthen the Apartheid State.

Other than the recommendation that you have made now on the question of monopolies; what were you views and so on on some of those proposal that you put forward?

MR MOOSA: Mr Chairman, some of the suggestions that I have crystallised, I in fact present in my submission. You understandably curtailed me at quite a crucial moment, but I've tried my best to summarise it.

To answer that question, I just want to say that I think that the representations made by Prof Sampie Terblanche in the last two days, I believe merits serious consideration. That's certainly a very strong view I have having reflected on it.

DR ALLY: Was this the call for a wealth tax?

MR MOOSA: Yes. Yes, Mr Chairman.

DR ALLY: And this wealth tax, if you recall, Prof Terblanche actually spoke about it as the assets of all those people, more than two million rand. He didn't make this restrictive to White business or to White people.

So is it in an entirety that you support that recommendation?

MR MOOSA: Mr Chairman, yes, I thought about that and I will answer that adequately. On the one hand I can say that even though there were those that suffered under the system, one is not suggesting that as a result everybody was in poverty. There are many, even among those of the disadvantaged and dispossessed, would fall within the definition.

I believe in the spirit of nation building, in the spirit of the reconciliation we've tried to address and bearing in mind the words of our deputy president resent days of his concerns about - if this issue is not addressed properly what could be the consequences.

I believe, yes, I would agreed that it will apply to anybody and everybody.

DR ALLY: In your submission you indicate that there is a legal case still taking place between yourself in Ster Kinekor. Is that correct?

MR MOOSA: Mr Chairman, it is not a legal case. The matter is in the hands of the board and the Minister. Ster Kinekor as you might know, has now been sold to Primedia. This why I said, formerly a subsidiary of SANLAM and Old Mutual, because those, that interest does not lie any more. It's now in the hands of Primedia.

The matter is at present on the desk of the competition board and the Minister. It is not at this point certainly an issue of legality. In other words, we're not in legal - we haven't joined issue. There is an endeavour towards some kind of an amicable resolution to the problem.

Of course if that cannot be achieved then it will depend on how the Minister acts. It will really be determined by the Minister of Trade and Industry. So, we're not in litigation, if that's what you're concerned about. We're not engaged in litigation.

That may arise down the road, but certainly not at this stage.

DR ALLY: Thank you very much, Mr Moosa. I think that probably one of the most startling things in your submission, certainly for me, was when you point at that even although the Apartheid system was - part of it based on this idea of group areas and that within those group areas the business is supposed to be reserved for the particular group to which the group area has been designated, but even within their own system, the greed I suppose of business undermines the very logic and rational of Apartheid.

So that even in an area designated for Indians, Indians are not allowed to own the complexes established, but White business. I think that actually was a very important part of the submission.

Thanks very much.

MR MOOSA: Mr Burg, your permission if I may just amplify the last point made by your learned colleague there.

When I used my example as merely because I had to confine it to the subject I had dealt with, but I must tell you that this applied even in the African Black areas. The same situation in my industry and I would imagine other industries as well.

So it wasn't even unique to - I just used the Indian area example, because this was a real case history. This has happened rapidly otherwise as well.

DR ALLY: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: No further questions? Mr Moosa, thank you very much. I hope you listened to my regret at the beginning that we haven't been able to give more time to groups presenting as well as groups who are not here.

So I accept again your point that I cut you off at that - at different point of your submission.

MR MOOSA: Mr Chairman, I shan't join issue with you on that, but I must say that I have since the slight feeling of disappointment that I've been here for the last three days and I have not experience any other grouping cut off and I found it a bit disappointing.

CHAIRPERSON: The Development Bank of South Africa, please. Dr Goldin, good morning and welcome. Are you going to be by yourself? It's very brave. A new boy in the block and taking all the responsibility.

Mr Golden - Dr Goldin we of course read your very lengthy submission. It goes into, if I remember rightly, almost 40, 50 pages.

Thank you very much for the work that's gone into that. I would like you please to try and stick within the time. I'll try not to interrupt as you're finishing your most important point, but if I have to, I will.

DR ALLY: The oath or the affirmation?

DR GOLDIN: The oath.

DR ALLY: The oath.

DR GOLDIN: (Duly sworn in, states).

DR ALLY: Okay.

CHAIRPERSON: You may begin.

DR GOLDIN: Honourable Chairperson, Commission and ladies and gentlemen. I'm the chief executive of the Development Bank of Southern Africa ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: Ian?

DR GOLDIN: Do you want me to begin again? Chairperson, Honourable Commissioners, ladies and gentlemen. I'm the chief executive of the Development Bank of Southern Africa and have been mandated by the board and the management to present the institution today.

The DBSA supports the TRC and its vision and welcomes this opportunity to present its submission. The submission I will present to you has been put together through a consultative process, involving key stake holders. Inside and outside the institution we have sought to interview those that are prepared to talk.

The process is an ongoing one and the submission I've given to the Commission today is a slight revision from our previous versions.

As I joined the bank 18 months ago in April 1996, the board was appointed by the cabinet in July this year, it should be noted that the views I've put forward are not from first hand experience in most cases.

I will in the short time available touch in three subjects. The context and establishment of the DBSA. Secondly, the relationship between the DBSA and the Apartheid system. Thirdly, the transformation of the DBSA.

The political environment in which the DBSA was established, was that of total onslaught. The manifest failure of the homelands to provide jobs and the mounting economic and politic failures had since at least 1972 prompted economists like Jan Lombaard and others to consider alternative mechanisms of supporting the structures.

At the end of 1982 a new strategy for regional development was announced in which the Development of Bank of Southern Africa played a prominent role. When the bank was established it was viewed and explained at the time largely as part of what was called "Die verligte" or reformed strategy.

The idea was to promote an investment of public and private capital for development purposes. To mobilise funds that had not previously been available to try and support the system which was rapidly collapsing.

The fact that these participating governments were the homelands of Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda and Ciskei, the so-called TBVC states, immediately of course framed the operations of the DBSA within an Apartheid political context.

Although article 9.e of the terms of establishment of the DBSA said it should provide finance and I quote:

The board was constituted to reflect as a spread of private sector professional government interest. It was clear from the very initial stages that this was part of the state's structure and would of course following political lines.

The council of governors of the bank which met twice a year to provide overall strategic direction, was comprised solely of political appointees, nominated by the South African Government and the TBVC states.

From 1983 to 1992, the chief executive and executive chairman of the bank was Dr Simon Brandt. Dr Brandt was formerly the chairperson of P W Botha's economic advisory council.

Given that the TBVC's homelands were regarded as independent countries by the Apartheid Governments, dealings were mainly through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the bank fell under the diplomatic immunities act.

Because of its diplomatic status, it was not subject to the South African judicial system, was exempt from VAT and payroll taxes on its personal remuneration and normal taxes on profits.

This payment exemption amounted to about 20 million rand annual savings. The bank was also exempt from the banking act, the supervision of the Reserve Bank and did not come under the scope of the financial services board.

The authorised capital of the bank was two billion of which the paid in amount was 200 million. South Africa has 66 percent of the voting rights effectively controlling the institution. By South Africa of course I mean what was then considered South Africa. No longer what we would consider White South Africa.

The founding agreement committed the South African Government to providing an annual transfer of funds to the DBSA. These annual contributions were between 160 and 500 million rand per year and by the end of 1994 they had totalled 3,7 billion rand.

The greatest proportion of this money was meant to be passed through to the homelands and from the late 1890's - the late 1980's excuse me, also to the Black local authorities what were called the Black local authorities outside the homelands.

This meant that the DBSA could lend at highly subsidised rates. By 1994 the average spread between the interest rate charts by the DBSA and the commercial rates for similar maturities was about 8 percent. In other words the DBSA was lending at about half of the commercial rates. It has been estimated that in the a (indistinct) - still in the early 1990's the DBSA subsidised the homeland economies to the tune of about 300 million rand a year through these pricing policies.

It also provided a many - a wide range of other functions like technical assistance. Perhaps amongst the most important other functions of the DBSA was the policy work that it was engaged in, because it was receiving such large transfers from Government, it could develop a very large policy function.

This included interventions at the operational level where the bank through, if one believes the documents of the time, applied best practises to its operational appraisals.

Of course, in practise essentials principles of appraisal such as community participation or economic viability were virtually meaningless or at least best highly distorted by the Apartheid policies.

The bank, especially in the late 1980's and early 1990's also engaged an extensive policy formulation in the homelands. In part this was to implement what at the time were effectively structural adjustment programmes in a vain attempt to place homeland finances on a sustainable footing.

With respect to the macro policy work, the DBSA fulfilled functions normally assigned to the Apartheid Government supportive think tanks in Government Departments. Policy work of which a great deal was nationally focuses rather than of direct relevance to DBSA projects, constituted a significant cost to the bank.

It was also, however, a significant contribution of the bank to Government and to the Apartheid system.

If I may turn to the DBSA and Apartheid in other areas. By providing loans to homeland structures, as well as advise to homeland in South African Government officials in the formulation of policy, the bank was an integral part of the system.

It legitimised it and supported it and was part and parcel of the Apartheid gross violation of human rights. Although the bank's leadership in the documents of the time and some of them in interviews, claimed that the bank was modelled on international development institutions, the Apartheid reality meant that its operations and activities remained constrained by and supported the system.

For example, the bank dealt with the TBVC states which were ethically defined in the homeland structures which were its main clients and their officials the main counterparts.

Even in urban area the counterparts of the bank were the discredited urban administrators. The choice of projects was determined by homeland officials or the administrators. Not by the communities themselves. There was no democratic accountability to the communities from the officials.

As the homeland governments had to budget and in most cases guarantee repayments to the DBSA loans, the DBSA required official approval. It did not for the most part operate outside the system.

It was owned by Government. It was staffed by enlarge by individuals who came from Government institutions, especially in the initial years. It continued to warehouse, implement, monitor and evaluate projects which were transferred to it from the Government. It's council, as I have indicated was also pointed by Government.

Although the bank over the period from 1983 to 1994 of course did evolve, as late as 1994 with what was called the inside story which alleged a bank board member and certain staff members criticised the RDP initiative, it was clear that the institution had not totally broken from its Apartheid origins.

In projects the majority of projects which were approved by the bank, applied the so-called development principles within the context of the highly distorted Apartheid economy and the absence of the democratic structures.

The Apartheid framework informed all its projects. At times which the leadership of the time indicate were the exception, not the rule, the DBSA implemented development projects and programmes for explicit political reasons which went beyond the (indistinct) support for the homelands.

For example, there's evidence which suggests direct political and military influence in the DBSA's involvement in the Alexandra urban renewal programme, which was in the state of great unrest at the time.

There are also examples, many of them, of projects financed by the DBSA which, if one may use the phrase, were white elephants, because they were either motivated by homeland policies or economically or technically not sustainable.

Examples of these include of course the projects that were in areas like Jackson and Ndbaza industrial complexes. These would not have been sustainable outside the homeland system.

Despite many suggestive examples and allegations it has not been possible to ascertain the extent of direct political influence on the bank's daily day to day operational activities. The management of the time argue that they were independent and that the DBSA supposedly had a regular system of project assessment involving skilled multi-disciplinary teams.

However, the fact remains that the projects - many of the projects, if not all of them, would not have taken place outside the Apartheid system and clearly that the communities were not generally consulted.

The development bank in the main operated in conformity and support of the political framework that violated human rights. Regardless of those that its helped, it might have maintained reformists views.

As the regional decentralisation programme was implemented, it became clear that the Government alone could not have the resources to finance the system. With the support of the IDC, the SBDC and DBSA and others, industries were being established and people were being relocated to where they should never have been.

This depended on continued Government subsidies and enforcement of pass laws and the many other legislative and other forms of control in the Apartheid system. In addition unionisation of labour in these areas was actively repressed.

Within the bank itself it is evident from the personnel records that the management and staffing for the most part reflected racially discriminatory employment practises, especially in initial years after the formation of the bank.

Evidence of this is that Blacks and women were engaged in lower grades and portfolios than their White male counterparts. Whites compromised the majority of staff, particular at middle and top management positions and as late as 1992 only seven percent of management positions were held by Black people or women.

By early 1990's attempts were beginning to be made to address nominees and apply affirmative action policies, but the bank continued to have a very low use of Black consultants and as I've indicated, representation in management.

If I may turn finally to the transformation of the bank. The water shed event in the history of the DBSA was the announcement in December 1994 by the then deputy Minister of Finance, Alec Irwin, of the formation of a transformation team under the chairmanship of Prof Nkushlu.

This had a mandate to advise the Minister on the process of transforming the DBSA into a new, more focused development finance institution, in line with the new South Africa.

The report tabled in May 1995, identified critical areas which needed to be changed, including the mandate institutional restructuring, human resource management and restructuring of the loan book.

The following, my appointment in April 1996, through a process which included 41 task teams and a highly participative process, the restructuring has occurred.

The Development Bank of Southern Africa act in April 1997 put a legal stamp on the transformation. It has confirmed the DBSA's role as a financier of infra-structure with a development purpose.

This repositions the bank from its past role of funding a wide range of sectors. The mission of the bank is to facilitate the provision of infra-structure or development finance in order to improve the quality of life of the people of South and Souther Africa.

The new mandate is focused on infra-structure and particularly water and sanitation, energy, roads, transport and telecommunications.

Where as the bank previously received annual subsidies from Government it has since 1995 become entirely self-sustaining financially. It gets no money from Government what so ever.

It is also committed to pay tax and to ensure sustainability has increased its interest rate and sharply increased its cost effectiveness. Lowering overhead costs, increasing staff productivity and applying best international development business practises is a priority for the new management and board.

Internally the bank has undergone a fundamental transformation to meet the strategic challenges more effectively. The organisational systems and structures had been changed. The management hierarchies have been reduced, the number of managers reduced from 65 to 24. Business units have been created and closely aligned with the client's needs.

Assertive steps have been put in place to empower staff and ensure fair and acquittal employment practises. Gender and affirmative action issues are specifically emphasized and currently 75 percent of the management team are from previously excluded groups as compared, as I indicated, to 7 percent in 1992.

The recently completed anomalies exercise sought in a joint management and staff initiative to identify the race and gender discrimination which had been suffered by staff and we allocated an amount this year of two million rands towards compensating staff for past discrimination.

We will also be as a carry through of this be allocating three point five million rand a year in future years to ensure that there's absolutely no race or gender discrimination in the bank in the future.

A new board was appointed by the cabinet in July 1997 and includes private sector and community stake holders as well as three director generals to ensure the interest of key constituencies and stake holders are reflected. The governor of the bank is the Minister of Finance.

The bank has one of the riches multi-disciplinary development skill bases in the country. Our challenge is to ensure it is effectively mobilised in the national interest. The bank's internal transformation has facilitated a virtual doubling of our activities and productivity while at the same time we have re-aligned our human resource and business practises.

The bank exists in order to contribute to a better life for all and especially previously disadvantaged groups in South Africa and the Sadec region.

Since 1994 we have invested over four billion rand in RDP and economic infra-structure in South Africa. In addition we have supported the transformation of South Africa in a wide variety of capacity building and other activities. On behalf of Government we've implemented the NUF job creation programme, which created 18 000 jobs, sorry (indistinct) of jobs.

We are housing the spacial development initiatives (indistinct) of farmers and engage in a wide range of other activities which mobilise our skills both financial and human in support of Government and transformation.

The chore business of the bank however, is infra-structure development. Given the needs which are estimated conservatively at over 175 billion rand, we are striving to achieve more and to be a catalyst in support of private and public sector interventions.

We are engaged in partnerships with the national, provincial and local governments at all levels and other development finance institutions as well as the private sector to overcome the enormous back logs.

This year we expect our board to approve over three billion rand of investments in infra-structure, compared to two billion rand last year and one billion rand in 1995. This reflects and extremely rapid growth in our activities despite the fact that at the same time we are down sizing, reducing our costs and have become financially independent.

Alongside our funding we are seeking also to mobilise at least an equal amount of co-funding from public and private sources. Our aim is to do what we can within our mandate and while ensuring we are financially sustainable to contribute to the provision of basic RDP and economic infra-structure.

In conclusion. The bank was established in the dying decade of Apartheid as an outcome of the conjuncture of total onslaught - as what was called total onslaught, economic imperatives and the search for alternative Apartheid development strategies.

It aimed to provide an economic (indistinct) to the homelands and to regional decentralisation. A number of those interviewed claimed that they contributed to the reform of Apartheid. However, whatever the views of individual managers or staff, it is clear that the bank supported the Apartheid system, especially the homeland structures.

The bank contributed very significant amounts of money an policy guidance to Apartheid structures and undoubtedly was part of and contributed to the system and its gross violations of human rights.

The present board and management of the bank cannot speak for those that led the bank in the Apartheid period. However, we firmly believe that the Apartheid system was a gross violation of human rights and acknowledge that DBSA was an integral part of the Apartheid system in the period from 1983 to 1994.

For this the current board and management unreservedly apologises. The bank, since 1994, has undergone a fundamental transformation. This has put it in a position to contribute to overcoming its own and the country's Apartheid legacy, both in South Africa and the Sadec region. I thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Dr Goldman.

REV FINCA: Mr Golden, I hear from your submission that you are in fact part of the new face of DBSA so you will not be able to assist with the problem of what happened in the past which we are dealing with in this hearing.

I will ask just a few general questions, but before I do, could I perhaps just comment you for the manner in which you have taken a position where you feel you must apologise for things that you were yourself not responsible for.

When there are people in this country who were directly responsible and do not feel so moved, we comment you for that.

I don't know whether you've seen the submission which had been made by a certain Mondesemema to the TRC. He is a former financial specialist of the DBSA. In that submission he makes very serious allegations of gross corruption which he says happened in the DBSA.

Will you care to comment on that and to just - we will make our own decision, but just to give us an indication whether you'd consider that this is a matter that is worth being taken seriously by the Commission and being referred to the President for enquiry if it's necessary?

DR GOLDMAN: Thank you, Chairperson. I will to the best of our understanding from looking at the evidence respond to the question. I have not seen the submission by Mr Mondesemema, but I am aware from other documents which I've seen which he showed to me after my arrival at the bank; I believe of the general issues that are of concern to him.

If I'm correct, he's main concern is concerning this so-called inside story, particularly in the period 1994 to 1995 and I'm not sure if that is what is being referred to in the documents referring to.

From what I, in my personal assessment have been able to ascertain, there were certain individuals in the bank, as I've indicated including on the board and in management, who might have said some things which I certainly would strongly disagreed with about the RDP.

I have not been able to follow up with the person on the board. He has not responded to any of my attempts to contact him and has long since left the bank and the board.

The staff - the managers concerned and other staff concerned I have spoken to about the allegations and their view is that they were taken out of context. I do believe that it is inevitable in an institution where a large number of staff certainly did support the Apartheid system, that one would not expect the staff to change over night, their spots, however they might declare it.

I firmly believe that from 1994 the institution have been in line with the RDP. I have spoken about this matter. Also with the Minister of RDP, Jay Naidoo, and he has indicated that he did not consider the bank to be undermining the RDP in a significant way, although he was aware that certain individuals might have been attempting to do so.

As to corruption, I have not become aware in any of the evidence that I have looked at of gross corruption within the bank. We have an internal audit function, we have risk management committees and as far as I'm - and of course it has always been externally audited by external auditors.

As far as I'm aware there's never been an uncovering of gross corruption. I am aware of course that the homelands were grossly corrupt and therefore we were lending to grossly corrupt institutions. How one tallies these two different things, I cannot say, but as far as I'm aware within the institution itself, our control structures, our audit trails and so on have been in order over this time and that there's been no significant gross corruption as far as I'm aware.

REV FINCA: Thank you, Mr Golden. The second question is directly linked to your comments about the homelands. It is not clear to some of us the - how the relationship is structured between DBSA and its manifestations in the homelands.

I know that in Transkei they used to be TDC. Was there a direct relationship with DBSA? Is there a level of accountability for - in DBSA for what happened in those Bantu (indistinct) manifestations.

MR GOLDEN: Thank you, Chair. I believe there was a very direct relationship at a number of levels. At a financial level the DBSA was a major funder of the homelands. Sometimes the tap was turned off and sometimes it was turned on and that of course is something we'd like to understand much better as well. How that related to political pressures and so on.

There was also as I've indicated, a very strong policy dimension where the bank staff provided policy advice to the homeland governments or to sub-structures within the homeland governments like the development corporations that were established.

So, I believe that both at the economic level and at the policy level, there were very strong connections. I don't know if you'd like me to elaborate on this, Chair?

REV FINCA: Not really. I think that's sufficient.

On page 17 of your main submission, paragraph five, you deal with the funding of projects and you say at times which the leadership of the time says were the exception, not the rule, the DBAS implemented development projects and programmes for political reasons.

In the perception of a number of people it will be the opposite. It will be - it appears to us to have been the rule rather than the exception that the DBSA was politically motivated in its funding. Again going back to Bantu (indistinct) area where I come from, it seemed to be the order of the day that those who were aligned to the Government, those who supported Bantu stand authorities, those who were related, those who were friends, those who were girl friends, those who were vocal in support of (indistinct), qualified for loans and those who were in opposition, most of the time failed to qualify.

Is it true that this was an exception rather than the rule?

MR GOLDEN: Chair, I do not say this was the exception and not the rule. This was the views of those that I interviewed.

As I've tried to indicate, the whole framework of the DBSA and perhaps each and every project must be viewed in the political context and it would be difficult, I believe, to find any projects which would have taken place outside the homeland system or the homeland structures.

I believe the institution and all its activities were framed by the political context and particularly the support for the homelands. However, it is also true that there is, for example, an operational manual and I did read the article of agreement which specifically indicates that there should not be direct political motivation in the choice of projects.

I think this is the sort of Alice in Wonderland situation which we see in so much of the Apartheid system; that the system is totally framed politically and is a abuse of human rights, but within it people are trying to operate or said they're trying to operate in what they considered to be rational ways and even in the case of the DBSA they said they were applying those practise and believed it in many cases I think.

So it is a contradiction. I believe that the projects were all politically motivated myself in a broad sense, because they supported a political motivated system. So, I also do know that the choice of projects of course because there was no democracy was not democratically constituted and determined by those that there were meant to be the recipients.

So, clearly the leadership of the homelands, the officials who had to sign off on these projects and in the end the Goverment's had to guarantee them, I believe, would have made the key decisions.

REV FINCA: My last question, Chairperson, is on the question of border industries. You have not dealt with this question in your main submission.

I don't whether it is because DBSA was not directly involved in border industries or whether you do not perhaps see that they linked up any way with the violation of human rights in the way in which they operated?

MR GOLDEN: Thank you, Chair. Please correct if I'm wrong, but I think projects like the Dimbaza and Fort Jackson projects were indeed border industry type projects which we supported as indicated in the paper.

I believe we did support particularly in the provision of infra-structure a wide range of border industries. I would see that as an absolute integral part of the bank's functions in that period.

As I indicated we also did this in conjunction with the wide variety of other institutions like the IDC which had the industrial function, the SBDC for small enterprises and so on.

So, I believe there was a set of parastatal institutions which worker together. I certainly believe, I can speak only for the DBSA, that that was part and parcel of the system and was certainly part and parcel of support for Apartheid and the gross violation of human rights.

REV FINCA: Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Dr Ally?

DR ALLY: Dr Goldin, you locate the establishment and the origin of the bank in what you call a conjuncture of the total strategy on the one hand and the attempts at reform and that the bank was an integral part of that, particularly its role in the homelands.

What, from your knowledge of the research you may have done, was the role of the private sector of big corporations in this initiative? What kind of involvement if any did they have with the Development Bank?

DR GOLDIN: Chair, if I may speak from my more general rather than my DBSA knowledge, I believe that an essential part of the strategy was to try and mobilise resources from wherever they may come to try and save these crumbling economies from total collapse and that that certainly involved co-funding with the private sector.

Indeed, it's in the articles of agreement of the DBSA that they should seek co-funding from other sources. I know that the investors in the decentralised or whatever one calls them, industrial occasions, were for the most part private investors.

We know that the location of much of industry, for example, around the Eastern Cape and other areas is determined by those sort of set of factors which influenced location, not only through the DBSA and (indistinct) institutions, but through tax breaks, repression of trade unions and all the other sets of factors which forced those low weight economies to be attractive for private investment.

So, I believe the private sector was an integral part of the system and if I may speak in my personal capacity, I certainly believe that it has much to account for in this.

DR ALLY: Just to continue from again your general knowledge, would you say that the private sector was conscious of some of the political motivations behind these kinds of initiatives or was it because this was a good deal?

DR GOLDIN: Well, good deals and political consciousness, I would have thought goes hand in hand. It's very difficult to be a good business if you're unaware of the society you're operating in . So, I think people knew what they were doing.

DR ALLY: One of the important issues to emerge from these hearing, and I'm sure it's going to be something that will continue for a long time, is obviously the question of reparations, given the injustices and inequities and inequalities of the past.

Now, ...(tape ends)

DR ALLY: ... must have gained some insight into the ravishes of the past of what the consequences of the Apartheid system and particularly its economic component, what the consequences of that has been for the vast majority of people.

Do you perhaps want to make some sort of general comments on the costs for the majority of people and some of the issues that are questions of reparations in order to be - seem to be really addressing these issues as opposed to simply ameliorating some of them?

DR GOLDIN: Thank you, Chair. As to the costs, I don't believe that we will ever begin to grasp the cost of the system and that's why it is a gross violation of human rights. The costs particularly to the deaths of people, their family's destruction - of family destruction of life, destruction of opportunity for the people of this country, is unquantifiable.

One can begin to look at in economic terms, the destruction in terms of the economy, the refocussing of the economy and we live with the legacy of that today which is why we can't grow faster and why we can't do more.

It's obviously beyond a huge number. It's what we're all living and grappling with in all of our lives and trying to reconstruct and transform the economy.

Not only of course of South Africa, but of the region and the DBSA is now a bank that covers the 14 countries of Sadec and often what we're grappling is South Africa's destructive force in the region.

As to reparations, we believe that the most we can do or the most focused thing we can do is to ensure that this institution, the DBSA, runs as fast as it can to try and meet the huge back logs which exist in South Africa and in the region for RDP and economic infra-structure.

We will do all we can without drawing on Government resources which have to be prioritised for other purposes to maximise investment in our mandated area which is infra-structure.

We believe in doing so and by listening to the needs of the people as to what their priorities are, because we know that not all their priorities will be met. We will be doing what we can to overcome the legacy of the past.

Within the organisation a fundamental transformation which we are undertaking, not only through affirmative action, the policies, not only through the anomalies exercised which we've allocated these amounts of money that I've indicated for, but recreating an institution which gives people a learning opportunity.

An opportunity to give back to society what society has taken away from people. I believe that is the form of reparations that we as an institution can take.

Because we are not taking back and because we are getting no subsidy, because we will be paying taxes and dividends, in a sense what we are doing is transferring the subsidy that was given to the institution in the past, for good use in the future on the strength of our balance sheet.

That of course in a sense is, one may interpret, as a form of transfer from the Apartheid system to the new system. I don't know if you'd like to say more than this, but I think the biggest thing we can do is to help change people's lives for the better in everywhere we can.

DR ALLY: Thank you. The last question. The involvement of the private sector presently in the Development Bank; the same, less, more enthusiastic? What's your experiences as to its role in the past?

DR GOLDIN: As you may be aware we have an ongoing, I should say, relationship with the private sector. We believe that we can mobilise private sector funds, both South African and foreign for the use of RDP infra-structure and economic infra-structure in South Africa and the region.

Given the back log and it's probably 200 or more billion rand, we have to bring all the resources and all the skills we have in the region and internationally to bear on the problem.

We want to be a catalyst. We want to support the private sector in investment and infra-structure. We want to support the public sector. What is crucial is that we do this on terms which we believe are acceptable; that the corporate government, that their countability ethics, that the democratic ethics which inform our appraisal principles, inform those of anyone co-funds with us.

We will be and are continuing to work with different private investors to see how we can maximise their contribution in these areas.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Dr Goldin, you may step down.

I ask the representatives of Tongaat-Hulett to come forward, please.

Good morning, gentlemen. Sir, could you please introduce your delegation to us first.

MR SAVAGE: Thank you, Chairperson and members of the Commission. It is our pleasure to be here this morning and thank you for inviting us.

On my right I have Mr Chris Saunders, a very well known businessman in South Africa. Chris Saunders has been with our company for more than 43 years. His family, in fact, has been associated with us and in fact founded the company some 105 years ago.

On my left I have Mr JB Makwasa. JB has been with the company for 22 years. JB is an executive director of the group and apart from his many responsibilities, he is chairman of Corobrick.

Myself, group managing director, being in (indistinct) management for 20 years in the company and have really dealt with many of the nuts and bolts of the issues that the TRC is dealing with and we'll be dealing with today.

I might say, Chairperson, members of the Commission, unlike some of the other presentations, we have been with - dealing with the issues for more than 20 years and we do hold ourselves fully accountable for what has happened; that's the good, the bad and the indifferent.

CHAIRPERSON: Sir, can I stop you before you go on, because we still need to take the oath. We've asked Tongaat-Hulett to come today to talk specifically not about your entire company, but about the cultural sector and that's the area that you're going to be concentrating on and the involvement of Tongaat in that sector.

Are you going to be making the presentation and are you going to be the only person speaking?

MR SAVAGE: Yes, Dr Randera and I will be directing the questions and I will make the initial submission.

CHAIRPERSON: So would you all stand to take the oath or affirmation then?

DR ALLY: The oath or the affirmation?

MR SAVAGE: The oath.

DR ALLY: The oath.

MR SAVAGE, CHRIS SAUNDERS, JB MAKWASA: (Duly sworn in, states).

DR ALLY: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You may proceed.

MR SAVAGE: Thank you, Chairperson, members of the Commission, once again for this opportunity to present the Tongaat-Hulett group submission to the TRC.

Before I have done the introductions and also Dr Randera, the detail back ground information concerning the company has been given to members of the Commission at the time of the submission.

So, I don't intend spending much time on the company's business here, other than to say very briefly it is involved in seven basic industries of sugar, building materials, foods, aluminium, starch and glucose, textiles and property. So, it's a wildly diverse supply group. All the manufacturing divisions are subject to international competition and exports are a major component of the business.

The group is currently one of the leading long term investors in South Africa. We are committed to South Africa and we're confident in the future of South Africa and in this regard we have recently committed more than three billion rands in the installation of new production facilities. That's in fixed assets.

The group employees more than 20 000 people in South African and over 10 000 people in Zimbabwe. It also has interest in Mozambique. Trade unions are well established and the company currently has 43 formally recognition agreements with 19 unions.

So, it's a company that has width and depth. Moving now to the submission itself. It is essentially the product of work done recently by a committee of which I was chairman. The committee comprised 18 people with a wide range of responsibilities and experience within the group and included some of the group's top Black executives.

Resource was also made to retired managers and records of public speeches made by executives. I should say that the exercise itself, members of the Committee, was not without emotion. In fact it was an emotional experience and it ended up being both a (indistinct) and team strengthening exercise.

Chairperson, the group believes that it is not - it has not been responsible for any gross violations of human rights as defined in terms of the TRC act. There were, however, isolated instances of ill treatment of employees, for example by individual supervisors.

There were also instances in the past 30 years were management was guilty of condoning discrimination and discomfort through for example, application of Apartheid's job reservation and the imposition of separate amenities.

My own experience has been that in each case where any unfair incident was brought to the attention of group executives, corrective action was taken. Whites were fired due to the ill treatment of Blacks.

So, unfair incidents did take place and for these we are sorry and for these we apologise. In retrospect it is clear that business in general, including the group, could have done more to hasten the demise of Apartheid. Even though it is well recorded that the group publicly opposed Apartheid for many years, with perfect hind sight its opposition could have been stronger.

The group of course, is a public company and as such it had to act within the ambit of the law and I'm not giving this as an excuse. It has been used before, but as a fact.

There were instances in the mid 1980's, for example, when the group was requested to stop paying taxes as a means of protest. It was felt at the time the group could not do this without substantial backing of other businesses and that was sorely lacking at the time.

On the question of where the business benefitted from Apartheid, the group believes that it actually suffered as a result of Apartheid. For example, through the isolation of South Africa within the international economy. Bear in mind the group is big in exports. The over regulation of social life and constraints on the labour market as well as the poor standards of Black education and the political and social instability and unrest.

There was no doubt in the minds of executives that the group would have been more successful than it is, had it not been for the penalties of Apartheid.

Chairperson, over the years executives of the group, including the three of us here, have devoted considerable energies and time in the pursuit of socio-political change in South Africa.

This has been done through inter-alia, participating in the leadership of organisations such as Urban Foundation, SACOB, the Corporate Forum, USALEP and the Consultants of Business Movement. More recently of course the NBI business against crime and countless other initiatives.

But other initiatives at that time aimed about bringing reform in which group executives participated, were the Buthelezi Commission, that's 1980, 1982, the KwaZulu Natal Indaba, 1986 and the Tongaat-Hulett planning forum, 1989.

Various conferences both in South Africa and abroad on the need for political change were also tendered, for example, the meeting of business leaders and the UDF and COSATU in Broederstroom in August 1988.

Now, this was an illegal meeting where the executives, including myself, were subjected to imprisonment, but that meeting resulted in the formation of a consultative business movement.

I'm pleased to see in that regard, Chairperson, many familiar faces from that meeting, including Dr Boraine and (indistinct).

It has been suggested by some that the group's support for the Buthelezi Commission and the KwaZulu Natal Indaba might have inferred a political alignment. This support however was unrelated to party politics. At that time it was motivated by a deep concern of the group and by leaders in the community that the then Minister of Constitutional Development, Mr Heunis, and the Natal Provincial Administration, were attempting to enforce unjust and unworkable geo-political divisions upon the province.

Some unions also believed that the group was sympathetic to specific political parties. The conflict between the IFP and the UDF throughout the 1980's inflicted unique circumstances on business operating in the area.

In most of the group's plants the allegiance workers was clearly divided between the political forces and employers could not be seen to be siding with either party. It was because the group was never allied to any political party that at different stages it receive both compliments and criticisms from other political parties.

I should say that the group's geographic situation in KwaZulu Natal placed special responsibilities on it and it continues to do so. I've got many cases of these which I could - if we had time we could go through.

But I would like to see - I would like to mention, Chairperson, that one incident comes to mind and that was the time when the group chairman and myself and another prominent businessman in KwaZulu Natal personally facilitated a meeting between the president and Buthelezi before the election.

We believe it was that key meeting where we personally met the president in Johannesburg, convinced him of the need and the timing of the meeting to take place, it was that meeting that we believe was instrumental in KwaZulu Natal coming into the elections.

As I say it's because of our size and our location we have responsibilities in that region. Now, with regard to labour relations, group executives have played pioneering role in the Wiehahn Commission.

In fact JB Makwasa was a leading member of that. That was in the late '70's and by the time trade unions for Black employees were recognised in law, the group had already accepted the employee rights of freedom of association, of representation, of collective bargaining, of training and development and the right to strike.

The Tongaat-Hulett was the regional business leader in the signing of recognition agreements with the emerging unions.

Now, throughout the '80's many operations in the group was severely effected by political violence. This caused stayaways, high levels of absenteeism, employees being killed in the violence and it seems (indistinct) to say consequential loss in productivity and business. It seems (indistinct) to say that, but that was a fact.

Sometimes the continued violence led to the group deciding to withdraw from certain business operations as was the case at Hebok textile mill at Hammersdale. In the 1980's in Pietermaritzburg, Hulett-aluminium lost 15 employees, killed in political violence and during that time many employees used to sleep at work in order to be safe.

At Hambanati, a township located near Tongaat, violence also erupted. This had tragic consequences for many employees and once again, (indistinct) to say, clearly disrupted business.

The groups, rather in trying to deal with this unstable environment is well documented and is also evidence in the participation by many of its executives including the three of us here in trying to mediate between the factions.

Chairperson, earlier this year and arising from a TRC investigation in the Durban area, concerning confessions made by security police, a body was exhumed in the grounds of a house owned and rented out by the group to the South African Police.

At that time, to give some back ground, the group owned more than 4 000 houses, residential houses and was letting out 300 houses to the public. Now, I'm saying that not to distract from this appalling incident.

It was raised by the TRC, brought to our attention, a thorough investigation was carried out by the group and a full report was submitted to the TRC in Durban.

A copy of that full report has also been submitted to the TRC sitting here today. The reply from Commissioner

Richard Lyster, dated 18th of April of this year, stated and I quote:

Moving onto the issue of land. While the group - while the very nature of its core business has relatively large areas of agricultural and industrial land, it also has been a victim of large scale racially motivated expropriations.

Areas exploited by the Government included KwaMashu and later Phoenix. Phoenix was to accommodate the resident who had been forcibly removed from (indistinct). During the 1980's however, the group successfully opposed the expropriation of thousands of hectares of land under racially motivated Government plans that compensations at Shenembi and the Umthloti Valley.

It also opposed the implementation of group areas in Tongaat in 1965. The group's view is that land should always be put to the most productive and economically rational use.

In this context it has for example promoted Black entrepreneurship into small and medium scale farming and has initiated the development of lower income housing on its land.

The conclusion ... (intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: You have two more minutes.

MR SAVAGE: Thank you. In conclusion, Chairperson, may I say that the historical record of the group confirms opposition to Apartheid in pursuing a more enlarged approach than many other business, it is now proud of the fact that it employs more than 340 qualified Black graduate and diplomates and the majority of skilled and supervisory posts are occupied by Blacks.

Our resources of services to facilitate Black economic empowerment was valued at some 200 million rands last year and is estimated to be 300 million rands this year. Already three percent of after tax profits are expanded on affirmative action programmes and quality of life programmes already.

It is planned to allocate an amount equal to four percent of the group's annual payroll to (indistinct) of that it 32 million rands a year. The payroll is 800 million rands a year. It has planned to put four percent of this into training and development and many substantial grants on top of this have been made to socially deserving causes.

Finally, Chairperson, probably the most important contribution that the Tongaat-Hulett group can make to the greater society in the future, is to remain a world class business in order to survive economically and grow successfully.

Simply put, if we are not successful in business, we will not have anything to offer. You may be interested to know, that today through the payment of wages and salaries to our employees, and taxes paid, the group is contributing an excess of one billion rands a year to the public good.

May I conclude then by saying if the work of this Commission resulting from the business sector hearing can prevent the evils of the past reoccurring, we believe, the three of us here, that this exercise will have proved a valuable contribution to South Africa and the future. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Savage. Rev Finca?

REV FINCA: Thank you, Chair. Your submission, Mr Savage deals primarily with your agricultural work as requested by the Commission, but I'm grateful that you have dealt also with the - what you call an appalling incident which shocked so many in this country when the bones of Mr Meweni were dug in your property.

I know that you said that the Durban office of the Commission is handling this matter and we may not want to delve on it long, here, but I just want to raise a general question with you.

How would you describe your relationship with the security police in the Apartheid period?

MR SAVAGE: I think it's a very good question and after making three comments I'm going to ask JB Makwasa to help answer that.

But there's no doubt about it. You might have had the impression also, after having to deal with so much violence as you've had to deal with, of opposing factions in KwaZulu Natal, the police, the South African - now, I'm not talking about the security police, the South African Police played a very important role and there's no doubt that our own security police within the Government, within the company were close to them. There's no doubt about that. They had to be.

When we had massive disruptions and as we went up that learning curvy over a period of about fifteen years, we learned and the police learned that when there was disruption, they would then keep a low profile.

In the early days they kept - they were right up front and that inflamed the whole situation. So there was close - there was no doubt, there was close contact. Not only with the police, the managers of security in our group, but also the other companies in KwaZulu Natal. There was close contact.

Now, with regard to security police, that's another issue altogether. As I said whilst we knew we were letting this one house of 300 houses being let out at the time, to the SA police and I'd like to add we are continuing to let houses to the Sa police at the moment. It's under new dispensation, but we still continue to let houses to the new South African police.

We weren't aware of the fact that it - that he was a security policeman, but JB Makwasa has also done a full investigation to this and JB maybe you'd like to add to it.

MR MAKWASA: Thank you, Chairperson. I think the issue is actually quite critical. The issue of the relationship between Tongaat-Hulett group and the security police.

At the meetings held in May this year, between Tongaat-Hulett group management and the KwaZulu leadership of COSATU and the ANC, the issue of perceived coalition between Tongaat-Hulett group security department and the South African police particularly the period of state security, was raised.

Then, subsequent to that, we carried out an investigation to try and get to grips with this issue. As far as it can be ascertained, there was no active coalition between the security police - between the security departments within the Tongaat-Hulett group and the security police of the state.

Company security personnel did however liaise with the police in the normal course of their duty and this included contact with the security branch of the state.

Whilst we were doing this investigation, we also became aware of the fact that at some stage the head of the security personnel within Tongaat-Hulett group, a Mr Jan Steenkamp, who has since retired, was in fact a member of the military before he joined Tongaat-Hulett groups and that in fact he had a brother who was associated with the bureau of state security in South Africa.

However, there was no indication that that relationship at any (indistinct) with what was taking place within Tongaat-Hulett group.

Thank you, Chairperson.

REV FINCA: With the benefit of hind sight, after having listened to the testimonies that have come through the Truth Commission hearings, do you think that it is appropriate in your letter that you actually - in your letter to Richard Lyster, you say that the properties - you have rented out properties to a wide range of individuals, families and institutions, such as church groups, schools, hospitals, police, defence force, etcetera.

I mean, with the benefit of hind sight, would you put the activities of the security police on the same level as the other institutions that you are referring to?

MR SAVAGE: No ... (intervention).

REV FINCA: Let me just come back to this question again. Is this just an isolated incident? Can we have just an isolated incident or was there in fact a practice of having a number of these people actually operating within your properties?

MR SAVAGE: I can categorically say it was an isolated incident and there was no conscious efforts of our company to collude with illegal activities with the security police. We can say that categorically. The reason I gave as a back ground the number of houses that we let out, the 300 houses, that fact that we let them out to contractors, church groups, schools, teachers, a wide range; was to indicate the range of people.

It wasn't meant to indicate that we viewed the security police on the same value system as the other tenants. But we were appalled, we were absolutely appalled by the incident.

REV FINCA: Just a last question. Did you attempt to reach out to the Neweni family on this matter? I know that we're told yesterday that the business of business is business, it's not to show compassion and have moral values attached to these things, but it's such an appalling incident as you've said it.

Did you do anything to reach out to the family?

MR MAKWASA: Chairperson, that question has actually occupied our minds to a very great extent and one finds one self as an organisation trapped within the interpretations and the perceptions that can't be given on an incident of this nature.

Would any extension or showing of good hand by Tongaat-Hulett group be considered and seen as an admission of guilt, which there is a good body of people who would interpret that the Tongaat group felt it was clean, his hands are clean on this issue, it would have not have extended this hand.

The human side in terms of our value systems also is saying, so what if there's those kinds of interpretations. The position where we find ourselves right now is that we don't know whether the matter has been concluded or not, because we are still expecting that those people who came to confess to the TRC might be called upon to say more about this issue and also to the question that Cedric answered as to say are we absolutely sure that this was an isolated incident?

One can only say with the information that is available to us right now, in terms of the investigation that we carried, we are absolutely sure that that was an isolated incident, but being in South Africa and knowing South Africa to what it has been, I would not be surprised and we would not be surprised if anything came up.

We don't know. We were appalled and it was the first time that we become aware of that activity. So it is a vexing question. We would like to assist - seek assistance in seeing our way through the question.

Are we expected to extend a word - I mean a hand to the Neweni family? We are not sure what to do.

DR BORAINE: Chairperson, just a comment on this. I have to say that I find the reply totally unacceptable. I'm astonished at the quality of the presentation and the framework of which I know this company to be working in; that there should be any hesitation at all in extending a hand of assistance to people who suffered grievously, not at the hands of your company, but on your property.

I would hope very much that there will be, in the spirit of your own presentation, a reaching out without any delay. Thank you.

MR SAVAGE: Dr Boraine, thank you for that comment and it has been noted.

REV FINCA: Just to move onto a different area. Your company has depended in the past, if I'm correct, on the labour of - drawn mainly from Pondoland.

MR SAVAGE: Sorry, I didn't hear on that.

REV FINCA: I was just checking if I'm right in saying that the bulk of the labour that you've used in your sugar plantation has come from Pondoland.

MR SAVAGE: Migrant labour? Yes.

REV FINCA: Can you perhaps sketch us - sketch for us just very briefly a picture of how you recruited the people from Pondoland, the working conditions under which they laboured and the housing conditions in particular under which they lived whilst they were in your employ?

A person who grew up in Natal, there is a general perception that the people who came in to work at the sugar plantations, they worked under very terrible conditions.

MR SAVAGE: Thank you, Chairperson. It is the sole question of migrant labour and either one of us could answer it, but JB Makwasa was involved in industrial relations for many years.

JB, could I ask you to deal with this?

MR MAKWASA: Thank you, Chairperson. I mean once again the question of migrant labour is a question that has applied the gross mind for a number of years and perhaps it is important to understand how we come to have migrant labour.

The sugar industry by its very - by the very nature of the raw material that it requires, operates in the rural areas, one, and then secondly, we have found that the local people are reluctant to work in agriculture and we have therefore been forced to go and recruit outside KwaZulu Natal as it were.

Over the years one of the vexing questions have been the conditions of employment in agriculture. One of those conditions of employment in agriculture has been housing. We are coming from a history of hostels if a - which we would not be ashamed to admit that if you go back in the early '60's, the early '70's, the conditions were not the conditions that we would be proud of and through that realisation we have tried to improve the conditions of housing for the employment - for the employees in agriculture.

We would not sit here and say that we have the best conditions, but we will be saying that there are efforts in terms of trying to improve these conditions.

One must also bear in mind that it was not just the housing of the employees in hostels are not just in agriculture only. It was in the industrial sector as well. We're sitting now, we would say we have done it far better than perhaps we could have done in agriculture and besides that some of the houses that we are now putting on the land are in a - would be occupied by families as time goes on.

So we are making a lot of improvements as far as housing within the Tongaat-Hulett group is concerned.

We wouldn't say here that we are perfect, but we are putting a lot of effort in that regard.

MR SAVAGE: Yes, can I just add to that to give a slightly different perspective. This migrant labour is seasonal labour. It's therefor six to seven months maximum a year. So, then they go back to their areas of origin, mostly Northern Natal or Transkei.

Transkei is a big provided of seasonal migrants to the sugar industry. It does raise this issue of single sex hostels, by enlarge they have been phased out into flats, but on the other hand it has in the past been a convenient way of providing accommodation for seasonal migrants.

It's not permanent.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. I'll take one more question from Dr Ally.

DR ALLY: Thanks, Chairperson. Your submission raises again the classic dilemma that this hearing has been faced with throughout. That's on the one hand businesses which have made submissions to say repeatedly that Apartheid was actually negatively (indistinct). It was deleterious and you say that yourself.

Yet, we have an economic system which is dominated by Whites and a social economic system in which Whites enjoy a very high standard of living.

So there is a need to try and understand that situation now. That is - that dilemma is capture, I think, in a statement which you make in your submission, now which I'm going to ask you to comment on against that back drop.

You say the core business of your group depends on land, especially in its earlier stages and you needed to acquire land over the years in order to grow and to secure your status as a leading sugar producer in a globally competitive arena.

Today the group owns more than 45 000 hectares of agricultural land and industrial land which is quite substantial, but then you say it is not owned land in an unfair manner within a racial discriminatory framework of legislation.

Now, how's it possible to make that statement if it's not owned land in an unfair manner, within a racially discriminatory framework against the back drop of the colonial wars, because your company stretched way back.

Against numerous other laws that were passed with regard to land ownership, the 1930 land act, the 1936 act again, the group areas act and the Bantu stand policy.

What challenges that pose